LAW RESEARCH
Review Quarterly

Law Research Review Quarterly is a **Journal for Law, Justice, and Crime in Indonesia and Southeast Asia**. The Journal is a peer-reviewed journal published by Faculty of Law Universitas Negeri Semarang, Indonesia. The Journal published quarterly on February, May, August, and November. ISSN 2716-3415 (Online)
Online at https://journal.unnes.ac.id/journals/snh

Social Security Protection for Laid-Off Workers in the Sritex Mass Retrenchment: A Welfare State Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines whether Indonesia's Job Loss Insurance (JKP) and Old Age Security (JHT) programs have fulfilled the state's obligation to protect workers affected by mass layoffs from corporate bankruptcy, using the Sritex case as the primary reference. This study employs a normative juridical approach analyzing relevant legislation against the ICESCR, General Comment No. 19, and ILO Convention No. 102. The findings reveal four structural gaps: an eligibility gap, an adequacy gap, a legal uncertainty gap in JHT, and an insolvency gap due to the absence of a wage guarantee fund. These gaps demonstrate that Indonesia's social security framework remains insufficient to fulfill its constitutional and international obligations in cases of large-scale mass layoffs. Structural reform is needed to strengthen the state's role as the primary guarantor of workers' social rights.

KEYWORDS
Social Security; Welfare State; Sritex; Mass Layoff; Workers' Protection

Introduction

The collapse of PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk, widely known as Sritex, represents one of the most serious industrial labor crises in Indonesia's recent history. Once regarded as one of the largest textile manufacturers in Southeast Asia, the company was declared bankrupt by the Semarang Commercial Court in late 2024, leading to the termination of more than eleven thousand workers between August 2024 and February 2025. This mass layoff did not only eliminate thousands of livelihoods within a short period of time, but it also exposed longstanding structural weaknesses in Indonesia's social security system, particularly regarding its capacity to respond when workers lose employment on such a large and sudden scale. The problem is not merely procedural. The Sritex case tests whether the state's constitutional commitment to social protection translates into genuine and accessible protection for workers in practice.[1]

Indonesia's obligation to provide social protection for its citizens is firmly rooted in its constitutional framework. Article 28H paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to social security, while Article 34 paragraph (2) mandates the state to develop a comprehensive national social security system.[2] The state's responsibility in this regard is further elaborated through Law Number 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System (SJSN), which establishes the legal foundation for programs including the Jaminan Kehilangan Pekerjaan (JKP) and Jaminan Hari Tua (JHT), and Law Number 24 of 2011 on the

[1] Al Diva and Zain Farras, "Perlindungan Hukum Bagi Pekerja Yang Terkena Pemutusan Hubungan Kerja Akibat Resesi Ekonomi," *Pemuliaan Keadilan* 2, no. 3 (2025): 48–57, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.62383/pk.v2i3.990.

[2] "Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, Pasal 28H Ayat (3) Dan Pasal 34 Ayat (2)" (n.d.).

Social Security Administering Body (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan), which designates BPJS Ketenagakerjaan as the institution responsible for implementing those programs.[3] These provisions reflect the foundational logic of the welfare state, a model of governance in which the state actively assumes responsibility for shielding citizens from social and economic risks including unemployment. In practice, however, the Sritex mass layoff raises serious doubts about whether existing social security instruments, particularly JKP and JHT, are adequate in either their normative design or their practical reach.

This concern extends beyond the domestic legal context. The right to social security is recognized internationally as a fundamental human right, and Indonesia bears binding obligations in this regard as a state party to several key international instruments. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes the right of everyone to social security including social insurance, and Indonesia is bound to progressively realize this right following its ratification through Law Number 11 of 2005.[4] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, through General Comment No. 19, clarified that states must not only establish social security systems but ensure those systems are genuinely accessible to individuals facing social risks such as unemployment.[5] The International Labour Organization through Convention No. 102 of 1952 similarly places general responsibility on the state for ensuring the proper provision of social security benefits to all workers, including unemployment benefit.[6] Together, these international instruments provide a normative baseline against which Indonesia's response to the Sritex crisis can be evaluated.

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[3] "Undang-Undang Nomor 40 Tahun 2004 Tentang Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional; Undang-Undang Nomor 24 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial" (n.d.).
[4] "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1976).
[5] General Comment No. 19 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "The Right to Social Security: Article 9" (2008).
[6] "International Labour Organization, Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention" (1952).

Prior studies have examined related dimensions of this problem from varying angles, yet important gaps remain across all of them. Studies focusing on the legal position of workers in corporate insolvency proceedings, such as Mulyono et al. (2025) in the Gorontalo Law Review, and those addressing procedural fairness in mass layoffs, such as Prasetyo et al. (2024) in Media Hukum Indonesia, share a common limitation, neither engages with the social protection framework as a welfare state instrument, nor do they examine whether JKP and JHT functioned as meaningful safety nets in practice.[7]

