

# Handling Corruption as a Social System: An AGIL-Based Socio-Legal Analysis of Prosecutorial Practices in South Sulawesi

*Muhammad Djaelani Prasetya*   
Hasanuddin Universitas, Indonesia  
Email: [djaeprasetya@unhas.ac.id](mailto:djaeprasetya@unhas.ac.id)

*Arini Nur Annisa*  
Hasanuddin Universitas, Indonesia  
Email: [arininurannisa.aa@gmail.com](mailto:arininurannisa.aa@gmail.com)

*Syachwal Tri Anugrah*  
Hasanuddin Universitas, Indonesia  
Email: [syachwaltrianugrah@gmail.com](mailto:syachwaltrianugrah@gmail.com)

## Abstract

This article examines the handling of corruption in South Sulawesi through a socio-legal approach by applying Talcott Parsons' AGIL (Adaptation, Goal Achievement, Integration, and Latency) framework to structured interviews. Different from the dominant approach that frames the handling of corruption primarily in terms of legal compliance, institutional capacity, or political matters, this article conceptualizes handling as a dynamic social system shaped by the institutional practice and professional experience of prosecutors. Empirical data was collected through structured interviews with 25 prosecutors from 24 district attorney's offices and 1 person from the South Sulawesi High Prosecutor's Office, all of whom had first-hand experience in dealing with corruption. The findings suggest that the handling depends on a functional balance between technical adaptation to complex corruption schemes, the achievement of substantive objectives oriented towards the deterrent effect and recovery of assets, institutional integration through teamwork and inter-agency coordination, and latency



mechanisms that support professional values, and psychological stability. Disruption to AGIL's function can weaken the performance of handling corruption. This article offers a contribution by developing the AGIL framework from the normative side to the practical direction of institutional-based. This article affirms the concept of institutional balance to explain the legal structure, organizational coordination, and professionalism interacting in maintaining the handling of corruption at the regional level.

### **KEYWORDS**

Corruption Prosecution; Criminal Justice System; Prosecutorial Perspective; Socio-Legal Studies; Structural Functionalism.

## **Introduction**

Corruption is one of the challenges in Indonesia's criminal justice system, not only because of its impact on state finances, but also because of its ability to undermine public institutions and social trust<sup>1</sup>. Although legal and institutional reforms are ongoing, the handling of corruption shows a significant variety of problems, particularly at the regional level<sup>2</sup>. Previous studies have tended to place the problem of corruption within a normative framework, emphasizing weaknesses in regulation, institutional independence or political factors<sup>3</sup>. An approach that ignores the practical-technical side of handling corruption, let alone the experience of actors as part of a social system.

In the Indonesian context, the Prosecutor plays a central role as a liaison between legal norms and social realities in handling corruption. Handling not only requires judicial competence, but also adaptive ability in dealing with the development of *modus operandi*, power relations, political pressure, and institutional limitations. Therefore, understanding the

---

<sup>1</sup> Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," in *Political Corruption*, 2017, 321–38; Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palifka, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index," accessed December 23, 2025, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/idn>.

<sup>3</sup> Lutfil Ansori, "Reformasi Penegakan Hukum Perspektif Hukum Progresif," *Jurnal Yuridis* 4, no. 2 (2017): 148–63.

handling of corruption as a purely normative application is risky to the social reality faced by prosecutors in the field<sup>4</sup>.

This article departs from a critique of the legalistic approach and proposes Talcott Parsons' structuralism-functionalism as an analytical lens to read the handling of corruption as a social system<sup>5</sup> that works through four functions including Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration, and Latency. The AGIL framework opens up a more comprehensive analysis of the functioning of the handling system to adapt to environmental changes (adaptation), set substantive justice goals (goal attainment), institutional coordination (integration), and maintain the values and professionalism of legal actors (latency) (AGIL)<sup>6</sup>.

Unlike previous studies that used AGIL conceptually or macro-structurally, this article places AGIL as an empirical analysis instrument based on the experience of prosecutors. The focus is on the South Sulawesi region as a context of article because of the character of the region which represents a combination of geographical complexity, bureaucracy, and local political dynamics<sup>7</sup>.

Using a socio-legal approach and structured interviews with 25 prosecutors, this article aims to answer how AGIL's functionalism-structure works in handling corruption. The contribution of the research is to introduce the Prosecutor's view on handling corruption as an institutional

---

<sup>4</sup> Fachrizal Afandi, "Researching the Legal Culture of the Bureaucracy : An Introduction to Ethnographic Study of Procedural Criminal Law," *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijls.2021v1n2.1>.

