

Sub-National Authoritarianism after the New Order: Relationship of Political Recruitment and Political Culture with Political Dynasties in Indonesia

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Abstract

The transition of the Indonesian government from a centralized to a decentralized one, marked by the granting of autonomy to the regions to manage their regions, raises political problems. One of the political problems is the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level. The emergence of political dynasties in regional elections at the sub-national level in Indonesia has experienced a significant increase. For this reason, this article will research the emergence of political dynasties in regional elections at the sub-national level in Indonesia. The method used in this research is the literature study method. A literature study is related to data collection methods that involve reviewing literature, reading and taking notes, and processing research materials. The results of this study indicate that, apart from weak regulations, another aspect that causes the emergence of political dynasties is the process of political recruitment by political parties that nominate candidates based on the capacity of candidates as regional heads. Nominations for regional heads by political parties are based on the local community's political culture, which wants to maintain the status quo. Political parties carry out unfair political recruitment to nominate candidates for regional heads so that they nominate candidates from political dynasties by using the image of their predecessors, which makes the emergence of political dynasties more and more common in Indonesia, especially at the sub-national level. Therefore, the recruitment of political parties to elect regional head candidates is highly dependent on the political culture of the local community. The link between society's political culture and political recruitment has led to the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia.

Keywords

Political Dynasties; Political Recruitment; Political Culture

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia has transitioned from 32-year authoritarianism to a democratic system. This transition is marked by the change of local government policy from centralization to decentralization. The new regulation enables every region to manage things under the name of autonomy. In developing countries, a decentralized government system is the best choice for increasing the

welfare of local communities as it grants authority to determine more suitable development programs and community services based on the needs of local communities (Sujarwoto, 2016).

However, after the implementation of decentralization, various political issues arose in Indonesia. One of the most widespread problems is the emergence of local little kings or elites controlling some

regions. Elites are plural and alternate at each functional stage in the decision-making process, and their roles can fluctuate depending on the situation. That is, this status is not an absolute thing obtained in an ascriptive relationship but can be attached to anyone who happens to have an important role, such as a political position (Effendi, 2018).

In Indonesia, according to Mietzner (2009), elites are a group of people who can influence the process of policy-making or political decisions under their authority. The decisions can eventually be used as tools to seize power easily. Meanwhile, Kurtz (2001) elaborates that political occupation is an abstract structure of a given position with political power and authority that gives access (from the office) to other power sources. Political occupation allows authority and power to be transferred to the next hands without requiring individuals to establish a new base of authority and power. Kenawas (2018) states that political dynasties are a rational choice for elites to extend and strengthen local political grip in their area.

Arisandi (2016) mentions that dynastic politics is political behaviour that tends to give privileges to certain dynasties or family descendants. The difference between dynastic politics and political dynasties is that the first refers to political behaviour. In contrast, the second does not refer to political behaviour or actions—but instead several descendants of a political actor who follows in the footsteps of the actor in jumping and being active in politics. Therefore, the practice of dynastic politics with the phenomenon of political dynasties is interrelated. That is, if a public official successfully carries out dynastic politics, it will cumulatively enable the development of a political dynasty. Furthermore, if a political dynasty succeeds in growing, it

will likely be followed again by dynastic politics.

Empirically, political dynasties can be carried out in ways that violate political norms and ethics, as well as in ways that follow political ethics. Even so, political dynasties have a negative effect on the development of democratization in Indonesia. This is partly because of the control over the government that is needed in a democracy. For example, checks and balances will be weakened (Arisandi, 2016; Mietzner, 2009). Sons, daughters, relatives, and people with family ties with political elites are sometimes deliberately prepared to become challenging and successful politicians. This process can be done without violating political norms and ethics. However, if recruitment only depends on ascribed status, the norms and ethics are violated. Violations of those values are even more apparent when an elected public official begins to abuse the authority and public resources entrusted to him to influence and give privileges to his children and siblings (Arisandi, 2016). Therefore, some academics argue that political dynasties are negative excesses of decentralization/regional autonomy and are considered a violation and antithesis of democracy since they have created injustice (Djati, 2014; Chandra, 2016; Suharto et al., 2017).