A second cluster of studies has examined the JKP program more directly, yet each remains incomplete in its own way. Silitonga et al. (2022), publishing in the Administrative Law and Governance Journal, produced what is arguably the most foundational critique of JKP's eligibility design, demonstrating that the minimum contribution requirements under Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021 created structural barriers that excluded many workers from accessing benefits.[8] This finding is significant because it establishes that the protection gap predates the Sritex collapse and is embedded in the program's normative architecture. Building on this, Fransinta et al. (2025) in the Journal of Innovative and Creativity offer the most theoretically proximate study to this article, identifying persistent normative disharmony between JKP rules and broader labor law instruments under the revised Government Regulation Number 6 of 2025.[9] Their analysis is the strongest among existing studies in its engagement with regulatory coherence. However, it does not use the Sritex case as an empirical reference point and does not incorporate international human

[7] Ferio Ivan Mulyono, Sugeng Santoso PN, and Alivia Hasnanda SM, “Studi Kasus Perlindungan Hukum Pekerja/Buruh Pada Kasus Kepailitan PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk (Sritex),” *Gorontalo Law Review* 8, no. 1 (2025): 139, https://doi.org/10.32662/golrev.v8i1.40465.

[8] Attallah et al., “Optimalisasi Kebijakan Ketenagakerjaan Untuk Mengatasi Dampak PHK Massal Dan Meningkatkan Perlindungan Pekerja,” *Media Hukum Indonesia* 2, no. 4 (2024): 643, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14271188.

[9] Chintiya Oktaviani Silitonga, Solechan Solechan, and Muhamad Azhar, “Prospek Pemberian Jaminan Kehilangan Pekerjaan Guna Memberikan Perlindungan Hak Pekerja Dalam Sistem Hukum Ketenagakerjaan,” *Administrative Law and Governance Journal* 5, no. 1 (2022): 41, https://doi.org/10.31004/joecy.v5i3.6450.

rights standards, particularly the ICESCR or ILO Convention No. 102, as evaluative tools. Similarly, Faidhah et al. (2024) in the Jurnal Pengembangan Ketenagakerjaan documented persistent coverage gaps especially for unregistered workers, pointing to structural exclusions that extend well beyond any single company's failure, yet their analysis equally lacks an international normative dimension.[10]

No prior study has simultaneously examined the welfare state as both a constitutional obligation and a theoretical framework for assessing state responsibility, evaluated the effectiveness of JKP and JHT in the specific context of the Sritex mass layoff, and measured Indonesia's response against international standards under the ICESCR and ILO Convention No. 102. This threefold gap constitutes the novelty that distinguishes this article from prior contributions in the field. This article employs a normative juridical approach drawing on statutory, conceptual, and human rights methods of analysis to examine whether Indonesia's legal framework adequately protects workers affected by mass layoffs. The central issue is whether the existing social security framework, particularly JKP and JHT, is structurally and practically capable of fulfilling the state's welfare obligations when mass layoffs occur at the scale of the Sritex collapse. The objective is to analyze the extent to which JKP and JHT fulfill the state's welfare obligations in response to the Sritex mass layoff, and to evaluate whether the existing legal framework is sufficient in both its normative design and practical implementation to protect workers in accordance with the welfare state principle.

Methods

This article examines the adequacy of Indonesia's social security legal framework in protecting workers affected by mass layoffs, with particular

[10] Fransinta Dewi Ayu et al., "Implementasi Dan Kepatuhan Terhadap Peraturan Pemerintah Tentang Jaminan Kehilangan Pekerjaan (PP No. 6 Tahun 2025)," *Journal of Innovative and Creativity* 5, no. 3 (2025): 39004, https://doi.org/10.31004/joecy.v5i3.6450.

reference to the Sritex case as the central object of analysis. The topic is analyzed through the lens of the welfare state theory, drawing principally on the typological framework of Gøsta Esping-Andersen and the social citizenship theory of T.H. Marshall, both of which provide the conceptual foundation for evaluating the extent to which the state fulfills its protective obligations toward workers who face the risk of unemployment.[11]

The legal instruments used as the primary basis of analysis include the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly Article 28H paragraph (3) and Article 34 paragraph (2), Law Number 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System, Law Number 24 of 2011 on the Social Security Administering Body, Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021 on the Job Loss Insurance Program, and Government Regulation Number 6 of 2025 as its amendment. The analysis further incorporates international normative standards, including Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and ILO Convention No. 102 of 1952 on Social Security Minimum Standards.[12]

This article acknowledges certain limitations inherent to its normative orientation. As a review article, the analysis does not incorporate primary empirical data such as direct accounts from affected workers or administrative statistics on JKP and JHT claims filed following the Sritex dismissal. The practical implementation of social security programs is therefore assessed through normative and theoretical evaluation rather than field investigation. Future research employing socio-legal or empirical methods would be valuable to complement and verify the findings presented here.

[11] Peter Mahmud Marzuki, *Penelitian Hukum* (Jakarta: Kencana, 2019).
[12] Soerjono Soekanto and Sri Mamudji, *Penelitian Hukum Normatif: Suatu Tinjauan Singkat* (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2015).

