



Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) in Indonesia : Moderated Audit Committee Characteristics

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ABSTRACT

Purpose : The study aims to determine the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA) whether they have substitution or complementary influences. In addition, the researcher wanted to investigate whether the characteristics of the audit committee can be moderated between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA).

Method : The study analyzes non-financial companies in Indonesia listed on OSIRIS in 2017 – 2021. The purposive sampling method produced 399 research samples. Researchers used regression panel data to determine the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA) and the effect of audit committee moderation.

Findings : The results showed that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has a significant positive influence on Tax Avoidance (TA) while Audit Committee Size (ACZ) and Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) have an insignificant influence.

Novelty : The research will add literature related to the influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA) by providing an overview of how company management in Indonesia utilizes Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Whether as a philanthropic activity or used to make up an unethical act such as Tax Avoidance (TA). This study also provides a new picture by providing a moderating effect characteristic of the audit committee.

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INTRODUCTION

Improving public welfare in Indonesia is currently dominated by tax funds. Based on the Indonesian State Budget (APBN), state revenues sourced from taxation reached IDR 1,285 trillion in 2020. This revenue is greater than the revenue that does not come from taxes which only reaches IDR 343 trillion (Central Government Finance, 2021). This makes taxes the primary source of revenue for the Indonesian state. According to Law number 28 (2007) taxes are mandatory contributions to the state by individuals or entities that are coercive based on the law by not getting direct compensation and are used for state purposes for the prosperity of the community. Although the community does not get direct compensation, funds sourced from taxes will be managed by the state to carry out development activities and improve welfare. This makes the role of taxes considered very crucial.

The state is well aware of the important role of taxation for the welfare of the community. However, this awareness is inversely proportional to some corporate taxpayers. This is because not a few taxpayers feel burdened with their tax obligations because they will lose some of their profits and do not get a direct compensation. This condition gives companies the tendency to carry out Tax Avoidance (TA) to minimize their tax burden. This is in line with the conditions reported in the Tax Justice Network (2020) in which Indonesia is experiencing losses of up to IDR 68.8 trillion due to Tax Avoidance (TA) carried out by companies. According to Manihuruk et al (2021) the Directorate General of Taxes has found that many companies in Indonesia have carried out Tax Avoidance (TA) such as PT. Coca Cola Indonesia audit period from 2002 to 2004. Toyota Motor Manufacturing Company for the 2005 audit period, Starbuck Company for the 2008-2010 audit period and so on.

According to Wiratmoko (2018), Tax Avoidance (TA) is an effort made by Taxpayers in carrying out tax

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avoidance legally and not violating tax laws by reducing the amount of tax payable. Although Tax Avoidance (TA) is still in the legal context, the aggressive use of Tax Avoidance (TA) will have adverse impacts on companies such as the potential for tax sanctions and a decline in the company's reputation (Abid & Dammak, 2021) this paper uses panel data regressions. The authors apply generalized least square panel regression to overcome autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems. For further robustness, this paper runs instrumental variable regressions using the three-stage instrument variable method (three-stage least square). A company's reputation is an important component in maintaining a company's sustainability. Therefore, the company will strive to improve and maintain the positive reputation they already have. One of the things that the company does to improve and maintain the company's positive reputation is to carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an activity born due to pressure from stakeholders so that companies are not only concerned with profitability but also economically, socially and environmentally responsible for their operational activities. By carrying out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), companies will get image, reputation, trust and satisfaction from their stakeholders (Muflih, 2021). Therefore, according to Istianingsih (2020), when companies want to maintain company sustainability, companies must carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. This is in line with the research of Lee et al. (2022) which found that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can improve a company's reputation. Therefore, according to Zeng (2018), recent research has begun to provide a lens on the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA).

Davis K et al (2016) argue that there are various perspectives of companies in looking at the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and tax payments. First, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a substitute for tax payments. That is, companies assess that by paying high taxes, companies will lose opportunities to increase innovation, production and job creation (Davis et al., 2016). In other words, paying taxes will reduce the welfare of the company. Therefore, companies will minimize tax payments with Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. However, because Tax Avoidance (TA) can cause high negative consequences for the company, the company will use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a makeup for the Tax Avoidance (TA) practice. In simple terms, the substitution view emphasizes that companies that carry out Tax Avoidance (TA) will also increase Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities to maintain the company's reputation.

