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Military Coup in Niger and Its Impact on Political Stability in West Africa

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Abstract

This study examines the military coup in Niger on July 26, 2023 and its impact on political stability in West Africa, as part of a series of coups in the Sahel, including Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Niger's democracy has been fragile since 2010, marked by corruption, economic hardship, and security threats from groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda. The study aims to identify the main causes of the coup, evaluate its domestic and regional impact, and analyze the response of ECOWAS and the international community. It uses a qualitative case study approach, relying on secondary data from official documents, reports from Amnesty International and the World Bank, academic publications, and media, collected through literature review and document analysis. The findings point to three main factors: weak civilian governance, security instability in the Sahel, and external intervention from France and the United States. Domestically, the coup undermined public trust, suspended the constitution, and worsened human rights abuses. Regionally, it tested ECOWAS's credibility, increased isolation risk, and heightened tensions. Global responses have been mixed, from Western sanctions to expanded Russian influence. Comparisons with other Sahel coups show instability, highlighting limits of the liberal democratic model and the need for prevention.

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INTRODUCTION

In some countries, especially countries where democracy is still fragile, the coup shows that the political situation is unstable. On July 26, 2023, Niger experienced this. President Mohamed Bazoum, who was only elected a few years ago, was suddenly overthrown by his own military force led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani. In fact, the takeover of power in Niger is one of several political events that have occurred in the Sahel region in recent years. Previously, Mali had experienced two coups in 2020 and 2021. Shortly afterwards, the same problem also occurred in Guinea in 2021 and in Burkina Faso in 2022. These events show how difficult it is to run democracy in West Africa. The country's political institutions were very fragile when democracy only began after 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2023). This phenomenon suggests that the Sahel region has deeper structural vulnerabilities compared to other parts of Africa, mainly due to persistent political, economic, and security pressures in the absence of a long-term solution.

All of these incidents show a similar pattern: dissatisfaction with civilian government, increasing insecurity, and weak democratic institutions (International Crisis Group, 2023). According to Peter (2023), the coup that occurred in Niger was caused by dissatisfaction among the military with the leadership of President Bazoum, who was considered incapable of handling the problems of corruption, poverty, and security threats from terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Sahel region. According to some observers, this incident serves as a warning that the liberal democratic model adopted from the West has not been fully established and firmly entrenched in West African countries. However, some researchers argue that political instability in the region should not be seen solely as a "failure of democracy," but rather because of the impact of past events, such as the influence of the legacy of colonialism that undermines state institutions and creates the political groundwork that is easily influenced by armed groups vying for power.

According to Saidou (2024), several countries in the Sahel region still face social and political problems due to a combination of poverty, corruption, and the threat of extremism. In this context, Niger has been under threat from jihadist groups operating on its borders with Mali and Nigeria over the past few years, which has been further exacerbated by social tensions arising from economic injustices (Thurston, 2024). In addition, many recent academic reports suggest that the government's failure to provide basic public services, such as education and security, has led some people to perceive the military as better able to maintain order and security, although this ultimately undermines democratic mechanisms.

Therefore, General Tchiani established the National Council for the Protection of the Homeland (CNSP) and stated that the purpose of this action was to protect the country from various threats, both from within and from outside. The country has about 25 million inhabitants and holds large uranium reserves, thus making it an important position in the region. This is the reason why the coup could affect political instability across West Africa. Strategic factors such as uranium and Niger's position as a Western security partner mean that its internal political dynamics have greater international consequences than coups in other countries. Some analysts even argue that Niger's economic and political ties with France and the United States played a role in shaping the "anti-foreign intervention" narrative that the military uses to gain public trust.