Based on the preceding background, it is essential to reveal factors influencing the emergence of sub-national political dynasties in Indonesia. Many studies on sub-national political dynasty only present that political dynasty emerges due to several things such as personal network, material resources, the legacy of previous position/power structure, and incumbent status. Those do not indicate similarities in the factors that cause the growth of political dynasties. Therefore, this research aims to show the similarity of factors of political

dynasties' emergence in each region in Indonesia.

RESEARCH METHOD

This article was a literature study emphasizing a series of activities related to data collection methods by reviewing, reading and taking notes of literature, as well as processing research materials. A literature study is carried out primarily to find a basis for building a framework of thinking, a theoretical basis, and determining research arguments/hypotheses. Literature study is required in research, especially in academics whose main objective is to develop theoretical and practical aspects. From its findings, we can classify, organize, and use variations of the literature on the selected topics. A literature study gives researchers a broader and deeper understanding of the chosen issues. Researchers used this method to collect data from previous studies on the emergence of sub-national political dynasties. After that, the researchers analyzed the factors that have similarities. This research is expected to contribute to the political science field by finding the leading causes of the given topic.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Reform and amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia have given birth to decentralization and democratization at the sub-national level. However, local elites have been continuously emerging to control and maintain power, one of which is political dynasties (Kenawas, 2017; Ramadhan et al., 2021). In democratic countries, political dynasties raise concerns about inequality in the distribution of political power, which has an impact on reflecting imperfect democratic representation. Inherited political power is considered undemocratic, while on the other hand, the democratic

process still allows *de facto* inheritance of political power (Dal Bó, E. et al., 2009).

The government then attempted to stem the growing political dynasty by limiting the political rights of incumbent families through Article 7 Letter r of the Local Elections Law. However, this provision was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in decision Number 33/PUU-XIII/2015. The legal implication of the Constitutional Court's decision is that the incumbent's family is allowed to run again in the local head election contestation (Ramadhani, 2017). The decision says and means that "not having a conflict of interest with the incumbent" is not having blood relations, marital ties and/or lineage of 1 (one) level straight up downward, sideways with the incumbent, namely father, mother, in-laws, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, in-laws, children, and in-laws unless they have passed one term of office (Decision of the Constitutional Court, 2015). This has resulted in the growing number of candidates for regional heads having kinship with incumbents or related political elites.

The institutional design that failed to hinder the pace of political dynasties through the Constitutional Court's decision made the family-based politicals by the political elite grow (Hadiz, 2022). The elimination of articles related to dynastic politics was then used again by elite groups to rule in their regions by taking seats as regional heads or synergizing with each other, including through marriage. The development of political dynasties is usually preceded by the strengthening of informal power within the scope of society, which is slowly being able to control the running of government in the region (Djati, 2014).

Regional head candidacy data related to dynastic politics after the reform has experienced a significant increase. From

2005 to 2014, 59 early candidates were exposed to political dynasties before the Constitutional Court's decision. However, after the Constitutional Court decided to legalize political dynasties and the implementation of simultaneous local elections from 2015 to 2018, there were 86 regional heads from political dynasties. In the 2020 local elections, the trend for candidates from political dynasties increased by 124 candidates from political dynasties. The facts above show that local elites have used the legalization of political dynasties through the Constitutional Court's decision. Tusalem (2013) argues that provinces dominated by family clans tend to experience poor governance in terms of infrastructure development, spending on health, the prevalence of crime, full employment opportunities, and overall quality of governance. The implications of this empirical analysis suggest that political dynasties have a deleterious effect on the allocation of public goods, even if their presence leads to higher congressional allocations.

Several studies on the success of political dynasties demonstrate that political dynasties grow due to political institutions, personal networks, material resources, the legacy of positions/power structures from before, and incumbent status. First, Hutabarat (2012) conducted a study on the success of Zulkifli Nurdin, who emerged as a "local strongman" in Jambi in the decentralization era, because Zulkifli Nurdin came from the Nurdin Hamzah family, the wealthiest Malay businessman in Jambi. Zulkifli Nurdin's position as governor was used to build great economic and political power in Jambi. Zulkifli Nurdin succeeded in growing the National Mandate Party (PAN) into a major party and received support from the Jambi Province Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in issuing policies. In

addition, Zulkifli Nurdin also managed to use the bureaucracy to obtain funds from government projects, raise votes, organize officials loyal to him, and establish closeness with election organizers in Jambi. His development model also benefited him from Jambi's natural resource management licensing business.