<sup>5</sup> David Jackson, "Systemic Corruption as a Meso-Level Phenomenon: Severe Abuse and Strategic Gain," *Public Integrity*, June 27, 2025, 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2025.2520679>; Eugen Dimant and Thorben Schulte, "The Nature of Corruption: An Interdisciplinary Perspective," *German Law Journal* 17, no. 1 (2016): 53–72, <https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/S2071832200019684>; Paul M Heywood, "Rethinking Corruption: Hocus-Pocus, Locus and Focus," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 95, no. 1 (December 12, 2017): 21–48, <https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveastorev2.95.1.0021>.

<sup>6</sup> George Ritzer and Jeffrey Stepnisky, *Sociological Theory* (SAGE Publications, 2017); Håkan Hydén, *Sociology of Law as the Science of Norms* (Routledge, n.d.).

<sup>7</sup> Mark Jorgensen Farrales, "Bureaucratic Corruption in Southeast Asia : A Comparative Analysis of the ASEAN 5," 2006; Afandi, "Researching the Legal Culture of the Bureaucracy : An Introduction to Ethnographic Study of Procedural Criminal Law."

balancing process, which emphasizes that handling corruption is not just a norm, but the system's ability to deal with actors<sup>8</sup>.

## Methods

This article uses a socio-legal approach<sup>9</sup> to examine the handling of corruption from the perspective of the Prosecutor (Public Prosecutor) in South Sulawesi Province. This approach was chosen to understand the law as a norm, as well as a practice shaped by the institutional structure and professional experience<sup>10</sup> of the Prosecutor. The article involved 25 prosecutors from 24 District Attorney's Offices and 1 person in the South Sulawesi High Prosecutor's Office, selected *purposively* based on direct experience in dealing with corruption<sup>11</sup>.

Primary data were collected through structured interviews compiled under the AGIL (Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration, and Latency) framework of Talcott Parsons to explore adaptation, the goal of providing justice, institutional integration, and the professionalism of Prosecutors. Secondary data were obtained from laws and regulations, court decisions, and relevant academic literature. Data analysis was carried out in a qualitative thematic manner by linking empirical findings and structural functionalism frameworks<sup>12</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> David O Friedrichs, "White Collar Crime," in *The Handbook of White-Collar Crime*, 2019, 16–31, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118775004.ch2>.

<sup>9</sup> Lidwina Inge Nurtjahyo, "A Sociolegal Perspective to Legal Research in the Digital Field : A Methodological Proposition ( Penelitian Hukum Berperspektif Sosiolegal Pada Ranah Digital : Satu Tawaran Metodologis ) PENELITIAN HUKUM BERPERSPEKTIF SOSIOLEGAL PADA RANAH DIGITAL :," *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n1.4>; Sulistyowati Irianto, "Legal Education for The Future of Indonesia : A Critical Assessment," *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n1.1>.

<sup>10</sup> Adriaan Bedner et al., "Legal Education in Indonesia," *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n1.6>.

<sup>11</sup> Bo Rothstein, "Fighting Systemic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy," *Daedalus* 147, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 35–49, [https://doi.org/10.1162/daed\\_a\\_00501](https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00501).

<sup>12</sup> Glenn A Bowen, "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method," *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (August 3, 2009): 27–40, <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>; Matthew Mitchell, "Analyzing the Law Qualitatively," *Qualitative Research Journal* 23, no. 1 (September 14, 2022): 102–13, <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-04-2022-0061>.

## Result and Discussion

### 1. AGIL Dynamics in Handling Corruption

This section presents the empirical findings of this article by analyzing the dynamics of handling corruption through the AGIL Talcott Parsons framework. Based on written interviews with prosecutors in South Sulawesi, the findings show that the handling of corruption is not only normative, but also dynamic technical and institutional, as follows:

#### a. Adaptation: Prosecutor's Capacity for Handling

Within the framework of Talcott Parsons' structural functionalism, the Adaptation function refers to the ability of a social system to adapt to the changing external environment in order to maintain its sustainability and effectiveness<sup>13</sup>. In the context of corruption in South Sulawesi, the findings of the article show that adaptation is a central dimension that shapes the professional practice of prosecutors. Respondents consistently described handling corruption as a complex process in terms of *modus operandi*, proof, and institutional pressure.

The results of the interviews revealed that the basic patterns of corruption—such as abuse of authority and manipulation of state finances—are relatively uniform, each case has unique characteristics for handling differently. Prosecutors are not only required to understand criminal norms and criminal proceedings, but also must master financial flows, bureaucratic mechanisms, and institutional dynamics of the sectors involved. This condition places adaptation as a continuous learning process

---

<sup>13</sup> Lawrence M. Friedman, *The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1975); Niklas. Luhmann, *Law as a Social System* (Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, 2004); Hossein Sobhani and Seyyed Mansour Mirsaeidi, "A Comparative Study of Extended Criminal Confiscation from the Perspective of the Financial Action Task Force, EU, UK and Iran," *Comparative Law Review* 14, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.22059/JCL.2023.342633.634350>.

with the professionalism of the Prosecutor which continues to be tested by the development of case variations and crime patterns<sup>14</sup>.

