

# The Securitization of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

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## Abstract

Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a community organization that was born from the resistance of the Islamic community against Western occupation. Western values that hegemony national and state life are currently considered by HTI to be highly irrelevant to Islamic values. In addition, deteriorating national political conditions are perceived by HTI as a result of the failure of the Western system in Indonesia, so to resolve the issue there needs efforts to return Muslims to an Islamic system based on the Qur'an and Sunnah. By the Indonesian government, the ideas and solutions envisioned by HTI are considered to threaten national security which is referenced to Pancasila as the idea of state and community harmonization as the physical base of state. HTI construction as a threat that led to the dissolution of HTI on July 19, 2017 is a form of securitization carried out by the Indonesian government. This paper tries to explain how and why the securitization process was carried out and what the impact of HTI securitization itself was in Indonesian politics. This study seeks to fill the gap that previous research regarding how non-state actors play a major role in the HTI securitization process and how HTI securitization is a turning point for efforts to politicize and securitize other Indonesia's so-called radical communities after the PERPPU ORMAS.

## Keywords

HTI; Securitization; Threats; Ideology; Security

## INTRODUCTION

Prohibition of an ideological form in the history of Indonesia does not only occur once. Pancasila which is claimed as the final ideology of the nation and state of Indonesia is not considered final by some groups. In the initial phase of independence, the emergence of Islamic ideology under DI/TII groups aimed at establishing an Islamic-based state under Kartosuwiryo's leadership ended in a

crushing. The next period at the end of the Old Order period, there was the tragedy of the crackdown of 1965-966 which was the government's response to the G30S/PKI incident under the auspices of the ideology of communism. By Soeharto, as the executor of Supersemar, the occurrence of the G30S/PKI incident was a result of the many ideologies that developed within the body of the Indonesian people. The aftermath of this conflict was the issuance of MPRS No. XX/MPRS/1966 which required all forms of organization in Indonesia to have the ideology of Pancasila while banning the ideology of communism in Indonesia.

Basically, every group of people

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has an image of their own ideal order. Muslim community have ideal of life in an Islamic state so they can live with Islamic values as a whole. On the other hand, the left is represented by the communist party idealizing a form of society without class and communal to be free from the system of capitalism and imperialism. Whereas Pancasila, as the final ideology of the Indonesian state, aspires to create a society which is devout, just, civilized, united, deliberated, and prosperous. The ideals that exist in a society sometimes cannot be taken for granted by other communities and can cause conflicts. Even if there are values deemed incompatible with what they believe, a group can be excluded and perceived as a threat to the values or identities that other groups have.

In April 2017, the Indonesian government, through president Joko Widodo, issued a Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (PERPPU) ORMAS which contained a ban on anti-Pancasila community organizations. The PERPPU resulted in the dissolution of the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesian Islamic Organization (HTI) legal entity. The PERPPU, by the Indonesian government, was issued on the basis of the need for firm efforts to protect the country's sovereignty and place HTI — and not allow other organizations— as a threat. This is the author's value as a form of securitization, which is an act of making an object that was not initially considered as threat, become a joint threat, or in the perspective of the state, seen as a national threat by a subject or actor who has the power to label

something as a threat to a community group. In this paper, the author tries to explain how the process of securitization of HTI takes place in Indonesia.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Securitization

Security is an attempt to pursue freedom from threats (Buzan, 1991: 18) that are relatively dependent on something that is perceived to threaten the existence of an entity. Based on this definition, it can be said that national security is a form of liberation of a nation from things that are considered capable of threatening the existence of that nation. In the traditional concept of national security, scientists usually interpret security —which can be simply understood as an atmosphere free from all forms of threat of danger, anxiety, and fear— as a condition the absence of physical threats (military) from outside (Anggoro, 2003). The three characteristics of the traditional sense are: (1) identification of “national” as “state”; (2) threats are assumed to come from outside the country; (3) the use of military force to deal with these threats.

In explaining national security which is identified as a state, the state is defined by Buzan (1991: 40) as consisting of three components, namely (1) the physical base of state in the form of population and territory; (2) the institutional expression of the state that functions to manage the physical bases; (3) the idea of state or the ideas of the state that are in the minds of the people can be in the form of national or

ideological insights (guidelines for life) of a nation. So, in this case, the use of "state security" as an object of security must meet at least three components: territorial sovereignty, state institutions (including government) that can function properly; and guaranteed safety, order and welfare of the community (Anggoro, 2003).

