





# Restricting Public Officials' Authority to Combat Corruption: The Role of Term Limits and Political Sanctions in Indonesia

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## Abstract

Corruption among public officials continues to pose a serious threat to the integrity and sustainability of democratic governance in Indonesia. This study examines the restriction of public officials' authority, particularly through political term limits and the revocation of political rights for convicted officials, as a preventive strategy against corruption. Employing a normative legal research method and document analysis, the study analyzes Indonesian laws, policies, and case data from regional heads between 2004 and 2019. The findings reveal recurring patterns of power abuse and highlight the social and institutional consequences of corruption. The study also identifies challenges in implementing anti-corruption policies, emphasizing the need for systemic reforms to enhance transparency and accountability. The results suggest that political term limits can reduce opportunities for previously corrupt individuals to regain office and help restore public confidence in governmental institutions.

The study concludes that effectively combating corruption requires coordinated efforts among government bodies, civil society, and law enforcement agencies to implement policies that reinforce integrity and institutional accountability.

**KEYWORDS** *Term limits; Political authority; Public officials; Corruption; Accountability*

## Introduction

Corruption in the public sector has long posed a significant challenge to governance worldwide, including in Indonesia.<sup>1</sup> It not only depletes state finances but also erodes public trust in governmental institutions and hinders sustainable development.<sup>2</sup> Countries with high levels of corruption often exhibit weak political institutions, including insufficient oversight of public officials in strategic positions.<sup>3</sup> In this context, exploring strategies to reduce corrupt practices, particularly among public officials, is increasingly urgent.

A key factor linked to pervasive corruption among public officials is the absence of robust regulations governing political office.<sup>4</sup> Political positions can serve as loopholes through which power holders exploit public resources for personal or group interests.<sup>5</sup> In systems lacking effective checks and balances, officials have greater opportunities to abuse their authority with minimal

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<sup>1</sup> Azwar and Achmat Subekan, "Does Democracy Reduce Corruption in Indonesia?," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 25, no. 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.56886>.

<sup>2</sup> Titin Purwaningsih and Bambang Eka Cahya Widodo, "The Interplay of Incumbency, Political Dynasty and Corruption in Indonesia: Are Political Dynasties the Cause of Corruption in Indonesia?," *Revista UNISCI* 2020, no. 53 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.31439/UNISCI-89>.

<sup>3</sup> Dewi Asri Yustia and Firdaus Arifin, "Bureaucratic Reform as an Effort to Prevent Corruption in Indonesia," *Cogent Social Sciences* 9, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2166196>.

<sup>4</sup> Akhmad Rifky Setya Anugrah and As'ad Albatroy Jalius, "Potensi Konflik Dampak Penyelenggaraan Pemilu Serentak 2024," *Jurnal Global Futuristik* 1, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.59996/globalistik.v1i1.120>.

<sup>5</sup> Ahmad Jukari, Suud Sarim Karimullah, and Muhajir Muhajir, "Identity Politics in the Construction of Electoral Laws: A Qualitative Analysis," *Walisono Law Review (Walrev)* 5, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.21580/walrev.2023.5.2.14414>.

consequences.<sup>6</sup> The entrenchment of patronage politics and the weakness of legal institutions further enable systemic corruption.<sup>7</sup>

In response to these challenges, term limits and other restrictions on political office have been widely proposed as potential solutions.<sup>8</sup> These measures stem from the recognition that corruption is often driven by unchecked power and incentives, both economic and political, that encourage misconduct.<sup>9</sup> Power can corrupt moral judgment, and when it becomes absolute, corruption can become pervasive.<sup>10</sup> In such circumstances, even influential individuals may succumb to moral degradation. When authority guarantees moral decay rather than accountability, it loses legitimacy. True authority should serve freedom rather than suppress it. Human beings naturally tend to accumulate power when circumstances allow, and they rarely accept limitations that restrict personal will.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, unchecked power not only demoralizes officials but also undermines broader societal trust and governance.

Legal scholars and policymakers argue that term limits can reduce the duration during which officials have access to public resources, thereby minimizing opportunities for abuse.<sup>12</sup> However, the effectiveness of term limits remains debated. Without complementary mechanisms, such as transparency, accountability, and active public participation, term limits risk becoming

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<sup>6</sup> Febri Handayani, "The Pernicious Consequences of Political Corruption In Indonesia," *Prophetic Law Review* 1, no. 1 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.20885/plr.vol1.iss1.art1>.

<sup>7</sup> Hufon and Sulton Fikri, "The Urgency of Regulating Forfeiture of Assets Gained From Corruption in Indonesia," *Legality: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 32, no. 2 (2024): 292–310, <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v32i2.35243>.

<sup>8</sup> Hendi Yogi Prabowo, Rizki Hamdani, and Zuraidah Mohd Sanusi, "The New Face of People Power: An Exploratory Study on the Potential of Social Media for Combating Corruption in Indonesia," *Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal* 12, no. 3 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v12i3.3>.

<sup>9</sup> Virginie Vial and Julien Hanoteau, "Corruption, Manufacturing Plant Growth, and the Asian Paradox: Indonesian Evidence," *World Development* 38, no. 5 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.022>.

<sup>10</sup> Lord Acton Quote Archive, "Power and Authority," 2025, <https://www.acton.org/research/lord-acton-quote-archive#:~:text=Power tends to corrupt and,certainty of corruption by authority.>

<sup>11</sup> Ridwan Arifin, Sigit Riyanto, and Akbar Kurnia Putra, "Collaborative Efforts in ASEAN for Global Asset Recovery Frameworks to Combat Corruption in the Digital Era," *Legality: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 31, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v31i2.29381>.

<sup>12</sup> Septiana Rizco Nurfaizi, "Kepala Negara Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Perspektif Siyasa Islam," *DIKTUM: Jurnal Syariah Dan Hukum* 18, no. 2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.35905/diktum.v18i2.1409>.

symbolic gestures with limited impact.<sup>13</sup> In some cases, officials nearing the end of a term may even accelerate the exploitation of public resources, as observed in certain extensions of village head terms.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, weakened institutions and limited oversight can allow officials to circumvent restrictions, highlighting the need for a holistic anti-corruption approach.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, restricting public officials' authority should be viewed as one component of a broader strategy to enhance governance.<sup>16</sup> Term limits must be accompanied by strengthened legal institutions, rigorous oversight mechanisms, and empowered civil society; term limits risk becoming formalistic and ineffective.<sup>17</sup>

Corruption in the public sector remains one of the most significant and detrimental challenges to governance in many countries, including Indonesia.<sup>18</sup> A key contributing factor is the weakness of political office management systems, which often facilitates corrupt behavior among public officials.<sup>19</sup> In this context, restricting public officials' authority, through measures such as term limits, regulating conflicts of interest, and the enhancement of transparency and accountability, has been widely discussed as a potential strategy to curb corruption.<sup>20</sup> Term limits can reduce opportunities for abuse by limiting the

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<sup>13</sup> Mei Susanto, "Hak Angket DPR, KPK Dan Pemberantasan Korupsi," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 4, no. 2 (2018).

<sup>14</sup> M. Fadhillah Harnawansyah, "Dinamika Politik Daerah Dalam Pelaksanaan Sistem Pemilu Umum Legislatif Daerah," *Syntax Literate; Jurnal Ilmiah Indonesia* 4, no. 9 (2019): 50, <https://doi.org/10.36418/syntax-literate.v4i9.710>.

<sup>15</sup> Nenry Fathiyatul Hikmah, "Keberadaan Dewan Pengawas Terhadap Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Perspektif Siyasa Dusturiyah," *Al-Balad: Journal of Constitutional Law* 2, no. 2 (2020).

<sup>16</sup> Noory Okthariza, "Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State of in Indonesia," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 56, no. 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2020.1742957>.

<sup>17</sup> Oly Viana Agustine, Erlina Maria Christin Sinaga, and Rizkisyabana Yulistyaputri, "Politik Hukum Penguatan Kewenangan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 16, no. 2 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1626>.

<sup>18</sup> Muhammad Nasir, "The Government's Strategy and Efforts to Eradicate Corruption in Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Science* 2, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.55324/ijoms.v2i1.271>.

<sup>19</sup> Tanya Jakimow, "A Moral Atmosphere of Development as a Share: Consequences for Urban Development in Indonesia," *World Development* 108 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.03.023>.

<sup>20</sup> A Dirwan, "The Effect of Education against Corruption in Indonesia," *OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development* 12, no. 01 (2019).

duration an official has access to public resources.<sup>21</sup> However, this mechanism is only effective when accompanied by strict oversight and consistent law enforcement. Ensuring transparency in the political management system is equally essential.<sup>22</sup> Greater transparency in budget management and decision-making processes narrows opportunities for misconduct,<sup>23</sup> whereas the absence of transparency can render term limits merely symbolic and ineffective.

