Political Identity and Challenges for Democracy Consolidation in Indonesia

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Abstract
This study explains about the emergence of political identity in Indonesia, especially in Islamic community. As a nation, Indonesia is heterogeneous in religion, ethnicity and regionalism, so the emergence of political identity cannot be avoided. Post independence, the issue of political identity, has emerged and developed. In the reformation era, the issue of political identity not only caused horizontal conflicts, but also entered political contestation in Regent, Governor and Presidential elections. In 2017 Jakarta Governor Election, the issue of political identity arose in an effort to suppress incumbents. Likewise, with the 2018 national regional head elections, political identity emerged in some regions where candidate used ethnicity and religion –based-political issues. Entering 2019 simultaneous Election, the symptoms of the emergence of political identity have also begun to appear. In several surveys, some people were worried that the emergence of political identity would color the campaign and contestation. The emergence of this phenomenon of political identity will disrupt the future of democracy in Indonesia. Moreover, the actors who use political identity are carried out by several elites and civil society, which, in fact, are the main actors for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

Keywords:
Political of Identity; Democracy Consolidation; Regent Election; Gubernatorial Elections; Presidential Elections; Civil Society

INTRODUCTION

This essay aims to discuss about identity politic phenomenon in Islam in Indonesia after the New Order. By

discussing about identity politic around Islam, it does not mean that the groups outside Islam do not exist. In choosing the district head, for example, there are some cases like in the West Kalimantan where the leader is not from Islam. There are also things that related to regional regulation, like the case in Manokwari, Papua, where people think that regional regulation based on the Bible is needed, is also part of identity politics. The identity politics that will be discussed here is related to religions and ethnicities (Li, 2000).

Identity politics in Indonesia is not a new thing. After its independence, identity politic based on ethnicities, tribes, religions and regions, which called as primordialism sentiment by Geertz, existed. Movements that aimed to be separated from Indonesia that appeared in the beginning of post-independence time are based on that identity politics. In New Order era, identity politics was pressed along with the policies about repressive security and the rise of authoritarian government.

In post-reformation, by the rise of freedom era, this is a fresh air in the development of democracy that has been suspended in the New Order era, but on the other side, demands and conflicts based on identity politic appeared. For example, in early reformation era, in Central and West Kalimantan, identity conflict based on ethnicity appeared. This also happened in Maluku. According to the notes of Gerry van Klinken, the conflict of Maluku is the most fearsome religion-based conflict. This conflict ensnared religion communities where almost every Indonesian is a part of them (Klinken & Nordholt, 2007; Suaedy, et.al., 2007).

Identity politic problem in district head election appeared very often. As we know, district head election, which is a part of democratic procedure in electing leaders, is full of identity politics and tribes, religions, races and inter-communities (TRRI/SARA) politicization. Started from gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2017 and continued to Simultaneous District Heads Election in 2018, they are full of identity politics and TRRI politicization. In some regions that conducting district head election, like in West Java, West Kalimantan and Papua, identity politics and TRRI politicization appeared as a strategy to achieve victory.

As we know, the gubernatorial election in Jakarta 2017 became public attention. It happened because there were some demonstrations that demanded that the Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, or called Ahok, to be brought to justice and to be tried because of his speech in Seribu Island considered to be a harassment toward Islam. One of the biggest demonstrations is Islam Defending Act 212 (taken from the date of the demonstration which is December 2nd 2016). Demonstration events that bring religions are often named as identity politics or TRRI politicization in political view.

Identity politics by TRRI politicization in simultaneous district head election in

2018 also appeared. Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Bawaslu/Supervisor Agent of General Election) released the list of the regions that are vulnerable to TRRI politicization. There are six regions that identified as vulnerable, which are North Sumatera, West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Kalimantan and North Sulawesi (Bawaslu, 2017). According to that, Deasy Simandjuntak (2018) wrote,

> "In West Java's 2018 gubernatorial election, the less popular candidate backed by the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) almost won due to religiously charged campaigning. North Sumatra's 2018 gubernatorial election was also dominated by identity politics and won by candidates supported by PKS and Gerindra".

As the Simultaneous General Election 2019 that will be conducted in April 17th draws near, worries of the appearance of identity politics and TRRI politicization is quite high. Many opinions, surveys, and demonstrations related to the identity politics and TRRI politicization appeared in public. Survey that has been conducted by Litbang Kompas, for example, showed that as many as 40.9% are worried and 10.4% are very worried that identity politics will appear. Next, as many as 44.4% are still very sure and 26.3% are

sure that identity politics will be used in the campaign (Kompas, 2018).