Result and Discussion

1. The Legal Framework of Social Security Protection for Laid-Off Workers in Indonesia: Normative Adequacy and Structural Gaps

1.1 Constitutional and Regulatory Foundation

Indonesia's obligation to protect workers who lose employment is constitutionally grounded in Article 28H paragraph (3) and Article 34 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, which recognize social security as a fundamental right and direct the state to develop a comprehensive national social security system. These provisions are implemented through Law Number 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System and Law Number 24 of 2011 on the Social Security Administering Body, which establish BPJS Ketenagakerjaan as the implementing institution and regulate the principal programs available to dismissed workers, the Jaminan Kehilangan Pekerjaan and Jaminan Hari Tua.[13] Program-level rules for JKP are further elaborated in Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021, as amended by Government Regulation Number 6 of 2025, while severance entitlements are governed under Law Number 13 of 2003 on Manpower as modified by the Job Creation Law and its implementing regulations.[14] Read together, these instruments constitute the formal regulatory framework within which workers affected by the Sritex mass layoff are expected to receive protection.

This constitutional and legislative architecture reflects the foundational logic of the welfare state, in which the state assumes

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[13] Republic of Indonesia, "Law Number 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System, Article 1 Law Number 24 of 2011 on the Social Security Administering Body, Articles 1 and 6" (n.d.).
[14] Republic of Indonesia, "Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021 on the Job Loss Insurance Program; Government Regulation Number 6 of 2025; Law Number 13 of 2003 on Manpower, Article 156; Government Regulation Number 35 of 2021, Articles 40–57" (n.d.).

responsibility for protecting individuals from social and economic risks, including unemployment.[15] The critical question is not whether Indonesia has established this framework in form, but whether the framework is capable of delivering substantive protection in practice, particularly when mass dismissal occurs on the scale and under the conditions produced by the Sritex bankruptcy.

1.2 Structural Deficiencies of the Job Loss Insurance Program

The The most fundamental structural weakness of Indonesia's post-dismissal protection framework lies in the eligibility architecture of JKP. Under Article 4 of Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021, a worker's access to benefits is contingent on the employer having registered with and maintained consistent contributions to BPJS Ketenagakerjaan prior to dismissal.[16] This design produces a deeply problematic paradox, workers employed by financially distressed companies face the highest probability of mass dismissal and are simultaneously the most vulnerable to exclusion from protection, because employer contribution compliance tends to deteriorate as financial conditions worsen. The Sritex bankruptcy illustrates this inversion precisely, as the company descended into insolvency, the likelihood that its contribution obligations were irregular or incomplete increased, placing dismissed workers at compounded risk, losing employment as a direct consequence of employer financial failure while potentially losing benefit eligibility for the same reason.

This eligibility gap is not a product of the Sritex crisis alone. Silitonga et al. observed that the eligibility structure of the JKP program potentially creates exclusionary consequences for workers where employer compliance with BPJS Ketenagakerjaan contribution obligations becomes inconsistent,

[15] Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
[16] Republic of Indonesia, "Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021, Article 4." (n.d.).

particularly under conditions of financial instability.[17] The Sritex case intensifies this finding by showing that those barriers operate most severely at exactly the moment when protection is most urgently required. This arrangement inverts the foundational logic of social insurance, in which the materialization of the insured risk should trigger benefit entitlement, not foreclose it.

The adequacy of JKP benefits compounds this problem. The program provides cash benefits equivalent to 45 percent of prior wages for the first three months following dismissal and 25 percent for the subsequent three months, for a maximum of six months.5 This replacement rate falls below the adequacy standard reflected in ILO Convention No. 102, which establishes 45 percent of reference wages as a minimum floor, and the six-month benefit ceiling is structurally misaligned with re-employment realities in the manufacturing sector, where displacement periods regularly exceed six months for workers with sector-specific skills and limited labor market transferability.[18] The vocational training and job placement components of JKP do not resolve this gap as their delivery depends on the institutional capacity of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan's partners and the absorptive capacity of the local labor market, conditions that are demonstrably constrained in the Solo Raya region following the simultaneous dismissal of more than eleven thousand workers.[19]

The structural weaknesses of JKP ultimately demonstrate a broader failure of the welfare state function within Indonesia's labor protection framework. In welfare state theory, social insurance is designed to operate as a mechanism through which the state absorbs and redistributes social risk during periods of economic vulnerability. However, the Indonesian JKP framework shifts a substantial portion of that risk back onto workers by

[17] Silitonga, Solechan, and Azhar, "Prospek Pemberian Jaminan Kehilangan Pekerjaan Guna Memberikan Perlindungan Hak Pekerja Dalam Sistem Hukum Ketenagakerjaan." *Administrative Law and Governance Journal 5*, no. 1(2022): 39-55, https://doi.org/10.14710/alj.v5i1.
[18] International Labour Organization, "Convention No. 102 Concerning Social Security (Minimum Standards), Article 65" (1952).
[19] Republic of Indonesia, "Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021, Articles 21–24." (n.d.).

conditioning access on employer compliance and limiting benefit adequacy in both amount and duration. As a result, workers facing mass layoffs are thereby left exposed to economic insecurity at precisely the moment when the state's constitutional social protection obligations should be most operationally effective.