Nevertheless, studies highlight potential drawbacks of term limits.<sup>24</sup> In contexts where legal institutions are weak, term limits may inadvertently incentivize officials to minimize personal gain during their limited tenure.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, restricting public officials' authority should be integrated with efforts to strengthen legal institutions and empower civil society, ensuring a comprehensive approach to combating corruption.<sup>26</sup>

Overall, the literature suggests that limiting public officials' authority is a promising approach to mitigating corruption in the public sector. Its success, however, depends on comprehensive policy design, consistent implementation, and the reinforcement of supporting institutions.<sup>27</sup> Reducing corruption among public officials requires not only regulatory reform but also a broader transformation of bureaucratic and political culture. Growing public concern over political office and corruption, particularly in countries like Indonesia,

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<sup>21</sup> Alya Maya and Kresnha Adhy W, "Kewenangan Hukum Administrasi Terkait Penyalahgunaan Wewenang Dalam Tindak Pidana Korupsi Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Komunitas Yustisia* 4, no. 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.23887/jatayu.v4i3.43738>.

<sup>22</sup> Siti Nurhayati, "Dinamika Perkembangan Demokrasi Serta Problematikanya Pasca Reformasi," *As-Shahifah: Journal of Constitutional Law and Governance* 3, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.19105/asshahifah.v3i1.8282>.

<sup>23</sup> Wessy Trisna et al., "Examination of the Legal Protection for Indirect Crime Victims of Corruption in Indonesia," *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change* 11, no. 8 (2020).

<sup>24</sup> Fahrizal S.Siagian, "Optimizing Lawrence Meir Friedman's Legal System Theory in the Authority to Investigate Corruption Crimes in Indonesia," *JUSTICES: Journal of Law* 2, no. 4 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.58355/justices.v2i4.93>.

<sup>25</sup> Tinuk Dwi Cahyani and Halimatus Khalidawati Salmah, "Legal Construction of Asset Recovery for Crime of Corruption in Indonesia," *KnE Social Sciences*, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.18502/kss.v8i21.14813>.

<sup>26</sup> Khalid Idris Nuhu, "The Legal Implication of Political Defection on Nigeria's Democracy," *Sriwijaya Law Review* 5, no. 2 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.28946/slrev.Vol5.Iss2.1060.pp247-261>.

<sup>27</sup> Rohmadi, Supanto, Hari Purwadi, "The Existence of Justice Collaborator in Fastening The Eradication of Corruption Crime In Indonesia," *Psychology and Education Journal* 58, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.17762/pae.v58i1.1037>.

underscores the importance of robust oversight systems.<sup>28</sup> When combined with term limits, these systems can serve as effective tools for promoting transparent, accountable, and ethical governance.

This study employs a qualitative case study approach to examine the effectiveness of political term limits in curbing corruption among public officials.<sup>29</sup> Data were obtained through document analysis, including anti-corruption laws, state audit reports, and academic literature. The analysis was conducted thematically using an interpretative approach<sup>30</sup> to identify patterns and relationships between term limits, corrupt practices, and the misuse of authority.

The study highlights the involvement of state officials, particularly those affiliated with political parties, in corruption cases, including the role of corporations as legal actors. The analysis is grounded in constitutional theories, such as Montesquieu's separation of powers<sup>31</sup> and the broader concept of constitutionalism, which emphasize limiting state power through law to prevent abuse and protect individual rights. Scholars such as Hans Kelsen<sup>32</sup> and John Locke have similarly emphasized the importance of basic legal norms, institutional oversight, and popular control.<sup>33</sup>

Political corruption, as defined by Robert Klitgaard, refers to the misuse of authority by democratically elected officials for personal gain.<sup>34</sup> It differs from bureaucratic corruption in that it involves actors who exercise control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Within this framework, political parties and corporations are recognized as actors capable of

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<sup>28</sup> Muhtar Hadi Wibowo, "Corporate Responsibility in Money Laundering Crime (Perspective Criminal Law Policy in Crime of Corruption in Indonesia)," *Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies* 3, no. 2 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.15294/jils.v3i02.22740>.

<sup>29</sup> Philipp A.E. Mayring, "Qualitative Content Analysis," in *International Encyclopedia of Education: Fourth Edition*, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-818630-5.11031-0>.

<sup>30</sup> J. W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (United Kingdom: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014).

<sup>31</sup> Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws, The Spirit of Laws*, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.2711560>.

<sup>32</sup> Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State, General Theory of Law and State*, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203790960>.

<sup>33</sup> Hans Kelsen, *Pure theory of law*. Univ of California Press, 1967; John Dunn, "Consent in the political theory of John Locke." *The Historical Journal* 10, no. 2 (1967): 153-182.

<sup>34</sup> Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption, Controlling Corruption*, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520911185>.

committing corruption-related offenses.<sup>35</sup>

Although corporations have been legally recognized as subjects in Indonesia since the enactment of the Goods Hoarding Law (1951) and subsequently special laws, the Indonesian Criminal Code primarily regards individuals as the main subjects of criminal law. The involvement of corporations in corruption cases is analyzed through legal doctrines such as the functional perpetrator theory, identification theory, vicarious liability, and strict liability.<sup>36</sup> These doctrines are essential for establishing the criminal liability of corporations, including political parties, in corruption-related offenses.

This study contributes to the governance literature by emphasizing the relationship between political term limits and the reduction of corrupt practices among public officials.<sup>37</sup> It offers a novel perspective on how term limits can function as an anti-corruption mechanism, an area that has received relatively little attention in previous studies. Furthermore, the study presents a conceptual framework for evaluating the effectiveness of political term limits across diverse social, cultural, and political contexts. As such, it provides both theoretical insights and practical recommendations for policymakers seeking to design more effective anti-corruption strategies.

Although the Indonesian Constitution imposes strict term limits on the Presidency in line with constitutionalism's demand for limited government, similar constraints are not uniformly applied to other influential public offices such as governors, mayors, and ministers. This asymmetry contradicts Montesquieu's maxim against concentrated power. Extending tenure restrictions and permitting revocation of political rights for corruption offences, therefore, aligns with Indonesia's constitutional commitment to preventing abuse of authority.

## Policy and Limitation of Power

Corruption represents one of the most significant threats to a country's stability and development.<sup>38</sup> To address this challenge, governments worldwide have implemented various policies and mechanisms aimed at limiting the

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<sup>35</sup> Daniel Nyberg, "Corporations, Politics, and Democracy: Corporate Political Activities as Political Corruption," *Organization Theory* 2, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720982618>.

<sup>36</sup> Ramelan, "Pertanggungjawaban Korporasi Dalam Hukum Pidana," *Jurnal Hukum PRIORIS* 1, no. 2 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.25105/prio.v1i2.318>.

<sup>37</sup> Handayani, "The Pernicious Consequences of Political Corruption In Indonesia."

<sup>38</sup> Ghulam K Shabbir, Mumtaz Anwar, and Shahid Adil. "Corruption, political stability and economic growth." *The Pakistan Development Review* (2016): 689-702.

concentration of power.<sup>39</sup> Anti-corruption measures aim to promote transparency, accountability, and effective oversight in governance.<sup>40</sup> A central strategy involves the implementation of good governance, which emphasizes transparency, public participation, accountability, and adherence to the rule-of-law.<sup>41</sup>

Restricting the concentration of power is a crucial measure to prevent the misuse of authority by public officials. In this context, the separation of powers serves as a fundamental principle,<sup>42</sup> distributing state authority across three main branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, so that each branch can monitor and balance the others through a system of checks and balances.<sup>43</sup> By constraining power in this manner, acts of corruption become more difficult to commit due to the integration of oversight mechanisms.<sup>44</sup>

Another key component of anti-corruption strategies is the establishment of independent agencies tasked with investigating and prosecuting corruption. In Indonesia, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) plays a significant role in combating corruption.<sup>45</sup> The KPK possesses special powers to conduct inquiries, investigations, and prosecutions of corruption cases,

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<sup>39</sup> Syed Raza Shah Gilani, Zahid Ullah, and Shehla Zahoor, "Democracy, Economic Development, and the Separation of Powers in the 1973 Constitution Pakistan: A Critical Analysis," *Qlantic Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 4, no. 3 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55737/qjssh.401499812>.

<sup>40</sup> Imam Sukadi and Erfaniah Zuhriah, "The Legal Policy of Judicial Power: The Idea of Implementation of Small Claim Courts in Religious Courts," *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum Dan Syar'iah* 13, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v13i1.10913>.

<sup>41</sup> Budi Setiyono, "Does Governance Reform in a Democratic Transition Country Reduce the Risk of Corruption? Evidence from Indonesia," in *Corruption, Good Governance and Economic Development: Contemporary Analysis and Case Studies*, 2014, [https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814612593\\_0011](https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814612593_0011).

