

REVIEW ARTICLE

POLITICAL DYNASTY IN LAW AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE ELECTION LAW BEEN REFORMED?

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ABSTRACT

A democratic state allows for the birth of a dynastic politics. Indonesia as a democracy must accept these consequences. As long as dynastic politics are in accordance with the constitution and do not violate democratic principles, the state accommodates the birth and development of dynastic politics. In Indonesia, since the opening of the doors of reform and regional autonomy, it has led to a democratization of political power at the center as well as in the regions. Dynastic politics also grows and develops. The growth and development of dynastic politics occurs at the level of political power in the regions. In the Tegal Raya region, dynastic politics led by the Dewi Sri clan had experienced developments and was able to place several members of the Dewi Sri clan in several political powers. But interestingly, the political development of the dynasties in the Tegal Raya region must be reduced. This article analyzes the factors that influence the development and reduction of dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya Region.

Keywords: *Development; Political Dynasty; Reduction; Tegal Raya.*

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a country that adheres to democracy. This can be seen from the provisions of the 1945 Constitution Article 1 paragraph (2) which states that sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is exercised according to the Constitution. According to Asshiddiqie (2005), this provision is said to be a *constitutional democracy* (Muhtada & Ayon, 2018).

One of the consequences of constitutional democracy is that every implementation of the life of the nation and state must be based on the sovereignty of the people and the constitution. This applies to the mechanism of state life in the transfer of power which must be carried out with the people's sovereignty and based on the constitution. This mechanism can be done through elections. It is not surprising that Indonesia, which adheres to a constitutional democracy, always conducts elections in transition, especially in the executive branch of power. This mechanism took effect after the amendments to the 1945 Constitution.

In Indonesia, the transfer of power in the executive branch of power has been going on from the central level, namely the President and Vice President to the regional levels of Governors, Regents, and Mayors and their deputies. Normatively, this mechanism can be said to be running well. This is evidenced by the existence of a consolidated electoral system starting from the organizers, supervisors, and legislative institutions in the field of disputes over election results.

Indeed, many influencing phenomena are related to the mechanism for selecting leaders in the executive branch of power, especially at the local or regional level. Dynastic politics is one of the phenomena that occur due to the existence of a democratic and constitutional electoral mechanism.

Normative dynastic politics do not violate democracy and the constitution. This condition is because there are no regulations that prohibit dynastic politics at the time of elections in branches of power both at the central and regional levels.

However, the question is, dynastic politics are often enlivened by pro and contra (Rizan, 2019). Therefore, it is necessary from a different perspective, remembering that from a democracy and a constitutional perspective there are no problems.

Analysis of the quality of dynastic politics in the seizure and exercise of power must be analyzed, how political dynasties can grow and be able to run power and can dynastic politics grow or be reduced? This question is very aptly addressed to dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region which includes Brebes Regency, Tegal Regency, Tegal City, and Pemalang Regency. The four regions were once (there are still areas) controlled by the dynasty of Dewi Sri's ruling clan. Here in after referred to as the Dewi Sri clan. Idza Priyanti (Regent of Brebes, 2012 -2022), Edi Utomo (Candidate for Regent of Tegal Regency, 2013), Ikmal Jaya (Mayor of Tegal, 2010-2015), and Mukti Agung Wibowo (2010-2015) (Rizan, 2019).

Now practically, only Idza Priyanti is still holding power in Brebes Regency and will end in 2022 for the second period, so that regulations cannot go forward again. Edi Utomo failed to become a regent when he participated in the 2013 contest for regional head elections in Tegal Regency. Ikmal Jaya lost when he ran again in the 2013 election for mayor of Tegal, and even tripped over a corruption case. Mukti Agung Wibowo failed when he faced the *incumbent* in the 2015 Pemalang Regency regional head election (Sinaga, 2016; Nugroho; 2013, KPU, 2015).

This means that the dynastic politics in Tegal Raya driven by the Dewi Sri clan is Idza Priyanti and will end in 2022. The reduction of dynastic politics from the Dewi Sri clan, which only Idza Priyanti left behind raises questions. Who is the next dynastic political administrator from the Dewi Sri's family.