1.3 JHT and the Problem of Legal Uncertainty

The Jaminan Hari Tua program provides a parallel layer of post-dismissal financial access through a defined-contribution savings mechanism, under which accumulated funds may in principle be disbursed upon dismissal alongside retirement and permanent disability.[20] However, the JHT framework is marked by a persistent and unresolved ambiguity regarding its primary function whether it operates as a retirement savings instrument or as a broader social insurance mechanism that includes unemployment as a qualifying disbursement event. This ambiguity became most visible following the issuance of Minister of Manpower Regulation Number 2 of 2022, which restricted JHT disbursements to workers aged 56 and above, effectively barring working-age dismissed workers from accessing their own accumulated contributions. The regulation was ultimately revoked and replaced by Minister of Manpower Regulation Number 4 of 2022, but the episode exposed a fundamental design question that the current regulatory framework leaves unanswered.[21]

The significance of this unresolved ambiguity for Sritex workers is direct, as workers cannot confidently rely on JHT as an accessible income buffer at the point of dismissal when disbursement conditions remain vulnerable to regulatory change. As Nugroho observes, Indonesia's social security system has not been effective in ensuring adequate protection, particularly for vulnerable and informal sector workers, despite long-

[20] Republic of Indonesia, "Law Number 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System, Articles 35–38." (n.d.).
[21] Republic of Indonesia, "Minister of Manpower Regulation Number 2 of 2022, Article 3; Minister of Manpower Regulation Number 4 of 2022" (n.d.).

standing constitutional recognition of social security rights. This ineffectiveness reflects persistent gaps in legal compliance and implementation, which in turn reduce the actual accessibility of social security benefits.[22] Accordingly, within a constitutionally mandated comprehensive protection framework, the normative indeterminacy surrounding JHT undermines its function as a reliable post-employment income security mechanism.

1.4 Severance Pay and the Insolvency Problem

Workers dismissed in the Sritex bankruptcy are entitled in principle to severance pay, long-service recognition payments, and compensation for outstanding entitlements under Article 156 of the Manpower Law as amended by the Job Creation Law.[23] Many Sritex workers, having accumulated lengthy service periods, hold significant statutory severance claims. Under Law Number 37 of 2004 on Bankruptcy, workers are classified as preferred creditors for unpaid wages and severance pay, placing them formally ahead of unsecured creditors in the distribution of the insolvency estate.[24] This classification, however, does not constitute a guarantee of full or timely recovery where the debtor's estate is insufficient to satisfy all priority obligations. Tax arrears, secured creditor claims, and administrative costs of insolvency proceedings are addressed before preferred creditor distributions can be fully realized, and in cases of genuine insolvency, where total liabilities exceed available assets preferred creditor status provides a relative advantage within the distribution hierarchy without ensuring substantive recovery.

The critical structural absence in this context is a statutory wage guarantee fund. Several jurisdictions have established guarantee

[22] Fajar Adi Nugroho, "Analisis Efektivitas Sistem Hukum Jaminan Sosial Di Indonesia: Evaluasi Perlindungan Bagi Pekerja Sektor Informal," *Ikatan Penulis Mahasiswa Hukum Indonesia Law Journal* 1, no. 1 (2021): 21–33, https://doi.org/10.15294/ipmhi.v1i1.49852.
[23] Republic of Indonesia, "Law Number 13 of 2003 on Manpower, Article 156; Government Regulation Number 35 of 2021, Article 40" (n.d.).
[24] Republic of Indonesia, "Law Number 37 of 2004 on Bankruptcy and Suspension of Debt Payment Obligations" (n.d.).

institutions consistent with ILO Convention No. 173 of 1992 on the Protection of Workers' Claims in the Event of the Employer's Insolvency, which ensures that workers receive mandated severance and wage arrears regardless of estate sufficiency.[25] Indonesia does not have a fully comparable institutional mechanism to International Labour Organization Convention No. 173 within its insolvency framework, particularly regarding comprehensive protection of workers' claims in bankruptcy proceedings. In the Sritex case, Mulyono et al. emphasize that although workers' wage claims are legally recognized as preferential under bankruptcy law following Constitutional Court Decision No. 67/PUU-XI/2013, their realization remains dependent on the availability of the debtor's estate and the completion of the liquidation process. This condition creates uncertainty regarding the effective fulfillment of workers' entitlements in practice.[26] This demonstrates that formal legal prioritization does not necessarily guarantee timely and effective recovery for workers in practice.

The absence of a wage guarantee mechanism reveals that Indonesia's labor protection system remains fundamentally dependent on the solvency of private employers rather than on an autonomous system of state-backed protection. In large-scale insolvency cases such as Sritex, this dependency transforms workers' statutory severance rights into formally existing entitlements without effective realization. The legal framework thereby fails to provide substantive social protection at precisely the moment of greatest need, when corporate collapse eliminates both employment and the financial capacity of the employer to honor its obligations.

1.5 Structural Gaps: An Integrated Assessment

The analysis in the preceding sections reveals that the inadequacies of Indonesia's post-dismissal protection framework constitute not isolated

[25] International Labour Organization, "Convention No. 173 Concerning Protection of Workers' Claims in the Event of the Employer's Insolvency: Article 6-12" (1992).