<sup>42</sup> Zia Akhtar, "Montesquieu's Theory of the Separation of Powers, Legislative Flexibility and Judicial Restraint in an Unwritten Constitution," *Amicus Curiae* 4, no. 3 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.14296/ac.v4i3.5616>.

<sup>43</sup> Alif Duta Hardenta and Tariq Hidayat Pangestu, "Penataan Kewenangan Kelembagaan dan Pemberian Batasan Konstitusional Sebagai Upaya Penataan Proses Legislasi Pasca Amandemen UUD NRI Tahun 1945," *Jurist-Diction* 4, no. 2 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.20473/jd.v4i2.25748>.

<sup>44</sup> Jovial Falah Parama and Sholahuddin Al-Fatih, "Kajian Yuridis Ambivalensi Pergeseran Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Kpk) Ke Dalam Rumpun Lembaga Eksekutif," *Journal Komunitas Yustisia Universitas Pendidikan Ganesha Program Studi Ilmu Hukum* 4, no. 1 (2021).

<sup>45</sup> Zainal Arifin Mochtar, "Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Pasca Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 18, no. 2 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1823>.



particularly those involving high-ranking officials or resulting in substantial state losses.<sup>46</sup> Its institutional independence ensures that it can operate without undue political influence or external pressure.<sup>47</sup>

**TABLE 1.** Regulations in state laws governing the authority of public officials

No	Name of Law	Number & Year	Substance
1	Anti-Corruption Law	UU No. 31 of 1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Prohibits abuse of power for unlawful personal or third-party gain.</li> <li>– Imposes strict sanctions, including imprisonment and fines.</li> </ul>
2	Government Administration Law	UU No. 30 of 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Limits administrative decision-making authority of public officials.</li> <li>– Provides mechanisms for public oversight and dispute resolution via the State Administrative Court (PTUN).</li> </ul>
3	Anti-Corruption Law (Corruption Crime)	UU No. 20 of 2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Increases criminal penalties for corruption that harm the state.</li> <li>– Includes provisions for restitution of state losses.</li> </ul>
4	Republic of Indonesia Ombudsman Law	UU No. 37 of 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Establishes an independent body to receive public complaints regarding maladministration and abuse of authority by public officials.</li> </ul>
5	Freedom of Public Information Act	UU No. 14 of 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Guarantees public access to information held by state institutions.</li> <li>– Imposes sanctions on officials obstructing such access.</li> </ul>
6	Environmental Law	UU No. 32 of 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Restricts authority in environmental management.</li> <li>– Imposes legal sanctions on individuals or entities that damage the environment irresponsibly.</li> </ul>
7	Law on the State Administrative Court (PTUN)	UU No. 5 of 1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Provides mechanisms to resolve disputes between citizens and public officials.</li> <li>– Restricts unlawful administrative decisions.</li> </ul>
8	Regional Government Law	UU No. 23 of 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Regulates the distribution of authority between central and regional governments to prevent power centralization.</li> <li>– Authorizes the central government to evaluate regional policies.</li> </ul>
9	Election Law	UU No. 7 of 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Limits the authority of electoral bodies to ensure neutrality and transparency.</li> <li>– Prescribes sanctions for administrative and criminal violations during elections.</li> </ul>
10	Law on the KPK	UU No. 19 of 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Strengthens the KPK's mandate as an independent anti-corruption agency.</li> </ul>

<sup>46</sup> Susanto, “Hak Angket DPR, KPK Dan Pemberantasan Korupsi”

<sup>47</sup> Arfiani, “Prinsip Kemandirian Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Dalam Dinamika Ketatanegaraan,” *UNES Journal of Swara Justisia* 7, no. 3 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.31933/ujsj.v7i3.430>.

No	Name of Law	Number & Year	Substance
			– Establishes a system of checks and balances for monitoring power among state institutions.

Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration contains broad discretionary powers without sufficiently detailed procedural safeguards. This creates opportunities for long-serving officials to exploit these gaps over multiple terms. Therefore, external structural restrictions, such as tenure limits, serve as necessary corrective measures when internal administrative controls prove inadequate.

Legal regulations (*Undang-Undang* or UU) in Indonesia provide a framework for limiting the authority of public officials to promote transparency, accountability, and the prevention of power abuse. The anti-corruption laws (Law No. 31 of 1999 and UU No. 20 of 2001) serve as the foundation for firm action against corruption, emphasizing criminal sanctions and the recovery of state losses. Despite this, enforcement challenges persist, particularly regarding elite-level corruption.

Similarly, the Government Administration Law (UU No. 30 of 2014) and the Law on the State Administrative Court (UU No. 5 of 1986) provide mechanisms for monitoring and constraining administrative authority, including dispute resolution via the PTUN. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms is frequently undermined by protracted legal processes and limited public awareness.

The Freedom of Public Information Act (UU No. 14 of 2008) enhances transparency by granting public access to state-held information. However, its exception clauses are often exploited to obscure certain policies. A similar challenge arises under the Environmental Law (UU No. 32 of 2009), where restrictions on governmental power in environmental management are frequently neglected due to weak regional oversight and collusion between officials and businesses. The Election Law (UU No. 7 of 2017) aims to uphold democratic integrity by restricting the discretionary power of election organizers; however, persistent issues such as money politics and political interference indicate that implementation remains inadequate.

The establishment of independent oversight bodies, such as the Ombudsman (UU No. 37 of 2008), provides a formal channel for citizens to report maladministration and abuse of power. However, the Ombudsman's limited power to impose sanctions diminishes its effectiveness. Similarly, the Regional Government Law (UU No. 23 of 2014), which delineates the distribution of authority between central and local governments, often suffers

from poor coordination, resulting in overlapping policies and legal inconsistencies. Furthermore, amendments to the KPK Law (UU No. 19 of 2019) have weakened the Commission's independence, raising concerns about the politicization of anti-corruption efforts and eroding public confidence in the government's commitment to curbing corruption.

Although Indonesia has established a robust legal framework to curb the abuse of power, the effectiveness of these regulations is hindered by weak law enforcement, regulatory gaps, and limited public participation. To address these challenges, it is essential to strengthen independent oversight, implement stricter audits, and enhance legal literacy among citizens. These measures are fundamental to realizing transparent, accountable, and ethical governance.

In addition to structural reforms, anti-corruption policies must emphasize preventive strategies. These include increasing transparency in budget management, implementing e-government systems, and developing whistleblowing mechanisms to protect individuals who report corrupt practices.<sup>48</sup> The adoption of digital technologies, such as electronic procurement platforms and online corruption-reporting tools, can significantly reduce opportunities for misconduct within the bureaucracy.

Bureaucratic reform is another vital component of corruption prevention. Such reforms should streamline administrative procedures, improve civil servant welfare, and institutionalize merit-based appointments.<sup>49</sup> Addressing these areas minimizes loopholes for corruption, resulting in more efficient and integrity-driven service delivery.

Civil society, academia, and mass media play an essential role in raising public awareness of corruption risks and promoting government accountability. Educational programs, anti-corruption campaigns, and integrity training in schools help cultivate a culture of ethics and integrity. Community participation is equally important;<sup>50</sup> civic engagement in monitoring government activities creates social pressures that deter corrupt practices.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Syah Awaluddin and Sartje Sarah Alfons, "Between Worship and Bribery: Charity in the Shadow of Electoral Politics" 17, no. 1 (2025): 4–6.

<sup>49</sup> Wahbi Rahman et al., "Discretion of Government Officials Detrimental to State Finances: The Intersection Between Administrative Illegality and Criminal Illegality," *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum* 20, no. 2 (2024): 230–49, <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v20i2.64129>.

<sup>50</sup> I T Sutarna, D A Santo, and K Husna, "Kebijakan Antikorupsi Dan Dinamika Perlawanannya: Suatu Banalitas Di Indonesia," *Journal Law and Government* 1, no. 1 (2023).

<sup>51</sup> Archibald Cox and John Hart Ely, "Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review," *Harvard Law Review* 94, no. 3 (1981), <https://doi.org/10.2307/1340684>.