Second, companies view the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and tax payments as complementary. This means that tax payments made by companies are a form of support in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. This shows that companies view tax payments and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as the same activity in order to improve the welfare of the community. In addition, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) which is a guideline for companies in conducting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) recommends companies to disclose their taxation. This will create a complementary relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and tax payments. In this view, the company will make tax payments as it should so that it will not carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a makeup for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

Third, companies view that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) are independent of each other. According to Mao (2019), companies are willing to invest their resources in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as long as these activities meet the company's ultimate goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. Maury (2022) found that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is proven to be positively related to the company's future profitability. This shows that the implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be beneficial for shareholders. On the other hand, companies can also engage in Tax Avoidance (TA) for the purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth (Mao, 2019). This view considers that if Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) independently contribute to the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth, managers can carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) in separate strategies so that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has no relationship with Tax Avoidance (TA) (Davis et al., 2016).

The difference corporate perspectives in looking at the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) has created various research results. Alsaadi (2020) tried to examine the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA) by taking into account different levels of financial and tax reporting in 15 countries. The results of the study show that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has a positive effect on Tax Avoidance (TA). However, Lanis & Richardson (2014) found different results, namely Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) negatively affects Tax Avoidance (TA). In addition, Salsabila et al. (2021) showed that there is no influence among Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA).

The existence of different perspectives and inconsistencies in the results of previous studies motivated researchers to investigate how companies in Indonesia perceive the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) whether it is substituted or complementary. This study will confirm the results of the study of Davis et al. (2016). Exploring the research of Davis et al. (2016) this study has a novelty by adding moderation variables in the form of audit committee characteristics, namely Audit Committee Size (ACZ) & Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC).

Researchers will use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an independent variable and Tax Avoidance (TA) as a dependent variable. This is because, according to Gulzar et al. (2018), the influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) will depend on the nature and trends of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), whether it is more directed to philanthropic activities or for tax strategies. The Audit Committee is

used as a moderation variable because the audit committee is believed to have an important role in making financial policies in the company such as providing tax strategies, evaluating and recommending financial policies, and ensuring the integration of financial statements (García-Meca et al., 2021).

Audit Committee Size (ACZ) is suspected to be able to moderate the influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA) because the number of audit committees is related to a variety of knowledge, experience and skills so that the number of audit committees is suspected to affect the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA). Meanwhile, the researcher uses Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) because the effectiveness of a group will be determined by the performance of each individual while each individual has different traits and characteristics (gender classification) (Sari & Supadmi, 2014) & (Betz et al., 1989). According to various psychological studies, women will have a tendency to support ethical standards of business and reduce the risk of financial statements (Ibrahim et al. 2009) & (Riguen et al., 2019). Therefore, the presence of women in the audit committee is suspected to affect the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA).

The influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA) is based on Risk Management Theory. According to Ajupov et al (2019) Risk Management Theory is based on three basic concepts, namely utility, regression and diversification. The utility strategy was first introduced by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 (Stearns, 2000). In this strategy, companies are expected to be able to make decisions by considering the benefits they obtain. Meanwhile, the regression strategy began at the end of the nineteenth century where companies must start taking into account and considering the probability of risks and fluctuations in their business cycle (Ajupov et al., 2019). Furthermore, the diversification strategy introduced by H. Markowitz in 1952 suggests that companies must be able to minimize deviations from existing investments (Ajupov et al., 2019). Companies don't want to get the negative impact of the Tax Avoidance (TA) that they have done so they will use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a make-up to act as if they are a company that upholds good responsibility

Meanwhile, the effect of audit committee moderation on the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA) is based on agency theory. According to Jensen & Mackling (1976), agency relationships will occur when the owner trusts the agent to carry out the company's operational activities. However, the relationship has the potential to have information asymmetry because agents will know more about the company's operations than the company owner. The manager's decision to utilize Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a make-up for aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices can create information asymmetry in company owners. Therefore, the owner of the company needs a third party, namely the audit committee, to carry out the supervisory function so that the manager works in accordance with the company's goals.

High tax payments are one of the things that companies avoid. This is because by paying high taxes, the company's profits will decrease. Therefore, companies will tend to practice Tax Avoidance (TA) to minimize their taxes. However, because the practice of Tax Avoidance is an unethical act, the company will hide the practice. One of the activities that can be used as makeup to cover up the practice of Tax Avoidance (TA) is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. According to Yuthas et al (2002) and Abdelfattah & Aboud (2020) companies will carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) first to illustrate that the company seems to have fulfilled their legitimacy to stakeholders but in fact they are practicing Tax Avoidance (TA). This illustrates that the company uses Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as a make-up of Tax Avoidance (TA) practices show that companies are trying to manage their risk management. With risk management theory, companies will carry out utility management, regression and diversification that allow to provide security for the company in the future (Ajupov et al., 2019). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be an image and risk management tool Lin et al (2017). This is because by implementing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) companies show that they are responsible for all their operational activities so that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can improve the company's image and reputation (Chiu et al., 2020) & (Muflih, 2021). According to Godfrey (2005), when companies experience negative events, they can use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a damper for negative assessments of the company. This is in line with risk management where the company will strive to minimize negative risks that can arise in the future.