The background of this study explains that Niger is located in an important geopolitical location. The country borders Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and several other countries in the Sahel region, so disruption in the country could lead to greater instability in the surrounding areas. According to a report by Al Jazeera (2023), the coup occurred just hours after President Bazoum dismissed the head of the presidential bodyguard, which immediately prompted a swift response from the military. Afterwards General Tachiani and his group seized power from the president, arrested Bazoum, and announced plans to restore stability in Niger. After further research, the cause of the coup in Niger was not only political and security conflicts, but also unresolved economic problems and problems in relations between countries. In most incidents in the Sahel region, the military often uses a

combination of economic crisis and public discontent as an excuse to seize power, although such measures rarely bring about meaningful change after a change of power.

According to a report from the World Bank (2025), the economy in Niger is still very underdeveloped with a poverty rate of 40%. Only a few elites feel the benefits of natural resources such as uranium, while many people have difficulty getting out of poverty (Nuclear Engineering International, 2025) This situation is further supported by what Kohnert (2024) conveys, as the "development trap," which is when a country has great difficulty in advancing its own economy and is dependent on international aid. In addition, the combination of the economic crisis and dependence on the outside further weakens the position of the civilian government and provides an opportunity for the military to claim that it is the one who saved the nation.

In addition to economic problems, outside intervention has further worsened the political situation in Niger. (European Parliament, 2023) states that French and US military bases in the Sahel region make people think that the previous civilian government was too dependent on western countries. Military groups take advantage of this by creating narratives about sovereignty to gain support from the public (Lanaspa et al., 2025) This narrative is further reinforced by campaigns in the local media targeting anti-colonial sentiments, a move often used to gain political recognition in situations of public discontent.

Reporting from Amnesty International's media in a News Article titled *Niger: "Threatened and Brought to Heel" - Human Rights and Civic Space Under Pressure Since the 26 July Coup* (2025), reported human rights violations after the coup, such as detention without clear legal process. This condition shows that the political and social situation in Niger is deteriorating even though the coup was carried out under the pretext of political stability. After the coup, the situation in Niger was so calm that ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African Countries) responded quickly and decisively, demanding that President Bazoum be reinstated and threatening to intervene in the military if the military government refused to return to power. Mali and Burkina Faso, which have already suffered coups because their governments are unable to deal with the threat from Boko Haram, are now supporting the military government in Niger and rejecting outside intervention. Since this is the first time that ECOWAS member states have been involved in internal conflicts and are on opposing sides, this situation hinders cooperation between countries. These conflicting responses suggest that the joint security work structure in West Africa has now reached the highest level of vulnerability since the organization was founded.

Based on the view of Dzulfian Syafrian (2025), this situation makes cooperation between countries difficult and this problem can lead to political and economic isolation in the Sahel region and raise concerns about ECOWAS's ability to defend democratic values. It also raises questions about the opportunities for regional cooperation in West Africa, especially as it becomes increasingly difficult to reach agreement on democratic and security values amid the growing role of the military in the governments of member states.

Based on this background, this study aims to answer some of the main research questions. What were the main factors that prompted the military coup in Niger in July 2023? Second, how did the coup affect political stability in West Africa? third, how did ECOWAS and the international community respond to this coup? In addition, the study also addresses specific questions, such as whether the coup exacerbated the threat of terrorism in the Sahel region and how the coup impacted the economies of neighboring countries, such as Nigeria. These questions are important, as understanding the causes is an important step to prevent the same problem from happening again in the future. Salihu et al (2023) assessed that the coup in Niger was caused by increased jihadist activities that could threaten regional stability. Based on information from the International Crisis Group (2023), the coup that occurred in Niger has caused instability in the border region and increased the risk of conflict. This impact is not only happening in Niger, but the entire region is also feeling it. In this difficult situation, people in the Sahel region have to face difficult challenges such as arrested political figures and media that

can no longer report the political situation in Niger freely. This research aims to provide a deeper understanding of recent political developments in Niger and West Africa as a whole.

