

Sacralization of Pancasila: Ideology and Repression in the Implementation of the Pancasila Ideology Development Board (BPIP) and Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila (P4)

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Abstract

Pancasila's role has become an unavoidable topic of dispute. For intellectuals, Pancasila should be an open ideology. The authorities frequently make Pancasila a closed doctrine. Ideology becomes closed when it is officially implemented by the state and interpreted unilaterally to assess incompatibility with societal interpretations. This qualitative study compares New Order government policies to the Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila (P4) project run by the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP). Various journal papers were collected, evaluated, and seen through the lens of ideology and repression. According to the research findings, when Pancasila was institutionalized, such as during the New Order period, it was frequently employed as a beating stick for parties that disagreed with the government's political goals. This potential can also be observed in BPIP during Joko Widodo's tenure, if executed strictly. Pancasila is founded on the principle of openness, which was echoed by the Founding Fathers. Often told behind closed doors using a frozen sacralization procedure

Keywords:

Pancasila sacralization; Ideology; Repression; P4; BPIP.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout its evolution, ideology was interpreted in three ways. First, something neutral. Second, it's an unscientific belief. Third, as a false consciousness. Ideology, as a neutral concept, refers to the entire system of concepts, values, and fundamental

attitudes of a specific social or cultural group. Whether it is good or evil is determined by the philosophy (Asshiddiqie, n.d.). This notion stems from a number of countries that recognize the value of having a state ideology. Pancasila, the philosophy of the Indonesian state, fits within this group. Where it becomes a thinking system and a country's value order.

Ideologies, according to the social sciences and the positivistic philosophical

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approach, are any views that cannot be demonstrated rationally, mathematically, or scientifically. So ideology is an unscientific idea (Hewitt, 1992). Ideology manifests itself in metaphysical reasoning, normative beliefs, and all ethical and moral concerns. Finally, ideology is defined as a doctrine directed not toward truth but toward the interests of those who propagate it. This method is commonly employed by philosophers and social scientists. Ideology is viewed as a tool that allows a particular class or social group to legitimize its power. In this scenario, ideology is interpreted as a false consciousness that is common in the Marxist paradigm. Where ideology plays a role in maintaining political and economic power (Kleden, 2007).

The existence of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP) during the Joko Widodo era, as well as the Guidelines for Appreciating the Practice of Pancasila (P4) during Soeharto's New Order era, were attempts to interpret the ideological construct in an operational context. These institutions are viewed as necessary to improve the community's grasp of ideology. Unfortunately, this is frequently obscured by the need to enhance state structures in order to maintain social control. As Althusser noted, all social and political institutions contribute significantly to the growth of ideology and the dissemination of dominant meaning. Ideology is frequently spread by social structures, specifically the ideological state apparatus (ISA) and the repressive state apparatus (RSA) (Althusser, 2004).

Several present political processes are repeats of previous ideologies. Many people believe that Joko Widodo's

government's policies during the first term (2014-2019), which heavily supported China, rekindled an old romance between Soekarno's Old Order administration (1959-1965) and Beijing (Peking). History documents this strong association with the formation of the Axis: Jakarta-Peking and, of course, Moscow. This is correct, and it demonstrates how the government's free-active foreign policy doctrine of the moment has become a paradox (Mustapa et al., 2019).

A developing country will unavoidably require assistance from a variety of stakeholders to hasten its development process. When domestic investment loses its potency. It is undeniable that attempts must be made to attract external finance to aid in this process. Foreign investment is essential in every growth process, particularly in the economy and infrastructure of all countries. If the country is not politically powerful, it may slide into a quagmire of concealed exploitation disguised by pampering policies such as investment support (Mustapa et al., 2020).

The consolidation of this process results in ideological flexibility. Thus, Pancasila as an ideology was used to create Socialistic Pancasila in Soekarno's Old Order Era (after the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959), Capitalistic Pancasila in Soeharto's New Order Era, and Neo-Liberalistic Pancasila in the post-reformation period.