Based on this explanation, the higher the company's Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) will reflect the higher the Tax Avoidance (TA) practices carried out by the company. This is in line with research conducted by Gulzar et al (2018) and Alsaadi (2020) which found a positive influence between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA). Therefore, the researcher has hypothesis 1 as follows:

H₁: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Has a Positive Effect on Tax Avoidance (TA)

The Audit Committee is one of the corporate governance that has an important task. According to García-Meca et al (2021) the audit committee has the authority to provide reasonable tax estimates, recommend and evaluate accounting policies, and ensure the integrity of financial statements. According to regulation No. 55/POJK.04/2015, audit committees in Indonesia also have duties and responsibilities in reviewing financial information and reviewing companies' compliance with existing regulations. This indicates that the audit committee also has the authority to ensure that the company's tax strategy does not cross the legal corridor including aggressive Tax

Avoidance (TA) so as to avoid adverse impacts on the company's sustainability.

According to Al-Okaily & BenYoussef (2020) the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) is one of the indicators of the effectiveness of the audit committee. This is in line with Ashfaq & Rui (2019) who found a positive influence between a large Audit Committee Size (ACZ) and internal control of the company. In addition, according to Goh (2009), the larger the audit committee, the more optimal they will be in producing substantial discussions. This can happen because the larger the Audit Committee Size (ACZ), the greater the opportunity for members to have a variety of knowledge, experience and skills. It is expected that it can be integrated to limit aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. With the limitations of management in carrying out Tax Avoidance (TA), it can minimize the use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. Therefore, the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) in this study is used as a moderation variable on the influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA).

The use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices can cause information asymmetry between management and company owners. This can be based on agency theory. Agency theory is a theory that explains the relationship of agency within a company where shareholders as principals will hire agents, namely managers to carry out company operations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) However, according to Jensen & Meckling (1976) managers have the potential not to act in the interests of shareholders. This can happen if managers have an opportunistic nature to maximize their profits. Therefore, shareholders need a supervisor to help minimize information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. One of the corporate governance that can help shareholders in minimizing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is the audit committee. The audit committee will oversee the manager's actions to stay within the regulations and ensure that the manager's decisions are in line with the company's interests.

Previous research conducted by García-Meca et al (2021) found that the larger the audit committee, the weaker the positive influence of CEO narcissism on Tax Avoidance (TA). In addition, Wiratmoko (2018) found that the larger the audit committee, the more difficult it will be for companies to conduct Tax Avoidance (TA). Therefore, researchers have H2A as follows:

H_{2A}: Audit Committee Size (ACZ) Weakens the Positive Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA)

Furthermore, researchers will use the Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) as a moderation variable. Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) reflects the presence of women on the audit committee. According to Sari & Supadmi (2014), the effectiveness of a group will be determined by the performance of each individual in the group. Each individual will get a personal formation process from a socialization process that they have gone through. This can then create differences in traits and characteristics among each individual, including the gender classification of men and women (Betz et al. 1989).

According to various psychological studies, women will have a tendency to support business ethical standards and reduce the risk of financial statements (Ibrahim et al. 2009) & (Riguen et al., 2019). García-Meca et al. (2021) also showed that women will promote activities to ensure the long-term success and survival of the company. In addition, Gul et al. (2013) also argue that women are able to provide more accurate analysis than men. This indicates that the presence of women can provide better oversight to prevent aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices by providing their point of view so that researchers suspect the presence of women can minimize Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a makeup for aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

There are various studies that try to reveal the relationship between Tax Avoidance (TA) and gender (Rahmanti et al., 2022). Zalata et al. (2018) argue that if all audit committees are male, they will behave more opportunistically. This is due to the psychological tendency of men to become 'old boys club'. 'Old boys club' is a condition where the longer the interaction between men will create an increasingly loyal relationship (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Based on this explanation, researchers suspect that when all audit committees are male, managers are more able to carry out Tax Avoidance (TA) and use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as makeup for aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. However, this will be different if there are women in the audit committee because women are not included in networks such as the 'old boys club' so they are more likely to provide greater supervision, monitoring and independent thinking (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). According to various psychological studies, women will have a tendency to support business ethical standards and reduce the risk of financial statements (Ibrahim et al. 2009) & (Riguen et al. 2019).