The most prominent aspect of adaptation is reflected in the proofing process. The prosecutor faced the defendant who denied his actions, so the evidence from the investigation stage to the trial must be carefully examined. This process is not only technical-judicial, but also strategic, including anticipating rebuttals, managing evidence, and ensuring the conformity of evidence with court standards<sup>15</sup>. The success of the handling is understood as the result of the Prosecutor's adaptive ability to read dynamics, not solely procedural compliance.

Adaptation also takes place in the context of power relations. Prosecutors face challenges when witnesses come from ordinary people who have to give evidence against the defendant with a strong public position or social influence. This situation expects the sensitivity of the examination to protect the credibility of witnesses without sacrificing legal objectivity. In addition, geographical and logistical constraints—such as evidence collection in remote areas—add to the physical-administrative adaptive dimension, affecting the duration and intensity of work<sup>16</sup>.

These findings show adaptation in handling corruption as a response to crime, as well as the ability to manage the complexity of evidence, power relations and geographical-logistical problems. The adaptive capacity of the Prosecutor serves as a stabilizer that allows the criminal justice system to continue to run effectively in the midst of a dynamic environment.

---

<sup>14</sup> Ismail Rumadan, "Penafsiran Hakim Terhadap Ketentuan Pidana Minimum Khusus Dalam Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi," *Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan* 2, no. 3 (2018): 379, <https://doi.org/10.25216/jhp.2.3.2013.379-404>; Soerjono Soekanto, *Pokok-Pokok Sosiologi Hukum* (Jakarta: PT, Raja Grafindo Persada, 2000).

<sup>15</sup> Achmad Ali, *Menguak Teori Hukum Dan Teori Peradilan* (Prenada Media Goup, 2012); Christian Courtis, *Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, 2008.

<sup>16</sup> OECD, "Consequences of Corruption at the Sector Level and Implications for Economic Growth and Development" (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264230781-en>.

### **b. Goal Attainment: Evidentiary and Efforts to Justice**

In Talcott Parsons' structural-functional framework, the function of Goal Attainment refers to the capacity of social systems to set priorities, mobilize resources, and direct collective action to achieve predetermined normative goals<sup>17</sup>. In handling corruption crimes in South Sulawesi, the findings of this article show that the Prosecutor does not interpret the handling of corruption as the fulfillment of procedural obligations, but as a strategic instrument to achieve the goals, namely the recovery of state losses, the deterrent effect, and the delegitimization of corrupt practices in the public bureaucracy.

The results of the interview revealed a significant change in the Prosecutor's view of the motive for corruption. In contrast to the narrative that associates corruption with economic needs alone, respondents consider corruption to be driven by greed, hedonistic lifestyles, and ambition to maintain social status and political power<sup>18</sup>. This condition reflects a goal-oriented dysfunction, in which the individual interests of the perpetrators systematically trump the collective goals of law and governance<sup>19</sup>. Therefore, the achievement of the goal of handling must be directed at stopping corruption as a "normal" matter of the bureaucracy.

The orientation of goal attainment is reflected in efforts to handle proportionate and touch the economic interests of the perpetrator. Practices such as budget mark-ups and fictitious projects are understood as a form of calculation that must be responded to through sanctions that can have a real deterrent effect<sup>20</sup>. However, achieving goals is faced with various structural obstacles. Prosecutors identified weak oversight systems, abuse of

---

<sup>17</sup> Talcott. Parsons, *The Social System* (Routledge, 2013); Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, "Culture, Institutions, and Social Equilibria: A Framework," *Journal of Economic Literature* 63, no. 2 (2025): 637–92, <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20241680>.

<sup>18</sup> Luhmann, *Law as a Social System*.

<sup>19</sup> David Nelken, *Comparative Criminal Justice* (London: Sage Publications, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> John Hagan, *Who Are the Criminals? The Politics of Crime Policy from the Age of Roosevelt to the Age of Reagan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

authority, and certain institutional pressures as part of the structure of opportunity that allows for repeated corruption<sup>21</sup>. This condition suggests that the failure to achieve the goal is not entirely from individual actors, but also from institutional designs that have not been completely corrective.

Another finding is the limitation of legal instruments in achieving the main goal of eradicating corruption. The majority of prosecutors consider that the absence of the Asset Forfeiture Law is a serious normative vacuum, as it allows perpetrators to continue to enjoy the proceeds of crime even though they have been sentenced to corporal punishment<sup>22</sup>. From the point of view of functionalism, this imbalance between the goals of the system and the tools of achievement weakens the overall capacity of goal attainment. In addition, the interpretation of the application of Article 2 and Article 3<sup>23</sup> is still happening and also hinders handling. Differences in interpretation of the elements of "self-enrichment" and "abuse of authority" result in disparities in verdicts<sup>24</sup>. The challenge of proving the elements of the country's economic losses further shows that the existing system must deal with complex and rigid crimes.