METHODS

This study uses a qualitative approach through case study methods to discuss in depth the military coup in Niger in 2023 as well as its impact on political stability in the West African region. This approach was chosen because this topic is more suitable for analysis with qualitative data. The main goal is not to conduct statistical calculations, but to understand the context, important values, and relationships between events that complicate the political situation in the Sahel region. Through this discussion, social and political aspects that are often overlooked in quantitative approaches can be known. This research is qualitative descriptive, focusing on describing and explaining the background, causes, and consequences of the coup. Data sources are obtained from official documents, such as Nigerian government reports, ECOWAS, and the United Nations. In addition, this study uses reports from international organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or the World Bank. To strengthen the context, this study also refers to academic journal articles from platforms such as Google Scholar as well as news from trusted media such as the BBC, Reuters, or Al Jazeera. All data was collected from the period 2023 to 2025 to ensure accuracy and relevance to current conditions in the Sahel. This data is secondary, given the difficulty of conducting field research in Niger, but official sources and academic journals are able to provide a truly real picture of the situation. This case study method ensures that research can be conducted in depth while still paying attention to the relationships between domestic, regional, and international elements related to the coup.

Data collection techniques include literature review and document analysis. First, various sources are collected through reading resources on the internet such as Google Scholar and the official websites of international institutions. Keywords used included "Niger's 2023 Military Coup," "ECOWAS's response to the coup," and "Political Instability in the Sahel." Next, the data is separated by type and stored in a single folder. The collection of reading materials is carried out in a structured manner, by prioritizing primary sources such as official statements from international organizations, as well as additional sources such as scientific journal articles or news from trusted media. Data processing is carried out using descriptive content analysis methods, which include repeated reading of data, marking important elements, compiling summaries, and conclusions based on findings. Data processing is done manually to ensure a deeper understanding, while still referring to various sources to keep the results reliable. The results of the analysis are not intended to conclude based on numerical data, but to examine how various things are interconnected and shaped the political situation of Niger after the coup. This method facilitates the mapping of the pattern of relationships between events and the influence of domestic and international roles on political developments after the coup.

This study is limited to the military coup in Niger since 2023 and its development until 2025, as well as its impact on political stability in West Africa. Aspects such as global economic conditions, cooperation between countries, and the structure of military organizations are not discussed in depth due to limited access and are not the main focus of this study. However, the use of various secondary sources from official institutions, academic journals, and international media has been sufficient to provide a definitive picture of the political changes that took place in Niger after the coup. The limitations of this study include the reliance on the use of secondary data due to the security conditions in Niger, so the results of this study must be read carefully, paying attention to the accuracy and consistency of the sources used. Although it is descriptive, this study still involves comparing data from various sources to maintain data consistency. Therefore, this research method provides a transparent, organized, and repeatable pattern of work for other researchers to examine the relationship between the coup in Niger and broader political issues in West Africa.

Table 1. The Main Factors That Caused the Niger Coup

Key Factors	Brief Description	Examples/indicators
Weak civil government	The government has failed to address corruption, poverty, and poor public services, thereby undermining the government's legitimacy.	Public dissatisfaction, unresolved corruption cases, weak bureaucracy.
Insecurity in the Sahel	Attacks by armed groups have been on the rise since 2015, while the civilian government is perceived as failing to secure and manage border areas effectively.	Boko Haram/Al-Qaeda activity, increased attacks in Tillabéri and Tahoua.
External influences	The government's dependence on military aid from Western countries fueled anti-Western sentiment, which was then exploited by the military.	Anti-French/US protests, criticism of foreign military bases.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Since the coup in Niger is still ongoing until 2025, this discussion will focus more on the most recent developments during 2024-2025, although it still includes the setting from 2023 so that the beginning of the events is clear. This approach makes the analysis more relevant to the current situation, especially in view of the increasing increase in human rights violations and the changing attitudes of the international community. By taking into account recent developments, the analysis becomes broader because it involves changes that were not seen at the beginning of the coup.