With this explanation, the presence of women in the audit committee is expected to reduce the occurrence of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. This is in line with agency theory where shareholders require supervisors to supervise the actions of managers to keep running within the corridors of the law by not doing Tax Avoidance (TA) aggressively and using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as the makeup of aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA). According to García-Meca et al. (2021) women will promote activities to ensure the success and long-term survival of the company. In addition, Gul et al. (2013) also argue that women are able to provide more accurate analysis. This indicates that the presence of women can provide better oversight to prevent aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices by providing their point of view so that researchers suspect the presence of women can minimize Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a makeup for aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

Table 1. Purposive Sampling

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total Samples
OSIRIS non-Financial companies that disclose CSR according to GRI	64	71	75	104	197	511
Companies that do not have audit committee data	(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Companies that suffer losses and have an ETR value outside the range of 0-1	(12)	(13)	(14)	(29)	(41)	(109)
Total samples	399 Sampel Penelitian					

Source : By Researchers (2023)

This argument is supported by research by Riguen et al. (2019) which tried to investigate the effect of audit quality on Tax Avoidance (TA) moderated by women in the board. The results of the analysis indicate that audit quality has a negative influence on Tax Avoidance (TA) and the presence of women on the board can strengthen the negative influence of audit quality on Tax Avoidance (TA). In addition, Dang & Nguyen (2022) tried to investigate the influence of female members in the audit committee on Tax Avoidance (TA) and the results provide evidence that female members can limit Tax Avoidance (TA) behavior. Therefore, researchers have H_{2B} as follows:

H_{2B}: Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) Weakens the Positive Influence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA)

RESEARCH METHODS

Researchers used reports of non-financial companies in Indonesia registered with OSIRIS in the 2017-2021 period. The researcher excluded financial companies because financial companies have different accounting patterns from non-financial companies. In addition, researchers will also use information on the company's Annual Report and Sustainability Report. All financial data will be converted into rupiah according to the exchange rate each year. The results of purposive sampling show the following data (Table 1) and Table 2 shows variable measurement.

Researchers conducted data analysis using Eviews (Econometric Views) 12 for Windows. Researchers will approach the Common Effect Model, Fix Effect Model and Random Effect Model to estimate regression models, while to determine the right model, researchers will conduct the Chow Test, Hausman Test and Lagrange Multiplier Test (Basuki & Prawoto., 2015). The analysis model in this study can be described in the equation model 1-5:

Model 1

$$TA = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 CSR + \beta_2 ROA + \beta_3 LEV + \beta_4 SIZE + \beta_5 YEAR + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots 1$$

Table 2. Variable Measurement

Variable	Measurement	Source
Tax Avoidance (TA)	ETR = (Income Tax Expense : Profit Before Tax) x -1	Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) ; Abdelfattah & Aboud (2020) ; Richardson & Lanis (2016)
CSR	Global Reporting Intiative (GRI) disclosures	Harymawan <i>et al.</i> (2021)
Audit Committee Size (ACZ)	The number of audit committees	Prakosa & Hudiwinarsih (2018)
Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC)	1 = women in the audit committee 0 = the company does not have a female audit committee	Nguyen & Faff (2006) ; Rahmayanti <i>et al.</i> (2022) ; (Rahmayanti <i>et al.</i> , 2022)
FirmSize	Natural logarithm of total assets	Lanis & Richardson (2012)
ROA	Net Income : Total Assets	Dang & Nguyen (2022)
Leverage	Total Debt : Total Assets	Zeng (2018)
Year	1 = for years during the Covid-19 pandemic (2020, 2021) 0 = for years before the Covid-19 pandemic (2017, 2018, 2019)	Lanis & Richardson (2014)

Source : By Researchers (2023)

Table 3. Moderation Category Classification

	Significant (Independent)	Insignificant (Independent)
Insignificant (Moderation)	1 Predictor Moderator	2 Homologizer Moderator
Significant (Moderation)	3 Quasi Moderator	4 Pure Moderator

Source : Sharma *et al.* (1981)

Model 2

$$TA = \alpha_2 + \beta_6 CSR + \beta_7 ACZ + \beta_8 ROA + \beta_9 LEV + \beta_{10} SIZE + \beta_{11} YEAR + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots 2$$