Ideological openness is necessary in both projective and introspective settings. As a conceptual imperative in a fast-changing modern environment. In addition, we hope to reassert the dynamic worldview that our country's founders

adopted in 1945. Pancasila, as an open ideology, will enhance awareness of its eternal underlying ideals, while also encouraging us to develop them creatively and dynamically. To fulfill the necessities of the time. Pancasila is based on the nation's vision and philosophy, hence it fits the fundamental prerequisites for open ideology. Even though the ideology is open, this does not imply that it is open to a level that is capable of destroying or eliminating the ideology itself, which is absurd (Febriyanto, 2018).

This research seeks to compare the implementation of BPIP and P4 institutions with the state's efforts to interpret Pancasila within the political context of the time.

RESEARCH METHOD

The approach used in this study is qualitative. A comparative qualitative technique involves conducting analysis to look for and identify similarities and contrasts in occurrences (Arikunto, 2016). This is crucial to comprehend the phenomenon of understanding Pancasila philosophy across two eras (Soeharto and Joko Widodo). Furthermore, descriptive exploration is conducted on research subjects such as behavior, perceptions, motivation, actions, and so on (Moleong, 2010). The story was carried out by comparing the political policy patterns of Pancasila interpretation between the BPIP time under Joko Widodo and the P4 era under Soeharto's New Order era. Observations were made using electronic mass media as well as articles about BPIP and P4.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Pancasila is meant to serve as the state's foundation as well as the basis for the Constitution. This indicates that Pancasila's ideals have been incorporated into and implemented through the articles of the 1945 Constitution. Anyone who adheres to the 1945 Constitution—and everyone who considers themselves a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia—implicitly and automatically acknowledges and commits to Pancasila. This indicates that a person or group of citizens, regardless of religion, belief, or philosophy, is devoted to living and working in harmony and peace both within and outside the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Soekarno, 1965).

Working together to keep one's individual identity and personality. Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and so forth continue to be their respective religions. People from varied backgrounds (Muslims, Christians, etc.) are no longer permitted to form groups based on the principles of their respective religions and ideas. And because all citizens are only permitted to organize in accordance with Pancasila, Indonesia, a fertile and prosperous country with many hills and valleys, appears to have been transformed into a barren Sahara desert made up of indistinguishable rocks and sand particles [whose substance is the same].

Pancasila is not meant to be the foundation for citizens or groups, whether political, social, or otherwise. Our beloved Republic of Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Indonesia, will become a national-socialist country, a fascist country as awful and ruthless as a

communist country, if Pancasila is converted from the basis of the state to the basis of human life. This indicates that religions revealed by Almighty God (or perceived to be so) must be replaced by an ideology that does not refer to itself as a religion but appears to desire to replace the present religion based on its conduct.

Previously, there was no "Pancasila Morality" because morality was left to individual religions. Then a committee was formed of people who were considered "smart"—not a single major Muslim scholar was included—and this committee of smart people compiled a kind of holy book with moral recommendations that had to be read. All inhabitants of our country follow these recipes, but not all of them are acceptable to Muslims because many of them contain instructions that contradict Islamic principles. When the government drafts the "Single Principle of Pancasila," it will eventually result in "Pancasila Law," "Pancasila Economics," and so on (Prawiranegara, 1983).

Soekarno believes that inclusive citizenship in Pancasila is not predicated on people in the majority who are thought to have advantages over others. However, it is more than equivalent to the rule of law for citizens. Mutual respect among religious communities can be maintained through the study of political philosophy, which is produced when appreciating links are established between the state and religious institutions. Religion in this definition refers to an order of mutually fostering religiosity in civil society as a public religion, rather than a religious discourse in the private domain (Kusman, 2023).

In Indonesia, this inclusive nature is reflected in a liberated and humanist mentality. Liberal in the sense of having moral authority to improve the status of the world. Meanwhile, humanists emphasize human values. This is historical, particularly in the Indonesian setting (Mustapa & Bakti, 2021).