This section presents the main results of the data analysis and discusses them thoroughly. The data were drawn from official sources such as ECOWAS, the United Nations, and academic journals, and were compared based on the situation in the region. After being analyzed gradually, the results are not just numbers and data, but describe a complex phenomenon of how a single event can impact the entire West African region. The results of this analysis are then divided into several main themes so that readers can more easily understand the relationship between factors that affect and worsen the political situation in Niger.

To be clearer, this study divides it into several parts according to the outline: first, there are several reasons that led to the military coup in Niger 2023. From the analysis of the data, there are 3 main factors: weak civilian governance, insecurity in the Sahel, and outside influences. Bazoum's government was considered unsuccessful in overcoming the problems of corruption and poverty, so the military felt the need to "save" the country. This incident is similar to what happened in West Africa, where the military would take over when the civilian government was unable to address the problem. The threat from Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda since 2015 has further exacerbated the situation, and this situation has led to long-standing security tensions. In addition, the role of France and the US through anti-terror operations has made the public worried that the government is too dependent on Western countries. Viewed more broadly, this problem is not only about Niger, but also shows the failure of liberal democracy in conflict-prone areas. These three factors are the main basis for explaining why a coup can happen so quickly and gain support from some people.

In terms of domestic impact, this coup has made the public no longer trust. The constitution was temporarily suspended, human rights were violated such as arbitrary arrests, and at first the people felt calm, but then worried because of the worsening economic conditions. Reporting from Amnesty International media in a News Article entitled *Niger: "Threatened and Brought to Heel "- Human Rights and Civic Space Under Pressure Since the 26 July Coup* (2025), reports that many communities were affected, leaving the country as if trapped, so the military took power with unstable and rapidly declining public support. Although the military government says this is to create stability, the reality is that it is fueling social division. Reporting from Amnesty International media on News Article entitled *Niger: "Threatened and Brought to Heel "- Human Rights and Civic Space Under Pressure Since the 26 July Coup* (2025), reports that from 2023 to 2025, arrests of opposition activists increased, press

Table 2. The Impact of the Niger Coup on Domestic & Regional Conditions

Level	Aspects	Main Impact	Indicators/Examples
Domestic	Politics & constitution	The constitution was suspended, the civilian government was dissolved, and all political authority was centered on the CNSP.	President Bazoum remains in detention, democratic institutions are not running.
Domestic	Human Rights & Civil Space	The opposition was suppressed, the media was restricted, and detention was carried out without due process.	Amnesty & HRW reported a decline in civil liberties during 2023–2025.
Domestic	Economics	Food inflation, supply disruptions, and foreign investment declined.	The impact of ECOWAS/WAEMU sanctions on food and energy trade.
Regional	Area integration	Niger is getting closer to Mali and Burkina Faso, forming a new Sahel bloc.	Establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
Regional	Security	Border coordination is weakening, creating space for jihadism and crime.	Attacks are increasing in the Sahel tri-border zone.

freedom was increasingly restricted, and space for civil society was reduced.

As a result, at the societal level, public trust in the government continued to decline as there was no clear progress during the two years of military rule. In the 2024–2025 period, this situation further strengthens these findings: the junta regime remains in power, while external actors are undergoing changes, but stability indicators such as security, the economy, and human rights do not show definite progress.

Economically, the domestic burden has increased due to the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and WAEMU since 2023, which have halted trade flows, energy subsidies, and development assistance. According to a report from the World Bank (2025), showing increased import restrictions and food inflation throughout 2023–2024, with the heaviest impact felt by low-income households and rural areas. Although the rate of extreme poverty is expected to decline in the 2024–2025 period, economic recovery remains slow due to high inflation and limited market access.

These domestic impacts are summarized in Table 2 to show how political, social, and economic issues are intertwined in worsening domestic conditions.