According to that, this essay will try to do an identification of identity politics potency in Simultaneous General Election in 2019, especially that related to presidential election. Before the topic is discussed, he writer will first explain about identity politics and the appearance of identity politics in Indonesian political landscape. This essay is closed by the future of democratic consolidation by the appearance of TRRI politicization in presidential election.

Identity Politics: Theoretical Approach

Identity according to Suparlan is an acknowledgement towards certain people or certain group that has a chain of certain characteristics that become a whole unit that marks them to be included in a certain group or community (Suparlan, 2004). Buchari (2014) considered that identity in general is an image that differ an individual or group with another individuals or groups, this is done simultaneously in the social interaction until a certain opinion appears that related to the existence of that individual or group.

Agnes Haller and Sonja Punsher (2017) define identity politics as a

concept and political movement that focused on their difference as the main political category. This thing appeared because of the failure of the grand narrative, like the idea of freedom and tolerance. Therefore, differential politics became a new name from identity politics; racism, bio-feminism and ethnical conflict. According to Maarif, identity politics issue in the 1970s, started in US, when facing problems of minorities, genders, feminism, races, ethnicities and another social groups that felt being left aside. In the next development, the scope of this identity politics widen to religions, believes and the diverse cultural bounds (Maarif, 2012).

As a matter of fact, identity is an old problem that found its vitality and style in these days, as stated by Bauman,

> If" identity problem in modern world is how to build an identity and keep it to be strong, then identity problem in the post-modern world is how to avoid fixation and keep it opened in the matter of identity… the main word of modern world is created; in post-modern world, it is recycled.

Genealogically, identity politics that exist in the west, especially in its early appearance, is different with what we found in Indonesia. In US, for example, substantively, identity politics is related to the interest of the members of a social group that felt being left aside by the domination of the big stream in a country. Feminist movement that fight for gender equality, black movement, homosexual movement and some other social movements that appeared in the second half of the 20th century are aimed to get the same rights and level to the dominant or majority groups.

In Indonesia, identity politics is more related to the problems of ethnicities, religions, ideologies and local interests that represented by the elites with their own articulation. In its historical framework, Indonesian identity politics is contained with ethnicities, religions and political ideologies. RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan), GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), and GPM (Gerakan Papua Merdeka), for examples, are the embodiments of the worries of these ethnics toward the centralistic politic in Jakarta that felt injustice, especially to Aceh dan Papua. DI (Darul Islam) movement in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi used religion as their identity politics. Aside from GPM that still active until now, those identity politics movements relatively has been overcame by persuasive diplomacy or by war.

Next, Maarif said, the burning issues with the identity politics for the last 11 years in the reformation era is the appearance of radical or half radical movements that "based" on Islam in Indonesia. As their partner in another part of the world, these movements are also against the democratic system and pluralism and could reach as far as against the nationalism. Ideologically, they clearly inspired by the Islamic movements and Salafi that originated from Arabic nations that spread quickly all over the world.

Even though these Islamic movements and Salafi consisted of many factions in Indonesia, they have the same demand: the establishment of Islamic Sharia system. These radical groups, with the possibility of difference and even conflict between their own factions, according to Yusuf al-Qardhawi, are included to the new sect of Zhahiriyyah category with six stand out characteristics: hard, literal and difficult understanding and interpretation, arrogant toward their opinions, do not accept a different opinion, brand everyone who has different opinion as infidel and do not care about slander. Al-Qardhawi wrote:

Those literal people are not enough with just denying others who have different opinions from them, but also doing greater things than that by suspecting or even calling them infidel. The base for those who have different opinion than them is accusation. Whereas, according to human law, the base for the accused people is right (not guilty). This is affirmed by Islamic Sharia, but their base is guilty until proven.

Hiariej stated that the rise of radical Islamic movements are tied to causing problems to Indonesian people which consisted by many ethnics, religions and cultures. But the rise of those Islamists and Salafis are only a symptom from a huge problem that related to oppression that worked in the most private part of a human that makes it hard to act plural. The radical activists, for example, by doing identification process with "friends" and negation with "enemies" in defining who they are. They become intolerant and against pluralism not because they negate others as enemies, but because others are treated as "enemies" that have no right to live and need to be eradicated. Treating others like this can be treated as unhealthy social action in multicultural people (Hiariej, 2012).