Pancasila Ideology in Althusser's Review

Althusser defines it as a set of beliefs and values established in society to perpetuate the authority of social classes. Ideology has a vital role in shaping human consciousness, directing behaviors, and establishing social positions within society. Althusser distinguished between two types of state apparatuses: repressive and ideological. Repressive apparatuses use physical or legal force to sustain ideology, whereas ideological apparatuses include institutions such as schools, media, and religion, which transmit ideology in subtler fashion.

In this way, ideology becomes implanted in the human psyche without his knowledge. The concept of state ideological apparatus is used in the Indonesian education system to represent Althusser's ideas. The school curriculum is intended to impart state ideology and the government's desired social values within the framework of the ideological machinery underlined by Althusser (Althusser, 1971; Althusser, 2004).

There are two types of ideology as state ideology: closed ideology and open ideology. As seen in the following table.

Table 1. Types of Ideology

Types of Ideology	Key Concepts
Closed	▪ Presents a philosophy that establishes political and social goals and norms as irrefutable facts that must be accepted and followed. ▪ Debates should not be founded on other ideals or moral beliefs. Its content is dogmatic and a priori, therefore it cannot be altered or modified in response to social experience. As a result, this ideology rejects alternative worldviews and values. ▪ One of the hallmarks of a closed ideology is the ability to determine not only the reality of fundamental ideals and ideas, but also concrete and operational issues. Closed ideology does not acknowledge everyone's right to hold their own beliefs and thoughts. Closed ideology requires absolute adherence. ▪ Another feature of closed ideology is that it stems from elite thinking, which must be propagated across society. On the other hand, the superiority of beliefs that form and grow in society is evaluated in terms of their ideology. By itself, closed ideology must be enforced and obeyed by society by specific elites, implying that it is authoritarian and carried out in a totalitarian fashion.
Opened	▪ Open ideology merely comprises basic orientations, and its translation into sociopolitical aims and norms can always be questioned and altered to reflect the moral values and principles that emerge in society.. ▪ The operational ideals to be accomplished cannot be predetermined; they must be collectively agreed upon. Open ideology is inclusive rather than authoritarian, and it cannot be used to legitimize a group's dominance. An open philosophy can only exist in a democratic system (Chandranegara & Bakhri, 2019).

Source: (Chandranegara & Bakhri, 2019: 32).

Marxism–Leninism is the best example of a closed worldview. This ideology evolved from Karl Marx's ideas, which were further developed by Vladimir Ilianov Lenin, and includes a system of thought that begins with basic values and principles and progresses to actual operations in social, national, and state life. Marxism-Leninism's ideology includes the teachings of (a) the nature of natural reality in the form of dialectical materialism and atheism; (b) the meaning of history as historical materialism; (c) rigid norms about how society should be organized, even how individuals should live; and (d) legitimizing the monopoly of power carried out by a group of people in the name of the proletariat (Gonenc, 2006). Pancasila's spirit as an open ideology has flourished since its establishment as the foundation of the

state. However, the discourse has evolved significantly, particularly since 1985 (Emran & Nurdin, 1994). The core qualities of Pancasila's five precepts are universal essences, which include good and true ideas, goals, and values. These core values are permanent as an open philosophy, and because the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution embodies these basic values, it, too, has a permanent nature and is linked to the country's survival. In other words, amending the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which includes the essential values of the Pancasila philosophy, is equivalent to abolishing the state (Febriyanto, 2018).

Guidelines for Appreciating and Practicing Pancasila (P4) and the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP)

In national politics, Suharto was successful in consolidating his authority in the 1970s. The oil boom resulted in an abundance of money, which was used to fund the country's infrastructure development and poverty alleviation programs. However, the invasion of East Timor undermined Indonesia's international standing. Following Portugal's decolonization and East Timor's declaration of independence in 1975, Indonesian troops launched a violent invasion of the country. In 1984, all socio-political organizations decided to adopt Pancasila as their only doctrine. Suharto could now utilize Pancasila as an instrument of repression because all organizations faced frequent accusations of anti-Pancasila activity (Report, 2023).