From a regional perspective, ECOWAS faces challenges to maintain its stability and credibility. They are trying to impose economic sanctions, but Niger is getting closer to Mali and Burkina Faso, which are also experiencing the same thing. This has caused regional groups to be divided, as other countries are hesitant to follow sanctions if there is no other option. The impact it has on West Africa's stability is significant, the possibility of isolation is increasing, trade is disrupted, and the threat of terrorism is increasing. This situation poses a dilemma for ECOWAS in defending democratic principles while preventing a wider military conflict.

Their response was swift, they gave a stern warning to return Bazoum, but Mali and Burkina Faso refused to intervene, because it was difficult to work with. The International Crisis Group (2023), said that ECOWAS's credibility declined because domestic affairs or domestic interests were considered more important, and this made one country collapse and another country under pressure. This division became even more evident when Niger, along with Mali and Burkina Faso, officially left ECOWAS in January 2025 and formed a new bloc called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This exit decision is not only a political symbol, but changes the regional security structure as the three Sahel countries choose to join a new military alliance outside the democratic framework of ECOWAS.

The international response has been mixed, from US and French sanctions to the debate on intervention. The United States delayed aid, France withdrew troops, but the United Nations was more cautious because of the risk of worsening the situation. What is interesting is that Russia and China are starting to fill the mess by offering unconditional democratic options. This makes Niger more independent, but it also makes West Africa more geopolitically divided. Directly, the cessation of aid and the withdrawal

Table 3. ECOWAS & International Community's Response to the Niger Coup

Actor	Key responses	Impact/implication
ECOWAS	Economic sanctions, threats of intervention, ultimatums for the restoration of civil order.	Putting economic pressure on Niger, but triggering resistance and the exit of Niger and other countries.
US	Stop non-humanitarian aid & military cooperation	Increasing Niger's isolation, making room for Russia/China influence.
France	Withdraw troops and end military agreements.	Reducing counter-terrorism support; increases security risks.
UN / AU	Condemnation + encouraging dialogue/mediation (without intervention)	It prevented escalation, but was unable to exert effective pressure on the junta.
Russia & China	Unconditional political/economic/security support for democracy	Creating a new geopolitical polarization in West Africa.

of Western troops created a "vacuum of security support" in the Sahel. This vacuum is then filled by countries such as Russia through military training and defense cooperation without democratic conditions.

In the end, when compared to the events that took place in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, we see the same pattern: weak democracy, high levels of insecurity, and foreign interference that angers local communities. All of this started with the military promising to "save the country", but ended up causing instability. Viewed more broadly, the international response shows that there is no truly consistent pattern in dealing with coups in Africa, the Western Region that emphasizes democracy and the Eastern region that offers unconditional democracy. this split gives the Sahel countries a wider room to maintain their military regimes.

This makes Niger look like a country that has no experience in geopolitics, but it can pose a major threat to stability throughout the region. Messiaen (2024) states that France withdrew its troops because the local community protested anti-western, which made them no longer able to control as they used to. According to the United States Institute of Peace (2024), sanctions from the US will actually bring Niger closer to Russia, which offers unconditional political assistance. Some analysts also believe that intervention could lead to a worsening of the conflict, as in the case of a civil war, so the UN should focus on negotiations. Interestingly, this has become a public debate about whether outside pressure can help or strengthen military rule. In retrospect, this opinion suggests that the coup in the Sahel was part of a global conflict: the West wanted to maintain democracy, and the East wanted to expand power. Ultimately, the coup in Niger is no longer just a domestic problem, but has become a place of global competition of interests in West Africa.

A closer look at the data shows the reason for this coup: it happened because the Bazoum government failed to address cases of corruption that were already out of control and the security improvements that had been going on for a very long time, leaving the military frustrated and wanting to take over. This answers the first research question: the main cause of this problem arises from a combination of foreign (external) problems such as foreign and domestic (internal) interference such as weak power or influence of the civilian government. In retrospect, this issue is not just about Niger; this is also true throughout the Sahel, where liberal democracies have failed because they do not fit the current circumstances, communities prioritizing security over democracy. Looking at the current situation, the 2023 Niger coup will continue until 2025, with the Tchiani junta remaining strong despite outside pressure.