As security studies develop, the emergence of a group of wideners, pioneered by Barry Buzan, broadens and deepens the agenda of security studies vertically and horizontally (Šulović, 2010: 2). In the horizontal dimension, the group of wideners assessed that the concept of security has moved out of the military aspect exclusively to the political, economic, social and environmental sectors. While in the vertical dimension, the object of reference in the concept of security is open. Not only focus on the state, but also individuals, social groups, or humanity as a whole. This means that security is no longer related to defense and military strength, but there are also other low political aspects that are central to the issue and pose a threat to an object of reference.

The Copenhagen security study conceptualizes security as a social construction process of a threat that includes securitization actors (mostly from the political elite), who declare certain problems as urgent and threats that threaten the survival of the object of reference. When the message is once received by an audience, they legitimize the use of extraordinary measures to neutralize the threat. Thus, this problem was secured and

eliminated outside the normal limits of democratic political procedures and included in the agenda of "political panic" (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). From this explanation, securitization has at least three elements, namely the existence of speech acts, messages, audiences, and reference objects.

Speech act is the use of words that contain certain messages so that security is no longer interesting as a sign that refers to something more real, but the speech itself is an action on something as a form of security. By saying these words, something is indirectly done to the object (Buzan et al., 1998: 55). The second element is the securitization actor, the party who places the problem on the security agenda, while the audience is the party who receives the message and has the choice to accept or reject the agenda given. Securitization can be imposed when the audience agrees and justifies the application of extraordinary measures, which include violations of regular political procedures, to neutralize threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Thus, it can be concluded that securitization is an intersubjective process.

To succeed in securitization, there are at least three steps that must be taken, namely: (1) identification of existential threats; (2) emergency measures; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by freeing the rules (Buzan et al., 1998: 6). This first stage is called securitizing move, which is an open choice for any unit when the actor convinces the audience that there is a relationship between the need for

legitimate units to go beyond binding rules and regulations (emergency models) (Taureck, 2006: 57). Therefore, for the Copenhagen school, the public problems that will be securitized will first go through the process of politicization. Buzan et al. (1998: 24) argue that securitization is an extreme version of politicization. Politicization is understood here as the actions of politicians or politicians who make allegations of security problems become public and political in a community. The act of politicization allows this problem to be followed beyond the normal limits of political procedures (Kuzemko, 2012: 130).

Countries that embrace the sovereignty of the people —such as Indonesia— are given a mandate to realize the public will (Kholiludin, 2009: 57) through a variety of policy and regulatory products. This relates to the concept of securitization, which is a technique from the government that takes the power arrangement from the fear of cruel death by replaying myths about the variations in the nature of Hobbes (Aradau, 2001). In Buzan's view (1991: 24), there are two types of countries in viewing individual threats, namely the minimal state and the maximum state. The state at least tends to assume the low disharmony between the interests of the state and citizens in realizing civil and external defense rules. The maximum state is more focused on that internal security is a natural and an expected dimension. Limitation of disharmony is done, there is, and trying to efficiency constraints

so that requires the state to pay attention to the needs of its people.

In case of HTI problem in Indonesia, author tries to explain how a state does a securitization towards an ideology, namely Pancasila, by putting a group as a threat towards state itself. Kim et al. (2017) in "The impact of securitization on marginalized groups in the Asia Pacific: Humanizing the threats to security in cases from the Philippines, Indonesia and China" states that securitization generally occurs due to laws, policies, and campaign that articulates the threat and intends to increase the power and scope of action of the security forces. His study regarding LGBTI securitization in Indonesia shows that abuse of power is not only perpetrated by the state, but also by non-state groups. By vigilante action and incitement to violence through social media. LGBTI is constructed as an existential threat by conservative groups, right-line Islam, and some political elites who want to consolidate their power. LGBTI threats are articulated in three registers, namely heteronormativity, nationalism, and threats to families/children.