Suharto was at his most powerful throughout the 1980s. Every election suggests an easy triumph. Furthermore, he succeeded in rendering the army powerless. Similar to political organizations and the public service, the army functioned solely to carry out Suharto's agenda. However, the depoliticization of Indonesian society has had one significant negative effect. This has resulted in a rebirth of religious awareness, particularly among the younger population. Religion is viewed as a safe choice by religious communities because the political sphere is closed. Complaints about the government were aired in the context of places of worship because it was too dangerous to speak up

during rallies, which were successfully controlled. This religious awakening would result in other policy reforms in the early 1990s.

The "five principles" served as a political weapon to legitimize previous authoritarian governments by attempting to "revive" the ideology. General Soeharto confirmed Pancasila's role as Indonesia's national ideology, stating that Pancasila has served as a basic norm, a source of norms and fundamental principles that apply to all parts of society. In front of society, the dictatorship seemed to preserve and restore the founding fathers' ideals. What actually happened was that Pancasila was utilized to expel the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) by arresting and executing persons from various backgrounds—doctors, professors, scholars, and intellectuals—who were suspected of being party members. Furthermore, the administration made Pancasila the sole philosophy that could be permitted in its limited political landscape. Since then, all political parties have been required to use Pancasila as the intellectual underpinning and mandatory ideological basis for their beliefs (Jonathan, 2018).

For decades, Soekarno and his successor, Suharto, promoted Pancasila, to the point where many people saw it as a solution for Indonesia's myriad socioeconomic issues, such as corruption and poverty. In 2020, the Pancasila Ideology Policy Plan (RUU HIP) was created. The bill attempts to give recommendations for national development policies at both the federal and regional levels, based on Pancasila's values. This bill makes the government the primary authority for interpreting

Pancasila. And seeks to strengthen the Pancasila Ideology Strengthening Agency (BPIP). Protests against former Jakarta Governor Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama resulted in the formation of the Presidential Working Unit for the Development of Pancasila Ideology (UK-PIP). It appears to be intended at "re-radiating Pancasila."

The measure is sponsored by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), whose general chair, Megawati Soekarnoputri, also serves as chairman of the BPIP's steering committee. The dispute in this law stems from the inclusion of Sukarno's previously proposed ideas of 'trisila' and 'ekasila' in Article 7. Sukarno advocated that these five concepts be united into three (trisila): socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and belief in God, and then reduced down to one (ekasila): gotong royong. The Pancasila Bill sparked an immediate outcry, not against Pancasila itself, but against the MPs' attempts to impose a certain interpretation of Pancasila. A number of Islamic mass organizations opposed the measure because it did not include a ban on communism and Marxism, which Islamic groups regard to be Pancasila's principal adversaries. Islamic communities are particularly concerned that the concept of trisila or ekasila undermines the principle of "belief in Almighty God." They claim this is the most significant feature of Pancasila and does not exist in Ekasila.

Other community members protested the bill, which controls Pancasila within the Constitution. They contend that, while Pancasila is mentioned in the Constitution, it is the source of all laws, making it hierarchically higher than the

Constitution. They argue that regulating it through the law would undermine its sacred status. The arguments presented by both supporters and opponents of the law demonstrate Pancasila's virtually sacrosanct and untouchable status in society. However, these arguments divert attention from the real problem with ideology, which is that it can be readily controlled and utilized as an authoritarian tool (Satrio, 2020).

The draft Pancasila Ideology Policy Bill is divided into ten chapters. Specifically, General Provisions; Pancasila Ideological Direction; Pancasila Ideology as a Guide to National Development; and Pancasila Ideology as a Guide to the National Science and Technology System. Also included are Pancasila Ideology as a Guide to the National Population and Family System; Development of Pancasila Ideological Direction; Society Participation; Funding; Transitional Provisions; and Closing Provisions. The Pancasila Ideology Policy Bill was enacted to improve the institutional position of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP), as stated in Article 44. So far, the existence of the BPIP is based on Presidential Decree Number 7 of 2018 (Persada, 2020).

The Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila (P4) program was the brainchild of Roeslan Abdulghani, a Sukarno era figure and M. Yamin associate. As previously stated, Suharto's interest in recognizing and emulating Sukarno's policy style was revealed when he instructed Roeslan Abdulghani to design P4. Suharto's policy doctrine was control over the population without realizing it, and he created subjects with ambiguous pseudo-

consciousness. Roeslan Abdulgani reiterated the fundamental premise that Pancasila, as the driving force, must be a call to conscience that is applied in the lives of the country and state through work. Abdulgani, as one of the figures that created and formulated Sukarno's notion of guided democracy, believed in what he called the "inspiration of the revolution."

The values in Pancasila represent the ideals of the Indonesian state. The shift in Pancasila ideals is becoming more visible in national and state life, as evidenced by the rise of religious extremism, which threatens the Pancasila ideology. Through Presidential Decree No. 07 of 2018, President Joko Widodo established the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP), which is in charge of developing Pancasila Ideology. It was discovered that BPIP faced numerous problems, including a lack of public trust, a high number of anti-Pancasila groups or persons, and BPIP's legal instrument, a Presidential Decree, which was still relatively weak when viewed from the legal hierarchy (Ali, 2020).

Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP) employs an ideological state apparatus (ISA) style

Social and political trends frequently create opportunity for increasing threats to state ideology. This threat manifested itself in the 1980s as apathy for Pancasila doctrine among a number of social organizations. Suharto's New Order dictatorship imposed the single Pancasila ideal, which sparked this response. The transnationalist movement presented a challenge throughout the reform era

(1998–present). Especially movements that adhere to the Khilafah philosophy. This caliphate clearly opposes the Republic of Indonesia's political model for Indonesian Islam. Radicals reject Pancasila, democracy, and other state symbols (Harisudin, 2011).

BPIP was established by Presidential Regulation (Perpres). According to Article 7, paragraph 1 of the P3U Law, the Presidential Decree is classified as a type and hierarchy of statutory rules, with serial number five (5) under government regulations. The Presidential Decree serves as the foundation for state development plans, including the establishment of organizations dedicated to programs that support the President's vision and mission. This vision and mission are embodied in the National Medium-Term Development Plan Law, which includes one of the President's missions: to create a cultural advancement program that reflects the nation's personality through the development of Pancasila ideology, the revitalization of mental revolution, and so on. To make the President's duty of implementing the program simpler, a new governmental organization was established whose mission was to develop the Pancasila ideology. The new organization is called the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency, or BPIP (Wahid, 2023).

BPIP is tasked with supporting the President in developing policy orientations for the development of the Pancasila philosophy, as well as coordinating, synchronizing, and controlling its complete and sustainable growth. In addition, education and training standards are being developed

and organized. Aside from that, making recommendations based on the results of studies on laws or regulations that conflict with Pancasila to high-level state institutions, ministries and institutions, regional governments, sociopolitical groups, and other components of society (PPRI, 2018).

In carrying out its duties as the development of the Pancasila ideology, BPIP has one main secretariat and five deputies (Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2018 concerning the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency), which include deputies for law, advocacy, and regulatory supervision, one of which is to supervise regulations by implementing Pancasila's internalization and institutionalization in the legal field. One of the responsibilities of the deputy for legal, advocacy, and regulatory oversight is to analyze all legislative rules and test their fitness against the Pancasila "touchstones," one of which is the law.

Referring to the facts on the ground, BPIP's legal deputy has conducted a review of approximately 84 laws and stated that 63 laws should be revised since they are seen to be opposed to Pancasila's ideals. (Complete Legislative Analysis and Recommendations) However, because the BPIP study results are simply recommendations, they are not legally binding. For example: BPIP reviewed Law Number 23 of 2019, which governs the utilization of national resources for national defense. According to the findings of its investigation, the law is in line with Pancasila, but no changes have been made to it as of yet. BPIP uses internal indicators to verify the law's conformance with Pancasila. In the

existing constitutional system, the Constitutional Court (MK) has the right to interpret Pancasila, hence the validity of the BPIP indicators is still unclear.