Reporting from Amnesty International media in a News Article entitled *Niger: "Threatened and Brought to Heel "- Human Rights and Civic Space Under Pressure Since the 26 July Coup* (2025), Human rights abuses are getting worse – many opposition activists are detained without due process, the media is restricted, and public protests are forced to be suppressed. This has lowered public trust, as reported in recent news, where Nigerians are getting tired of the junta's promises but seeing no real change. In other words, the coup, which was initially claimed as a solution, actually prolongs the political and social crisis that already existed.

According to a report from the World Bank (2025), The economy is getting chaotic, poverty

has risen dramatically due to ECOWAS sanctions that disrupt trade. Uranium is still exported, but the profits are only for the elite, while the poor are getting more and more difficult. Kohnert (2024) stating that this is a deepening development trap, with Niger dependent on aid from Russia and China to survive. In retrospect, this was the long-term effect of the initial coup – the state was increasingly isolated, but the junta claimed sovereignty. The result is inversely proportional, the plan to maintain sovereignty makes them dependent on other external forces.

In the region, ECOWAS is still trying to negotiate, but economic sanctions are still in place, making it difficult for Niger to access Nigeria. Mali and Burkina Faso continue to support, which makes the regional bloc easy to disintegrate. As a result, the Sahel region has not only become a haven for competing local interests, but has also become a battleground for influence between Western and non-Western blocs.

If we compare this with the situation in Mali and Burkina Faso, the same pattern is clearly visible, the military junta remains in power for a long time, but stability remains elusive. Salihu et al., (2023) stated that the rise of jihadism is the result of a power vacuum, which has made the Sahel region increasingly vulnerable to threats. Cooperation between countries has also become more complex, especially with the loss of ECOWAS's credibility. If we look deeper, this is a lesson for the international community, intervention from the West actually triggers local resistance, while the East offers a more appropriate approach. With the latest developments, the coup in Niger is not just an event in 2023, but an ongoing crisis that requires a comprehensive solution. Such a solution cannot be achieved simply by holding snap elections or imposing sanctions, but must involve fundamental reforms in the areas of security, economic and political governance throughout the Sahel region.

Beyond the political and security dynamics discussed earlier, recent developments between 2024 and 2025 suggest that the coup in Niger has led to a shift in relations between the government and civil society. Reports from international media sources reveal that although a small part of the public still supports the "save the country" narrative propagated by the military junta, more and more citizens are beginning to question the success of the military rule. This can be seen from the increasing public conversation about economic instability, difficulties in obtaining daily needs, and unclear direction of government policies in the face of external pressures. This situation confirms that public support for the military tends to fluctuate and is unstable, in stark contrast to the initial level of support when the coup first took place.

International relations observers also say that the situation in Niger is increasingly showing a phenomenon called "security-democracy exchange," when the military government prioritizes security issues as a reason to delay the democratization process. In Niger, the argument that "security is more important than elections" is often used as an excuse by the military junta. However, after two years in power, there has been no significant improvement in security conditions. Attacks by armed groups in border areas are becoming more frequent, especially in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions. According to experts, one of the main causes is the decline in security cooperation with neighboring countries since Niger's decision to leave ECOWAS, as well as reduced intelligence support from the West.

In addition, relations between Niger and Nigeria have become increasingly complex since the imposition of sanctions by ECOWAS. Nigeria is Niger's main economic partner, especially in energy and food supply. The partial closure of the border in 2024 has led to a drastic increase in the prices of basic commodities in cities such as Maradi and Zinder. This raises concerns among the people who are heavily dependent on imports from Nigeria. According to economists in West Africa, if these tensions continue, Niger may face a long-term food crisis, given that much of its territory relies on cross-border trade to meet its daily needs.