The dynastic politics driven by the Dewi Sri clan will enter a receding period if there are no candidates from the Dewi Sri clan who run for regional head in the Tegal Raya region, especially after Idza Priyanti was unable to run again due to legal regulations that allow only two terms.

However, it can be said that the Dewi Sri clan still strengthens the political existence of the dynasty in the Tegal Raya region. This is evidenced by the re-advancement of Mukti Agung Wibowo, who has re-nominated for Pemalang Regent, after previously being Deputy Regent of Pemalang (2010-2015) and losing the Pemalang Regency Regent Election in 2015 (Basaran, 2020). If Mukti Agung Wibowo succeeds in winning the battle, then the dynastic politics of the Dewi Sri clan will again show its existence in the Tegal Raya region, which previously only left Idza Priyanti. Based on the scientific reasons above, the writer breaks down the problems, namely (1) How did the political development of dynasties in the Tegal Raya region begin? And (2) what are the factors that influence the reduction of dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DYNASTIC POLITICS IN THE TEGAL RAYA REGION

Politics in Nasti or politic dynasty in fact there is no legal definition. This is because there are no regulations governing dynastic politics. Agustino and Yusof define dynastic politics as the placement of several family members in a political structure. The family members are based on ancestry or clan (Agustino & Yusoff, 2010). This definition can generalize that several people in a family who are included in the political structure can be said to be dynastic politics. This definition also does not impose limits only on the leadership of the branch of power in the government.

This phenomenon is not taboo in Indonesia. The political definition of a dynasty that has been described is used to observe political conditions and structures in Indonesia. The phenomenon of dynastic politics can be said to already exist. Even before the reformation many have been carried out under the term nepotism. However, nepotism is not limited to family members but can also be friends or relatives. Interestingly, in the current context, dynastic politics with nepotism are very different. Dynastic politics has not been defined in the regulations, so there is no prohibition against doing dynastic politics. The placement of family members in the political structure is also carried out democratically, namely through elections that are regulated by law. The people as the holder of sovereignty then choose and deliver it to the political structure, on the condition that they must win the democratic mechanism.

This is different from nepotism which has been explicitly defined in law and is said to be a prohibited act. Article 1 point 5 of Law Number 28 of 1999 concerning Clean and Free State Administration from Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism states that Nepotism is any act of State Administrators against the law which benefits the interests of their families and / or cronies above the interests of the community, nation, and country. Then Article 5 point 4 and Article 22 in substance states that every state administrator who practices nepotism can be subject to imprisonment and fines.

The definition of nepotism is very clear, namely the existence of acts against the law that use family interests such as the placement of family members in a political structure. This is what makes dynastic politics different. Dynastic politics is not an act against the law because it is carried out with a legal and democratic mechanism. For example, such as the Regional Head Election or Pilkada which was attended by several family members and succeeded in winning the contestation.

This means that legally, dynastic politics is legal and constitutional. The law can be said to provide space for dynastic politics. The provision of space from law to dynastic politics can be said to be the cause of the growth and existence of dynastic politics. Comparative, for example: if the law does not provide room for dynastic potential. Of course, dynastic politics is said to be an act against the law and anyone who practices dynastic politics will be prosecuted according to law enforcement.

In the Tegal Raya as the cause of the growth of dynastic politics, other causes of the growing political dynasty as resources, community support, and access to political parties. The three causes are causes that do not have to be collectively owned but follow the conditions of the area to be addressed in the placement in the political structure. In the Tegal Raya region, dynastic politics have occurred, driven by the Dewi Sri clan. Klan Dewi Sri cannot be separated from tribes that cause, so that affects the emergence and development of dynastic politics in Tegal Raya.

Resources that can be said to play an important role in bringing about political dynasty in the Tegal Raya. Resources according to Charles F. Andrain are divided into five types, namely physical, economic, normative, personal, and expert (Andrain, 1992). There is only one Dewi Sri clan that is not owned by resources, namely physical (Luluardi, 2013). Physical in this case for example weapons (Andrain, 1992). Others such as economic, normative, personal, and expert resources were owned by the political dynasty in the Tegal Raya region.