Specifically, securitization of Islamic groups has also been carried out by Europe. After 9/11, Islam was in the spotlight because it was considered a radical, extreme religion and taught terrorism. Vellenga & De Groot (2019) in his research "Securitization, Islamic Chaplaincy, and the issue of (de)radicalization of Muslim detainees in Dutch Prisons" explains that the level of fear of the Dutch government has much to enter the prisons are

populated by people Muslims. Netherlands did the effort to de-radicalize prisoners Muslims as a follow-up to the securitization Salafism who are problematic in the Netherlands in the creation and integration of security because it tends practicing 'political Islam'. This securitization was also caused in response to several bloody attacks in the US and Europe in the name of Islam, and the rise of the anti-Islam movement in the Netherlands which was triggered by Pim Fortuyn in 2001.

Lenz-Raymann (2014) in "Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia" dissects how state actors claim that a secular state is threatened by Islamist terrorists who want to enforce sharia –therefore they enforce religious policies that restrict and prohibit religious groups. The Central Asian governments subsequently established their own interpretation of 'traditional Islam' as the legitimate 'official' Islam. As a result, the Central Asian Governments limit the freedom of religion of its citizens through counter-terrorism measures. This securitization effort is supported by the securitization process of non-state actors which is described in the following table 1.

In the context of HTI's securitization, two studies have been published by academics. The first research is Hanif's (2014) thesis entitled "The Securitization of Hizbut Tahrir: A Comparative Case Study". Hanif researched the securitization of HT in

four regions/countries, namely the Middle East, Uzbekistan, Indonesia and the United Kingdom. HTI is constructed as social security. After the domination of the emergence of civil society waves due to the influence of US financing on Indonesia's modernization, there was an effort to spread the interests of the United States after 9/11 through social programs, civil society, and counter-extremism which resulted in the rise of secularism and liberalism in Indonesia. The emergence of the Liberal Islam Network sparked HTI to expand its influence within the Indonesian Ulama Council by issuing fatwas condemning efforts to liberalize the United States. In the research, it is explained that HTI is considered a threat to society vis a vis the funding agencies of the United States, NU, and Muhammadiyah which often oppose HTI's tough fatwas and the idea of a caliphate which is considered contrary to Pancasila which contains upholding plurality. The Indonesian government is encouraged by these two community organizations to mobilize emergency action against HTI.

Emergency actions taken by the government after the internal dynamics of civil society were manifested by the dissolution of HTI in 2017. Sahara (2020) with the thesis; "Efforts Securitization Indonesia against Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia Year 2017" men clearly right that the dissolution of the HTI is an attempt securitization of government caused the construction of HTI as a threat (existential threat) by the political elite and civil society such

**Table 1.** Securitization Theory in the Central Asian Context

Aspects	State Actor	Non-State Actor
Reference object	Positive: secure governmental power	Positive: sharia, Islamic society/state
	Negative: freedom from sharia	Negative: freedom from corrupt leaders
Securitizing move	Speech act: restrictive laws, fatwas (issued by the muftiate)	Speech act: fatwas, other publications (leaflets etc.), rel. instruction
	Practice: repression of the free practice of religion	Practice: jihad
Dispositive	Regulatory tools: institutions (ministry, muftiate)	Regulatory & Capacity tools: members
	Capacity tools: security forces, alliances	
Audience	Citizens	Religious umma

**Source:** Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia.

as NU, Muhammadiyah and MUI to issue HTI threatening ideology Pancasila state, democracy, diversity among religious communities, the fading of the state identity, and the threat of terrorism (Erdianto, 2017). Research conducted by Sanjaya places the government as the actor who has the main power in determining the threat of an entity. The role of civil society is not taken into a more mandatory consideration and is only an additional actor, which is to provide input to the government, which ultimately issues the PERPPU ORMAS as an emergency action. The breaking of the rules referred to by the author is also a problem in itself. Because in the history of the development of civil society, such actions have been carried out by the Soeharto government during the G30S/PKI, which issued a Decree on the formation of the Indonesian

Communist Party. Based on the description above, this study seeks to fill the gap that previous research has not explained regarding how non-state actors play a major role in the HTI securitization process and how HTI securitization is a turning point for efforts to politicize and securitize other Indonesia's so-called radical communities after the PERPPU ORMAS.

### Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

The growing trust of Muslims in the birth of a reformer (mujaddid) which will improve the condition of Muslims for marginalization and hegemony has caused many losses to Muslims, especially the gradual shrinking of internal and external trade as a result of the trade activities of European maritime countries (Nashir 2013: 192), internal weaknesses of

Muslims, to Western imperialism over Islamic countries themselves. This prompted Taqiyuddin An-Nabhany to establish an Islamic political party with the agenda of rebuilding the Khilafah system and enforcing Islamic law in the reality of life in 1952 at the Al-Quds Mosque, Palestine. Through the Khilafah system, Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) aspires to rebuild the order of society based on Islamic faith, revive Muslims from decline, and free Muslims from all Western products and influences (Rahmat, 2005: 49). This system is very important for HT because they consider that the Islamic Khilafah Daulat is the way to the world as stated by Allah Subhanahu Wata'ala and a system that is able to guarantee the welfare of the universal Ummah.

The transmission of Hizbut-Tahrir to Indonesia first occurred in 1982-1983 by M. Mustofa and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi who learned to organize in the Hizbut-Tahrir political party in Jordan and were actively involved in carrying out the Hizbut-Tahrir underground movement (Rahmat, 2005: 97). Upon Musthofa's return to Indonesia, he founded the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) organization right under Soeharto's government which was very oppressive of freedom of association.

HTI also has the goal of realizing the Khilafah as an appropriate framework for implementing Islamic systems and laws as a whole as HT. HTI is very pessimistic that this can be done in countries with Western-style systems and forms of government – republics, democracy, etc. In realizing

the Khilafah, HTI adopts the method of da'wah (marhalah) HT which is carried out gradually, namely: (1) cadre (marhalah thaqif), through fostering with the aim of giving birth to people who believe in the idea of HTI; (2) interaction with the community by efforts to encourage people to carry the Islamic da'wah and to form public awareness and opinion on Islamic ideas and laws (marhalah tafa'ul ala 'umma); (3) power struggle (marhalah istilam al-hukm), through the spread of Islamic treatise in a practical way throughout the country, but limiting its movements in political aspects without resorting to physical and weapons violence (Rahmat, 2005: 112).

The Indonesian public began to know the agenda of HTI's struggle and movement since HTI openly criticized the political system that existed in Indonesia during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) era (DetikNews, 2010; Gumilang, 2017). Starting with the Al-Wa'ie No. bulletin 41 years IV in January 2004, HTI declared a ban on Muslims participating in elections and it was forbidden to vote in legislative and executive elections. The reasons presented include: (1) legislative authority in determining the law violates the teachings of Islam because that authority only belongs to God; (2) the format of legislative and executive elections oriented towards the kufr Western system; (3) the probability of the selection of people who are not capable – women, infidels, wrongdoers, wicked, and infidels – because of majority support (Muhtadi, 2009).

In addition to Al-Wa'ie, HTI also actively publicizes its critics in the mass media and on the internet nationally such as in the "Tabloid Umat Media" and "Bulletin al-Islam". HTI also actively engages in engagement on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and so on to attract the masses. HTI underground movements carried out almost in mosques and campus propaganda institutions (Hayati, 2017).

In 2010, HTI held a "6-year Reflection of the SBY Government" at Wisma Antara Jl Medan Merdeka Selatan, Jakarta, and called for the failure of the SBY government because it was considered to have failed to protect religion from heresy, the divinity and teachings of sharia, such as neoliberalism, which disturbs the life of Muslims. As stated by HTI through Ismail Yunanto (2017), HTI has long been concentrating on combating the ideologies of communism, neo-liberalism, and neo-imperialism whose resistance is in tune with the breath of Pancasila.

Indonesia, in this era, was considered by HTI as a country led by a regime that failed to develop prosperity and tended to be pro-liberalism. Poverty and inequality felt by the ordinary people became an issue raised by HTI in propagating the idealism of the Khilafah. These issues are indeed close to the community. There are also many HTI criticisms of the state, such as posts on the HTI website that contain criticisms of corruption in the SBY era (Burhani, 2017).

HTI tries to offer a change in the political system by implementing the Khilafah and returning to Islamic law in solving the nation's problems. This is in line with the opinion of Abdul Mu'ti, Muhammadiyah mass organization leader, that the presence of HTI is the impact of the uneven development of justice aspired by Pancasila. Mu'ti assessed that if there were still imbalances in society, organizations that embraced and wished to change the foundation of the state would continue to emerge.