---

<sup>21</sup> Michael Tonry, "Reinventing American Criminal Justice," in *Crime and Justice* (University of Chicago Press, 2017); Anggoro Yulianto, "Cybersecurity Policy and Its Implementation in Indonesia," *Law Research Review Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2021): 69–82.

<sup>22</sup> Irma Reisalinda Ayuningsih and Febby Mutiara Nelson, "Perampasan Aset Tanpa Pidana: Suatu Perbandingan Indonesia Dan Australia," *Jurnal Ius Constituendum* 7, no. 2 (2022): 246–61, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26623/jic.v7i2.5142>; Refki Saputra, "Tantangan Penerapan Perampasan Aset Tanpa Tuntutan Pidana (Nonconviction Based Asset Forfeiture) Dalam RUU Perampasan Aset Di Indonesia," *Integritas: Jurnal Anti Korupsi* Vol. 3, no. 1 (2017): 115–30; Stephanie Holmes Didwania, "Asset Forfeiture and Inequality," *Stanford Law Review* 77, no. 1 (2025): 159–234.

<sup>23</sup> Munawwar Hamidi, Ida Keumala Jeumpa, and Sri Walny Rahayu, "Legal Analysis of The Element of Economic Loss to The State in Article 2 Paragraph ( 1 ) and Article 3 of The Corruption Crimes Act," *International Journal of Law and Society* 3, no. 1 (2025): 10–23; Wahbi Rahman et al., "Prevention of the Corruption Crime through Administrative Enforcement Mechanism against Abuse of Authority," *Journal of Law and Legal Reform* 5, no. 4 (2024): 2013–44.

<sup>24</sup> Daffa Ladro Kusworo and Titi Anggraini, "Extensive Interpretation of State Financial Losses in Tin Sector Corruption : A Comparative Study of Emerging Economies," *Integritas: Jurnal Anti Korupsi* 10, no. 2 (2024): 173–86; Rahman et al., "Prevention of the Corruption Crime through Administrative Enforcement Mechanism against Abuse of Authority."

Overall, these findings show that the goal attainment function in handling corruption in South Sulawesi is not fully optimal. The achievement of objectives (e.g. substantive justice) requires alignment between legal instruments, evidence, structural and system strengthening. Thus, the success of the eradication of corruption depends not only on the adaptation of the Prosecutor, but on the capacity of the system to direct the subsystem towards collective goals.

### **c. Integration: Organizational Coordination and Support**

According to Talcott Parsons, the Integration function plays a role in maintaining the internal cohesion of the system while regulating the relationship between sub-systems so that conflicts can be managed and collective goals are achieved stably<sup>25</sup>. The findings of the article show that in handling corruption in South Sulawesi, integration does not stop at the normative level, but is manifested as an organizational practice that determines the handling of corruption. All respondents emphasized that corruption was never handled individually, but through structured and formal-based teamwork.

The structure of the case handling team—which generally consists of supervisors, team leaders, and prosecutor members—serves as an internal checks-balance mechanism. Strategic decision-making, from the preparation of indictments to the determination of "criminal charges", is carried out collectively and does not depend on the personal discretion of one actor<sup>26</sup>. This model strengthens internal integration by reducing role

---

<sup>25</sup> Claudio De Mattos, Laura Salciuviene, and Stuart Sanderson, "Can Conflict Be a Desirable Step in Trust-Building within International Strategic Alliances? A Systematic Literature Review and Typology," *Journal of International Management* 31, no. 2 (2025): 101234, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2025.101234>; Parsons, *The Social System*; A Javier Treviño, "Talcott Parsons on Building Personality System Theory via Psychoanalysis," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 59, no. 4 (October 2023): 417–32, <https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.22257>.

<sup>26</sup> Masyhudi, "Membangun Sistem Integritas Untuk Pemberantasan Korupsi Dalam Sistem Peradilan Pidana Indonesia," *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 26, no. 1 (2019): 44–66, <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol26.iss1.art3>; Dudy Heryadi and Denny Indra Sukmawan,

conflicts, distributing responsibilities, and preventing authority over subjective discretion.

The integration function also includes internal administrative subsystems. The involvement of administrative staff is seen as crucial in managing procedural problems of corruption which is characterized by large volumes of documents and long bureaucratic stages. These findings confirm that the success of the handling is not solely determined by the juridical capacity of the Prosecutor, but also by the administrative coordination that underpins the litigation process.

The most dominant integration function is reflected in the relationship between the Prosecutor's Office and external audit institutions. The prosecutor emphasized the need for the Financial Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP), and/or the Regional Inspectorate to prove state financial losses<sup>27</sup>. This need mirrors systemic interdependence by acknowledging its technical limitations and adapting through external expertise. One of the respondents even stated that without the results of the audit, corruption charges risk losing the legitimacy of the evidence in court<sup>28</sup>. These findings suggest that cross-agency collaboration is a prerequisite for good corruption management<sup>29</sup>.