The next cause for the emergence of political dynasties in the Tegal Raya region was community support. Strong community support can win democratic battles. It is impossible, without strong community support quantitatively will win a political battle like the Pilkada. Given the democratic system requires the support of the people as sovereignty and must amount to the majority.

This community support seems to have been managed well by the Dewi Sri clan in the Tegal Raya area. Dewi Sri's clan has succeeded in getting support from the grassroots community of entrepreneurs and *grassroots* (Luluardi, 2013). No wonder the Dewi Sri clan gets support from business circles. Given that the Dewi Sri clan comes from business circles. A successful business business is run by the Dewi Sri clan so that becoming a large business clan in the Tegal Raya area will make it easier to be known and close to the grassroots community. Dewi Sri Clan business businesses are very popular in the Tegal Raya area such as PO Dewi Sri which is engaged in transportation services. Bring influence on the level of popularity of the members of the Dewi Sri clan. This means that people will get to know the Dewi Sri clan more because the business they are running has been popular in the community.

The high level of popularity in the Dewi Sri clan will have an impact on the high potential acceptability or liking of the community. The potential for obtaining a high level of bishopricks is greater than that of someone who has low popularity. favorite high level will also provide a potential incidence of high desirability. That is, the potential to be chosen is higher if it has high acceptability. All of that can be done by approaching the community until it gets grassroots support. This is because grassroots people constitute the majority voters in democratic elections in Indonesia such as Pilkada.

The support from entrepreneurs and the grassroots community seems to have been really optimized by the Dewi Sri clan so that they can win competitions in several Pilkada.

Another reason for the emergence of dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region, driven by the Dewi Sri clan, was access to political parties. Political parties are one of

the pillars of democracy (Muhtada & Diniyanto, 2018). It is hoped that the presence of political parties in democracy can protect the wheels of democracy so that it truly becomes the sovereignty of the people. This condition is not surprising if in the operation of candidacy in elections, support from political parties is often required. In Indonesia, it even requires support and proposals from political parties in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election.¹

This also applies to the Pilkada. However, in the Pilkada process, there is still one option, namely through individual or *independent* channels provided that, it collects support from the community directly, which is usually proven by the identity cards of each person who supports it. Of course, the individual route will be more difficult because it must first gather real community support. The next problem is having to form a support machine that can move the grassroots community to be able to win the Pilkada. Spontaneous formation of support machines will be more difficult and requires relatively large material and non-material resources.

It is not surprising that in the Pilkada process, many candidates for regional heads or deputy regional heads prefer to use support channels from political parties. Not because it is easy to get support from political parties, but because there is a political party machine that can make winning the Pilkada easier. It remains only to optimize the party machine and increase voter support from other sectors.

The Dewi Sri clan seems to fully understand the function of political parties and the benefits of being promoted by political parties in the Pilkada. This is evidenced by members of the Dewi Sri clan who almost always advance using political parties. There was only one time that progressed using the individual route, namely Mukti Agung Wibowo when he was running for the 2008 Tegal City Regional Election. Given that Ikmal Jaya, the older brother of Mukti Agung Wibowo, had no opponent at that time, Mukti Agung Wibowo became a candidate for puppet mayor. It is only part of a political strategy (Luluardi, 2013).

That is not a serious clan Dewi Sri in nominate in elections using individual track. The Dewi Sri clan can be said to be more comfortable using political parties as a vehicle to win the Pilkada. This was proven by members of the Dewi Sri clan who won the Pilkada using political parties as vehicles.

The understanding of the Dewi Sri clan about the importance of political parties in the Pilkada seems to be followed by the ease of gaining access to political parties. The Dewi Sri clan seems to easily get support from political parties. This is evidenced by the various political parties that support the Dewi Sri clan members. The Dewi Sri clan does not always use one political party as a vehicle for candidacy in the Pilkada (Nugroho, 2015; Afif, 2016; Kristyarini, 2013).