HTI began to tend to communal to raise the issue of religion and the state. Among them HTI actively contributed to the civil society movement by holding long marches and demonstrations, for example after the case of desecration of the Koran verses by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, one of the candidates for governor of DKI Jakarta, entitled "Aksi Damai Islam I" on November 4, 2016 and "Aksi Damai Islam II" on 2 December 2016 which was able to cause millions of Muslims to overflow in Jakarta.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### **Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia in Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions**

Horizontal and vertical dimensions play a lot in the process of HTI securitization. In the horizontal context of Indonesia, HTI does tend to be different from other large Islamic organizations that already exist such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. These two organizations were formed from the social dynamics of the local community



and tended to address "Indonesian-style Islam" (Qodir, 2017), through the concepts of Nusantara Islam and Progress Islam. These two organizations tend to apply the Islamic acculturation model with local values. For example, the concept of Nusantara Islam which is an Islamic concept echoed by NU at the 33rd conference in Jombang emphasizes the combination of Indonesian culture and Islamic teachings. Besides this Islam is tawasut (moderate), middle way, not extreme right and left, always balanced, inclusive, tolerant and can coexist peacefully with followers of other religions, and can accept democracy well (Azra, 2017). This concept tends to reflect the traditional Islamic model and is planned to challenge the concept of the Islamic Khilafah idealized by HTI which refers to alternative political forms of the kufur Western system whose implementation is not in accordance with Islamic law.

The debate over the concept of Islam between mass organizations is rife found in cyberspace and science assemblies. Basically, this debate has been going on for a long time, even since the beginning of these Islamic mass organizations. Although HTI is a new mass organization in Indonesia, the fundamental values that HTI believes are NU values as the same understanding as Wahabi, the revivalist group that triggered NU's standing. NU considers HTI to be the same challenge as other organizations such as the Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an (MTA), Shiite, Ahmadiyah, Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII), and Salafi

Wahabis because it deviates from the teachings of ahlussunnah wal jama'ah.

The teachings of some groups and styles are indeed very different from what has become a tradition among nahdliyin residents. In fact, they convicted the faithful practices of NU citizens such as Tahlil, Yassin, Shalawat, were heresy, and were forbidden to do so (Munahwan, 2012). On the other hand, NU considers that the teachings of "bid'ah" is form of radicalism and will instead bring disintegration between Muslims and civil conflicts as happened in the Middle East, such as the conflict in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. On the other hand, HTI often questions attitudes that confront the concept of Islamic Nusantara with Islam in the Middle East that is deemed inappropriate (Affan, 2015). According to HTI there is a difference between Indonesian Islam and Middle Eastern Islam "in the socio-cultural-political realization. The Islamic conflict in the Middle East is a form of resistance to despotic rulers (Ismail Yunanto, 2017).

In addition to the debate about understanding Islam, the presence of HTI is considered to be a little bit off against "original Indonesian" Islamic organizations and their supporting bases. In 2017, HTI claimed to have networks in 34 Provinces and more than 300 in districts/cities with members of various walks of life. In addition, many of HTI leaders with NU backgrounds, particularly from Central Java and East Java (Qodir, 2017). Like Muhammad Al-Khaththah who was born and grew up in the NU

environment in Pasuruan and Ismail Yusanto from Cilacap. In fact, many traditional NU thinkers and Muhammadiyah modernists embraced HTI ideas because they were considered to fill the void of ideological space that had not been touched by NU and Muhammadiyah.

From a vertical dimension, HTI does openly oppose Western forms of government, especially in the Indonesian context, it strongly rejects the use of democracy in the political system in Indonesia. In addition, HTI also does not approve of Pancasila as an absolute ideology of the Indonesian people, which is manifested in regulations that all organizations and political parties are obliged to make Pancasila their only basic ideology. HTI considers Pancasila as the legal source of all laws as stipulated in TAP MPRS No. 3/1978 which is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam which makes the Koran and Sunnah as its primary legal basis and is an obligation for the Muslim community to do so.

In contrast to NU and Muhammadiyah which accentuates the Indonesian version of Islam, HTI's transnationalism ideology is more representative of the Islamic "centrifugalism" movement that wants to unite national and local Islamic identities scattered throughout the world under the sole authority of the Khilafah Islamiyah. The doctrine is recognized by HTI activists as an ideological antithesis that is ready to rival, even replace, the concept position of the nation-state (NKRI) which is

considered final in Indonesia (Hilmy, 2011).