Meanwhile, according to Musdah, if we look to our homeland, identity politics is done by the mainstream group, which

is the major religion group, with the intent of overthrowing the minorities that they think as deviate. Islamic identity politics, especially those that backed by fundamentalist groups, at least held responsible for the birth of three forms of violences. First, physical violence like destruction, shutting down praying places like churches and mosques or another physical violence that caused the object to get hurt, traumatized or killed. Second, symbolic violence, that may form in semiotic violence like writings or preaches that degrading a certain religion. Third, structural violence, that may form in violence that done by a country, either from the law enforcements or the apparatus.

The more important thing in affecting identity politics stream especially between Moslems is the strengthening of religion fundamentalism. Islamic transnational waves that bring radical understanding make the Islamic fundamentalist groups strengthening themselves. They will not hesitate in doing maneuvers to eliminate every group that they see as different. The appearance of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and some related groups are included to the cause of this phenomenon. The support of Majelis

Ulama Indonesia (MUI) towards these groups is worsening the situation by saying things that degrading some groups that they think as deviate, and ended up in violence cases.

According to Jones, the supporters of these radical movements are originated from the civil society. According to him, in Indonesia, one cannot talk about civil society without including the Islamic groups that support the formalization of Islamic Sharia and intending to replace the democratic system with Islamic government. The aim can be very narrow and discriminative, the doctrines can be exclusive and for some, the tactics may include violence. The key to consider these groups as civil society is whether they see themselves as the bridge between the countrymen and the country, and most of them are like that (Jones, 2013).

According to Jones, there are three diehard groups that developed in Indonesia, which are: first, vigilante groups, and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) are the most well known in this country; second, the advocate groups in the base level that can be represented by GARIS (Gerakan Reformis Islam), a base organization that is quite rich in Cianjur and lead by Hajj Chep Hernawan who is

often using violence tactic; and third, transformative groups that represented by Hizbut Tahrir, that wants to replace the democratic system in Indonesia with khilafah.

While Azca file three main variants of Islamic radical movements: First, godly variant; second, jihadist variant; third, political variant. Godly variant is more oriented in building activity of "individual morality", they are very concerned with the preaching activities like education and Islamic studies. Included to this group are Forum Komunikasi Ahlus-sunnah wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ), Salafi, and Tarbiyah movement. Jihadist Islamic radical movement activist approves the use of violence in achieving their aim. Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAT), Jamaah Islamiah (JI), and Darul Islam (DI) are the members. While political Islamic radical activist is the most intensive variant that involved in the process of their advocate agenda in public space, some of them are PKS, PPP, PBB, HTI and FPI (Azca, 2015).

The trajectory of Islamic radical activist is highly related to three things. First, public participation legitimacy; second, justification of their violence in achieving their movements agenda; and third, the membership affiliation types of Islamic radical movement in the godly variant tend to stay away from public matters, so their political participation in public is very low. They used to live in Salafi enclave and against the idea of using violence. Contrary to that, Islamic radical movement in the politic variant is very active in participating in political issues.

Democracy for them is just an invalid instrument for their fight. They involved in advocates, doing political lobbying, demonstrations and forming strategic alliances to achieve their goals and they approve the use of selective violence to some extent to achieve their goals (vigilantism). While Jihadist group use violence as their main method in realizing their goals. They are very anti-democracy and refuse to participate in the democratic system.

Identity Politic in Post-New Order

After the collapse of the New Order regime by the birth of the Reformation era, some change related to democratization is very high. Not only in the amendment of UUD 1945, the freedom of making political party, democratic general election, but also decentralization policy and regional autonomy, that gave a wide right to the

regions. Along the decentralization policy that followed by direct district head election, identity politic appeared in some regions.

The rise of the identity politics can be seen, at least, based on two things. First, in conducting district head election, the candidates and their supporters tend to use identity politics. In order to achieve victory, the district heads often use TRRI issues. Those issues can be a religion or ethnic issues. It is no wonder if the jargon that we must choose the leader from the same region or the same religion is common. In the context of achieving victory and also the balance politics, many district heads pay attention to the composition of the ethnics and religions.