Second, Savirani (2016) researched the Djunaid family dynasty, also referred to as the indigenous business family, demonstrating that institutional factors have various impacts on the fate of local dynasties. Therefore, the regional dynasty families had to change and adjust their strategies. Political dynasties by the Djunaid family have lived under various political and economic regimes and have tested their capacity to survive and adapt or fade away across eras.

Third, Sukri (2020) states that the Atut family's political dynasty in Banten was successful not only because it had the form and intense roots of a political dynasty but also because of the Atut family's political strategy. The Atut family's political dynasty took the form of the Octopussy Dynasty by utilizing the power network built by his father, Tubagus Chasan Sohib.

Fourth, Muksin et al. (2019) conducted a study regarding political dynasties in North Maluku, namely the families of Abdul Gani Kasuba and Ahmad Hidayat Mus. It is stated that the implementation of political dynasties occurred simultaneously with regional autonomy—the decentralization after reform. The rise of political dynasties in this Province was due to the legitimacy of intense political, cultural, economic and social modalities. Another factor is the emergence of political domination or control over parties by recruiting candidates who will participate in regional and legislative elections at the provincial and district/city levels.

Scholars have conducted studies and found various reasons for regional elites building political dynasties. Among them are simply maintaining power, spreading or expanding power in the form of political positions, maintaining economic resources through political positions, and covering up mistakes made by family members who previously served (Savirani, 2016; Effendi, 2018; Kenawas, 2018).

Studies on dynastic politics have been carried out in line with its massive emergence. In addition to weak regulations, another triggering aspect is the recruitment of political parties to elect candidates for regional heads, which depends on the political culture of the local community. The people's political culture in electing regional heads is strongly influenced by the results of people's evaluation of the performance and leadership of regional heads and their deputies. Therefore, this literature review presents how the pattern of the process of dynastic politics occurs by dividing it into three sub-sections: (1) political recruitment and political dynasties, (2) political culture and political dynasties, (3) political recruitment, political culture and, political dynasty.

Relationship between Political Recruitment and Political Dynasties

This part discusses the function of political parties in the recruitment process. Pamungkas (in Anshari & Fadiyah, 2019) explains that the measurement of a political party's success is its political recruitment process—in which the best cadres will determine its image in the public domain. According to Wicaksono & Yunifar (2015), the recruitment pattern of honest and fair political parties to regional heads is one of the most important things in determining good leaders. However, the decision-making agent in formalizing decisions can be informal-regional, where the leading

faction can bargain to place the favorite candidate in the best position.

Two preceding arguments contradict the study results in the field—where Susanti (2017) wrote that power networks create and support political dynasties through the recruitment of political parties. Political dynasties can undermine democracy by turning off the potential for cadre recruitment by political parties. However, it can also grow because of the trust and support of the people who are satisfied with the incumbent leader who has been in power for two periods, who then nominates family or close relatives in the hope that the incumbent will be able to become a shadow to continue successful leadership in his area. Mietzner (2009) argues that dynastic politics has a negative effect on the development of democratization in Indonesia, partly because the controls on government that are needed in a democracy, for example, checks and balances, will get weakened.

There is a contradiction in “the pattern of recruitment of honest and fair political parties to regional heads” with “power networks can create and support political dynasties through the recruitment of political parties”. This dissimilarity needs to demonstrate consistency between theories and practices in the recruitment of regional heads candidate. At the same time, it implies another influencing factor in dishonest recruitment patterns.

The Connection between Political Culture and Political Dynasties

The bad political culture of society influences insufficient political recruitment. Culla (2005) also argues that political culture determines whether a country is democratic. Political culture is a factor that influences the political system in a country. The political culture that develops in people's lives is influenced by the complexity of the values that exist in that

society. Suppose the political culture supports the development of democracy. In that case, the political system is also democratic, but on the other hand, the political system can also experience setbacks if the political culture does not support democracy. During the reform era, political changes tended to be more legalistic than substantive in Indonesia. The political system that has been successfully built has only reached a quasi-democratic form. Changes at the level of political culture have not supported the level of institutional change that has been taking place.