Nevertheless, integration function is tested by external pressures of a psychological and social nature<sup>30</sup>. A number of respondents reported verbal intimidation, emotional pressure, and symbolic threats from the

---

"Optimizing Interagency Coordination and Supervision in Corruption Eradication Efforts," *Integritas : Jurnal Antikorupsi* 9, no. 2 (2023): 213–28.

<sup>27</sup> Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, *Indonesian Law* (Oxford University Press, 2018); Bedner et al., "Legal Education in Indonesia."

<sup>28</sup> Rothstein, "Fighting Systemic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy"; Dimant and Schulte, "The Nature of Corruption: An Interdisciplinary Perspective."

<sup>29</sup> Matthew Jenkins, "Interagency Coordination Mechanisms," 2019.

<sup>30</sup> Maksat Yelikbay et al., "Methodology for Investigating Corruption Crimes : Theoretical and Practical Problems," *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 16, no. 1 (2024): 1086–94; Nicole Wilkes et al., "Mixed Methods Research in Criminology and Criminal Justice: A Systematic Review," *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 47, no. 3 (2022): 526–46, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09593-7>.

defendant's family, community leaders, and local political actors. Although rarely physical, it has the potential to undermine professional-organizational objectivity if it is not balanced with adequate institutional protection<sup>31</sup>. Interestingly, respondents stated that legal protection for prosecutors as stipulated in Law Number 11 of 2021 has not been effectively felt at the regional level.

Overall, these findings show that the integration function in handling corruption in South Sulawesi is built through internal solidarity, cross-agency collaboration, and psycho-social resilience of prosecutors. However, such integration is still weak due to institutional protections and external pressures. Without strengthening protection and anticipating physical pressure, the handling of corruption risks being weakened for the purpose of achieving the goal of substantive justice

#### **d. Latency: Professional and Institutional**

In Talcott Parsons' AGIL framework, the Latency (pattern maintenance) function refers to the ability of social systems to maintain the values, norms, and psychological stability of their actors so that the system continues to function sustainably<sup>32</sup>. The findings of this article show that in handling corruption in South Sulawesi, the Latency function operates as a mechanism for institutional survival of the Prosecutor's Office in the midst of structural pressures, personal risks, and the complexity of high-profile cases. Prosecutors face not only juridical challenges, but also technical challenges such as intimidation, psycho-social pressures that are rarely

---

<sup>31</sup> David Fitzpatrick, "A 'Think Piece' on Intelligence, Investigation and Prosecution," *Journal of Financial Crime* 24, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 449–60, <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-03-2017-0018>; Benjamin Van Rooij and Adam Fine, "Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational Processes of Deviancy," *Administrative Sciences*, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci8030023>.

<sup>32</sup> Parsons, *The Social System*; Raquel Weiss and Jayme Gomes Neto, "Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Morality," *The American Sociologist* 52, no. 1 (2021): 107–30, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-020-09466-w>; Treviño, "Talcott Parsons on Building Personality System Theory via Psychoanalysis."; Ritzer and Stepnisky, *Sociological Theory*.

formally recorded, hence the importance of maintaining internal, adaptive, and tiered patterns.

At the individual level, Latency is manifested through compliance with SOPs, internalization of professional ethics, and moral-spiritual resilience. The majority of respondents stated that the most obvious protection does not come from protection as in Articles 8A and 8B, but from internal mechanisms such as structural reporting, top consultation, team coordination and institutional solidarity. Values such as objectivity, professionalism, avoiding arrogance, and communicative with a framework of prudence as a defensive effort to reduce social pressure with the Defendant's environment. In the Indonesian context, the Latency function is also relevant to spiritual practices such as prayer and almsgiving, which are interpreted as a source of psychological resilience and moral stability, showing a close attachment between the legal system and cultural-religious values<sup>33</sup>.

At the relational level, this article found that the senior–junior mentorship mechanism functions as the main instrument for maintaining value patterns and work ethic. A total of 19 out of 25 respondents identified senior figures as ethical-tactical role models. From a functionalist perspective, role models play a role in transmitting integrity, prudence, professional courage and experience, thereby reducing the moral-professional risk when facing external pressure. Meanwhile, 6 respondents without role models indicated the potential need for role models or other efforts such as strengthening awareness of strong regulations.

Pattern maintenance is also institutionalized through internal regulations of the Prosecutor's Office, such as PERJA, INSJA, SEJA, and SEJAMPIDSUS, which function to maintain technical consistency and procedural discipline. INSJA Regulation No. 2 of 2020 concerning Simple

---

<sup>33</sup> Songklin Prayote, "Managing Ethics in Public Sector :'' 7, no. 4 (2016); Van Rooij and Fine, "Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational Processes of Deviancy."