Second, in some regions, there is a demand and some regional regulation based on religion was born (sharia regional regulation is the way to call the rules for Islam, even though this is rather unfitting). The appearance of district rule nuanced with religion is related to the existence of regional autonomy that gives the opportunity for the district head to create those regional regulations. In the making of those regulations, some regions use that opportunity to make their own regulations. Especially for sharia regulation, according to Michael Buehler,

the implementation of sharia regulation has risen in many regions in Indonesia even though the votes for Islamic parties are declining. The vote acquisition of four Islamic parties which are PBB, PKS, PPNUI and PPP showed that there is no significant change in the last four general elections from 1999 to 2014. In the general election in 2004, the votes gained by those parties are 18.9%, but declined in the general election in 2014 with 14.78% or just 0.14% higher than in 1999 general election (Buehler, 2016).

Since 1998, there are 443 Sharia Regulations that has been implemented in Indonesia.[1] From that number, there are at least four kinds that appeared. First, regulations that related to public morality issues, like regulations against prostitution, adultery and immorality. Second, regulations related to fashion like the obligation to wear hijab in certain places. Third, regulations related to "religion skill", like the obligation to be able to read and write Quran. Fourth, regulations related to social fund from the people through regulations of alms (Suaedy et al, 2007).

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[1] Discussion about this Sharia Regulation can be seen, like, Syafuan Rozi, Demokratisasi dan Pengelolaan Politik Identitas di Indonesia, Jakarta; Mahara Publishing and P2P LIPI, 2016 and Ma'Mun Murod Al-Barbasy, Politik Perda Syariat, Jakarta; Suara Muahammadiyah, 2018.

Even so, in the making of those sharia regulations, there are also the interests of political elites related to the electoral politics. Michael Buehler, in his interview with BBC Indonesia (February 21st 2017) said,

> "Implementation of Sharia Regulations in Indonesia not really become a sign of transformation of the ideology of Indonesian people. But more like a result of utilization politics. Politicians who need people's mobilization in the context of general election now rely on groups that supported the implementation of Sharia Regulations. The fact is, the politicians who implement those regulations are not Islamic activists. I doubt that they (politicians) really sure about the Sharia Regulation or understand much about it. Indonesian politicians who implement those kinds of regulations are, in other words, opportunist Islamist".

Identity politics is also colored by the appearance of Islamic fundamentalist or transitional Islamic movements who declared themselves as anti-democratic and using intolerant ideology like khilafah and takfiri. These Islamic fundamentalists now become a characteristic of transnational Islamic movements, even identical to the transnational Islamic movements. The characteristics of transnational religious groups are pressing authenticity of religious doctrine, group

exclusivity, against the tradition, bringing Islamism ideas (supporting the establishment of Islamic country or implementation of Islamic sharia). In Indonesia, the transnational Islamic movements strongly represented by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia which promotes khalifah ideology and anti-democratic (Hasan, 2006).[2]

Identity politics can be seen by the use of the religion for political interest. Religion politicization or instrumenting religion for political interest is often used in legislative or district head and presidential general election. Religion politicization appeared because there is a mix between religion and political field. One of the forms of religion politicization is related to electing district heads or president who is not from Islam. Some scholars, for example, stated that a corrupt leader can be fixed, while infidel leader is hard to fix because it is related to God. They believe that a non-moslem

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[2] Related to the appearance of fundamentalist movements and radical Islam in Indonesia, there are some books that discussed about it. See Haedar Nashir, Islam Syariat: Reproduksi Salafiyah Ideologis di Indonesia, Bandung; Mizan, 2013, M. Zaki Mubarak, Geneologi Islam Radikal di Indonesia, Jakarta; LP3ES, 2008, Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam, Jakarta; Teraju, 2002, Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, Jakarta; LP3ES, 2006, and Bilver Singh and Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Jejaring Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia, Yogyakarta, JB Publisher, 2012.

leader will always do harm and preventing the development of Islam.[3]

Aside from the prohibition of choosing non-moslem leader, there is also a prohibition of choosing female leader.[4] The controversy of female leadership in Indonesia became a wide talk after Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (KUII) in Jakarta in early November 1998 officially stated their rejection toward female president. One of the declarations by KUII is that upcoming president and vice president are godly men. This idea first stated by a representation of Persis and welcomed by the rest of the congress.