Prior to the formation of BPIP, the MK was a state institution that was the single interpreter of the constitution, including Pancasila, and its decisions were definitive (Sirajuddin, 2015). Meanwhile, BPIP, a recently constituted entity, gives only recommendations. As a result, in studying and providing advice on laws that conflict with Pancasila ideals, BPIP must use two channels mandated by the constitution: a) entering through the DPR to pressure the DPR to create new regulations that can replace existing regulations. has been ruled antithetical to the values of Pancasila by BPIP; b) being a linked party to the Constitutional Court (as is the DPR and the President in examining specific laws), meaning that the Constitutional Court can decide on these regulations by accepting the results of the analysis from the BPIP. Because the Constitutional Court has been mandated by the Constitution to decide on all laws that conflict with the Constitution.

P4 and the Character of the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA)

The New Order, which was more established in developing Pancasila's ideology and putting its ideals into practice, became the driving force behind Indonesia's development goals through the P4 Upgrading program. The New Order formulated very synchronized arguments in development legislation. The establishment of the Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) as a reinforcement of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is a

statute that helps the government's five-year development plan move forward. If traced, Pancasila is the basic basis that contains the form of the state and its society, as well as the aims and methods that shape Indonesian national life. Meanwhile, the 1945 Constitution outlines the nation's aspirations and ideals. These two aspects of national and state life are the most important principles expressed in 1945. This differs from GBHN, which is a product of the New Order and was no longer available during the reform era (Rosa, 2022).

Suharto and his government attempted to render Pancasila "sacred" and inviolable in order to cement their hold on power. One of them is to compile Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila (P4). The P4 Guide was established by MPR regulation no. II/MPR/1978 about Ekaprasetya Pancakarsa, and it outlines the five Pancasila principles in 36 points of practice that serve as practical recommendations for the execution of state principles. In March 1979, the New Order administration established the Education Advisory Board for the Implementation of Pancasila Appreciation and Practice Guidelines (BP7). This body is helped in its execution by the Presidential Advisor on the execution of Pancasila Appreciation and Practice Guidelines (P7). Each precept is defined and expanded into dozens of points of meaning and obligations that must be fulfilled. This expansion of Pancasila was then disseminated through intensive indoctrination beginning in 1978. The indoctrination, known as Penataran P4, was viewed as a non-negotiable responsibility and was

deemed a prerequisite for formal employment (Rizal & Galih, 2022).

This upgrading involves listening to lectures, participating in discussions, and drafting and delivering seminar papers. P4 training is provided in a variety of courses that are tailored to each participant's employment rank. High-level officials are required to attend "Type A" training, which takes many months. Then, second-level officials undergo the shorter and easier "Type B" training. Meanwhile, training for low-level government staff, such as drivers and typists, is merely a few days. The teaching system in P4 Training is similarly organized hierarchically. Ambassadors, Vice Chancellors, and other high-ranking officials received direct instructions from BP7 members during a 120-hour intense training program. Those who complete training courses offered by BP7 central and regional offices are awarded the title "Manggala" (Commander), allowing them to deliver training to lower-level officials (Bourchier, 2015).

In 1983, more than two million government servants and military officers attended the P4 Penataran. By 1990, more than 33 million Indonesians had learned about Pancasila through the P4 upgrading, and another 40 million had received 'knowledge and adequate understanding' of Pancasila through other ways. Serious indoctrination (P4) instruction is administered strictly. Each participant must be on schedule at 8 a.m. and attend training until 6 p.m. Participants are labeled failed and must retake the training, even if they miss only one day. They are also not permitted to be absent, even at the funeral of a deceased

family member. According to Bouchier, attendees are also expected to be polite during the course. Participants who arrive late for any of the sessions are highlighted, as are those who do not follow good decorum, such as sitting properly, paying respect to the presenter, or yawning. People who are too vociferous in expressing their thoughts, as well as those who remain silence, are likely to be condemned (Bouchier, 2015).