These four causes can be said to be the cause of the emergence of the Dewi Sri clan in dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region. The rule of law is loose for the

¹ See the 1945 Constitution Article 6A paragraph (2) which states that the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidate pairs are proposed by political parties or coalitions of political parties participating in the general election before the implementation of the general election.

proliferation of dynastic politics as a normative cause. Then resources, community support, and access to political parties are the strengths or advantages possessed by the Dewi Sri clan so that they are able to occupy members of the Dewi Sri clan in the political structure, namely regional heads and deputy regional heads.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE REDUCTION OF DYNASTIC POLITICS IN THE TEGAL RAYA REGION

The discussion related to the factors that influence the reduction of dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region in this article is carried out normatively and generally. The researcher examines the normative and general aspects that cause the reduction of dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region. There are at least two main factors affecting the reduction of dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region, as follows.

Candidate Recruitment Revolution Based on Political Survey

The function of political parties in the recruitment process is an important indicator of the success of democracy at the local level. The maturity of knowledge of political parties is at stake to find militant and productive cadres in this international institution. Instead, the parties will lose money if they choose the wrong seeds to become regional leaders. Governed by Article 29, paragraph 1 Law No. 2 of 2011 on Political Party explained that political parties do the recruitment of Indonesian citizens to become candidates for regional head and deputy head of the Regions. Although since the previous law, namely the Pilkada Law No. 12 of 2008, it has allowed them to run as individuals. Based on *Peraturan Komisi Pemilihan Umum (PKPU) No. 3 of 2017 Article 8 (1) Requirements for the nomination form of the amount of support for individual candidates for the Election of Regent and Vice Regent or Mayor and Deputy Mayor*, as shown on Table 1

Table 1 Support Terms based on the number of voters²

Number of Voters ³	Terms of support
<250,000	10%
250,000 - 500,000	8.5%
500,000 - 1,000,000	7.5%
> 1,000,000	6.5%

Source: *Data processed from PKPU No.3 of 2017*

² The amount of support referred to must be spread over more than 50% (fifty percent) of the number of sub-districts in the regency / city area concerned.

³ Regencies / Cities with the number of population included in the final voter list during the last election or election.

Rules that support the minimum requirements used as a reference touts individuals submit photocopy E-KTP requisite total number. However, this is the dilemma when individual candidates are required to submit proof of voting support from the people in practice individual candidates buy first photocopies of ID cards from the people. Every citizen has the constitutional right to be elected and to vote, but with the enactment of PKPU regulation No. 3 of 2017, independent candidacy is rare. Some of the factors of the lack of candidates from the independent path include the waste of capital for the succession of winning candidates, the difficulty of the requirements that must be fulfilled by prospective candidates, the considerable competition from competitors who use political party vehicles, the lack of political education for successful teams in winning political strategies, costs more politically borne and there is no solid support base for votes because there are no strong ideology-based ties. Therefore, by these considerations regional head candidates will choose to use political party vehicles as the basis for winning votes.

The rational choice of candidates for regional head prioritizes whether political strategies are more profitable or at least less risky. Practical politics plays in the search for political parties that apply to become potential cadres to become regional heads, but politics does not necessarily seek, because parties also have cadres who have long been loyal to fight together. Age of regeneration or party membership does not guarantee the quality of candidates expected by the community. Its loyalty is the dominant indicator in determining the quality priority of cadres on the other hand parties also need, their existence in politics. In order to survive, they usually make favourable contracts and agreements between the party institutions and the cadres themselves.

This party's chance of survival is read as an opportunity by candidates who do not have party affiliation. The documentary system which is oligarchic only at the level of the party elite and is not professional is presumed to be the failure of party regeneration. Members of the Dewi Sri clan in the Tegal Raya area became predatory for political parties at the regional level. The candidacy for Mayor of Tegal in 2009 is an opportunity for economic resources to be used to deceive and promise the progress of political parties in survival among the onslaught of rivalries of various political parties in the Tegal area. Recommendations issued by the Central Leadership Council (DPP) of Political Parties are considered a breath of fresh air (Johari & Gaharu, 2013).

In a different case, during the 2015 candidacy in Tegal Regency, Edi Utomo was unable to run from the PDIP party because he did not get a DPP recommendation less than 1 month before the registration of a candidate for Regent. The rush to find a replacement for a political party vehicle, and years of preparations for regeneration are considered lost. In the end the mass base also experienced a breakdown of support at the Branch Branch Leadership (PAC) level⁴.