Identity politics symptom is getting stronger in gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in 2017. TRRI issues near the time for the election are spreading in media, especially in social media. The developed issue is the prohibition of

choosing non-moslem leader for moslem and the danger of Chinese domination in Jakarta. The issue developed even more when in November 7th 2016, Ahok's speech in Seribu Island reported to the police in the accusation of religion insult. The speech is accepted by Seribu Island villagers at first, but then became viral when the content of the speech was uploaded by Buni Yani in Youtube. In November 10th 2016, Ahok delivered his apologize for his statement even though he thinks that he is innocent because he has no intention in insulting Islam, but Islamic groups still force the law enforcement to continue the process of Ahok's case.

Many protests act that demanded the law process of Ahok to be continued spread to many regions, like Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Tegal, Solo, and Sampit. In mid October 2015, thousands of people from many Islamic civil organizations demonstrated and blasted Ahok's statement because they take it as an insult to Quran and pressing the police to send Ahok to jail as soon as possible. The demanders believe that Ahok's statement, no matter the context, is insulting Quran, while the other assumed that it is not insulting Quran. Even Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) stated that Ahok's

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[3] In one of the verses in Quran, it is stated that, "the Jewish and Christian will not willing for you until you follow their religion. (Q.S 2:120). Because of that, in choosing their leader, they based on al-Maidah verse 51 and al-Nisa verse 144 about the prohibition of making Jewish and Christian and the infidels as their awliya, that they translated as leader.

[4] The argumentation that is used by the clerics who prohibit females as a leader is based on An-Nisa verse 34, Men is the leader of women, because Allah has already given more to some of them (men) above the others (women) and because they (men) already spend some of their wealth". That verse is strengthened in Al-Ahzab verse 33, And you should stay in your house and do not you make up and act like infidels in old times

statement is included in insulting religion. That statement was signed by the leader of MUI, KH. Ma'ruf Amin and General Secretary of MUI, Dr. H. Anwar Abbas. The content of the statements are as follows:

1. Al-Quran in al-Maidah verse 51 explicitly contain of the prohibition of making Jewish and Christian as a leader. This verse became one of the bases of prohibition of making non-moslem as a leader.

2. Scholars must deliver the content of al-Maidah verse 51 to Moslem that choosing moslem leader is a must.

3. Every moslem must believe the righteousness of the content of al-Maidah verse 51 as their guidance in choosing a leader.

4. Stating that the content of al-Maidah verse 51 that containing prohibition of making Jewish or Christian as a leader is a lie is haram and included as an insult towards Quran

5. Stated that lying to scholars that delivered the theorem of al-Maidah verse 51 about the prohibition of making non-moslem as a leader is an insult of scholars and Islam.

Because that statement by MUI, Islamic organizations that coordinated by FPI and GNPF-MUI did a demonstration in Friday, October 14th 2016, that demanded the police to process the report related to Ahok. These Islamic groups felt unsatisfied and assume the law process was slow and felt like Ahok is protected by the authority. Then the demonstration of Islam Defending Act was held for the second time in November 4th 2016 entitled Defending Islam Act II (411) that demanded the police to catch Ahok and to state him as the suspect of the religion insult case. Next, there is another act of demonstration entitled Defending Islam Act III that known as peaceful act 212. The act centralized in National Monument Cross and widen to Tugu Tani, Kwitang area, HI roundabout to Thamrin Street. Before the act, the government refused the act because according to the government, Ahok was already stated as the suspect by the police.

According to Greg Fealy (2004), 212 act signs as a victory of diehard Islamist in Indonesia. This is because the driver of this act is Islamic group that is known to be violent like FPI (Front Pembela Islam) with their figure, Habib Rizki Shihab. Even according to Rosidi, in Islam Defending Act 212 there are many groups, but some of the groups, which are FPI and HTI had their own agenda.

They use this act as a tool or a way for their wider Islamization agenda. They have a dream since a long time to implement Islamic Sharia in Indonesia (Rosidi, 2017).

Identity Politics Potency in General Election 2019

We do not know why, but presidential election in 2014, where there are only two candidates, which are Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo-Hatta, giving an impression that there is a competition between the conservative religious side and liberal nationalist side. This may because Jokowi's side was supported by national parties (PDIP, Nasdem, Hanura, and PKPI) and only one party with Islamic basis which is PKB. While Prabowo-Hatta's side, beside nationalist parties (Gerindra and Golkar), there are four Islamic parties, which are PPP, PAN, PKS, and PBB. In his campaign, Jokowi often pictured as an anti-Islam figure, descendant of a Chinese and originated from a PKI sympathizer family.