The mass media, civil society organizations, and academia play an essential role in educating citizens, raising awareness about the risks of corruption, and ensuring government accountability.<sup>52</sup> Anti-corruption campaigns, integrity training, and educational programs in schools are fundamental to cultivating a culture of integrity in society.<sup>53</sup>

However, these measures cannot succeed without strong political commitment. National leaders, political parties, and high-ranking officials must exemplify integrity and transparency.<sup>54</sup> Fair and consistent law enforcement, applied impartially, is essential to restore public trust.<sup>55</sup> Strict penalties, including imprisonment, substantial fines, and revocation of political rights, act as effective deterrents and reduce the likelihood of future offenses.<sup>56</sup>

Addressing corruption requires multi-sectoral collaboration among government institutions, law enforcement agencies, civil society, and the private sector.<sup>57</sup> Integration of effective policies, rigorous oversight, and a culture of integrity can substantially reduce corruption.<sup>58</sup> Successful anti-corruption efforts not only enhance public trust but also contribute to economic

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<sup>52</sup> Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Svensson, "The Emergence of Network Media Logic in Political Communication: A Theoretical Approach," *New Media and Society* 17, no. 8 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814522952>.

<sup>53</sup> Andrew Chadwick, *The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power, Second Edition, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power, Second Edition*, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190696726.001.0001>.

<sup>54</sup> Charren Hendrik, "Strategi Penguatan Hukum Administrasi Negara Dalam Memberantas Praktik Korupsi Yang Dilakukan Pejabat Administrasi Negara," *Indonesian State Law Review* 5, no. 1 (2022).

<sup>55</sup> Tanu Iswantonono and Elvira Angelia Mangori Kadembo, "Memperbaiki Tata Kelola Pemerintahan: Analisis Masalah Antikorupsi, Hukum, Dan Kebijakan Kontemporer," *Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Bonum Commune* 2, no. 2 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.30996/jhbbs.v2i2.2598>.

<sup>56</sup> Yaris Adhial Fajrin and Ach Faisol Triwijaya, "Pencegahan Korupsi Melalui Pencabutan Hak Politik Sebuah Telaah Dari Perspektif Pembaruan Hukum Pidana Indonesia," *Pandecta Research Law Journal* 15, no. 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.15294/pandecta.v15i1.18744>. See also Qurrotu Aini, "Study of penal and non-penal approach on prevention of corruption in Indonesia." *Indonesian Journal of Criminal Law Studies* 3, no. 2 (2018): 111-120; Zaka Firma Aditya, and Sholahuddin Al-Fatih. "Monitoring of Litigation Costs and Efforts to Eradicate Judicial Corruption Practices." *Indonesian Journal of Advocacy and Legal Services* 2, no. 2 (2020): 261-276. <https://doi.org/10.15294/ijals.v2i2.23020>

<sup>57</sup> Sigit Prabawa Nugraha, "Kebijakan Perampasan Aset Hasil Tindak Pidana Korupsi," *National Conference For Law Studies*, 2020.

<sup>58</sup> Hikmah, "Keberadaan Dewan Pengawas Terhadap Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Perspektif Siyasah Dusturiyah."

development, political stability, and societal well-being.<sup>59</sup> One key strategy is limiting the terms of office of public officials, which ensures leadership renewal and reduces opportunities for power abuse. These restrictions carry both legal and ethical implications, such as discouraging political dynasties by preventing officials from promoting successors within their immediate family.<sup>60</sup>

Nevertheless, challenges persist. Some officials exploit legal loopholes to extend their tenure beyond the permitted terms.<sup>61</sup> Effective oversight and coordination among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are therefore critical for upholding the integrity of these regulations.<sup>62</sup> Active community participation is also vital,<sup>63</sup> enhanced civic engagement exerts social pressure on officials to act transparently and responsibly.<sup>64</sup> In this context, restricting political tenure emerges as a vital strategy to combat corruption and strengthen democratic governance in Indonesia.

## Challenges in Law Enforcement for Combating Corruption in Indonesia

Efforts to combat corruption remain one of the most persistent challenges for many countries, including Indonesia, due to the systemic and deeply

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<sup>59</sup> Julieta Peveri, "The Wise, the Politician, and the Strongman: Types of National Leaders and Quality of Governance," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 50, no. 4 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2022.06.001>.

<sup>60</sup> Yacov Tsur, "Political Tenure, Term Limits and Corruption," *European Journal of Political Economy* 74 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102166>.

<sup>61</sup> Ro'is Alfauzi, "Pembatasan Kekuasaan Berdasarkan Paham Konstitusionalisme Di Negara Demokrasi," *Jurnal Politika* 7, no. 2 (2017).

<sup>62</sup> Ohad Raveh and Yacov Tsur, "Can Resource Windfalls Reduce Corruption?: The Role of Term Limits," *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 122 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102891>.

<sup>63</sup> Widhy Andrian Pratama, "Penegakan Hukum Terhadap Korupsi Di Era Modernisasi Digital," *SEIKAT: Jurnal Ilmu Sosial, Politik dan Hukum* 3, no. 1 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.55681/seikat.v3i1.1227>. See also Abdul Jalil, Aga Natalis, and Dewi Rembulan. "Community Engagement in Eradicating Corruption: Evaluating the Effectiveness and Reward Models for Whistleblowers as a Regional Strategy." *Jurnal Pengabdian Hukum Indonesia* 8, no. 1 (2025): 23-92. <https://doi.org/10.15294/jphi.v8i1.20440>

<sup>64</sup> Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor, and Quoc Anh Do, "Instability and the Incentives for Corruption," *Economics and Politics* 21, no. 1 (2009), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00335.x>.

entrenched nature of corrupt practices.<sup>65</sup> A major obstacle is the lack of strong political will.<sup>66</sup> When national leaders and high-ranking officials are not genuinely committed to reform, anti-corruption institutions frequently face political interference, ranging from restrictions on their authority to pressure on judicial processes.<sup>67</sup>

Weaknesses in the legal and regulatory frameworks further compound these challenges. Overlapping regulations, procedural loopholes, and lengthy legal processes create opportunities for corrupt actors to evade responsibility or prolong cases until public attention diminishes.<sup>68</sup> These structural gaps significantly reduce the deterrent effect of existing anti-corruption laws.

The justice system itself is not immune to corruption. Cases of bribery involving judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement personnel erode public trust and reinforce the perception that law enforcement is selectively—often targeting individuals without strong political or economic backing.<sup>69</sup> This contributes to a climate of impunity.

Cultural factors also play a role. Bribery, nepotism, and collusion have become normalized in everyday bureaucratic interactions, creating social resistance to anti-corruption reforms.<sup>70</sup> In such contexts, legal interventions alone are insufficient without parallel efforts to shift societal norms.<sup>71</sup> Report of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) showed that Indonesia's score stagnated at 34 in 2023, the same as in 2022, causing its global ranking to decline from 110th to 115th. Indonesia's highest historical score was 40 (2019). This stagnation indicates that governmental initiatives have not

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<sup>65</sup> Darmawan Sigit Pranoto and Teguh Kurniawan, "Tiga Tahun Reformasi Kelembagaan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi: Sebuah Analisis Narasi Kebijakan," *Jurnal Anti Korupsi* 8, no. 2 (2022).

<sup>66</sup> Arlen Intani, "Analysis of the Closed Proportional Implementation Plan in the 2024 Election," *Indonesian Journal of Advanced Research* 2, no. 3 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55927/ijar.v2i3.3454>.

<sup>67</sup> Kartika Sasi Wahyuningrum, Hari Sutra Disemadi, and Nyoman Serikat Putra Jaya, "Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi: Benarkah Ada?," *Refleksi Hukum: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 4, no. 2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.24246/jrh.2020.v4.i2.p239-258>.

<sup>68</sup> dkk. Susanti, Dwi Siska, "Korporasi Indonesia Melawan Korupsi: Strategi Pencegahan," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 4, no. 2 (2018).

<sup>69</sup> Michael Smart and Daniel M. Sturm, "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," *Journal of Public Economics* 107 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.08.011>.

<sup>70</sup> Bambang Slamet Riyadi, Basuki Rekso Wibowo, and Vinita Susanti, "Culture of Corruption Politicians' Behavior in Parliament and State Official during Reform Government Indonesia (Genealogical Study)," *International Journal of Criminology and Sociology* 9 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2020.09.06>.

<sup>71</sup> Yustia and Arifin, "Bureaucratic Reform as an Effort to Prevent Corruption in Indonesia."

produced meaningful progress and that corruption among political and public officials remains widespread.

Another important indicator is the Anti-Corruption Behavior Index (IPAK) released by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS). The 2023 IPAK score reached 3.93 (on a 0–5 scale), a slight decrease from 2022 and below the RPJMN target of 4.09.<sup>72</sup> This decline demonstrates ongoing weaknesses in public integrity and anti-corruption behavior across institutions.<sup>73</sup>

Public sentiment reflects similar concerns. A 2024 survey by Indicators found that 35% of respondents believed anti-corruption efforts had worsened, while only 32.7% perceived improvement. These perceptions align with data on potential state losses, which amounted to IDR 42.7 trillion in 2023, a significant figure despite being IDR 28.4 trillion lower than in previous years.<sup>74</sup> Although this reduction suggests some progress in detection or reporting, the amount remains substantial. Corruption, as an economically motivated crime, causes serious financial damage, weakens public service delivery, and obstructs efforts to achieve economic stability and national welfare.<sup>75</sup> Persistent financial irregularities across ministries, regional government, and village administrations highlight ongoing vulnerabilities in Indonesia's financial governance system.<sup>76</sup>

Given these conditions, strengthening oversight mechanisms is imperative. This includes enhancing internal and external audit systems, increasing transparency in financial management, and ensuring timely public access to government expenditure data.<sup>77</sup> Without these measures, efforts to reduce corruption will remain limited and fragmented.