Model 3

$$TA = \alpha_3 + \beta_{12} CSR + \beta_{13} ACZ + \beta_{14} CSR*ACZ + \beta_{15} ROA + \beta_{16} LEV + \beta_{17} SIZE + \beta_{18} YEAR + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots 3$$

Model 4

$$TA = \alpha_2 + \beta_{19} CSR + \beta_{20} FMAC + \beta_{21} ROA + \beta_{22} LEV + \beta_{23} SIZE + \beta_{24} YEAR + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots 4$$

Model 5

$$TA = \alpha_3 + \beta_{25} CSR + \beta_{26} FMAC + \beta_{27} CSR*FMAC + \beta_{28} ROA + \beta_{29} LEV + \beta_{30} SIZE + \beta_{31} YEAR + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots 5$$

The researcher will also identify the position of moderation variables. According to Sharma *et al.* (1981) moderation variables can be classified into four types of which are 1. Predictor Moderator 2. Homologizer Moderator 3. Quasi Moderator 4. Pure moderator. The following is a classification table of moderation categories according to Sharma *et al.* (1981) by Table 3.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Based on the research sample used by the researcher, the following descriptive analysis was obtained (Table 4). The results of the descriptive analysis show that the minimum value of Tax Avoidance (TA) is -0.9983 while the maximum value shows a number of -0.0004. The variable has a mean value of -0.2581 and a standard deviation value of 0.1747. The mean value of the Tax Avoidance (TA) variable indicates that the average research sample company is still compliant in making tax payments because based on Law No. 36 of 2008, Indonesia has a normal corporate income tax rate of 25 percent.

CSR has a minimum value of 0.1333 with a maximum value of 0.9782. The average value of the CSR variable showed 0.6422 and the standard deviation was 0.1588. The ACZ variable shows a minimum and maximum value of 2,000 and 7,000. The mean value of ACZ shows a value of 3.2631 with a standard deviation of 0.6824.

Table 4. Descriptive Analysis

	Minimum	Maksimum	Mean	Std. Deviasi
Panel A				
TA	-0.9983	-0.0004	-0.2581	0.1747
CSR	0.1333	0.9782	0.6422	0.1588
ACZ	2.0000	7.0000	3.2631	0.6824
CSRXACZ	0.4000	6.4354	2.1090	0.7571
CSRXFMAC	0.0000	0.9770	0.3203	0.3427
FIRMSIZE	18.4834	26.62947	23.2832	1.4379
ROA	0.00001	0.5265	0.0729	0.0829
LEV	0.0040	0.9225	0.4656	0.1967
Panel B				
FMAC	0.0000	1.0000	0.4912	0.5005
YEAR	0.0000	1.0000	0.5714	0.4954

Source: By Researchers (2023)

Panel A : Continous Variable

Panel B : Dummy Variable

Table 5. Chow, Hausman, & Lagrange Test

	Uji Chow	Uji Hausman	Uji Lagrange
Prob. (Model 1)	0.0000	0.2386	0.0000
Prob. (Model 2)	0.0000	0.3645	0.0000
Prob. (Model 3)	0.0000	0.4546	0.0000
Prob. (Model 4)	0.0000	0.0244	
Prob. (Model 5)	0.0000	0.0451	

Source: By Researchers (2023)

The CSRxACZ moderation variable showed a minimum value of 0.4000, a maximum value of 6.4354, a mean value of 2.1090 and a standard deviation value of 0.7571. As for the CSRxFMAC moderation variables, they show a minimum and maximum value of 0.000 and 0.977. The mean values and standard deviations of these variables show values of 0.3203 and 0.3427. The results of the panel data test, namely the chow test, the Hausman test and the Lagrange test, are shown by Table 5.

Based on the table above, it is known that the probabilities of models 1,2,3,4 and 5 in the Chow test show a value below 0.05. This suggests that the best regression model to use is a fixed effect rather than a common effect. Next, the researcher conducted a hausman test to determine which model is better between fixed effect and random effect. It is known that the probability values in models 1, 2 and 3 show greater than 0.05 while models 4 and 5 have values below 0.05. Therefore, random effect regression was selected for the probabilities of models 1, 2 and 3 and fixed effect for the probabilities of models 4 and 5. Because models 1, 2 and 3 have random effect regression, a lagrange test is needed to determine the best model between random effect and common effect. Based on the results of the study, it is known that the probabilities of models 1, 2 and 3 both have values below 0.05 which shows that the best model to use in the probabilities of models 1, 2 and 3 is the random effect model.

