Dividen, Hutang, dan Kepemilikan Institusional di Pasar Modal Indonesia: Pengujian Teori Keagenan

Teguh Prasetyo


Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji teori keagenan di pasar modal Indonesia dengan variabel proksi mekanisme pengendalian konflik keagenan yakni kebijakan dividen, hutang dan kepemilikan institusional. Data adalah data panel (pooleddata) dengan periode pengamatan dari tahun 2004-2010. Metode analisis yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah uji analisis regresi berganda dan uji analisis regresi Two-Stages Least Square (TSLS). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan dividen berpengaruh positif terhadap kinerja. Hutang berpengaruh negatif terhadap kinerja.Kepemilikan institusional berpengaruh positif terhadap kinerja. Secara simultan hubungan antara ketiga model tidak signifikan. Akan tetapi, hubungan antara dividen dan hutang signifikan. Artinya, dividen dapat menggantikan hutang begitu juga sebaliknya untuk mengontrol konflik keagenan.

This study aims to test theagency theory in Indonesian capital market wasproxiedbythe theagency conflicts controlling mechanism which are dividends, debtand institution alownership.The data is pooled data with the observation period from the year 2004-2010. The method of analysis used in this study is multiple regression analysis, and Two-Stages Least Square (2SLS). The results showthe dividend has a positive effect on performance an debt has negative effect. More over, institution alownership  has a positive effect on performance. Meanwhile, Simultaneously relationship between the three models are not significant. However, the relationship between dividends and debt significant. It means that dividends can replace debt andvice versato control the agency conflict.


Dividends; Debt; Institutional Ownership; Agency Conflict

Full Text:



Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A & James, W. L. 2000. Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. The Journal of Finance. Vol. 55, No. 1, pp: 81-106.

Allen, F., Bernardo, A. E & Welch, I. 2000. A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles. The Journal of Finance. Vol. 55, No. 6, pp: 2499-2536.

Amihud, Y & Murgia, M. 1997. Dividends, Taxes, and Signaling: Evidence from Germany. The Journal of Finance. Vol. 52, No. 1, pp: 397-408.

Chen, C. R & Steiner, T. L. 1999. Managerial Ownership, and Agency Conflict: A Nonlinier Simultanous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, risk taking, debt policy, and dividen policy. Financial Review. Vol. 34, pp: 119-137.

Crutchley, C. E., Jensen, M. R. H., Jahera, J. S., Raymond, Jr & Jennie E., 1999. Agency Problems and The Simultaneity of Financial Decision Making The Role of Institutional Ownership. International Review of Financial Analysis. Vol. 8, No. 2, pp: 177-197.

Farinha, J. 2003. Dividend policy, Corporate Governance and The Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An empirical analysis. Journal of business finance and accounting. Vol. 30, No. 09-10, pp: 1173-1209.

Husnan, S. 2001. Corporate Governance dan Keputusan Pendanaan; Perbandingan Kinerja Perusahaan dengan Pemegang Saham Pengendali Perusahaan Multinasional dan Bukan Multinasional. Jurnal Riset Akuntansi, Manajemen, Ekonomi. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp: 1-12.

Joher, H., Mohd, A & Nazrul. 2006. The Impact of Ownership Structure on Corporate Debt Policy: Two Stage Least Square Simultanues Model Approach For Post Crisis Period: Evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. International Business & Economics Research Journal. Vol. 5, No.5, pp: 51-64.

Mahadwartha, P. A. 2003. Predictability Power of Dividend Policy and Leverage Policy To Managerial Ownership: An Agency Theory Prespective. Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia. Vol. 18, No.3, pp: 288-297.

Shapiro, S. P. 2005. Agency Theory. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol. 31, pp: 263-284.

Tandelilin, E & Wilberforce, T. 2002. Can Debt and Dividend Policies Subtitute Insider Ownership in Controlling Equity Agency Conflict?. Gadjah Mada International Jornal of Business. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp: 3- 43.

Titman, S & Kaniel, R. S. G., 2008. Individual Investor Trading and Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance. Vol. LXIII, No. 1.

View Counter: Abstract - 2545 and PDF - 2960


  • There are currently no refbacks.