The Effect of Pyramidal Ownership Structure to the Financing Policies and Firm Value in Indonesia: Cronyman as Moderating Variable

Hety Budiyanti(1), Suad Husnan(2), Mamduh Hanafi(3),


(1) Universitas Negeri Makassar
(2) universitas gadjah mada
(3) universitas gadjah mada

Abstract

The research to examine the effects of ownership structures on financing policies and firm valuation. The populations are all listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange for period of 2013 and 2015. The sample selection technique used purposive sampling and resulting in a final sample of 72 listed firms. Empirical tests are conducted using multiple regressions and two stages least squares regression to test the simultaneous relationship between ownership structure, financing policies and firm value. The estimated results provide support for the hypotheses proposed that the separation of cash flow rights and control rights have led the use of excess leverage among pyramidal companies to preserve ultimate owner’s control. However, we failed to find a significant relationship between firm’s leverage and firm’s value. The conclusion is the simultaneounity relation between ownership structure, leverage and firm value appear that only the ownership structure significantly related with leverage and firm value. Also firm value and leverage ownership impact the ownership structure. Meanwhile, leverage does not appear to have a significant relation with the firm value, or the other way around.

Keywords

ownership structure; ultimate ownership; financing policies; firm values jel classification

Full Text:

PDF

References

Abosede Adebiyi, J., & Kajola Sunday, O. (2011). Ownership Structure And Firm Performance: Evidence From Nigerian Listed Companies. Corporate Ownership & Control, 8(4), 391–402.

Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 58–107. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.48.1.58

Azofra, V., & Santamaría, M. (2011). Ownership, control, and pyramids in Spanish commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35(6), 1464–1476. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.10.029

Bae, K. H., Baek, J. S., Kang, J. K., & Liu, W. L. (2012). Do Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation Incentives Imply A Link Between Corporate Governance And Firm Value? Theory And Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(2), 412–435. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.02.007

Bany-Ariffin, A. N., Mat Nor, F., & McGowan, C. B. (2010). Pyramidal structure, firm capital structure exploitation and ultimate owners’ dominance. International Review of Financial Analysis, 19(3), 151–164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2010.03.002

Bistrova, J., & Lace, N. (2011). Evaluation of Corporate Governance Influence on Stock Performance of CEE Companies. In WMSCI 2011 Proceedings I, (Vol. 19, pp. 59–64). United States of America, Orlando.

Boshkoska, M. (2014). The Agency Problem: Measures For Its Overcoming. International Journal of Business and Management, 10(1), 204–209.

Bunkanwanicha, P., Gupta, J., & Rokhim, R. (2008). Debt and entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia. European Journal of Operational Research, 185(3), 1578–1595. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.08.025

Byun, H. Y., Choi, S., Hwang, L. S., & Kim, R. G. (2013). Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt. Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 311–331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.09.003

Chen, A., Kao, L., & Lu, C. S. (2014). Controlling Ownership And Firm Performance In Taiwan: The Role Of External Competition And Internal Governance. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 29, 219–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.04.007

Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2741–2771. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00511

Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. . (2000). The Separation Of Ownership And Control In East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics (Vol. 58). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00067-2

Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. (2012). Corporate Governance and Development: An Update. A Global Corporate Governance Forum, 1–95.

Demsetz, H., & Villalonga, B. (2001). Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), 209–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00020-7

Driffield, N and Mahambare, V. (2005). How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structure and Firm Performance ? Recent evidence from East Asia Nigel Driffield , Aston Business School Vidya Mahambare Cardiff Business School 14 March 2005 Abstract How Ownership Structure Affects Capital Structur. Business, 1–44.

Ellul, A., Guntay, L., & Lel, U. (2007). External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms. Working Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, (908).

Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3), 365–395. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0

Faccio, M., Lang, L. H. P., & Young, L. (2001). Dividends and Expropriation. American Economic Review, 91(1), 54–78. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.1.54

Faccio, M., Lang, L. H., & Young, L. (2010). Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: International evidence. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(1), 88–104. https://doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2009.33

Fauzi, F., & Locke, S. (2012). Board structure, ownership structure and firm performance: A study of New Zealand listed-firms.

Jameson, M., Prevost, A., & Puthenpurackal, J. (2014). Controlling Shareholders, Board Structure, And Firm Performance: Evidence From India. Journal of Corporate Finance, 27, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.04.003

Jensen, M. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2), 323–329. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.99580

Jiraporn, P., Kim, J. C., Kim, Y. S., & Kitsabunnarat, P. (2012). Capital Structure and Corporate Governance Quality: Evidence from The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). International Review of Economics and Finance, 22(1), 208–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2011.10.014

Kim, K. A., Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, P., & Nofsinger, J. R. (2007). Large Shareholders, Board Independence, And Minority Shareholder Rights: Evidence From Europe. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 859–880. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.09.001

Kole, S. R. (1997). The Complexity Of Compensation Contracts. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(1), 79–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(96)00888-4

Kuo, Y. P., & Hung, J. H. (2012). Family Control and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity: Moderating Effects of Excess Control Rights and Board Independence. Corporate Governance, 20(3), 253–266. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00899.x

Lemmon, M., & Lins, K. (2003). Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis. The Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1445–1468. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00573

Liu, C., Uchida, K., & Yang, Y. (2012). Corporate Governance And Firm Value During The Global Financial Crisis: Evidence From China. International Review of Financial Analysis, 21, 70–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2011.11.002

Manawaduge, A., & De Zoysa, A. (2013). The structure of corporate ownership and firm performance: Sri Lankan evidence. Journal of Corporate Ownership & Control, 11(1), 723–734.

McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1995). Equity Ownership And The Two Faces Of Debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 39(1), 131–157. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00824-X

Michelberger, K. (2016). Corporate Governance Effects on Firm Performance: A Literature Review. Regional Formation and Development Studies, 20(3), 84–95.

Mitton, T. (2002). A cross-Firm Analysis of The Impact of Corporate Governance on The East Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 64(2), 215–241. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00076-4

Mohamed, W. S., & Elewa, M. M. (2016). The Impact of Corporate Governance on Stock Price and Trade Volume. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 6(2), 27–44.

Nyonna, D. Y. (2012). Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership and Leverage : The Case of Small Businesses, 4(1), 9–20.

Owala, A. C. (2010). Corporate Governance And Stock Returns: Evidence From The S&P 500. University Of Vaasa.

Peng, M., & Sauerwald, S. (2012). Corporate Governance and Principal-principal Conflicts, 658–672.

Porta, R. L. a, & Lopez-de-silanes, F. (1999). Corporate Ownership around the World Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54(2), 471–517.

Prowse, S. (1999). Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and Lessons from East Asia. World Bank.

Setia-Atmaja, L., Tanewski, G. A., & Skully, M. (2009). The role of dividends, debt and board structure in the governance of family controlled firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 36(7–8), 863–898. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02151.x

Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737. https://doi.org/10.2307/2329497

Stulz, R. M. (1990). Managerial Discretion And Optimal Financing Policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(1), 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90011-N

Tan, T. K. (2012). Financial distress and firm performance : Evidence from the Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance and Accountancy, 11, 1–11.

Villalonga, B., Amit, R., Trujillo, M., & Guzman, A. (2014). Governance of Family Firms. In The SAGE Handbook of Family Business American Economic Review (pp. 157–178). Sage Publications.

Yeh, Y. H., & Woidtke, T. (2005). Commitment or Entrenchment?: Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(7), 1857–1885. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.07.004

Zakaria, Z., Purhanudin, N., & Palanimally, Y. R. (2014). Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from Malaysian trading and services sector. European Journal of Business and Social Sciences, 3(2), 32–43.

Refbacks

  • There are currently no refbacks.




Creative Commons License
Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License