Using Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA), it is known that the results of the hypothesis test show the following (Table 6). Model 1, it is known that the CSR regression coefficient shows a value of 0.0929 and is significant at the level of 0.10. This reflects that every increase in CSR will increase Tax Avoidance (TA) by 0.0929.

Table 6. Hypothesis Test

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
c	-0.2378 (-1.3095)	-0.2385 (-1.3205)	-0.3920 (-1.6848)	-0.2667 (-0.1790)	-0.2748 (-0.1835)
CSR	0.0929 (1.8434)*	0.0946 (1.8787)*	0.3179 (1.4553)	0.0974 (1.5070)	0.0938 (1.1412)
ACZ		-0.0227 (-1.6582)*	0.0232 (0.5080)		
CSR*ACZ			-0.0673 (-1.0505)		
FMAC				-0.0345 (-1.1629)	-0.0402 (-0.4786)
CSR*FMAC					0.0084 (0.0719)
ROA	0.5034*** (4.1077)	0.4996*** (4.0898)	0.4997*** (4.0828)	0.8693*** (4.3470)	0.8712*** (4.3106)
LEV	-0.0912 (-1.5026)	-0.0860 (-1.4228)	-0.0859 (-1.4173)	-0.2015 (-1.0909)	-0.2029 (-1.0901)
FIRMSIZE	-0.0033 (-0.4099)	-0.0003 (-0.0402)	-0.0002 (-0.0299)	-0.0006 (-0.0094)	-0.0001 (-0.0021)
YEAR	0.0123 (0.4070)	0.0134 (0.8980)	0.0138 (0.9231)	0.0135 (0.7326)	0.0135 (0.7293)
R ²	0.0673	0.0735	0.0762	0.7446	0.7446

Source: By Researchers (2023)

^a : Coefficient; ^b : t-stats

***Significant at the level of 0.01; **Significant at the level of 0.05; *Significant at the level of 0.10

Therefore, hypothesis 1 which states that CSR has a positive effect on Tax Avoidance (TA) is acceptable. R Square shows a value of 0.0673 which shows that the CSR variable can explain Tax Avoidance (TA) by 6.7 percent and the rest is explained by other factors that are not included in the study. The ROA coefficient indicates a value of 0.5034. This illustrates that any increase in ROA will increase Tax Avoidance (TA) by 0.5034 and significantly at the level of 0.01. Meanwhile, the regression coefficients of leverage, firm size and year show coefficient values of -0.0912, -0.0033 and 0.0123 insignificantly.

In Model 2, it is known that CSR has a probability value of 0.0946 and is significant at the level of 0.10. This shows that every increase in CSR will increase Tax Avoidance by 0.0946. The Audit Committee Size (ACZ) coefficient shows a significant value of -0.0227 at the level of 0.10. The regression coefficient of ROA also showed significant at the level of 0.01 with a probability value of 0.4996. As for the leverage, firm size and year variables show coefficient values of -0.0860, -0.0003 and 0.0134 insignificantly.

Model 3 shows regression when Audit Committee Size (ACZ) is included as a moderation variable. The results showed that the change in the CSR variable on Tax Avoidance (TA) became insignificant with a coefficient value of 0.3179. The Audit Committee Size (ACZ) variable also changed to insignificant at a coefficient value of 0.0232. As for the moderation variable, CSRxACZ showed a coefficient value of -0.0673 insignificantly. Therefore, it can be concluded that hypothesis 2 of the studies was rejected. The ROA variable shows a value of 0.4997 significantly. As for the variable leverage, firm size and year show coefficient values of -0.0859, -0.0002 and 0.0138 insignificantly.

Model 4 shows that the CSR variable shows a value of 0.0974 and for the FMAC variable it shows a value of -0.0345. Both variables are not significant at each level. However, the ROA variable showed a value of 0.8693 significantly at the level of 0.01. In addition, the Lev, Firm size and year variables showed values of -0.2015, -0.0006 and 0.0135 insignificantly.