In state perspective, Pancasila plays an important role in uniting various groups to become one nation, namely the nation of Indonesia. As the idea of state, it is vital because it is included in the composition of Indonesia's sovereignty in the concept of Buzan's security. If left unchecked, the anti-Pancasila mass organizations are considered to make the community support fundamentalism and threaten the survival of the Pancasila as an idea of state which becomes the way of life of the Indonesian nation. Of course, this will be a challenge for the country to maintain its sovereignty composition. If not, the worst scenario that happens is that they have to compromise again with the nation's development which certainly will not be exactly the same as the nation's development that has been written history with Pancasila, which is very upholding the principle of unity in diversity.

This is in line with what was written by Foucault (1975), that religion as a grand narrative can produce and reproduce tremendous power to be able to produce obedience from its adherents, so that the concept of Islamic state which is agreed by HTI will leave the values of Pancasila which are considered *einmalig* (final) (Afandi, 2012). If the way of life is replaced, as Buzan's theory would damage the integrity of the elements of sovereignty, namely the people as the physical base of state and the government as the institutional expression of the state (Buzan, 2009). Both of these elements

will experience adjustments to the idea of state. This adjustment would require substantial costs as well.

As explained by [Riyanto \(2007\)](#), that the basic state (*Grundnorm*) which is the highest principle, fundamental, and becomes the core of every rule of law in an organized society, including the state is essentially unchanged but relatively "eternal". Changes to the country's foundation will be rooted directly in the historical will of a nation, according to Prof. Dr. Carl Schmitt is a joint decision or consensus on the nature and form of a political unity taken by the nation, and causes disputes over the will of groups, especially groups outside of Islam. There will be a radical change in the history of the nation's history and state *meta-juridis*. On the other hand, the replacement of Pancasila as a code of conduct or way of life for the people or nation of Indonesia will change the social structure of the unified Indonesian people if they become homogeneous based on unity of religious identity.

The desire of HTI to establish the Khilafah means to negate the nation state system used by Indonesia. The nation-state system is an important system for Indonesia because it represents a pluralistic nation. The nation-state system as explained by [Buzzan \(1991\)](#) provides accommodation for the feeling of being a nation and one nation, namely the nation and state of Indonesia even though they come from different ethnic, ethnic and racial backgrounds. For HTI, the ideal state is when the state is

formed based on Islamic values so that the identity used is also in the form of religious identity. So, in other intentions, HTI wants the concept of state and religion to collaborate so as to create a state, nation, economy and society based on Islamic law.

HTI's criticism does not only stop at the form of the state, but also leaders and prospective leaders. HTI, which strongly adheres to the Islamic Sharia, rejects the democratic system because it is considered possible for the election of non-Muslim leaders. DKI Jakarta's election is one example of how HTI tries to protect Islamic ideals and foundations in a democratic system. The rejection of the candidate for governor Ahok with pagan, Chinese and non-indigenous narratives became weapons for HTI and other fundamentalist groups. This is of great concern to the Indonesian government because it is considered to be damaging to the harmony of a pluralistic nation of Indonesia and has the potential to marginalize and even exclude minorities in Indonesia to engage in democracy, especially political contestation.

Indonesia, which is currently in the process of heading towards the Pancasila democracy, has experienced a period of vulnerability due to globalization and the era of information disclosure. The vulnerability is caused by the increasingly opening of the political system thereby widening the probability of the emergence of a collective movement ([Muhtadi, 2009](#)). The existence of this era of openness, allows HTI to take further steps to

recruit the masses and implement the method of preaching. This is evidenced by the increasing intensity of the use of anti-democratic propaganda on social media.

The Indonesian government has its own fears of this kind of revivalist group. The destruction of the countries of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and others due to civil war and the presence of jihadist organizations that carry the ideals of the Khilafah (example: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) overshadows if HTI continues to carry out its da'wah (Pratama, 2017). The jihadist organization — as well as HTI — is driving change in the state and political system. This fear is also confirmed by the many waves of Muslims jihadist in Syria.