[26] Mulyono, PN, and SM, "Studi Kasus Perlindungan Hukum Pekerja/Buruh Pada Kasus Kepailitan PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk (Sritex)." *Gorontalo Law Review* 8, no. 1 (2025): 45-48, https://doi.org/10.32662/golrev .v8i1.4045

defects but an integrated pattern of protection failure that is intensified in the specific conditions of mass layoffs arising from corporate insolvency. Four overlapping structural gaps are identifiable. First, an eligibility gap, in which workers employed by financially distressed employers are most exposed to JKP exclusion because employer contribution compliance deteriorates as the same financial conditions that precipitate mass dismissal worsen. Second, an adequacy gap, in which JKP's benefit replacement rate and maximum duration are insufficient to cover the realistic re-employment period for manufacturing workers displaced in a concentrated regional labor market. Third, a legal uncertainty gap, in which the unresolved ambiguity of JHT's function between retirement savings and emergency income replacement prevents workers from reliably accessing accumulated contributions at the point of dismissal. Fourth, an insolvency gap, in which the absence of a statutory wage guarantee fund leaves severance entitlements contingent on the outcome of protracted bankruptcy proceedings, with no institutional mechanism to ensure prompt and full payment independent of estate sufficiency.

These four gaps converge in the Sritex case to produce a condition that the constitutional framework expressly prohibits the denial of effective social protection to citizens facing the precise social risk, unemployment that the system is designed to address. The Sritex crisis does not reveal a new problem, it concentrates and amplifies pre-existing structural failures in ways that render the gap between constitutional aspiration and practical protection impossible to ignore. Measured against the welfare state principle and the progressive realization standard of Article 9 of the ICESCR, Indonesia's existing social security framework is neither normatively adequate in its design nor practically sufficient in its reach to fulfill the state's protective obligations when mass layoffs occur at the scale and under the insolvency conditions of the Sritex bankruptcy.

2. Legal Facts of the Sritex Mass Layoffs and Access to Employment Social Security

PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk. (Sritex) is a company engaged in the largest textile industry in Southeast Asia and has been operating since 1996. The bankruptcy problem of PT Sritex began when CV Prima Karya filed a petition for Suspension of Debt Payment Obligations (PKPU) against the company.[27] The peak of this crisis occurred when the Commercial Court of Semarang, through decision Number 2/Pdt.Sus Homologis/2024/PN.Niaga Smg dated October 21, 2024, officially declared that PT Sritex was in a state of bankruptcy.[28] As a result of the bankruptcy decision issued by the Commercial Court of Semarang in 2024, it forced the management of PT Sritex to carry out layoffs of 20 thousand employees.[29] Based on the journal by Mulyono, et al. in Gorontalo Law Review (2025), although the curator had paid the workers' wages in the bankruptcy case of PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk., there was a major problem in the fulfillment of workers' rights outside wages because those rights could be fulfilled after the separatist creditors obtained their rights.[30]

The most shocking fact and the crux of the legal issue in this case is that Sritex management deactivated the BPJS Ketenagakerjaan accounts of approximately 1,291 workers. The receivership team revealed in the bankruptcy case of PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk that 1,291 workers had resigned and that management had deactivated their BPJS Ketenagakerjaan

[27] Adelia Pramadanty Darmansyah and Dkk, "Mengungkap Penyebab Kepailitan PT . Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk (Sritex): Faktor Internal , Eksternal , Manajemen Keuangan Dan Proses Hukum," *Jurnal Riset Akuntansi* 3, no. 1 (2025): 330–40.
[28] Deby Fatria Ntobuo, Weny Almoravid Dungga, and Mohamad Hidayat Muhtar, "Tanggungjawab Perusahaan PT . Sritex Terhadap Pemenuhan Hak Pesangon Karyawan Yang Di PHK," *Jurnal Pustaka Cendekia Hukum Dan Ilmu Sosial* 3, no. 1 (2025): 22–31.
[29] Tri Utomo, "MENCARI SOLUSI PROBLEM PERINDUSTRIAN INDONESIA : STUDI KASUS PT . SRITEX TAHUN 2024 PENDAHULUAN :," *Journal of Economics Business Ethic and Science of History* 3, no. 5 (2025): 56–66.
[30] Mulyono, PN, and SM, "Studi Kasus Perlindungan Hukum Pekerja/Buruh Pada Kasus Kepailitan PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk (Sritex)."

accounts. As a result, those workers will not receive JKP benefits.[31] This action violates Article 15(1) of Law No. 24 of 2011, which stipulates that employers must register themselves and their employees as participants in the BPJS Ketenagakerjaan. Article 55 also stipulates that employers who fail to register their employees as participants in the BPJS Ketenagakerjaan face a maximum prison sentence of eight years or a fine of Rp 1 billion.[32]

An analysis of this case raises fundamental questions regarding the allocation of legal responsibility among the parties involved. First, Sritex, as the employer that directly deactivated the workers' BPJS accounts, is responsible for violating the membership obligations stipulated in the BPJS Law. Second, BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, through its internal oversight system, is responsible for detecting and preventing unilateral deactivation. Third, the state, through the Labor Inspector (PPK), has a constitutional obligation to ensure that workers' BPJS accounts remain active.