The preparedness of the candidate success team was strengthened to prepare for this drastic political change. The split of votes at the PAC level will reduce the

⁴ Interview with Marsinggih Marnadi on 21 August 2013.

political power of the candidates, which will actually benefit their political opponents. Sudden "jumping lice" of candidates in political parties overhaul the system of recruitment and regeneration, even buying and selling support packages. Some are in the form of t-shirt campaign attribute packages, banners, flyers, news services, and commercializing political party assets.

Variants of political "deal" packages of candidates with political parties are read intelligently by survey institutions. The succession bid of the winning candidate by the survey institute is considered more professional. In addition to survey institutions having data on needs figures, they are more sensitive to community responses. The main source of the response was the response to the rolling of the third democratic wave of developed countries. Demand for "one man one vote" democracy opens the door to political marketing promotion. Reflecting on the election 2004, the direct election provided a separate evaluation record, so that the survey pattern began to grow in the 2009 elections.

Parliamentary threshold in 2009 at the national level be milestone standard in government's success in simplifying the political parties. However, on the other hand, the political trend at that time shifted from political narrative to quantitative figures. The trend of modernizing *quick count* calculations has a big impact on the winning process. Survey agencies began to mushroom for electability, voter behaviour, formulating campaign strategies to create winning teams that were donated by candidates (Simarmata, 2017). The results of the survey institute also create an image of political victory as a definite result, which should not be the prediction result as the main measure in the excitement of a democratic party.

Survey institutions in general elections or regional head elections have begun to transform into the modernization of the political party recruitment system. The involvement of academics, marketing and endorsers has also enlivened the celebration of democracy lately. This is contrast to the previous election which only enlivened politicians and the mass media as a means of fighting. They offer surveys to regional head candidates to assess the extent of their winning rate in the *Pilkada*. In fact, some political parties require surveys with designated vendors. The results of this survey then become a consideration whether a political party makes recommendations or not, even though at that time the regional head candidates had not yet entered into the political party cadres. The survey package menu offered varies from one survey to the winning strategy model package. So that survey institutions not only make research but can also become event organizers in shaping the good image of candidates, preparing political scenarios, and even making political dramas during political campaigns. The results of survey institutes' research are also signaled to shape public opinion (Sobari, 2013).

The more dominant or superior numerical value of the candidates will be published and disseminated to create a good *image* and political image, while the low value of the graph is made in such a way that it will never be recognized by the public. The prediction of a candidate's victory is spread by survey institutions as an image

building (Wahid, 2009). Not only one survey institution, but several survey institutions claim the winning team of the candidate's victory. The election of a survey institution as a research vendor by a political party cannot be denied that this survey institution is also indirectly bound by a political contract. This political marketing strategy is used to reject the success of the candidate winning team.

Popularity is the main reference in taking political surveys, fame is the subject of a research agenda because voters tend not to see the ideological basis as the basis for the candidate's vision and mission but rather the fame of the candidate or even the voters only vote on *Perceived Popularity* (Cillessen & Rose, 2005). In this position, voters tend to be deceived by political imagery. On the other hands politeness and kindness constitute *Sociometric Popularity* (Parkhurst, & Hopmeyer, 1998; De Laet, Doumen, Vervoort, Colpin, Van Leeuwen, Goossens, & Verschueren, 2014; Cillessen & Rose, 2005) used as the ideal universal value that regional head candidates must have. It can be said that the closer you are, the more you know, not the other way around, the more famous you are, the more you are trusted because of your skills. Therefore, the popularity indicator is narrowed down to acceptability to get the best candidate seeds.

The candidates for regional head must have leadership skills, this capability which can then be seen by the general public. The ability to accept (acceptability) also affects the Pilkada victory procession. It could be that the candidate has high capacity and capability, but the community does not accept it because residents find it difficult to translate the candidate's achievements or even these advantages are covered by the shortcomings of the *Black Campaign* war. Pol-Tracking Institute uses 13 aspects in survey assessment namely; integrity, capability, intellectuality, visionary, leadership skills, achievement experience, courage in making decisions, public communication, elite communication, empathy/aspirations, emotional maturity, physical appearance, public acceptability, party acceptability (Sobari, 2013).