From a regional security perspective, the decision of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso to leave ECOWAS is considered a significant moment in the organization's history. Observing a pattern since 2020, a series of coups in the Sahel have formed two opposing political groups: one that promotes democracy and intensive international cooperation, while the other

emphasizes state sovereignty and anti-Western attitudes. This separation signifies that ECOWAS no longer serves as a powerful collective forum for all West African countries. Some observers even argue that the collapse of this regional organization's solidarity could reduce West Africa's ability to address cross-border challenges such as extremism, climate change, and illegal trade.

Within the framework of global geopolitics, the participation of Russia and China has strengthened the political shift in the Sahel countries. Russia provides military support and security training without requiring political change as a condition, while China is increasing its investment in infrastructure and natural resources. Although this approach provides temporary benefits for these countries, especially in fending off pressure from the West, some academics warn that prolonged reliance on these new external powers could result in another form of subordination similar to past colonial relations. Therefore, a coup that is seen as an attempt to "free oneself from foreign interference" actually risks creating a new pattern of geopolitical dependence that is more alarming.

In addition, the political dynamics in Niger show a tendency for the military to retain power in the long term by making changes to the governance structure. During 2024, the junta issued a number of policies restricting the activities of political parties under the pretext of national security. According to reports from various international non-governmental organizations, this move is considered an attempt to eliminate opposition and hinder the transition to civilian rule. In fact, the junta's initial plan to hold general elections in 2024 has now been postponed indefinitely. This delay further reinforces the view that the coup in Niger is not just a reaction to the crisis, but part of a strategy to form a new political order that dominates the Sahel region.

As a result, these socio-political developments show that the coup in Niger has had a significant impact on the prospects for democracy in West Africa. Countries that were previously seen as examples of democratic stability are now also facing increasing domestic pressure. Some observers warn that if ECOWAS is unable to develop a more flexible but consistent strategy in defending democratic principles, the wave of coups could continue in the region. In other words, the problems in Niger are not just local events, but a reflection of a fundamental crisis in West Africa that requires comprehensive solutions at the regional and global levels.

CONCLUSION

Based on a summary of all analyses, the military coup in Niger that took place in 2023 and continues until 2025 shows that this crisis is not just a simple transition of power, but rather a reflection of a deeper and prolonged problem in the Sahel region. The study shows that three key elements weakness of civilian governance, prolonged security instability, and external intervention or influence are intertwined and have created a situation that facilitates a rapid coup. These elements are not separate from each other, but rather reinforce each other, making democracy in Niger and its neighboring countries vulnerable and easily disrupted. The coup also had a wide impact, both nationally and regionally. At the national level, the military regime has failed to make significant progress in the areas of security, economy, and human rights protection. Conditions have worsened after two years, with increased human rights violations, difficulties for people to access basic necessities, and economic stagnation. On the other hand, Niger's relations with neighboring countries have also deteriorated, especially since Niger's withdrawal from ECOWAS, which ultimately reduced the effectiveness of security cooperation in the region. At the international level, the reaction from various countries and international institutions points to a deeper geopolitical divide. Western countries have stressed the importance of democracy and the application of sanctions, while Russia and China have intervened to offer unconditional assistance. This division has turned Niger into a fierce geopolitical battleground, not just a domestic issue. These tensions also show that the liberal democratic model that has been implemented is not fully suited to social and security conditions in Niger. Observing similar patterns in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, it is clear that the challenges in the Sahel are not solely caused by the failures of individual leaders or political parties. These

issues are fundamental and relate to security, economics, and long-established foreign policy roles. From this analysis, it can be concluded that resolving the crisis in Niger requires comprehensive measures, ranging from strengthening institutions and enhancing security stability to a regional strategy that does not rely solely on sanctions. Overall, the coup in Niger is an important signal to West Africa and the international community. If the root causes are not addressed, the Sahel region is likely to remain mired in a cycle of coups and long-term political instability.

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