Lifestyles, for example, operates as a proactive prevention mechanism against hedonistic motives that were previously identified as corrupt motives. In addition, formal-based teamwork (Sprintlid, Sprintdik, Sprintut) and internal information restrictions serve as protective organizations that divide responsibilities and protect the professionalism of the Prosecutor.

Furthermore, the system of determining "demands" based on PERJA No. 1 of 2019 strengthens the latency of subjective discretion and neutralizes the potential for hierarchical intervention. Beyond the internal realm, the function of Latency extends to the community through legal socialization programs such as School Entrance Prosecutors and Village Entrance Prosecutors, which place the Prosecutor's Office as a facilitator of legal awareness formation. Overall, these findings confirm that Latency is an invisible but decisive foundation in maintaining the stability of the corruption handling system, by combining formal regulations, professional ethics, collective work, and internalization of cultural-religious values

## **2. Structural-Functional in Handling Corruption**

The empirical findings outlined in the previous section show that the handling of corruption in South Sulawesi works as a social system that can only be understood in its entirety through the simultaneous interaction between the functions of Adaptation, Goal Attainment, Integration, and Latency. The four functions do not work separately, but form a dynamic institutional framework. Thus, handling corruption is not solely the application of norms, but a process of technical adjustment to functional pressure. structural and social.

The Adaptation function is reflected in the Prosecutor's ability to adjust to the complexity of modern corruption that is organized and cross-sectoral. The need for external auditors, the use of prosecutor's intelligence, and institutional learning in understanding the logic of state finances show that adaptation is not individual, but institutionalized. However, the

findings of the article also show that adaptation that is not balanced by strong institutional integration has the potential to encourage prosecutors to rely on personal discretion and informal practices.

In the context of Goal Attainment, handling corruption is not only directed at punishment, but also at recovering state losses and creating a deterrent effect. The interview data shows a shift in goal orientation from just proving deeds to strategies that target the economic interests of the perpetrator. This shift marks the system's attempt to align its normative goals with the increasingly rational and instrumental social reality of corruption. However, the achievement of the objective remains dependent on the success of the adaptation and integration function in providing adequate technical-coordination resources.

For the Integration Function, its presence as a mechanism that maintains the handling system with the complexity of the actors and institutions involved. The structure of teamwork, case exposure forums, and cross-agency coordination show that integration is not only formal rules, but also operational and procedural. These findings confirm that effective integration allows the system to absorb differences in interests and expertise without losing policy direction. However, reliance on superiors and informal consultative practices can indicate vulnerability due to personal relationships that let go of the mechanisms of operational standards.

The Latency dimension or maintenance of professional value patterns is the foundation that underpins the other three functions. This research shows that institutional integrity in handling corruption is more maintained through the daily practice, professionalism, solidarity and psycho-social resilience of prosecutors, compared to formal sanctions alone. Mechanisms such as mentorship, simple lifestyle regulations, collective teamwork, and internalization of spiritual-professional values serve to maintain the

stability of the motivation of the Prosecutor as a legal actor in a high-risk environment.

From a structural-functional perspective, an imbalance in one of the functions of AGIL has the potential to weaken the entire system. Rapid adaptation without strong latency can erode integrity, achieving goals without adequate integration can result in policy issues. Meanwhile, integration without adaptation risks creating bureaucratic rigidity. The empirical findings in this article show that the South Sulawesi Prosecutor's Office continues to be in the process of balancing, with relatively functional but not yet stable results.

Overall, the handling of corruption in South Sulawesi can be understood as an institutional balancing process, with the legal structure must continue to be aligned with the realities faced by prosecutors in the field. This approach shifts the anti-corruption paradigm from a reactive and normative model to an institutional paradigm, organizational learning, and the maintenance of professionalism.

By linking the views of the Prosecutor (through his experience) with the AGIL framework of Talcott Parsons, this research contributes to the artice of socio-legal and criminology by affirming that the handling of corruption is not on the normative side alone, but requires the ability of the criminal justice system to maintain a functional balance between structural adaptation, the achievement of substantive goals, institutional integration, and the maintenance of professional values.

## **Conclusion**

This article shows that the handling of corruption crimes in South Sulawesi cannot be understood as the application of norms alone or the expression of political will, but as a social system work process based on functional balance between technical adaptation, achievement of

substantive goals, institutional integration, and maintenance of professional values. The findings show that success is largely determined by the ability of the Prosecutor to adjust to the complexity of corruption, the orientation of recovering state losses, cross-agency coordination, and maintaining the integrity and psycho-social resilience of the Prosecutor. Dysfunction in one of AGIL's functions has been proven to weaken the performance of the corruption handling system.