The emphasis of party acceptability is the beginning of the revolution for political party recruit. The acceptance of party members and party cadres also had effect on the survey results. It also avoids the possibility of a breakout of support within the party, a race between healthy cadres in competing for medals for recommendations from party leaders. The party organizational system also forms a bulwark to prevent flea candidates, fairly-high value point in the survey assessment category to buy vehicle people's vote support through political parties.

The challenge of acceptability of political parties is also influenced by the lack of popular cadres, the fight between parties in finding idol leaders is like a boomerang when the robust recruitment system is violated. The existence of political parties in the regions is also questioned when there are no candidates, instead the voters switch support, or the party loses its grass roots. Therefore, the party will not bear a big enough risk, the alternative way is to find cadres who have high electability.

The existence of the electability measurement value of survey institutions was questioned by Wawan Sobari in the journal entitled "Electability and Rational Voter Myths: Debate on Opinion Research Results Ahead of the 2014 Election". This article

makes the public ambiguous about the extent to which survey institutions are able to use the same methods and approaches as their analytical tools while the results of the surveys are much different. It is not only the candidates for regional heads who are taken into account for their electability, but many survey institutions have been contested. Regardless of this, the survey figures are still a barometer of political candidacy, with proverbs soliciting politics behind its uncertainties. The public is often haunted by electability diagrams and figures in the mass media, while the electability context itself is frozen in the campaigns of regional head candidates. The vision and mission of leadership is considered as political promises, which implies a political contract against its supporters. Meanwhile, when they took office, they did not only contract with their supporters but with the entire community being led.

Issues of Political Dynasty Prevention in the 2015 Election Bill (Grand Design Black Campaign)

The rapid development of democracy at the local level is a sign of the harmonization of social and political changes in society in the progress of the life order. This growth is not without problems. Political malpractice is considered a dominant factor that plays a role in improving the political system in Indonesia. The most significant time in this change is the half-decade which is considered suitable for cutting the oligarchic chain of power, the entrance to the election as an official facility regulated by the constitution.

Anthropological studies look at dynastic politics, a cultural system inherited from an *acitocratic legacy* that can destroy democracy in Indonesia (Hijjang & Amelia, 2019). They are symbiotic in the realm of democracy at the local level, are included in the line of the social economy and hegemony at the grass roots (Haboddin, 2015). Dynastic politics is considered to be the culprit in burying the ideals of a superior generation in the regions. Therefore, grassroots, and political parties are also fighting to break the chain of dynastic hierarchies in the government and political system through legal channels by proposing the 2015 Election Bill.

When the drafting of the 2015 Election Law the struggle of the anti-dynastic politics was still considered controversial, they needed to accompany it to the Constitutional Court Ruling. Several provisions regarding dynastic politics that will still be harmonized include: *First* , the abolition of the requirement not to have a conflict of interest with the incumbent; *Second* , the affirmation regarding the meaning of the nomenclature of the Incumbent to avoid multiple interpretations in its implementation; In order to prevent dynastic politics, Article 12 Letter (p) of the Pilkada Bill compiled by the government states that the candidate for governor may not have marital ties, straight line up, down and sideways with the governor, unless there is an interval of at least one year. Meanwhile in Article 70 Letter (p) it is stated that the candidate regent does not have marital ties, straight line up, down, and

sideways with the governor and regent/mayor, unless there is a minimum interval of one term of office.

The dynastic political debate arose when the KPK convicted the younger brother of Banten Governor Ratu Atut Chosiyah, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana in a bribery case against the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Akil Mochtar (Budi, 2013; Detik News, 2015). The image of the constitution is getting weaker and confined in the nets of dynastic politics. The middle way in preventing dynastic politics which tends to damage and guarantee the political rights of the people. For example, by limiting the requirements for candidates so that there are no candidates from the regional head dynasty, regional heads are also required to leave office if a relative is participating in the regional elections.