Political culture is related to power preferences that are built in terms of public acceptance or regime development. Djati (2013) and Susanti (2017) have the same argument that the context of a society that maintains the status quo (the political attitude of the people/citizens who are satisfied with the existing/applicable situation and try to maintain that situation) in their region and wants the regional head to stay in power by encouraging family members or close people to replace the incumbent. This appears as access to the legacy of feudalism, forming a network of loyalty in society. As Yasril (2006) explains, the participation of the majority of the people is legitimacy, credibility and, at the same time, the government's political capacity.

The research results in Akbar and Purnomo (2019) show that the advantages possessed by political families in the form of political capital, economy, and public trust can make it easier for families to carry out dynastic practices through a democratic process that wins votes from the community with elections. This is reinforced by the article by Hermansyah et al. (2017) that political dynasties intensely collaborate with media capitalism, money politics, and patronage culture. Money, media, and

patronage culture are used and manipulated to control appearances and gain political justification. Meanwhile, Rosidi and Khotimah (2018) explain that being a popular politician is crucial. This is because famous figures tend to be elected in elections, so the popularity of figures on the local and national political stage is essential.

In his research in the Philippines, Querubin (2016) argues that family dynasties can provide acceptance and support in the political system. This is because Filipino culture provides enormous value and shows the importance of kinship ties since the pre-colonial era. The importance of family kinship in Filipino culture shows this dependence on kinship ties rooted in and legitimizes a political system that supports state paternalism. Akbar and Purnomo (2019) argue that political capital, economy and public trust make it easy for families who build political dynasties to occupy strategic positions through a democratic process.

There is a fundamental difference from the literature argument above, where there is literature which explains that dynastic politics occurs because people want the ruling leadership to be passed on through the family. In other literature, it says that although dynastic politics is also created from society's political culture, it is based on the figure of society towards candidates who have political and economic capital and the community's trust. However, the arguments from the literature above explain that the political culture of society is influenced by a leader's performance, which then fosters a sense of trust and satisfaction with that leadership.

Political Recruitment, Political Culture and Political Dynasties

In this section, the literature presented will discuss specifically the success of incumbents in running the government to

form political dynasties. These works of literature explain the relationship between political recruitment and how political culture can build political dynasty power.

In addition, Harjudin and Zuada (2020), Muksin et al. (2019) and Fitriyah (2020) argue that one of the entry points to the development of dynastic politics is through political parties with a political recruitment process. This argument is supported by Romli in Farisi (2016), who states that there are five patterns of tendency; having strong supporters, educational background and organizational experience, the authority of party leaders and the ability and loyalty of candidates. Of the five patterns mentioned above, some factors make political parties tend to be pragmatic towards nominating regional heads.

Fitriyah (2020) and Farisi (2016) argue that candidates who have high popularity and electability will become a benchmark for parties in carrying out political recruitment. This is closely related to the political culture of society according to Suharto et al. (2017), who honestly assess that families who build political dynasties are wealthy and educated families who want to develop regions by looking at the authority possessed by a leader who has been in power than being able to influence people's thinking about the successor to dynastic politics. The political culture of people who tend to vote because of fame alone is heavily influenced by the low awareness and lack of public understanding of the political world and the attitude of traditional society that judges leaders in making dominantly subjective choices rather than objective.

Mariana and Husin (2017), in their article, said that although liberal democratization has succeeded in making local politics institutionally more democratic, there are still many shortcomings and limitations, especially in

terms of accommodating participation at the local level. Accordingly, the ideas of modernization and development theory proved to be a failure because the local oligarchs that transformed into political dynasties finally caught the decision-making process.

Pasan (2018) states that the tendency to cult former rulers makes people no longer care about the competence of prospective rulers to become leaders. This causes the democratic system to become dysfunctional because the elected leaders are no longer based on a democratic system. This then makes political parties that tend to be pragmatic to recruit regional head candidates from dynastic politics because they have high popularity and electability among the people.

According to Suharto et al. (2017), dynastic politics causes unfair competition between candidates in regional elections. The authority possessed by a leader who has been in power before can influence people's thinking so that children and relatives who try to get political seats are influenced by his authority. However, apart from this, several factors influence political dynasties to develop, namely the contribution of leaders to citizens and the submission of voters is primarily due to individualistic thinking.