Reforms to strengthen Indonesia's anti-corruption framework must begin with improvements to the national financial management system, guided by the

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<sup>72</sup> ICW, "Laporan Hasil Pemantauan Tren Korupsi Tahun 2023," *Divisi Hukum Dan Monitoring Peradilan*, 2020, [https://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/default/files/dokumen/Narasi\\_Laporan\\_Hasil\\_Pemantauan\\_Tren\\_Korupsi\\_Tahun\\_2023.pdf](https://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/default/files/dokumen/Narasi_Laporan_Hasil_Pemantauan_Tren_Korupsi_Tahun_2023.pdf).

<sup>73</sup> Anja Osei, Hervé Akincho, and Stephen Mwombela, "Presidential Term Limits and Regime Types: When Do Leaders Respect Constitutional Norms?," *Africa Spectrum* 55, no. 3 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720945720>.

<sup>74</sup> ICW, "Laporan Hasil Pemantauan Tren Korupsi Tahun 2023."

<sup>75</sup> Paola Conconi, Nicolas Sahuguet, and Maurizio Zanardi, "Electoral Incentives, Term Limits, and the Sustainability of Peace," *European Journal of Political Economy* 51 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.04.002>.

<sup>76</sup> Jundiani Jundiani, "Kewenangan Kelembagaan Negara Setelah Perubahan UUD 1945," *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum Dan Syariah* 2, no. 1 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v2i1.45>.

<sup>77</sup> Yusri Munaf, "Konstitusi dan Kelembagaan Negara," *Konstitusi Dan Kelembagaan Negara*, 2014.

core principles of good governance.<sup>78</sup> In this regard, state officials are legally obligated to comply with the principles outlined in Article 3(1) of Law No. 17 of 2003 on State Finance, namely accountability, professionalism, proportionality, transparency, and independent financial audit. These principles form the foundation of discipline fiscal governance and are essential to preventing misuse of state resources.

In the area of law enforcement, greater priority must be placed on asset recovery.<sup>79</sup> According to findings from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), Indonesia's asset recovery performance remains significantly below expectations.<sup>80</sup> Weak recovery efforts not only enable corrupt actors to retain illegally acquired wealth but also hinder the uncovering of new cases, as potential whistleblowers are often discouraged from reporting corruption when protection and follow-up mechanisms are inadequate.

Law enforcement institutions also continue to face serious limitations in human resources, technological capacity, and financial support.<sup>81</sup> These deficiencies are especially evident in complex or transnational corruption cases, which require advanced forensic accounting, sophisticated digital-tracing technologies, and strong international cooperation, capacities that remain uneven across Indonesian agencies.<sup>82</sup>

The lack of robust protection for whistleblowers presents another critical challenge. Individuals who expose corruption frequently face intimidation, physical threats, workplace retaliation, or legal harassment.<sup>83</sup> Without an effective protective mechanism, efforts to encourage public participation in monitoring state institutions remain severely constrained.

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<sup>78</sup> Indroharto, *Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan Yang Baik* (Citra Aditya Bakti, 1994).

<sup>79</sup> Irma Reisalinda Ayuningsih and Febby Mutiara Nelson, "Perampasan Aset Tanpa Pemidanaan Dalam Perspektif Hukum Responsif," *Jurnal Ius Constituendum* 7, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.26623/jic.v7i2.5142>.

<sup>80</sup> Dairani, "Strategi Pencegahan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Pada Pemilu dan Pilkada Serentak 2024," *HUKMY: Jurnal Hukum* 3, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.35316/hukmy.2023.v3i1.346-363>.

<sup>81</sup> Ahmad Zairudin, Dominikus Rato, and Bayu Dwi Anggono, "Konsep Aliran Filsafat Hukum Utilitarianisme Dan Relevansinya Terhadap Konstruksi Pengaturan Pengawasan Pemilu," *Jurnal Rechtsens* 12, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.56013/rechtsens.v12i2.2489>.

<sup>82</sup> Wiyono, Eko Priyo Purnomo, and Linayati Lestari, "Culture of Corruption in the Smart Service System of Global Governance," *Chinese Public Administration Review* 14, no. 3 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1177/15396754231185320>.

<sup>83</sup> Mhd Teguh Syuhada Lubis et al., "The Criminal Law Policy on the General Election System in Indonesia," *Jurnal Dinamika Hukum* 23, no. 3 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.20884/1.jdh.2023.23.3.3782>.



Interference from powerful economic and political actors also obstructs the legal process. Corrupt individuals may leverage political connections, financial resources, and media influence to manipulate investigations, intimidate witnesses, or evade prosecution.<sup>84</sup> The effects of globalization further complicate these issues, as corruption increasingly involves cross-border transactions, offshore accounts, and multinational corporate networks.<sup>85</sup> In the absence of strong international collaboration, enforcement efforts become fragmented and ineffective.

These challenges demonstrate that anti-corruption laws enforcement must be approached through a holistic and integrated strategy. Comprehensive legal reform, institutional strengthening, and a transformation of societal norms that tolerate corruption are essential components of this effort.<sup>86</sup> Enhanced public participation, effective oversight institutions, and close international collaboration are equally vital.<sup>87</sup> Without these strategic measures, corruption will continue to threaten national development, democratic governance, and the overall well-being of Indonesian society.

**TABLE 2.** Summary of Major Corruption Cases in Indonesia

Case	Year	Involved Parties	Case Description	Punishment	Source
Corruption e-KTP	2017–2019	Setya Novanto (Chairman of the DPR), DPR members, Ministry of Home Affairs officials, contractors	Corruption in the electronic ID card (e-KTP) procurement project is worth IDR 5.9 trillion. Officials received bribes to facilitate the project.	Setya Novanto was sentenced to 15 years in prison and fined IDR 500 million. Several other officials were also imprisoned.	<a href="https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/02/04/12351421/awal-mula-case-corruption-e-KTP-yang-Had+a+moment+of+excitement+in+the+DPR+until+it+was+dragged+down?+page=al">https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/02/04/12351421/awal-mula-case-corruption-e-KTP-yang-Had a moment of excitement in the DPR until it was dragged down? page=al</a>

<sup>84</sup> Dwi Martiningsih, “Peran Masyarakat Madani Mewujudkan Clean Government (Pemerintahan Yang Bebas Korupsi Kolusi dan Nepotisme),” *PUSAKA* 5, no. 2 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.31969/pusaka.v5i2.180>.

<sup>85</sup> Oly Viana Agustine, “RUU Perampasan Aset Sebagai Peluang dan Tantangan dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi di Indonesia,” *Hukum Pidana dan Pembangunan Hukum* 1, no. 2 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.25105/hpph.v1i2.5546>.

<sup>86</sup> Wicipto Setiadi, “Pembangunan Hukum Dalam Rangka Peningkatan Supremasi Hukum (Development of Law in Order to Enhancement Supremacy of Law),” *Jurnal Rechtsvinding* 1, no. 1 (2012).

<sup>87</sup> J. Sebastian Leguizamon and George R. Crowley, “Term Limits, Time Horizons and Electoral Accountability,” *Public Choice* 168, no. 1–2 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0347-2>.