The issue of preventing dynastic politics in the draft general election law has become the central theme of the form of resistance by anti-dynastic politics during regional head elections. Those who are free from dynastic politics try to fight by raising the issue of political malpractice and governance of dynastic political actors. The issue became a hot ball that continued to roll until the political claim of the dynasty was forbidden in the land of their struggle. The worst possibility is corruption of regional government budget money, accumulated wealth of regional heads' subsidiaries, nepotism of regional government office structures, abuse of authority, buying and selling of office head offices, monopoly winning project tenders and even political contracts with opposition political parties.

The use of campaign materials by attacking political opponents is considered legitimate if it is to repair a corrupt government system. Moreover, the material used to bring down the character of a candidate who wants to perpetuate dynastic politics. The spread of issues is planned by the winning success team and sympathizers from the regional head or legislative candidates. The print media campaigning against dynastic politics is considered legal and has actually become a pioneer in eradicating dynastic political practices. Academics, researchers, social activists, *stakeholders*, and community leaders also played an active role in filling out the polls in questioning the *neo-patrialism system*. *Dynastic political hate speech* uploads on *online* social media and *messenger* services by *cyber army* (campaign team and sympathizers via social media) also flooded in the form of articles, *memes*, anecdotes, and short videos. Attacking each other with the issue of dynastic politics between supporters is justified because there is no standard rule that this is a black campaign, but the way to overthrow it by identifying or generalizing dynastic politics with this abuse of power can be categorized as *black campaign*.

The abundance of prospective first-time voters for 17 years each year and the TNI-Polri retirement age plus the number of marriages under 17 also increase the number of voting rights users. There is no fixed ideological basis and minimal knowledge which indicates that they are included in the *Swing Voters* category⁵.

⁵ Swing Voters are voters who choose a party / candidate because most people choose a particular party / candidate.

Tendency for political alienation (Cottam, Mastor, & Preston, 2004) *early* voters became the target of this *black campaign* of novice voters. They are potentially great men - so abstentions (white group) or a market share of *money politics*. Due to this determinant factor, they are easily exposed to *negative campaigns* and *black campaigns* (Hikmawati & Haryadi, 2017), those who tend to vote for dynastic political candidates may change faith instead of *abstaining*. The success team and the participants targeted novice voters as the dominant alternative in documenting the vote acquisition during voting. These *swing voters* consider the information available on social media to be accurate and absolute without looking for the truth.

The difficulty of the KPU, PPU, BAWASLU, and independent election supervisors in monitoring and taking firm action against *posts* on social media as campaign violations is because the perpetrators are only candidates. The biggest finding was from anonymous social accounts that were allegedly made by the winning team, both supporters and opponents. The lack of public knowledge about political campaign violations is also a challenge in itself, it can be seen that many violations of the ASN or PNS code of ethics do not know that supporting or *liking* and *posting* to one of the candidate pairs is considered a violation.

CONCLUSION

Dynastic politics in a democratic country such as Indonesia is certainly contained. Dynastic politics can grow and develop in Indonesia as long as it is in accordance with the constitution. Space for the state and space in society turned out to provide a place for dynastic politics to grow. Dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya region is an example of a family clan capable of becoming a dynasty in constitutional political power. Many factors influenced the political development of the dynasty. In the Tegal Raya region, dynastic politics led by the Dewi Sri clan had experienced a period of development. There are at least four factors that influence the political development of dynasties in the Tegal Raya region which was driven by the Dewi Sri Clan. The four factors include (1) the rule of law that allows the birth and growth of dynastic politics; (2) resources; (3) community support; (4) and access to political parties. Although dynastic politics in the Tegal Raya area have developed, the dynastic politics are in fact currently undergoing a period of reduction. This paper suggest that it is advisable for policy makers to evaluate the regulations that allow dynastic politics in Pilkada. The evaluation is intended to measure the relevance of dynastic politics with regional development and community welfare. It is also recommended that parties affiliated in dynastic politics conduct introspection and reform of the factors that affect dynastic political reduction

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QUOTE

A new dynasty is never founded without a struggle. Blood makes good manure. It will be a good thing for the Rougon family to be founded on a massacre, like many illustrious families.

Monsieur de Carnavant
Émile Zola, The Fortune of the Rougons