Model 5 shows regression when FMAC enters into a moderation variable. It can be seen that the CSR variable has a value of 0.0938 insignificantly. The FMAC variable showed a value of -0.0402 insignificantly and the CSRxFMAC moderation effect showed a value of 0.0084 insignificantly. The ROA value showed a significant amount of 0.8712 at the level of 0.01. while the Lev, Firm size and Year variables showed values of -0.2029, -0.0001, 0.0135 insignificantly.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA)

This study has hypothesis 1, namely CSR has a positive effect on Tax Avoidance (TA). Based on the results of the hypothesis test above, it is known that CSR has a positive effect on Tax Avoidance (TA) significantly so that hypothesis 1 of the study can be accepted. The results of this study are in line with Gulzar et al (2018), Davis K et al (2016), Alsaadi (2020) this study uses regression analysis to test the impact of financial-tax reporting conformity jurisdictions on the association between CSR and aggressive tax avoidance. Findings: The empirical results show that there is a positive association between CSR and tax avoidance, and firms headquartered in low financial-tax reporting conformity jurisdictions are more likely to engage in CSR to hedge against the potential negative consequences of aggressive tax-avoidance practices as compared to firms domiciled in countries with high level of financial-tax reporting conformity. Practical implications: This study confirms Sikka's (2010, 2013) who also found a positive influence between CSR and Tax Avoidance (TA). These findings show that the companies in the study sample view tax payments as hindering their welfare. By paying high taxes, companies will lose their opportunities to develop innovation and production development (Davis K et al., 2016). In fact, the innovations developed by the company are important to support the company's sustainability. The innovations developed by the company can also provide production efficiency and effectiveness that can be profitable for the company.

In addition, by paying high taxes, companies do not benefit directly. With conditions like this, companies will have a tendency to practice Tax Avoidance (TA) to minimize their tax burden. However, aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices can have a negative impact on companies. The negative impact that can arise from the practice of Tax Avoidance (TA) is the damage to the company's reputation and the threat of tax sanctions (Mao, 2019). Therefore, in order for the company to avoid the negative impact of Tax Avoidance (TA) practices, the company seeks to carry out CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. CSR is proven to be used for the benefit of the company while acting as if it is socially responsible, environmental and economic.

Basically, the practice of Tax Avoidance (TA) is a practice that is considered irresponsible. However, based on the results of the study, it can be said that companies that carry out high CSR indicate that they are more involved in Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. This illustrates that companies that perform high CSR do not guarantee that they actually do because they are socially responsible, environmentally and economically. Companies use CSR as a fulfillment of legitimacy to stakeholders as well as a make-up of Tax Avoidance (TA) practices because CSR activities can improve the company's reputation (Godfrey et al., 2009).

A company's reputation is important to a company. According to Godfrey (2005), when a company faces a negative event, the company's reputation obtained from CSR activities can help minimize the company's negative assessment. The positive image obtained by the company from CSR activities can reduce the level of negative reputation of the company due to the practice of Tax Avoidance (TA) (Mao, 2019). With the reduction of these negative assessments, the company is expected to continue to be able to carry out the company's sustainability. Therefore, it

can be known that CSR activities carried out by the company can provide great benefits for the company's sustainability.

The results of this study are in line with risk management where companies will strive to minimize negative risks that may arise in the future by using things that can help have a positive impact. This is reflected in the use of CSR activities as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. In addition, the implementation of CSR activities can also be used as a fulfillment of legitimacy to stakeholders so that companies will get an image as if they are responsible but in reality they take advantage of the opportunity to practice Tax Avoidance (TA) (Abdelfattah & Aboud, 2020). This is in accordance with risk management where companies consider the utility and risks they may get in a policy (Ajupov et al., 2019). In addition, the results of this study also confirm that companies in the research sample are more likely to view tax payments as substitutions with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rather than complementary.

Audit Committee Size (ACZ), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA)

The results of the study related to the moderation variable Audit Committee Size (ACZ) are known to have a negative effect on Tax Avoidance (TA) insignificantly. This shows that the hypothesis of 2 studies was rejected. The results of this study are in line with research conducted by Yohanes & Sherly (2022) which found that Audit Committee Size (ACZ) does not have a significant effect on Tax Avoidance (TA). The Audit Committee Size (ACZ) does not have a significant effect on Tax Avoidance (TA) because the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) is only tasked with assisting the board of commissioners in providing recommendations and supervision related to the company's management. With this function, the audit committee size (ACZ) does not have the authority to decide on policies taken by the company. The policies taken by the company will be decided by the CEO. Therefore, the number of audit committees cannot have a significant influence if the CEO has authoritarian power. Including the company's decision to use CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. The audit committee size (ACZ) is not able to influence the use of CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance practices due to limited authority in decision-making.