Case	Year	Involved Parties	Case Description	Punishment	Source
Social Assistance (Bansos) Corruption	2020	Juliari Batubara (Minister of Social Affairs).	Bribery related to COVID-19 social aid. Juliari received bribes from suppliers of basic necessities.	Multiple officials, including Juliari, received personal sentences.	<a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7410700/4-hal-terkini-di-kasus-korupsi-bansos-presiden-2020-diusut-kpk">https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7410700/4-hal-terkini-di-kasus-korupsi-bansos-presiden-2020-diusut-kpk</a> .
Medical Equipment Procurement Corruption	2020	Ministry of Health officials.	Inflated prices and misappropriation of funds in COVID-19 medical procurement projects.	Several officials imprisoned.	<a href="https://www.kpk.go.id/id/ruang-informasi/berita/kpk-tetapkan-3-tersangka-korupsi-pengadaan-alat-pelindung-diri">https://www.kpk.go.id/id/ruang-informasi/berita/kpk-tetapkan-3-tersangka-korupsi-pengadaan-alat-pelindung-diri</a> .
Palm Oil Export Permit Corruption	2024	Director General of Foreign Trade, Wilmar, Permata Hijau, and Musim Mas Group executives	Corruption in issuing crude palm oil export permits, contributing to rising cooking oil prices, state losses of IDR 6.47 trillion.	- Indrasari Vishnu Wardhana (former Director General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Trade): sentenced to 3 years in prison and fined IDR 100 million.	<a href="https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2024/08/14/111500065/perjalanan-case-corruption-of-cooking-oil-yang-jeret-airlangga-hartarto?page=all">https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2024/08/14/111500065/perjalanan-case-corruption-of-cooking-oil-yang-jeret-airlangga-hartarto?page=all</a>
				- Master Parulian Tumanggor (Commissioner of PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia): sentenced to 1.5 years in prison and fined IDR 100 million. - Stanley MA (Senior Manager of Corporate Affairs at Permata Hijau Group): sentenced to 1 year in prison and fined IDR 100 million. - Pierre Togar Sitanggang (General Manager of PT Musim Mas): sentenced to 1 year in prison and fined IDR 100 million. - Lin Che Wei (consultant involved in the case): sentenced to 1 year in prison and fined IDR 100 million. This ruling was deemed lenient by many, given the significant state losses caused by the actions involved.	
PT Duta Palma Group Land Corruption	2022	Surya Darmadi (businessman), Raja Thamsir Rachman (former Regent	Illegally acquired 37,095 hectares of land in Riau. State losses are estimated at IDR	Surya Darmadi was sentenced to 15 years in prison and fined IDR 1 billion. Raja Thamsir received a 9-year sentence.	<a href="https://www.tempo.co/hukum/kejaung-sita-uang-rp-301-miliar-terkait-kasus-korupsi">https://www.tempo.co/hukum/kejaung-sita-uang-rp-301-miliar-terkait-kasus-korupsi</a>

Case	Year	Involved Parties	Case Description	Punishment	Source
		of Indragiri Hulu)	4.7 trillion and USD 7.8 million, with a broader economic impact reaching IDR 73.9 trillion.		pt-duta-palma-group-1167307
Illegal Condensate Processing at Tuban Refinery	2009–2011	Raden Priyono (former Head of BP Migas), Djoko Harsono (former Deputy for Economic Finance), Honggo Wendratno (President Director of PT TPPI)	Corruption involving PT Trans-Pacific Petrochemical Indotama (TPPI) caused state losses of USD 2.7 billion (approx. IDR 37.8 trillion).	Raden Priyono and Djoko Harsono were each sentenced to 12 years. Honggo Wendratno was sentenced in absentia to 16 years but remains at large.	<a href="https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/trial-in-absentia-defendant—condensate-sued-lt5edf2ed81f9dc">https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/trial-in-absentia-defendant—condensate-sued-lt5edf2ed81f9dc</a>

These high-profile corruption cases demonstrate the persistent and systemic challenges Indonesia faces in eradicating corruption, particularly among senior officials and within strategic sectors. The e-KTP scandal (2017–2019), for example, implicated Setya Novanto, then Chairman of the DPR, and involved the misappropriation of IDR 5.9 trillion. Similarly, the COVID social assistance (*Bansos*) case exposed how emergency aid funds were exploited by the Minister of Social Affairs for personal gain, revealing serious failures in oversight during crises. Both cases clearly illustrated how entrenched corruption undermines governance, weakens public trust, and diverts resources intended for public welfare.

A second major case, the 2020 COVID-19 Social Assistance corruption scandal, centered on Juliari Batubara, the Minister of Social Affairs at the time. He was found guilty of accepting bribes from contractors responsible for supplying basic food aid to communities affected by the pandemic. As a result, assistance meant for vulnerable households was diverted for personal benefit. Juliari received a 12-year prison sentence and a fine of IDR 500 million. This case highlights the fragility of monitoring mechanisms within emergency welfare programs and the ease with which corrupt actors can exploit crises.

The third case involves corruption in the procurement of medical equipment (*Alkes*) in 2020, which implicated several Ministry of Health officials. During procurement efforts intended to mitigate the COVID-19 crisis, officials inflated prices and misused state budget allocations. Multiple individuals were subsequently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. This case reveals several shortcomings in integrity, transparency, and budgetary

control in the health sector, even at a time when effective resource management was critically needed.<sup>88</sup>

Taken together, these three cases reflect broader patterns of corruption in Indonesia: the abuse of public office, weak institutional oversight, and systematic misconduct within programs designed to serve the public interest.<sup>89</sup> Addressing these issues requires a comprehensive strategy that includes strengthening legal frameworks, improving supervisory mechanisms, and expanding anti-corruption education to prevent recurrence.<sup>90</sup>

**TABLE 3.** Summary of Major Corruption Cases Worldwide

Case	Year	Involved Parties	Case Description	Punishment	Source
Operation Car Wash (Operation Lava Jato)	2014	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (the president of Brazil), Dilma Rousseff (the president of Brazil), Petrobras officials, and businessmen.	A major corruption scandal involving Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Politicians, state officials, and businesspeople accepted bribes in exchange for contracts.	Lula da Silva was sentenced (later overturned), Rousseff was impeached, and others were imprisoned.	<a href="https://clp.law.harvard.edu/knowledge-hub/magazine/issues/brazilian-legal-profession/operation-car-wash/">https://clp.law.harvard.edu/knowledge-hub/magazine/issues/brazilian-legal-profession/operation-car-wash/</a>
Varsity Blues (College Admissions Scandal)	2019	University officials, Lori Loughlin, and Felicity Huffman.	Bribery in the college admissions process at elite U.S. universities. Officials accepted payments to falsify academic records and athletic status.	Loughlin and Huffman were sentenced to prison; several others were punished.	<a href="https://yaleailynews.com/blog/2022/05/22/college-admissions-scandal-paints-yale-in-varsity-blues/">https://yaleailynews.com/blog/2022/05/22/college-admissions-scandal-paints-yale-in-varsity-blues/</a>
Corruption in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)	2020	Government officials, businesspeople	Embezzlement and bribery in government contracts, particularly in the energy and infrastructure sectors.	Officials were imprisoned, while businesspeople were fined.	<a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/united-arab-emirates-a-go-to-offshore-haven-for-">https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/united-arab-emirates-a-go-to-offshore-haven-for-</a>

<sup>88</sup> Timothy Besley and Anne Case, "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110, no. 3 (1995), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2946699>.

<sup>89</sup> Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan, "Electoral Accountability and Corruption in Local Governments: Evidence from Audit Reports," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.998235>.

<sup>90</sup> Haryono Umar, "Government Financial Management, Strategy for Preventing Corruption in Indonesia," *The South East Asian Journal of Management* 5, no. 1 (2013), <https://doi.org/10.21002/seam.v5i1.1793>.

Case	Year	Involved Parties	Case Description	Punishment	Source
					africas- political- and- business- elite-leaked- records- show/

These three high-profile corruption cases reflect global patterns of power abuse and inadequate oversight across both governmental and private sectors. The first case, Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato) in Brazil (2014), exposed a massive corruption network centered on Petrobras. High-ranking political leaders, including Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, along with state officials and prominent business figures, were implicated in schemes involving the exchange of bribes for government contracts. The scandal triggered significant political upheaval, resulting in numerous convictions, although Lula da Silva's conviction was later annulled. This case illustrates how entrenched corruption within strategic sectors such as energy can destabilize national governance.

The second case, the 2019 Varsity Blues college admissions scandal in the United States, revealed deep vulnerabilities in the higher education system. Wealthy individuals, including Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman, engaged in bribery schemes to manipulate university admissions processes. Methods included falsifying an athletic profile and tampering with standardized tests. This scandal highlighted systemic inequities in access to higher education and demonstrated that even reputable institutions are not immune to corruption when oversight mechanisms fail.

The third case occurred in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2020 and involved government officials and business actors engaged in embezzlement and bribery linked to major infrastructure and energy-related contracts. These abuses of power allowed individuals to divert state resources for personal benefits, ultimately harming long-term development efforts. Several officials were sentenced to imprisonment, while businesspeople involved received substantial fines. This case emphasizes how corruption in infrastructure development can significantly impede national progress and weaken public confidence in government institutions.<sup>91</sup>

Each of these cases illustrates how prolonged tenure allowed officials to consolidate networks of influence, manipulate procurement systems, and

<sup>91</sup> Ian Senior, "Corruption - The World's Big C," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2011, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.918474>.

repeatedly bypass oversight. Long-term incumbency facilitated durable relationships with business elites, shielding corrupt transactions from detection. Thus, the empirical evidence demonstrates that extended tenure is not merely correlated with corruption, but structurally enables it.