Sacralization in the Institutionalization of BPIP and P4

The Pancasila notion of democratic citizenship does not want to interfere with the development of private and public morals; but, it can sensibly prevent the growth of private and communal morals that jeopardize people's lives (Latif, 2015). The provisions of the human rights articles are discussed in depth, beginning with Article 28A and ending with Article 28J of the Republic of Indonesia's 1945 Constitution. These articles indicate that the private sphere is Pancasila's primary value. Unlike previous definitions of citizenship, the Pancasila notion of democratic citizenship attempts to incorporate three major world concepts, namely liberal, republican, or other, into a formulation known as the Pancasila principles. At the same time, the Pancasila concept of democratic citizenship guards against the risk of privatizing the concept of a decent life, as occurs in liberal nations. However, it must be recognized that this paradigm is only important if it is publicly understood, for example, by focusing on universal human principles such as the concept of human rights. As a result, the

concept of Pancasila democratic citizenship is always intriguing when explored in depth through scientific discourse in the public domain. Thus, the Pancasila theory of democratic citizenship contributes to the formation of the collective consciousness of a nation-state like Indonesia (Otto, 2015).

At the theoretical level, the state should not delegate authority to one organ to interpret a fundamental standard. Furthermore, unlike the Constitutional Court (MK), this organ is not constitutionally mandated. In reality, in recent constitutional reforms, the President established the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP), tasked with establishing Pancasila (Wahid, 2023). More restrictive measures were implemented during the New Order era via P4. P4 represents the New Order's "single principle" brainwashing approach, which restricts the spirit of tolerance to the wrong shape. This aimed to construct a developmentalism project brought about by the New Order as an instrument that opened up high economic growth with a predisposition toward capitalism-liberalism (Morfit, 1981).

If P4 is often criticized for being utilized by the government to punish those who disagree with political policy lines, BPIP is not immune to criticism. Karjono, the Deputy Head of BPIP, stated that a closed electoral system would not lead to the country's dissolution. Several groups replied. Among them is Hidayat Nur Wahid. He believes that a closed system violates the spirit of the fourth principle. And this approach was used to maintain control during the New Order era (Imandiar, 2023). The BPIP's position as a force to strengthen the nation has

been ineffective. BPIP is still unable to facilitate honest and open discourse. Thus, division in society remains an ember in the husk (Saptohutomo, 2022). Still in 2021. BPIP is organizing a competition in honor of Santri Day. The topics covered were 'Respecting the Flag According to Islamic Law' and 'Singing the National Anthem According to Islamic Law'. Busyo, the chairman of Muhammadiyah, opposed this. It is tendentious and lacks an ideological academic notion. They even fight each other. As a result, the existence and function of BPIP are being called into question. If it is ineffective, it should simply be dissolved (Admin, 2021). BPIP eventually changed the competition theme and apologized to those who objected.

Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana avoided the Pancasila philosophy. He believes that establishing Pancasila as the official doctrine is excessive. Meanwhile, the substance of Pancasila, specifically its principles, remains varied and contradictory (Maarif, 1985). Pancasila is a collection of diverse philosophies that work together to meet the needs of each group. As a result, Pancasila is regarded as the outcome of a purely political agreement or acceptance. In 2013, President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono claimed that Pancasila was not required to be sacrosanct. Pancasila must remain open to current advances (Niam, 2013). This implies that the desacralization of Pancasila requires Pancasila values to be adaptable to the many dynamics of globalization. In accordance with this, Nasaruddin Umar argued that the meaning of "Pancasila" should be considered a proved word rather than a

holy word like the words in the Bible, which its followers believe to be the word of God.