The stage of the da'wah of Islam al-hukm HTI is quite worrying about the government if it is actually implemented. Because if that happens, the Indonesian government is worried that the values of the Pancasila that have become the final idea of the state will be lost, resulting in a total change in the nation and state of Indonesia. Pancasila is essentially placed as a consensus between nations and religion. The concept of the HTI Khilafah is considered to impose the truth of one group's religion on other groups so that it does not embody the spirit of integration, unity, and national harmony that is carried by Pancasila. On the other hand, for HTI, the Indonesian government overly imposes Pancasila as an ideology universally and ignores the interests of the majority Muslim community.

## **Securitization of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia**

Securitization of HTI began with various protests by civil society. The protest was triggered by the presence of HTI as a mass organization that has different ideals from the majority of the community. The definition of HTI as a threat began to be carried out since HTI came out to the public openly on 29 February 2004 when more than 50,000 HTI members held long march in Jakarta, Surabaya, Makassar and other major cities in commemoration of 80 years of abolition of the Khilafah system by Kemal Attaturk who was appointed to be responsible for the collapse of Ottoman Turkish rule (Muhtadi, 2009).

The first stage, securitizing move began with the release of a counter-discourse release by NU through the official NU online news website to be aware of HTI, FPI, and Wahabi in 2012. Then it culminated in an act of rejection and forced cessation before the issuance of the ORMAS PERPPU towards the Kirab Panji Rasulullah HTI action group that was crossing the Trenggalek-Tulungagung border, East Java on April 1, 2017 by the Gerakan Pemuda Ansor dan Barisan Ansor Serbaguna (Banser). Similar actions were also carried out by the Nahdlatul Ulama of the City of Ternate, East Nusa Tenggara, and other cities in rejecting all activities and teachings of HTI ideology in their area.

The existential statement of the threat was then followed by a speech act carried out by at least three actors, namely two from the government

(state) and one from civil society, namely Wiranto (coordinating minister for politics, law and human rights) Lukman Sarifuddin (minister of religion), and NU (Erdianto, 2017). The speech act was first performed by a traditional Islamic group, NU, which has the largest Muslim mass in Indonesia. PBNU Chairperson Said Aqil Siradj on several occasions said that at present the national values in the community were being reduced due to the emergence of anti-Pancasila mass organizations (Muliono, 2016). This is very much a concern for the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. HTI mass organizations are considered as a threat to Pancasila. Through NU, as many as 14 Islamic organizations issued a statement of attitude asking the government to immediately issue government regulations to replace the law (PERPU) on social organizations (mass organizations) (Wildansyah, 2017). This coalition encourages the government to immediately dissolve radical and anti-Pancasila organizations. This speech act is also supported by autonomous bodies under another NU, such as GP Ansor.

Responding to the threat statements, the Coordinating Minister of Politic, Law, and Human Rights, Wiranto, firmly stated that HTI threatened Indonesian sovereignty. Insistence from the majority of the people —through NU, Muhammadiyah, and its mass base—the prohibition of HTI in 20 other Muslim-majority countries, and the affirmation of the Minister for Law and Security, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, that

there is no room for organizations in Indonesia that does not include the ideology of Pancasila encouraging the government through Menkopolkham to issue Perppu No. 2 Tahun 2017 concerning Amendment to Undang-Undang No. 17 Tahun 2013 concerning Community Organizations (Perppu Ormas) which contains (Dhae, 2016; Kemenkopolkham, 2017; Kumparan, 2017):

"Community organizations are prohibited from embracing, developing, and spreading teachings or understandings that are contrary to Pancasila".

As a follow-up to the PERPPU, on 19 July 2017 the Indonesian government through Kemenkumham officially revoked the legal status of HTI with justification: (1) HTI did not carry out a positive role to take part in the development process to achieve national goals; (2) Activities carried out by HTI are strongly indicated to have been contrary to the objectives, principles and characteristics based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as stipulated in Law Number 17 of 2013 concerning mass organizations; and (3) activities carried out by HTI have caused conflicts in the community that can threaten the security and order of the community, as well as endanger the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

The speech act was then responded by the minister of religion. Lukman Hakim Sarifuddin —from the United Development and Party (PPP)—emphasized that HTI was not a

religious missionary movement, but it was a political movement (Sarwanto, 2017). This shows there is support for the definition of HTI securitization and legitimizing the dissolution and disbandment of HTI. As stated by Siswanto (2017) this response is considered as an effort by the government and the state is looking at a threat dynamic as if there is no other way than repressive policy. As if the state is allowed to crash into human rights to gather and associate in the name of national security (Bappenas, 2018). PERPPU that should be issued only when the state of gentinf and dissolution (revocation of legal entity HTI) that does not involve the judiciary is part of the "procedure outside the normal" so that securitization becomes legitimate done.

