Integrated Electoral Cartelization: Indonesia’s New Cartelization Model Through Competitive Intervention in 2024 Regional Head Elections

Abstract

The research analyzes the Integrated Electoral Cartelization phenomenon as a new model of political cartelization in Indonesia, where the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju/KIM) intervened in the 2024 regional elections in six strategic provinces (Jakarta, Banten, West Java, East Java, Central Java, and Banten). This research used a case study qualitative approach based on literature review from journals and online media reports. The analysis method used the Miles, Huberman, and Saldana technique, namely condensation, data presentation, and conclusion drawing. The results show that political cartel intervention in the realm of regional head elections uses three patterns. First, the appointment of candidates by national elites. Second, the co-optation of former opposition parties. Third, the exclusion of parties outside the cartel. Different from Katz & Mair's (1995) theory that focuses on state subsidies in Western Europe, or Slater (2006) & Ambardi's (2008) Indonesian-style study on post-election transactions, the concept of Integrated Electoral Cartelization shows the expansion of a new form of cartel politics characterized by parties as agents of cartels that serve a centralized party oligarchy.