The anti-Islam accusation kept developing when The Minister of Home Affairs, Tjahyo Kumolo suggested to erase the column of religion in the identity card, which the actual reason is to create justice for all believers, including the traditional believers. All of those accusations were denied by Jokowi that he is not against Islam and PKI sympathizer. In 2015 and 2016, he did a safari around some boarding school. Jokowi supports the official announcement of Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia in June 29th 2016, an institution that will be under the Religion Ministry.

The public was actually very aware of the negative issues about Jokowi. It can be seen from the survey conducted by Politic Indicator of Indonesia that was held in September 17th-24th 2017. From around 1220 respondent, only around 6% of the public who assumed that President Jokowi is anti-Islam and only around 5.5% who assumed that Jokowi is against the scholars. As many as 67% of the respondent viewed Jokowi as pro-Islam, while 66% assumed that Jokowi is not against the scholars. This survey also proved that majority of the public (64%) are not agree that Jokowi defending communist groups. Around 8% assumed the otherwise and 28% of the other did not give an assessment. Meanwhile, 13% of the public assumed that in Jokowi's era nowadays, Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) is rising.

In General Election of 2019, which is also a part of Simultaneous General Election that also elect DPR, DPD and DPRD, TRRI politicization potency will appear once again. This is because presidential election in 2019 almost the same with presidential election in 2014, the candidates for the president are the same: Jokowi and Prabowo.the difference is the candidates of the vice president and the supporting parties. Jokowi brings KH. Ma'ruf Amin, Rais Aam of PB NU and the Leader of MUI. While Prabowo asked Sandiaga Uno as his companion, a young entrepreneur, Vice Governor of Jakarta and originated from Gerindra party member. The supporting parties of Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin is a lot more now, which are PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP, Nasdem, Hanura, PKPI and three new parties, which are Perindo, PSI and Partai Garuda. Meanwhile Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno's supporting parties are Gerindra, PD, PKS, and PAN.

Identity politics nuance through religion politicization has showing its signs. It can be seen when Amien Rais preached in Baiturrahim Mosque, Mampang Prapatan, South Jakarta, in April 13th 2018 that stated Allah's party and Satan's party. In that preach, Amien Rais stated, now we must move every strength in this country to join forces with a party. Not only with PAN, PKS, Gerindra, but also groups that defend Allah's religion, which is hizbullah. Who are we going to fight? The hizbusy syaithan. That preach reaped so many complaints from many groups, even there are those who were willing to report it to Polda Metro Jaya because the content is bringing religion into political competition while provoke TRRI sentiment.

Aside from that, from GNPF (Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa) group who used to be the drive the demonstration of anti-Ahok, they did what they call as Ijtima Ulama for the incoming presidential election. They held Ijtima Ulama in July 27th-29th 2018 in Jakarta, which is attended by the party leaders or administrators that support Prabowo, like Amin Rais, Zulkifli Hasan, Sohibul Imam (PKS), Fadli Zon, and Governor of DKI Jakarta, Anies Baswedan. There are also scholars who attended this event, like KH Abdul Rasyid Syafi'i, KH Cholil Ridwan, Kiai Maksum Bondowoso, Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, Gus Nur, and so on. One of the recommendations of the Ijtima Ulama is that The Leader of Majelis Syuro Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Salim Segaf Al-Jufri and Abdul Somad become the candidates of the vice president for

the presidential election of 2019. GNPF suggested the two of them to accompany the General Leader of Gerindra, Prabowo Subianto.

Prabowo did not choose his vice president candidate from the suggestion of the Ijtima Ulama. Instead, he chose the Vice Governor of DKI Jakarta, Sandiaga Uno, as a vice president candidate a day before the registration of president and vice president candidate closed. By not following the recommendation of Ijtima Ulama I, GNPF then held Ijtima Ulama II in September 16th 2018. President candidate, Prabowo Subianto, signed 17 points of integrity pact as the result of Ijtima Ulama II. One of the points is:

> "Ready to use constitutional and attributive right that stick to the position of a President to do a rehabilitation process, assuring the return, and restoring the rights of Habib Rizieq Shihab as an Indonesian, and give justice to all of scholars, 411, 212 and 313 activists that was or still having criminalization process. Justice establishment also need to be done towards other figures who are molested".