Theoretically, this article develops Talcott Parsons' AGIL framework from the normative side to the practical-technical side based on institutions and professionalism. Different from previous studies that placed handling corruption as a matter of compliance, institutional capacity or political will alone, this article introduces the concept of institutional balancing as a prerequisite for handling corruption. This concept bridges the formal legal structure with the experience of the Prosecutor as a law enforcement actor at the regional level, while offering practical implications in the form of the need to strengthen adaptive capacity, coordination mechanisms, asset recovery orientation, and protection of the Prosecutor's professional value in corruption eradication policies.

## References

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. "Culture, Institutions, and Social Equilibria: A Framework." *Journal of Economic Literature* 63, no. 2 (2025): 637–92. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20241680>.
- Afandi, Fachrizal. "Researching the Legal Culture of the Bureaucracy : An Introduction to Ethnographic Study of Procedural Criminal Law." *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 2 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n2.1>.
- Ali, Achmad. *Menguak Teori Hukum Dan Teori Peradilan*. Prenada Media Goup, 2012.
- Ansori, Lutfil. "Reformasi Penegakan Hukum Perspektif Hukum Progresif." *Jurnal Yuridis* 4, no. 2 (2017): 148–63.
- Ayuningsih, Irma Reisalinda, and Febby Mutiara Nelson. "Perampasan Aset Tanpa Pidanaan: Suatu Perbandingan Indonesia Dan Australia." *Jurnal Ius Constituendum* 7, no. 2 (2022): 246–61. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26623/jic.v7i2.5142>.

- Bardhan, Pranab. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues." In *Political Corruption*, 321–38, 2017.
- Bedner, Adriaan, Jacqueline Vel, Adriaan Bedner, and Jacqueline Vel. "Legal Education in Indonesia." *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 1 (2021).  
<https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n1.6>.
- Bowen, Glenn A. "Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method." *Qualitative Research Journal* 9, no. 2 (August 3, 2009): 27–40.  
<https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>.
- Butt, Simon, and Tim Lindsey. *Indonesian Law*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Courtis, Christian. *Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, 2008.
- Didwania, Stephanie Holmes. "Asset Forfeiture and Inequality." *Stanford Law Review* 77, no. 1 (2025): 159–234.
- Dimant, Eugen, and Thorben Schulte. "The Nature of Corruption: An Interdisciplinary Perspective." *German Law Journal* 17, no. 1 (2016): 53–72. [https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200019684](https://doi.org/DOI:10.1017/S2071832200019684).
- Farralles, Mark Jorgensen. "Bureaucratic Corruption in Southeast Asia : A Comparative Analysis of the ASEAN 5," 2006.
- Fitzpatrick, David. "A 'Think Piece' on Intelligence, Investigation and Prosecution." *Journal of Financial Crime* 24, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 449–60. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-03-2017-0018>.
- Friedman, Lawrence M. *The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective*. Russell Sage Foundation, 1975.
- Friedrichs, David O. "White Collar Crime." In *The Handbook of White-Collar Crime*, 16–31, 2019.  
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118775004.ch2>.
- Hagan, John. *Who Are the Criminals? The Politics of Crime Policy from the Age of Roosevelt to the Age of Reagan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Hamidi, Munawwar, Ida Keumala Jeumpa, and Sri Walny Rahayu. "Legal Analysis of The Element of Economic Loss to The State in Article 2 Paragraph ( 1 ) and Article 3 of The Corruption Crimes Act." *International Journal of Law and Society* 3, no. 1 (2025): 10–23.
- Heryadi, Dudy, and Denny Indra Sukmawan. "Optimizing Interagency Coordination and Supervision in Corruption Eradication Efforts." *Integritas : Jurnal Antikorupsi* 9, no. 2 (2023): 213–28.
- Heywood, Paul M. "Rethinking Corruption: Hocus-Pocus, Locus and Focus." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 95, no. 1 (December 12, 2017): 21–48.  
<https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.95.1.0021>.
- Hydén, Håkan. *Sociology of Law as the Science of Norms*. Routledge, n.d.
- International, Transparency. "Corruption Perceptions Index." Accessed December 23, 2025.  
<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/idn>.
- Irianto, Sulistyowati. "Legal Education for The Future of Indonesia : A