Taken together, these cases demonstrate that corruption is a global challenge affecting critical institutions in both developed and developing countries. Contributing factors commonly include weak oversight systems, insufficient integrity among public officials, and collusion between private and public sectors.<sup>92</sup> Addressing these challenges requires a multidimensional approach, encompassing legal reform, improved transparency, stronger protection for whistleblowers, and enhanced international cooperation to address cross-border corruption.<sup>93</sup>

In Indonesia, law enforcement efforts to combat corruption continue to face substantial obstacles despite the presence of a relatively robust legal framework.<sup>94</sup> Law No. 31 of 1999 on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes (*Tipikor*), as amended by Law No. 20 of 2001, provides a firm legal basis for persecuting corrupt acts, including provisions to recover state losses. However, implementation remains inconsistent due to weak enforcement mechanisms, insufficient integrity within law enforcement institutions, and political interference.<sup>95</sup> These challenges have been compounded by the 2019 revision of the KPK (Law No. 19 of 2019), which many observers view as undermining the independence of the KPK and diminishing public confidence in anti-corruption initiatives.<sup>96</sup>

Furthermore, the State Finance Law (Law No. 17 of 2003), which mandates accountability, transparency, and independent financial audits, is not

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<sup>92</sup> Hendra Karianga, "Law Reform and Improving Asset Recovery in Indonesia: Contemporary Approach," *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization*, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.7176/jlpg/93-15>.

<sup>93</sup> Bo Rothstein, "Fighting Systemic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy," *Daedalus* 147, no. 3 (2018), [https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED\\_a\\_00501](https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00501).

<sup>94</sup> Indah Sri Utari and Ridwan Arifin, "Law Enforcement and Legal Reform in Indonesia and Global Context: How the Law Responds to Community Development?," *Journal of Law and Legal Reform* 1, no. 1 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v1i1.35772>.

<sup>95</sup> Aguinaldo Marbun, "Kewenangan Penyadapan Oleh Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 Tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Dalam Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi," *Jurnal Perspektif Hukum* 2, no. 2 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.35447/jph.v2i2.412>.

<sup>96</sup> Brian Septiadi Daud, Bayu Ardian Aminullah, and Nyoman Serikat Putra Jaya, "Law Enforcement and Overcoming Violations of Money Politic in General Election: Indonesia's Case," *Jurnal Hukum Novelty* 11, no. 2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.26555/novelty.v11i2.a15146>.

consistently enforced. Oversight gaps persist at both national and regional levels, often creating opportunities for corrupt practices. Similarly, the Government Administration Law (Law No. 30 of 2014), intended to regulate administrative dispute resolution, has not effectively prevented abuse of power, largely due to the suboptimal functioning of internal oversight mechanisms within government institutions.

Another pressing problem concerns the limited recovery assets derived from corruption, despite the provisions of Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering (TPPU). Asset recovery remains adequately prioritized, resulting in minimal institution of state losses. Moreover, the implementation of the Public Information Disclosure Law (Law No. 14 of 2008) is frequently weakened by the misuse of exemption clauses, which hinders transparency and obstructs the exposure of high-level corruption.<sup>97</sup>

Collectively, these problems highlight the urgent need for comprehensive reform in Indonesia's anti-corruption and law enforcement systems.<sup>98</sup> Reform must include strengthening regulatory frameworks that protect the independence of anti-corruption agencies, enhancing the integrity and technical capacity of law enforcement personnel, and adopting technology-based monitoring tools to support more effective oversight.<sup>99</sup> Without such systemic, sustained efforts, corruption will remain a persistent and formidable barrier to Indonesia's democratic governance and national development.

## Designing the Rule-of-Law: Addressing Tenure Limitations to Mitigate Corruption

Within the framework of the rule-of-law, principles such as justice, integrity in governance, and transparent and accountable public administration serve as fundamental pillars of a democratic state.<sup>100</sup> One essential measure that

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<sup>97</sup> Khrisna Lintang Satrio Nugroho, "Criminal Law Policy of Justice Collaborator in Corruption Crime Case," *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum* 17, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v17i1.37550>.

<sup>98</sup> Arie Kartika et al., "Law Enforcement in the Recovery of State Funds from Corruption Crimes," *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum* 20, no. 2 (2024): 211–29, <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v20i2.63799>.

<sup>99</sup> Jon S.T. Quah, "Leadership and Culture in Combating Corruption: A Comparative Analysis," *Public Administration and Policy* 25, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1108/PAP-05-2022-0043>.

<sup>100</sup> "Revitalization of Rule of Law, Democracy and Good Governance Ideas as Modern State Pillar," *Public Policy and Administration Research*, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.7176/ppar/9-4-06>.

supports the establishment of a corruption-resistant legal order is the imposition of limits on the duration individuals may hold political office.<sup>101</sup>

Term limits play a significant role in reducing opportunities for corruption.<sup>102</sup> In a system grounded in the rule-of-law, restrictions on political tenure are intended to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual or group, conditions that frequently foster corrupt practices.<sup>103</sup> Leadership rotation also strengthens a culture of transparency and responsibility and prioritizes the public interest over personal or factional agendas.<sup>104</sup>

By restricting the length of time an individual may hold political office, term limits curb the potential for corruption and abuse of power.<sup>105</sup> These limitations help prevent the over-consolidation of power and promote healthier leadership succession.<sup>106</sup> Such safeguards are particularly vital in preventing tendencies toward authoritarianism and unchecked executive dominance.<sup>107</sup> The evolution of presidential term limits in Indonesia can be traced through its constitutional development, including the 1945 Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, the 1950 Provisional Constitution, and the eventual reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Muh Rinaldy Bima and Rizki Ramadani, "Position of Supervisory Board Organ and Its Implications for the Institutional Corruption Eradication Commission," *Law Reform: Jurnal Pembaharuan Hukum* 16, no. 2 (2020): 179–97, <https://doi.org/10.14710/lr.v16i2.33770>.

<sup>102</sup> Fachreja Effendy Nasution, Kristiawanto Kristiawanto, and Santrawan T. Paparang, "Penegakan Hukum Terhadap Korporasi Yang Melakukan Pencucian Uang Dari Hasil Korupsi Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Syntax Fusion* 2, no. 02 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.54543/fusion.v2i02.148>.

<sup>103</sup> Maria Elize H. Mendoza, "Public Means for Private Ends? Local Electoral Incentives and Public Welfare Expenditures," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 43, no. 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1163/2165025X-bja10039>.

<sup>104</sup> Tianfeng Li and Richard C. Feiock, "Explaining State Budget Punctuations: Policy Transparency, Political Institutions, and Electoral Incentives," *Policy Studies Journal* 48, no. 4 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12344>.

<sup>105</sup> Benny Geys and Karsten Mause, "The Limits of Electoral Control: Evidence from Last-Term Politicians," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (2016), <https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12136>.

<sup>106</sup> Michael P. Olson and Jon C. Rogowski, "Legislative Term Limits and Polarization," *Journal of Politics* 82, no. 2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1086/706764>.

<sup>107</sup> Andi Andi, Anang Sujoko, and Wawan Sobari, "Oligarchical Populism; The Analysis of President Joko Widodo's Political Communication," *Technium Social Sciences Journal* 21 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v21i1.3795>.

<sup>108</sup> Edward B Foley, "Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An Exercise in Election Risk Assessment and Management," *51 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal* 309, *Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 501* 51, no. 2 (2019).



Additionally, restricting the authority of public officials reduces the risk of conflicts of interest, as long-term officeholders may develop entrenched networks that undermine the public good.<sup>109</sup> It also helps curb the misuse of state resources, which often escalates with increased tenure and unchecked political influence.<sup>110</sup> Upholding justice, transparency, and accountability is imperative in any rule-of-law system, and limiting political tenure is an effective tool for ensuring that public officials remain committed to serving the nation rather than personal gain.<sup>111</sup> Such restrictions represent a significant step toward reducing corruption and fostering cleaner, more democratic government.<sup>112</sup>

Limiting political terms is also an effective strategy for addressing the root causes of power abuse.<sup>113</sup> One primary benefit is the reduction in the likelihood of power monopolization. When political office is time-bound, the formation of entrenched and systemic corruption networks becomes more difficult.<sup>114</sup> Regular leadership transitions create opportunities for reform and reduce the risk that new officials will become entangled in long-standing corrupt practices.

Increased accountability represents another critical advantage of term limits. Officials who understand that their time in office is limited tend to focus more on achieving tangible and transparent outcomes. They are also more motivated to meet public expectations, aware that they will soon return to

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<sup>109</sup> Saeed Jafari Nia et al., “Systematic Review of Conflict of Interest Studies in Public Administration,” *Public Integrity* 25, no. 5 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2022.2068901>.