To strengthen the argument, the researcher will show some of the results of research conducted abroad. From his research on dynastic politics in the Philippines, Querubin (2016) argues that access to government and public resources is essential in a clientelistic democracy like the Philippines. This allows the incumbent to give an advantage to electoral relatives and thus be more likely to win at the general election. These results also provide important insight into the persistence of political elites. De jure political power and control over the elected officials are

significant determinants of the success of electing other family members. It also provides evidence that office has a causal effect on relatives who will contest future elections.

In contrast to the Philippines, Coppenolle (2014), in his dissertation, argued that dynastic status is essential for the political profession since succession no longer depends on dynastic succession but on the success of election campaigns. Therefore, understanding how and why political power can be inherited is essential. Factors such as name recognition (demand side of voters) and political networks (elite supply side) are potential explanations for the continued dynastic presence in parliament.

A literature review that is interrelated between political recruitment and the political culture of society, which is the basis for the formation of political dynasties, is an essential factor in causing the growth of political dynasties. People's political understanding is still subjective and is a trigger for poor political culture, which is then used by political parties to carry out unfair political recruitment. The candidates from political dynasties using the image of their predecessors increased the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

The transition of the Indonesian government from a centralized to a decentralized one, marked by the granting of autonomy to the regions to manage their regions, raises political problems. One of the political problems is the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level. Regional head candidacy data shows that candidates with links to post-reform dynastic politics have experienced a significant increase. From 2005 to 2014, before the Constitutional Court's decision,

59 candidate candidates came from political dynasties. However, after the Constitutional Court decided to legalize political dynasties and the implementation of simultaneous local elections from 2015 to 2018, there were 86 regional heads from political dynasties. In the 2020 local elections, the nomination of candidates from political dynasties had increased by 124 candidates from political dynasties. The facts above show that local elites have legalized political dynasties through the Constitutional Court's decision regarding regional control.

Most studies related to political dynasties at the sub-national level show that political dynasties grow due to personal networks, material resources, the legacy of positions/power structures from before, and incumbent status. The variations in the causes of the emergence of political dynasties from previous research do not show similarities in the factors that cause the growth of political dynasties. No research explains the root factors that have similarities to the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia. For this reason, the researcher uses the literature study method to collect data from research results from previous researchers regarding the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia. Furthermore, researchers use the data to analyze similar factors from all these studies. This research will contribute to the field of political science to find out the leading causes of the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia.

The results of this study indicate that, apart from weak regulations, another aspect that causes the emergence of political dynasties is the process of political recruitment by political parties that nominate candidates based on the capacity of candidates as regional heads.

Nominations for regional heads by political parties are based on the local community's political culture, which wants to maintain the status quo. Political parties carry out unfair political recruitment to nominate candidates for regional heads. Hence, candidates from political dynasties are the best choice for regional heads because they take advantage of the local community's political culture, which is subjective in assessing the candidates' personal characteristics. Candidates for regional heads who come from political dynasties only need to use their predecessors' image to win the people's hearts. This makes the emergence of political dynasties increasingly high in Indonesia, especially at the sub-national level.

From the discussions, it can be concluded that the recruitment of political parties to elect regional head candidates is highly dependent on the political culture of the local community. The link between society's political culture and political recruitment has led to the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia. Recruitment of political parties to elect regional head candidates depends on the political culture of the local community, which then triggers the birth of political dynasties. Whereas in political dynasties, the people's political culture in electing regional heads is strongly influenced by the results of people's evaluation of the performance and leadership of regional heads (personal networks, material resources, legacy of positions/power structures from before, and incumbent status). In this study, three sub-sections of the literature review show how the process of dynastic politics occurs by dividing into three sub-sections, namely, political recruitment and political dynasties, political culture and political dynasties, and political recruitment, political culture and political dynasties. From a literature review,

the link between society's political culture and political recruitment has led to the emergence of political dynasties at the sub-national level in Indonesia. The people's subjective political understanding is the trigger for the poor political culture, which is then used by political parties to carry out political recruitment by carrying candidates from political dynasties using the image of their predecessors.

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