The worry of religion politicization seems to be responded truly by Jokowi's side. It can be seen by the selection of the vice president that was going to appoint M. Mahfud MD, former leader of Constitutional Court and Minister of Defense in the era of President KH. Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dus), changed in the last seconds by appointing KH. Ma'ruf Amin, Rais Aam of PB NU and the Leader of MUI, that in Ahok's case delivered MUI's Statement that Ahok is insulting the religion in his speech in Seribu Island. Even though there are many analyses, but the announcement of the candidates of vice president for the candidates of the president Jokowi in presidential election next year is having a huge effect from the conservative groups. By choosing Ma'ruf, Jokowi wants to pull the Islamic constituent that now grow and dominating the national politic landscape. This decision will also accommodate the conservative groups that appeared in politics in Indonesia.

The worry of identity politics by religion politicization also can be seen from demonstrations related to the burning of "Tauhid Flag in Garut, West Java, by Banser individual at Santri Commemoration Day". The burning was meant as a protest to HTI, an organization banned by the government because they are against the Pancasila ideology and aimed to establish an Islamic nation (Khilafah) which has the same flag. But the protesters said that the flag is the flag of Rasullah. In October 25th 2018, they

did a demonstration in front of Ministry of Politics, Law and Security office. In Novmber 2nd, what they call as 211 acts did a demonstration in front of the Palace. They demanded that the government made an official statement that tauhid flag is Rasulullah SAW's flag, not the flag of any organization.

But according to Deasy Simandjuntak (2018), that demonstration was not purely related to tauhid flag, but widen to the demand of the change of the president. In this context she wrote.

> "These rallies, dubbed 'Defending the Tauhid Action' were organised by the Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa (GNPF). They were triggered by an incident in October 2018, where members of the youth wing of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation and a supporter of Jokowi, burnt a flag bearing the Islamic declaration of faith. During the rallies to protest the flag's burning, there were calls of 'ganti presiden' (change the president) as some protesters attempted to connect the rallies to the election campaign".

Democratic Consolidation Challenge

In the perspective of democratic consolidation, simultaneous general election 2019 is very important in the continuity framework of democratic consolidation. Thus, general election is the entrance point of democratic consolidation. General election is a democratic consolidation and can be seen from some sides. General election is a very good chance to choose a more representative leaders and parties (Azra, 2009). Within this simultaneous general election, the presidential election will also occur.

Even so, in measuring democratic consolidation, it is not enough by just looking at general election as a democratic procedure. Consolidated democracy is where democracy implemented as the play rule, whether in behavior, attitude or rules (constitution) (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Larry Diamond stated that the essence of democratic consolidation is the making of a behavior and attitude, whether in elite or public level which scoped and started from the methods and principles of democracy. He said that, the politic players must respect the democracy as the only game in town, the only framework that deserve to rule the people and advancing their personal interest (Diamond, 1999). The same thing also stated by Dankwart Rustow, consolidation include habituation where norms, procedures and hopes about democracy become internalized so the actors mechanically suiting themselves with the written (and unspoken) game

Graphic 1. Social Culture Condition (Democratic and Consolidation)

Source: Presentation of National Priority Expert Survey Team Political, Economy, Social Culture, Defense and Security Condition Mapping Approaching the Simultaneous General Election 2019

rules, even when they conflicting and competing.

By looking at the public survey result conducted by Political Research Central 2018, trust towards democracy is quite high, which is 73% (agreed 65% and very agree 8%). So, most of the Indonesian people believe in democracy as a better governmental system compared to another systems. Public trust will be disturbed when political elites and democratic actors do not use democracy as the only rules.

The existence of identity politics by TRRI politicization that developed in the public will potentially inhibit the democratic consolidation. It has been confirmed from the expert survey

conducted by Political Research Central of LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia). Expert survey said that there are 73.8% inhibit social culture. From that number, 30% originated from TRRI issues and identity politics, 27% from intolerant people, suspicious to each other, fanaticism and primordialism, and 7% from radicalism movements. To solve those factors, the experts suggest a solution by socializing values to Indonesia, peace movements, political education, elite example and political party reformation.

Meanwhile, if we look at the certain political condition that has a potency of inhibiting the democratic consolidation, 83.45% stated that it existed. So, the

Graphic 2. Political Condition (Democratic and Consolidation)

Source: Presentation of National Priority Expert Survey Team Political, Economy, Social Culture, Defense and Security Condition Mapping Approaching the Simultaneous General Election 2019.

threat of political potency is higher than social culture condition. From that number, TRRI politicization factors and identity politics are 23.1%, bad performances of political parties 16.5%. Segregation/polarization of the public is 8.3%, oligarchy (politic parties, media and business) is 5.8% and the dissatisfaction towards the result of general election is 5%. According to the opinion of the experts in that survey, the solution to solve them are: by reforming political parties 18.3%, political education 15,6%, Pancasila/ the value of Pancasila socialization 11.9%, law establishment/law certainty 11% and pushing the role of moderate national figures 11%. See graphic.