- Critical Assessment.” *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 1 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n1.1>.
- Jackson, David. “Systemic Corruption as a Meso-Level Phenomenon: Severe Abuse and Strategic Gain.” *Public Integrity*, June 27, 2025, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2025.2520679>.
- Jenkins, Matthew. “Interagency Coordination Mechanisms,” 2019.
- Kusworo, Daffa Ladro, and Titi Anggraini. “Extensive Interpretation of State Financial Losses in Tin Sector Corruption : A Comparative Study of Emerging Economies.” *Integritas: Jurnal Anti Korupsi* 10, no. 2 (2024): 173–86.
- Luhmann, Niklas. *Law as a Social System*. Oxford Socio-Legal Studies, 2004.
- Masyhudi. “Membangun Sistem Integritas Untuk Pemberantasan Korupsi Dalam Sistem Peradilan Pidana Indonesia.” *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 26, no. 1 (2019): 44–66. <https://doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol26.iss1.art3>.
- Mattos, Claudio De, Laura Salciuviene, and Stuart Sanderson. “Can Conflict Be a Desirable Step in Trust-Building within International Strategic Alliances? A Systematic Literature Review and Typology.” *Journal of International Management* 31, no. 2 (2025): 101234. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2025.101234>.
- Mitchell, Matthew. “Analyzing the Law Qualitatively.” *Qualitative Research Journal* 23, no. 1 (September 14, 2022): 102–13. <https://doi.org/10.1108/QRJ-04-2022-0061>.
- Nelken, David. *Comparative Criminal Justice*. London: Sage Publications, 2010.
- Nurtjahyo, Lidwina Inge. “A Sociolegal Perspective to Legal Research in the Digital Field : A Methodological Proposition ( Penelitian Hukum Berperspektif Sosiolegal Pada Ranah Digital : Satu Tawaran Metodologis ) PENELITIAN HUKUM BERPERSPEKTIF SOSIOLEGAL PADA RANAH DIGITAL :” *The Indonesian Journal of Socio-Legal Studies (IJSLS)* 1, no. 1 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.54828/ijsls.2021v1n1.4>.
- OECD. “Consequences of Corruption at the Sector Level and Implications for Economic Growth and Development.” Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264230781-en>.
- Parsons, Talcott. *The Social System*. Routledge, 2013.
- Prayote, Songklin. “Managing Ethics in Public Sector :” 7, no. 4 (2016).
- Rahman, Wahbi, Sudarsono Sudarsono, Prija Djatmika, Abdul Madjid, and Ramalinggam Rajamanickam. “Prevention of the Corruption Crime through Administrative Enforcement Mechanism against Abuse of Authority.” *Journal of Law and Legal Reform* 5, no. 4 (2024): 2013–44.
- Refki Saputra. “Tantangan Penerapan Perampasan Aset Tanpa Tuntutan Pidana (Nonconviction Based Asset Forfeiture) Dalam RUU Perampasan Aset Di Indonesia.” *Integritas: Jurnal Anti Korupsi* Vol. 3, no. 1 (2017): 115–30.

- Ritzer, George, and Jeffrey Stepnisky. *Sociological Theory*. SAGE Publications, 2017.
- Rooij, Benjamin Van, and Adam Fine. "Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational Processes of Deviancy." *Administrative Sciences*, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci8030023>.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Bonnie J. Palifka. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
- Rothstein, Bo. "Fighting Systemic Corruption: The Indirect Strategy." *Daedalus* 147, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 35–49. [https://doi.org/10.1162/daed\\_a\\_00501](https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00501).
- Rumadan, Ismail. "Penafsiran Hakim Terhadap Ketentuan Pidana Minimum Khusus Dalam Undang-Undang Tindak Pidana Korupsi." *Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan* 2, no. 3 (2018): 379. <https://doi.org/10.25216/jhp.2.3.2013.379-404>.
- Sobhani, Hossein, and Seyyed Mansour Mirsaedi. "A Comparative Study of Extended Criminal Confiscation from the Perspective of the Financial Action Task Force, EU, UK and Iran." *Comparative Law Review* 14, no. 2 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.22059/JCL.2023.342633.634350>.
- Soekanto, Soerjono. *Pokok-Pokok Sosiologi Hukum*. Jakarta: PT, Raja Grafindo Persada, 2000.
- Tonry, Michael. "Reinventing American Criminal Justice." In *Crime and Justice*. University of Chicago Press, 2017.
- Treviño, A Javier. "Talcott Parsons on Building Personality System Theory via Psychoanalysis." *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 59, no. 4 (October 2023): 417–32. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jhbs.22257>.
- Weiss, Raquel, and Jayme Gomes Neto. "Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of Morality." *The American Sociologist* 52, no. 1 (2021): 107–30. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-020-09466-w>.
- Wilkes, Nicole, Valerie R Anderson, Cheryl Laura Johnson, and Lillian Mae Bedell. "Mixed Methods Research in Criminology and Criminal Justice: A Systematic Review." *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 47, no. 3 (2022): 526–46. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12103-020-09593-7>.
- Yelikbay, Maksat, Kurmangaly Sarykulov, Nurzhan Zhaksylykov, Aigul Ordayeva, and Dauletgeldi Abdramanov. "Methodology for Investigating Corruption Crimes : Theoretical and Practical Problems." *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 16, no. 1 (2024): 1086–94.
- Yulianto, Anggoro. "Cybersecurity Policy and Its Implementation in Indonesia." *Law Research Review Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (2021): 69–82.