3. Welfare State Theory and the State's Responsibility in Protecting Workers from Mass Unemployment Risk

3.1 Welfare State as Constitutional Obligation

The theoretical foundation for evaluating Indonesia's response to the Sritex mass layoff lies in the welfare state tradition, which holds that the state bears an active and non-delegable responsibility for shielding citizens from the economic risks associated with unemployment, illness, disability, and old age. T.H. Marshall's theory of social citizenship establishes that full citizenship in a modern state encompasses not only civil and political rights but also social rights, including the right to a minimum standard of economic security and welfare as a precondition for meaningful

[31] Kamran Dikarma, "1.291 Buruh Sritex Tak Dapat JKP Karena Akun BPJS Dinonaktifkan," Republika.co.id, 2025, https://rejogja.republika.co.id/berita/ssrj4c282/1291-buruh-sritex-tak-dapat-jkp-karena-akun-bpjs-dinonaktifkan-part2.
[32] Republic of Indonesia, "Law Number 24 of 2011 on the Social Security Administering Body, Articles 15(1) and 55" (n.d.).

participation in society.[33] For Marshall, social rights are not discretionary policy concessions but constitutive elements of citizenship, obligations that the state is bound to fulfill through institutional mechanisms rather than charitable arrangements. Gøsta Esping-Andersen extended this framework by distinguishing welfare states according to the degree to which they decommodify labor, that is, the extent to which citizens can maintain a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market forces when employment is interrupted.[34] In a genuinely decommodifying welfare state, the loss of employment does not translate directly into economic destitution because state-administered social insurance absorbs and redistributes the associated risks across the population.

Indonesia's constitutional framework explicitly incorporates these welfare state commitments. Article 28H paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution recognizes the right of every citizen to social security, and Article 34 paragraph (2) obliges the state to develop a comprehensive national social security system. These provisions are not aspirational, they impose binding institutional obligations on the state to design and maintain social security programs that are genuinely capable of delivering protection when citizens face the social risks they are intended to cover. Read through the lens of Marshall's social citizenship theory, Indonesia's constitutional architecture presupposes a state that functions as a guarantor of workers' social rights rather than merely as a regulator of private employment arrangements.

The critical question raised by the Sritex crisis is whether Indonesia performs this guarantor function in practice. The answer, as demonstrated in the preceding sections, is that the existing social security framework operates primarily as a regulatory structure rather than as a substantive protective mechanism. The state has enacted legislation, established institutional bodies, and promulgated program regulations, but the

[33] T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).
[34] Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*.

realization of workers' rights under those programs remains contingent on the behavior of private employers rather than assured by autonomous state action. This arrangement is structurally inconsistent with the welfare state principle, under which the state's obligation to protect citizens from social risk cannot be validly displaced onto private actors whose own financial distress is precisely what generates the risk in the first place.

3.2 State Obligations Under International Human Rights Law

The international human rights framework reinforces and operationalizes the welfare state's normative demands by establishing specific and legally binding standards against which social security systems must be measured. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance, and Indonesia bears obligations of progressive realization under this provision following its ratification through Law Number 11 of 2005.[35] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in General Comment No. 19, elaborated the substantive content of this right by identifying availability, accessibility, adequacy, and sustainability as the core dimensions that social security systems must satisfy.[36] Availability requires that states establish, maintain, and administer social security programs covering recognized social risks including unemployment. Accessibility requires that entitlement conditions be reasonable and that programs be genuinely reachable by all qualifying individuals without discriminatory or disproportionate barriers. Adequacy requires that benefits be sufficient in amount and duration to enable beneficiaries to maintain a dignified standard of living during the period of social risk. Sustainability requires that systems be financially sound and institutionally capable of continued operation over time.

ILO Convention No. 102 of 1952 on Social Security Minimum Standards provides additional operational benchmarks. Article 71 of the

[35] "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Article 9," 1976.
[36] "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Article 9."

Convention places general responsibility on the state for the due provision of benefits and the proper administration of social security institutions, and establishes that where the financing of benefits involves contributions by employees, the total of those contributions should not be so burdensome as to impair access by workers with low incomes.[37] These standards collectively affirm a principle of fundamental importance the state's social security obligation runs directly to workers and cannot be conditioned on employer intermediaries in ways that permit employer default to extinguish worker entitlement.

Measured against these international standards, Indonesia's JKP framework exhibits significant compliance deficits across multiple dimensions. On accessibility, the requirement under Article 4 of Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021 that employer registration and consistent contribution compliance are preconditions for worker eligibility creates exactly the kind of disproportionate barrier that General Comment No. 19 identifies as incompatible with the right to social security.[38] Workers who are most vulnerable to mass layoffs due to employer insolvency are simultaneously the most likely to be excluded from JKP access, precisely because the financial deterioration that causes insolvency also disrupts contribution compliance. On adequacy, the replacement rate of 45 percent for three months declining to 25 percent for a further three months, capped at six months, does not reliably meet the minimum standard reflected in ILO Convention No. 102 when measured against actual re-employment periods in the manufacturing sector. On state responsibility, the framework's dependency on employer intermediaries to activate worker entitlement is structurally incompatible with Article 71's placement of overarching administrative and financial responsibility on the state itself.

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[37] "International Labour Organization, Convention No. 102 Concerning Social Security (Minimum Standards): Article 71" (1952).

[38] "CESCR, General Comment No. 19, Para. 23; Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021 on Job Loss Insurance, Art. 4." (n.d.).