Referring to the result above that showed that there is a potency of TRRI politicization and identity politics and the existence of demonstration that used TRRI symbols, democratic consolidation could be inhibited. Whereas, according to Larry Diamond,

".... There is no politically significant party, interest group, movement or institution that tries to overthrow democracy or using violence, frauds or unconstitutional methods or another anti-democracy as a deliberate tactic. So does the mass, there is no movement, party or anti-democracy organization that has a significant followers and the normal citizen not routinely using violence, frauds or another illegal and unconstitutional methods to express their political choices or to hunt their political interest".

Therefore, the success of a democracy must be supported by the

civilian or civil society. In this context, Diamond sees that this group has an important role in bordering the role of the country by looking for policy change or demanding accountability. He also sees them as pluralism supporters, so he excludes fundamentalist groups "that tried to monopolize functional or political room in public, claiming their way as the only valid way.

Doherty stated, civilian is a component that cannot be separated from a democratic system. Democracy cannot last without the companionship of a strong civil culture and support by population that committed to ideal things, like law supremacy, individual freedom, religious freedom, free and open debate, majority leadership and minority protection. A dynamic civilization developed many elements that are important for democracy, like: participation, accountability and continued political reformation (Doherty, 2001).

But according to Jones, by taking Germany's case at Nazi's era, the role of civil society is otherwise and not to promote pluralism, but to support authoritarianism. Thomas Carothers underlined that the statement that said the more active the civil society in a country, the stronger its democracy as not true. He quoted a study about Weimar period in Germany, that showed how the civil society network there, in 1920s and 1930s, can be infiltrated and utilized by Nazi Party which made the civil society not protecting the democratic system but ended up destroying it (Carothers & Barndt, 1999).

For the case in Indonesia, civil society group, which is Islamic group that expected to be a civil society power nut then changed. In this context, Bruinessen (2013) said,

> "The appearance of transnational Islamic movement to fight for influence…the most stand out one among them are Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and its affiliations, that is an Indonesian version of Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and non-political groups like Jamaah Tabligh and Salafi movement. In 2005, a conservative turn seems to be happened in the main stream of Islam".

Furthermore, Hadiz said about the appearance of what so called Islamic populism or identity politics in Indonesia. He said, Islamic Populism in Indonesia is underdeveloved compared to the others. The ability to conquer a country like what had been done by AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party) in Turkey is very limited. The ability

to dominate civil society like IM (Ikhwanul Muslimin) in Mesir before 2013 is also very limited. The failure of formal ways gave the opportunity for Islam to do politic outside the formal way (country) (Hadiz, 2014).

CONCLUSION

The trip and development of democracy in post-reformation era is always challenged by actors, whether from the elites or the mass. Those challenge, appeared in the form of intolerance, identity politics in the form of TRRI politicization to the will of replacing the democratic system with another system (Khilafah). The appearance of diehard groups and transnational Islam are parts of the democratic consolidation challenge. Moreover, in democratic consolidation, the existed actors must support and bear no intention of changing democracy with another system. In fighting their aspirations and interests, actors must make democracy as the only procedure, which is by peaceful way, not by violence and breaking the law.

The existence of identity politics cannot be avoided in political world, included in Indonesia. Even in advanced countries like the European and United States (US) countries, identity politics still happened in their political dynamic. Victories or the number of the supporting right parties in the general election Europe is not free from the identity politics, like anti-immigrant groups. As well as in the US with the victory of Donald Trump as the President, they are not free from identity politics issues.

Actually, identity politics existed as a narration for the fight of the groups that left aside because of the failure of the main stream narration in accommodating minority's interests. Positively, identity politics actually provide a new way to mediate in voicing the oppressed minority's aspirations. The problem is, in our current political reality, identity politics tend to be presented by the majority because of the feeling and perception of being marginalized by the applied political, economy and social structure. The clearest form of identity politics is TRRI politicization and original identity.

Identity politics is not only a threat towards pluralism and democracy, but also a serious threat towards Indonesia that based on diversity. It is because identity politics is politicized to the extent that it seems to be the only valid political preference to everyone in choosing political choice.

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