The first principle of Pancasila, "Belief in One Almighty God" (KYMA), is a political slogan endorsed by the founders. KYMA does not have its own doctrine independent of the theory followed by religious devotees in Indonesia. During the New Order government, the concept of Guidelines for the Appreciation and Appreciation of Pancasila (P4) was widely seen as Pancasila indoctrination. Indoctrination can be defined as reverence for regional ideals. As time passed, Pancasila, which had previously been regarded as a regional formulation, was abruptly raised to a religious formula. The sanctification of regional values will not increase their standing; rather, it may lower it.

If Pancasila is declared sacrosanct, it will undoubtedly conflict with religion principles held sacred by its adherents. If this occurs, it is normal for religious believers to respond strongly since new values will challenge the existence of values implanted in their souls and brains. In other words, the canonization of Pancasila has the potential to desecrate religious teachings that reflect the believers' doctrinal convictions. Nonetheless, Pancasila cannot be rejected in its name or for the sake of religious purity. There is no logical reason to reject Pancasila as long as its established values exist. Every religion's teachings are open, which means that one accepts external ideals in order to beautify oneself with them. The first principle of KYME, while not a sacred sentence in its construction, becomes sacred when its formulation to convey the interior state of each religious

group is adopted to describe the spiritual climate toward God. The relationship between religion and Pancasila should be built on functional and structural relationships. Pancasila values operate as both an articulation and a way of fulfilling religious teachings (values tool), while religion continues to serve as a source of sacred values (values resource) (Umar, 2019).

Desacralization, or removing Pancasila's sanctity, does not imply replacing it with a new ideology or reality. Desacralization of Pancasila seeks to "remove the mask of ideologies that tend to use Pancasila in the name of building status quo towers or legitimizing the power of certain parties" (Ratu, 2023). As power frequently attempts to strengthen its influence through the process of institutional sacralization, the face of the authorities, who frequently violate the interpretation of Pancasila along ideological lines, is frequently the tipping point of resistance to Pancasila's ideology. The socialistic Old Order Pancasila, the capitalistic New Order Pancasila, and the post-reform Neoliberalistic Pancasila. It is critical to avoid desacralization, which reduces Pancasila to a collection of ideas due to the lack of any embodiment of the Pancasila system concept. As a result, Pancasila serves as a transitory stepping stone to a more powerful system. This is the concept proposed by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

Desacralization in the good sense is consistent with Kontowijoyo's concept of Pancasila radicalization. Specifically, an effort to strengthen Pancasila in terms of philosophy, science, development, power balance, people's services, and

actualization through civilization. A functional grounding of ideology (Latif, 2014).

CONCLUSION

BPIP contains a wedge with P4. Both embody the president's vision and mission, as well as government development projects. The reasons for its founding are many. BPIP arose from the belief that the application of Pancasila ideological values had diminished. Meanwhile, P4 was prepared as both a spirit of implementation and a legal justification tool for the authorities to carry out their political policy plans. If the ruling powers employ P4 as a harsh weapon to close their various places, BPIP is a type of software that reads people who disagree with the government's reasoning. Both represent an attempt to view Pancasila as an ideology. And the interpretation is one-sided. There is a propensity towards it.

Pancasila should serve as an open ideology. In a positive sense. All parts come together to fill and interpret the framework of togetherness, solidarity, and inclusiveness. When efforts to interpret Pancasila were attempted to be singled out and institutionalized, the possibility of Pancasila becoming a closed ideology was greatly expanded. There are two types of attempts by the ruling regime to utilize Pancasila for political purposes. The forms for creating a legal umbrella include MPR Decree P-4 and the HIP Bill. If P-4 is implemented, the HIP law will transform into the BPIP bill. Second, put a legal cover into action. P-4 was successfully brainwashed. BPIP is insufficiently powerful due to the

atmosphere of pressure to reject civil society's power.

Sacralization is the government's attempt, in many forms, to standardize the interpretation of Pancasila from one standpoint. Descarceration aims to incorporate Pancasila's interpretation. So that it may continue to accommodate the myriad differences that define variety. Pancasila was birthed from the womb of multiplicity.

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