In addition, the variable audit committee size (ACZ) in this study did not fluctuate. This is because there is no change in the audit committee size (ACZ) from year to year so that the results of the study cannot reflect a significant influence. Based on the tabulation of research data, it is known that there are 322 samples of companies that have an Audit Committee Size (ACZ) with a total of 3 audit committees in the research period. Meanwhile, the audit committee of 2 people is owned by 2 company samples, the audit committee of 4 people is owned by 53 company samples, the audit committee of 5 people is owned by 16 company samples, the audit committee of 6 people is owned by 5 company samples and the audit committee of 7 people is owned by 1 company sample. Based on this data, it can be seen that the majority of Audit Committee Size (ACZ) in the research sample has 3 audit committee members. With data that does not fluctuate (constant), the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) cannot show its effect on the use of CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

The rejection of hypothesis 2 shows that the results of the study cannot confirm the agency theory. Based on agency theory, the audit committee should be able to provide limits on the use of CSR as a make-up for aggressive Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. However, due to limited authority, the audit committee size (ACZ) cannot affect the use of CSR for Tax Avoidance (TA)

Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Tax Avoidance (TA)

The results of the analysis in the hypothesis test show that the moderation effect of Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) has a non-significant positive effect on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA). This reflects that the hypothesis of 3 studies was rejected. The results of this study are different from Richardson & Lanis (2016) and Riguen et al (2019) who found that the presence of women can reduce the occurrence of Tax Avoidance (TA) practices. However, the results of this study support Yahya et al (2020) who found that there is no significant influence of board gender on the influence of ownership concentration on tax aggressiveness.

The absence of significant influence of Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) can be caused by data inconsistencies. Based on the results of the data tabulation, the presence of women in the audit committee does not provide a guarantee that the company has a high Effective Tax Rate (ETR) value where if the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) shows a value above 25%, it indicates that the company has complied in carrying out its tax obligations.

In the research sample, it was found that companies that have a female gender audit committee and have an Effective Tax Rate (ETR) value above 25% as many as 63 company samples. Meanwhile, companies without a female gender on the audit committee and have an Effective Tax Rate (ETR) level above 25% show as many as 84 company samples. On the other hand, companies that have women on the audit committee and have an Effective Tax Rate (ETR) below 25% are 133 sample companies. Meanwhile, for companies without a female gender in the audit committee and have an Effective Tax Rate (ETR) below 25%, it shows a sample of 119 companies. The inconsistency of the data can be the cause of the Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) not having a significant effect.

This fact shows that the presence of women in the audit committee cannot influence the use of CSR as a make-up Tax Avoidance (TA) because the presence or absence of Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC)

does not guarantee that the company does not carry out Tax Avoidance (TA). The existence of Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) can only be used to fulfill gender equality within the company. In addition, Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) can get pressure from the CEO to comply with all the policies they carry out so that Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) cannot have a significant influence on the use of CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices

The rejection of hypothesis 3 shows that the results of the study cannot confirm the agency theory. Basically, agency theory explains the existence of information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. Therefore, a third party is needed to supervise the company's management so that it runs according to the company's goals. However, the position of Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) cannot in fact have a significant influence on the use of CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practice, so agency theory cannot be the basis for this study.

CONCLUSIONS

This study aims to investigate the effect of Audit Committee Size (ACZ) and Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) in moderating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on Tax Avoidance (TA). By using non-financial companies in OSIRIS between 2017-2021 and conducting purposive sampling, the final sample of the study was found to be 399 samples. This study uses regression panel data where the results of the study provide an illustration that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has a positive effect on Tax Avoidance (TA). This confirms the substitution nature between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and tax payments. According to Davis et al. (2016), the substitution view can make companies carry out Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a makeup for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

The results of the study also showed that the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) did not have a significant effect. This can be due to the fact that the company's policy decisions remain in the hands of the CEO. The Audit Committee only assists the board of commissioners in providing recommendations and supervision related to the management of the company so that the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) cannot have a significant influence if the CEO has authoritarian power. Including the decision to use CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance practices. In addition, the Audit Committee Size (ACZ) data sample in this study did not change from year to year so that the results of the study could not reflect a significant influence on the use of CSR as a make-up for Tax Avoidance (TA) practices.

Female Members in Audit Committee (FMAC) also cannot show the influence of CSR on Tax Avoidance (TA). This is suspected to be due to data inconsistencies in the research sample. Because of the presence or absence of women in the audit committee, companies can still carry out Tax Avoidance (TA). The existence of female members in the Audit Committee is suspected to be only for the fulfillment of gender equality. In addition, women will have more pressure from the CEO to comply with all the policies they want. Therefore, Female Members in Audit Committee are not able to show a significant influence on the use of CSR as a Make Up of Tax Avoidance (TA) practices

This study has limitations, namely only investigating the influence of CSR on Tax Avoidance (TA) in non-financial companies. Therefore, further research can use all companies, both non-financial companies and financial companies so that it will increase knowledge in various sectors.

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