3.3 Evaluating Indonesia's Response to the Sritex Mass Layoff

When the theoretical commitments of the welfare state and the normative standards of international human rights law are applied to Indonesia's actual response to the Sritex mass layoff, the picture that emerges is one of systematic failure of the state's risk redistribution function. In welfare state theory, social insurance is the institutional mechanism through which the state absorbs economic risks that individual workers cannot reasonably bear alone, redistributing those risks across the broader population through mandatory contribution systems. The purpose of this redistribution is precisely to decouple the materialization of social risk from the financial condition of any individual employer, so that the collapse of a single enterprise does not simultaneously destroy both workers' employment and their social protection.

The Indonesian JKP framework inverts this logic. By conditioning worker eligibility on employer contribution compliance, the system reintroduces employer financial capacity as a determinant of worker protection at the exact point where the welfare state mechanism is supposed to become operative. When Sritex descended into insolvency, the probability that its contribution obligations were irregular or incomplete rose in direct proportion to the deterioration of its financial condition. Workers thus faced a compounded vulnerability, dismissal as a direct consequence of employer financial failure, and simultaneous exclusion from the primary post-dismissal protection program for the same reason. This inversion is not a peripheral design flaw but a structural contradiction within the framework itself, one that renders JKP most unreliable precisely when it is most needed.

This failure of risk redistribution is compounded by the absence of a statutory wage guarantee fund, which would otherwise ensure that severance entitlements are met independent of estate sufficiency in insolvency proceedings. As established in Section 1.4, preferred creditor status under Law Number 37 of 2004 does not translate reliably into full or timely recovery where total liabilities exceed available assets. The absence of an institutional mechanism equivalent to those contemplated under ILO Convention No. 173, which Indonesia has not ratified, means that the realization of statutory severance rights remains contingent on the outcome of protracted bankruptcy proceedings rather than guaranteed by autonomous state action. In this respect, the state operates as a rule-maker that creates entitlements without assuming institutional responsibility for their delivery, a posture that falls substantially short of the active guarantor role that the welfare state principle requires.

The vocational training and job placement components of JKP similarly illustrate the gap between formal provision and substantive protection. Even if these components were delivered efficiently under ordinary conditions, the simultaneous displacement of more than eleven thousand workers within a concentrated regional labor market creates an absorptive capacity problem that institutional partners and local labor market structures are not designed to resolve at that scale and pace. The welfare state's protective function cannot be discharged through nominal program availability alone, it requires institutional capacity proportionate to the magnitude of the social risk being addressed.

3.4 The Failure of Substantive Social Protection: A Theoretical Synthesis

The evidence examined across the preceding sections converges on a single analytical conclusion as the failure of social protection in the Sritex mass layoff is not primarily a problem of administrative implementation but a manifestation of a deeper structural misalignment between Indonesia's formal welfare state commitments and the substantive architecture of its labor social security system. This distinction is theoretically important. An implementation failure would be remediable through improved administrative capacity, enhanced enforcement, or better institutional coordination. A structural failure, by contrast, requires normative redesign, because the deficiency is embedded in the framework's foundational architecture rather than in its operational execution.

Using Esping-Andersen's typological framework, Indonesia's social security system in the labor domain exhibits characteristics of a residual welfare state model, in which protection is provided selectively and conditionally rather than universally, and in which the primary redistributive function remains with private employment relationships rather than with state-administered insurance mechanisms. The state acts as regulator rather than guarantor, establishing entitlements in law while conditioning their realization on employer intermediation. When those intermediaries fail, as Sritex did, the regulatory framework proves incapable of substituting state-backed protection for the private employment relationship it has lost.

T.H. Marshall's social citizenship framework provides the normative standard against which this failure must be measured. If social rights are constitutive elements of citizenship rather than policy concessions, then their realization cannot be made dependent on the financial capacity of private employers. A social security system that fails workers precisely when they most require protection is not merely administratively inadequate, it is constitutionally inconsistent with the guarantee in Article 28H paragraph (3) and Article 34 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, and it falls short of Indonesia's progressive realization obligations under Article 9 of the ICESCR.

The conclusion that emerges from this theoretical synthesis is that closing the protection gaps identified in this article requires not incremental adjustment but structural reform oriented by a clear reaffirmation of the state's role as the ultimate guarantor of workers' social rights. Such reform would necessarily include, at minimum, the decoupling of worker eligibility from employer contribution compliance through a state-backed access mechanism, the establishment of a statutory wage guarantee fund independent of insolvency estate sufficiency, the revision of JKP benefit parameters to align with ILO Convention No. 102 adequacy standards, and the resolution of JHT's functional ambiguity through legislative clarification of its role as both a retirement and an emergency income replacement instrument. Without these structural changes, the welfare state principle enshrined in Indonesia's constitutional framework will continue to function as an aspiration rather than an operative guarantee for workers facing the consequences of mass layoffs.