<sup>110</sup> Rofi Wahanisa et al., “Problems of Disputes/Conflicts over Land Acquisition towards Development for Public Interest in Indonesia,” *International Journal of Criminology and Sociology* 10 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-4409.2021.10.39>.

<sup>111</sup> Djoko Sigit Sayogo, Sri Budi Cantika Yuli, and Wiyono Wiyono, “Challenges and Critical Factors of Interagency Information Sharing in Indonesia,” *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy* 14, no. 5 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1108/TG-11-2019-0108>.

<sup>112</sup> Ridho Al Izzati et al., “Direct Elections and Trust in State and Political Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia’s Election Reform,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 85, no. June (2024): 102572, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102572>.

<sup>113</sup> Marie J. Dela Rama, Michael E. Lester, and Warren Staples, “The Challenges of Political Corruption in Australia, the Proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission Bill (2020) and the Application of the APUNCAC,” *Laws* 11, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.3390/laws11010007>.

<sup>114</sup> M. Arief Amrullah, “The Potential of Money Laundering in the Regent Election in Indonesia,” *Jurnal Cakrawala Hukum* 13, no. 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.26905/idjch.v13i3.8856>.

private life and thus have a reputation to protect.<sup>115</sup> Consequently, opportunities for the abuse of power are declining, and officials become more inclined to safeguard public trust.

Finally, term limits contribute to the democratization of the political system.<sup>116</sup> Leadership rotation broadens political participation by enabling a wider range of individuals to assume public office, thereby fostering healthy competition. This practice also helps prevent the rise of political dynasties, which are frequently associated with abuses of power and corruption.<sup>117</sup> When political competition becomes more inclusive and transparent, fair and ethical governance is more likely to be realized.

**Table 4.** The Legal Provisions Concerning Term Limits as a Mechanism to Reduce Corruption

No	Law/Article	Substance of Article
1.	1945 Constitution, Article 27(1)	Affirms every citizen has the right to decent work, including the opportunity to hold public office. Term limits are implemented to prevent the abuse of authority by long-serving officials.
2.	Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration	Strengthens government accountability by establishing tenure restrictions for public officials to prevent excessive concentration of power. Officials must remain accountable for policies enacted during their term.
3.	Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Government	Limits the terms of regional heads to reduce potential abuses of power and to create opportunities for new leadership with fresh ideas and policies.
4.	Law No. 39 of 2008 on State Ministries	Imposes limits on the duration of ministerial service to prevent undue influence on national policy, thereby promoting rotational leadership within the cabinet.
5.	Law No. 7 of 2017 on Elections	Restricts the tenure of legislative members to prevent prolonged incumbency and to facilitate healthy leadership transitions that uphold democratic values and reduce corruption risks.
6.	Law No. 19 of 2019 on Amendments to the KPK Law	Establishes term limits for public officials, including those in anti-corruption bodies such as the KPK, to mitigate corruption risks among long-serving officeholders.

Table 4 highlights various legal instruments that directly or indirectly regulate the authority and tenure of public officials as a means of reducing

<sup>115</sup> Giovanni Cornelia et al., “Implementasi Prinsip Demokrasi Dalam Hukum Tata Negara: Tinjauan Terhadap Sistem Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia,” *Jurnal Kewarganegaraan* Vol. 8, no. 1 (2024): 297–98.

<sup>116</sup> Nasir, “The Government’s Strategy and Efforts to Eradicate Corruption in Indonesia.”

<sup>117</sup> Purwaningsih and Widodo, “The Interplay of Incumbency, Political Dynasty and Corruption in Indonesia: Are Political Dynasties the Cause of Corruption in Indonesia?”

corruption. Term limits help maintain a balance of power, ensure regular leadership transitions, and minimize opportunities for corrupt behavior.<sup>118</sup>

A key benefit of term limits is the enhancement of the leadership succession system. By enforcing tenure restrictions, governments can ensure a planned and orderly transition of power,<sup>119</sup> reducing political vacuums that could otherwise be exploited for corrupt practices. Effective succession planning decreases uncertainty and promotes governmental stability, enabling newly appointed officials to focus on serving the public interest.<sup>120</sup>

In addition to term limits, several complementary measures can strengthen anti-corruption efforts. Enhancing transparency and accountability is one such measure. Requiring public officials to disclose financial statements and provide accessible records of budget usage significantly reduces opportunities for misconduct. Independent auditing systems also play a critical role in detecting irregularities in financial management.<sup>121</sup>

The imposition of strict sanctions for corruption is equally essential. Severe penalties, such as imprisonment, financial restriction, and the revocation of political rights, serve as a strong deterrent while restoring public confidence in the legal system.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, anti-corruption education should be widely disseminated among public officials and citizens alike. Such education helps cultivate a culture of integrity and raise awareness about the damaging consequences of corruption.

Strengthening oversight institutions such as the KPK and the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) is also crucial. Independent and well-resourced supervisory bodies are better equipped to monitor and investigate corruption cases effectively.<sup>123</sup> At the same time, empowering civil society enhances public

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<sup>118</sup> Dean G. Smith, "Term Limits in Academic Public Health Administration," *Public Health Reports* 135, no. 6 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1177/0033354920954495>.

<sup>119</sup> Muhammad RM Fayasy Failaq and Faraz Almira Arelia, "Merancang Konstitusionalisme Dalam Amandemen Penguatan DPD RI," *Sanskara Hukum Dan HAM* 1, no. 02 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.58812/shh.v1i02.57>.

<sup>120</sup> Melissa Crouch, *Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192870681>.

<sup>121</sup> Anna Fruhstorfer and Alexander Hudson, "Costs and Benefits of Accepting Presidential Term Limits: 'Should I Stay or Should I Go?'," *Democratization* 29, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1960314>.

<sup>122</sup> Patardo Yosua Andreas Naibaho, Purwoto, and Pujiyono, "Kebijakan Hukum Pidana Dalam Upaya Meningkatkan Peran Serta Masyarakat Dalam Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi," *Diponegoro Law Journal* 5, no. 4 (2016).

<sup>123</sup> Ovie Febri et al., "Komisi Penyidikan Korupsi (KPK) Corruption Investigation Agency in Strengthening Movement with the Civil Society Perspective," *Journal of Research and Development Institute* 7, no. June (2020).

participation and enables citizens to act as external watchdogs in promoting transparency and accountability.

Furthermore, the strategic integration of technology plays a vital role in reducing the risk of corruption. Digital systems, such as electronic procurement platforms, automated licensing mechanisms, and real-time financial reporting, reduce opportunities for the misuse of public funds.<sup>124</sup> Technology enables the establishment of efficient, transparent, and tamper-resistant administrative processes. By combining term limits with broader structural, institutional, and technological reforms, governments can implement systematic and sustainable anti-corruption measures.<sup>125</sup> These efforts strengthen governance, enhance public trust, and improve the overall quality of democratic institutions.

While complementary instruments such as transparency mechanisms and digital governance strengthen Indonesia's anti-corruption ecosystem, they do not directly prevent the accumulation of political power that fuels systemic corruption. Term limits uniquely interrupt long-term patronage networks, reduce opportunities to institutionalize corrupt practices, and curtail the discretionary authority accumulated over extended tenures. These structural effects distinguish term limits from general enforcement tools.

In the United States, constitutional term limits for the President and various state-level officials are justified on the grounds of preventing entrenched political power. Turkey, South Korea, and several EU states similarly impose statutory or constitutional term limits as safeguards against corruption and authoritarian drift. These comparative experiences demonstrate that tenure restrictions are internationally recognized tools to limit patronage networks and prevent systemic corruption.

## Conclusion

Corruption involving political and public officials illustrates how the misuse of authority for personal gain can inflict serious harm on the state and society. Such misconduct often includes the embezzlement of state funds, preferential contracting, and bribery in connection with specific projects or policy decisions. Preventing and reducing corruption, therefore, requires rigorous oversight, transparent budget management, and strict legal consequences for offenders. Limiting political tenure remains a vital strategy for

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<sup>124</sup> Abdul Fatah, Nyoman Serikat Putra Jaya Jaya, and Henny Juliani, "Kajian Yuridis Penerapan Unsur Merugikan Keuangan Negara Dalam Penegakan Hukum Tindak Pidana Korupsi," *Diponegoro Law Journal* 6, no. 31 (2017).

<sup>125</sup> I Nyoman Ngurah Suwarnatha, "Penguatan Eksistensi Lembaga Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Dalam Undang-Undang Dasar 1945," *Jurnal Konstitusi* II, no. June 2012 (2012).

reducing corruption among public officials. Term limits help curtail the abuse of power and create opportunities for more competent and ethical leadership. However, term limits alone are insufficient. A comprehensive anti-corruption framework, including transparency, strong sanctions, civil society participation, and robust oversight institutions, is essential for ensuring clean, accountable, and democratic governance.

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