4. Efforts to Strengthen Legal Protection for Employment Social Security

The failure of employment social security protections, as revealed in the case of PT Sri Rejeki Isman Tbk, calls for comprehensive policy reform, not merely administrative improvements. Indonesia’s JKP program does not yet fully protect workers who lose their jobs. According to Government Regulation No. 37 of 2021, access to JKP benefits remains contingent on specific administrative requirements, such as contribution periods and formal proof of termination.[39] Furthermore, Government Regulation No. 6 of 2025 makes changes to address these issues by expanding coverage through modifications to eligibility requirements, contribution periods, and claim deadlines, and by providing benefits to workers affected by layoffs.[40]

Legal protection for the rights of workers affected by layoffs can be enhanced through stricter oversight, simplified administrative procedures, and broader coverage of social security programs. This will strike a balance between the interests of companies, workers, and long-term economic sustainability.[41] In the case of Sritex, simplifying these procedures is crucial because workers who lost their jobs due to the deactivation of their BPJS accounts did not receive prompt and efficient assistance. Therefore, a critical reform is the establishment of a dedicated complaint channel and

[39] Republic of Indonesia, Government Regulation Number 37 of 2021, Articles 21–24.
[40] Republic of Indonesia, “Government Regulation No. 6 of 2025”.
[41] Ansrida D.D and Karim, “Perlindungan Hukum Bagi Pekerja Yang Terkena Pemutusan Hubungan Kerja Dalam Perspektif Jaminan Kehilangan Pekerjaan,” *Jurnal Magister Ilmu Hukum ‘DEKRIT’* 14, no. 1 (2024): 37–52, https://doi.org/10.55499/dekrit.v14n1.242.

JKP rights restoration process specifically for workers affected by bankruptcy.

The experiences of other countries can provide important lessons for strengthening Indonesia's JKP system. In Malaysia, the JKP program assists both formal and informal workers for three to six months, while in Japan it ranges from three to twelve months. The main difference between the Malaysian and Japanese systems is the stronger integration between active labor market policies and unemployment benefit programs, where the government provides post-employment cash benefits and actively promotes job placement and retraining aligned with market needs.[42]

Strengthening legal protections for social security for workers can be achieved through several measures, such as establishing an active monitoring system by Labor Inspectors (PPK) to ensure compliance with BPJS enrollment,[43] if a company deactivates an employee's BPJS account without a valid reason, the company may be subject to criminal penalties as provided for in Article 55 of the BPJS Law,[44] and develop an early warning system that integrates data on the company's financial condition with BPJS enrollment.[45]

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[42] Yos Fitraeva Pane et al., "Efektivitas Program Asuransi Kehilangan Pekerjaan Sistem Jaminan Sosial Di Indonesia, Malaysia Dan Jepang," *Zaaken: Journal of Civil and Business Law* 5, no. 3 (2024): 318–36, https://doi.org/10.22437/zaaken.v5i3.38633.

[43] Bagus Anggita Pradana, Lauddin Marsuni, and Sri Lestari Poernomo, "Analisis Hukum Program Jaminan Sosial Ketenagakerjaan Terhadap Peningkatan Perlindungan Sosial Bagi Pekerja," *Jurnal Dialogica* 1, no. 1 (2025): 1–19.

[44] Wahyu Nurhardiyanto Hulopi, Ramdhan Kasim, and Roby W. Amu, "Majelis : Jurnal Hukum Indonesia Efektivitas Terhadap Sanksi Pidana Bagi Perusahaan Yang Menunggak Iuran Jaminan Sosial Ketenagakerjaan Perlindungan Sosial Untuk Menjamin Seluruh Rakyat Agar Dapat Memenuhi Kebutuhan Dasar Ketenagakerjaan Di Pulau Sulawesi," *Majelis : Jurnal Hukum Indonesia* 2, no. 2 (2025): 83–97, https://doi.org/10.62383/majelis.v2i2.648.

[45] Alvionita Setiawati Mokoginta, Nurwita Ismail, and Yayan Hanapi, "Tinjauan Hukum Terhadap Pengawasan Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial Ketenagakerjaan Menurut Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2023 Tentang Cipta Kerja Di Indonesia," *GJR: Gorontalo Justice Research* 1, no. 1 (2025): 173–83.

Conclusion

This study found that Indonesia's social security legislation for workers, particularly the Job Loss Insurance (JKP) program, has not fully fulfilled the state's obligation to protect workers affected by mass layoffs resulting from corporate bankruptcy, as occurred at Sritex. Although Indonesia has a constitution and laws that uphold the principle of national prosperity, there are several structural weaknesses that prevent workers from fully accessing social protection when they face the risk of job loss. These conditions indicate that social security rights are still not fully in line with the mandate of the 1945 Constitution and international standards regarding social protection for workers.

The findings of this study indicate that the state must strengthen its role as the primary guarantor of workers' social rights by reforming the employment social security system. Expanding access to the Employment Social Security Program (JKP) without relying entirely on employer compliance, establishing mechanisms to ensure workers' entitlements are paid in the event of corporate bankruptcy, providing legal certainty regarding the role of JKP as a tool for worker protection in the event of job loss, and enhancing oversight of participation in the Social Security Agency for Employment (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan) are some of the measures that can be taken to implement these reforms. It is hoped that such actions will improve the performance of social protection, enhance workers' resilience against the risk of unemployment, and more tangibly realize the principles of the welfare state within Indonesia's labor system.

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DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The authors state that there is no conflict of interest in the publication of this article.

FUNDING INFORMATION

Please provide funding information.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Recognize those who helped in the research, especially funding supporter of your research. Include individuals who have assisted you in your study: Advisors, Financial support, or may other parties involved on the research.

HISTORY OF ARTICLE

Submitted :

Revised :

Accepted :

Published :