The response from the audience (the people of Indonesia) after the issuance of PERPPU ORMAS and the dissolution of HTI in the majority supported HTI as a threat. We can see this from a survey conducted by the polling agency Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting or SMRC showing that of 56.7% of people who knew HTI wanted to uphold the Khilafah, around 68.8% rejected HTI's struggle. As many as 78.4% of respondents agreed with the government's decision to disband HTI. This is in line with the public's response to ISIS which has become a scourge in the Middle East with the ideals of its caliphate, namely 91.3% of the Indonesian people forbid ISIS from being in Indonesia and around 90% consider ISIS as a threat (Wardah, 2017). Regarding HTI, only 9.2% of the

Indonesian people want to replace the Unitary Republic of Indonesia with the Khilafah or Islamic state which relies on the Qur'an, sunnah, and interpretations of certain scholars. Meanwhile, of respondents who knew HTI and its ideals, only 3.2% of the total national population agreed with the Khilafah carried out by Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia. The SMRC survey was carried out on May 14 to May 20, 2017 with 1500 respondents. The results of this survey are also in line with the support of political elites such as Mahfud MD, former chairman of the Constitutional Court, who supported the dissolution of HTI and the banning of the Khilafah in Indonesia. From the audience's response it can be said that HTI securitization experienced success.

To succeed the securitization, PERPU No. 2 Tahun 2017 is passed into law on October 24, 2017 by the House of Representatives. In the ratification, there is a minority of the House of Representatives submitting a revision of the Ormas Law, namely in the article on the procedure for dissolution of CSOs through the court or criminal sanctions against anti-Pancasila mass organizations. Responding to this, HTI tried to appeal to the Supreme Court, but the claim was rejected entirely cession in aspects of religious life by denying that HTI is included.

Uniquely, HTI securitization does not involve military force as is commonly practiced by countries in general, such as securitization that occurred in the United States with the slogan Global War on Terrorism and its unilateral policy to invade Afghanistan

in the name of counter-terrorism or securitization of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) by the Indonesian government by G30S/PKI in 1966-1967 with the issuance of the TAP MPR containing the dissolution of the PKI and operations to crush the PKI led by Sarwo Edhie because they were considered to have carried out a coup d'état by being the mastermind behind the G30S/PKI. The marking of HTI securitization lies in the definition of threats in the regulation and dissolution of the organization without going through a legal process.

HTI securitization at the policy level shows that efforts to safeguard the country are not only limited to the deployment of military forces, but also occur in the realm of non-procedural policies such as the dissolution of HTI and its establishment as a prohibited mass organization. The state is trying to eliminate group space that is not in harmony with the nation's DNA. The threat in HTI securitization here is also not defined as coming from outside the country-external factors as the definition of traditional security, but originating from domestic movements that also have the potential to undermine sovereignty or one of the compositions of state sovereignty, namely the idea of state, by providing caliphate system as a counter concept.

### **Post-HTI Securitization**

The emergence of an anti-Pancasila and *Pancasilais* dichotomy among the state and society is one of the effects of HTI securitization. The definition of *Pancasilais* and anti-Pancasila became a

form of application of government power over the people (Erdianto, 2016). There is an element of dominance in the construction of the definition. The Indonesian government has succeeded in idealizing the level of preferential ideas –depending on the individual or group looking at an idea– into something that must be universally owned by every head of Indonesian society. Although HTI lists the Pancasila as an ideology for its Association Legal Entity, based on the definition of government as explained by securitization actors, the facts on the ground create a perception for groups outside HTI that HTI is not in line with Pancasila. This dichotomy gave birth to derivative regulations such as the dissolution of the anti-Pancasila mass organizations, strengthening the educational curriculum by internalizing Pancasila values in each field of study, to fostering extra-campus student organizations through Permendikti No. 55 Tahun 2018.

The dissolution of HTI is not able to solve the problems of disintegration, radicalism, and terrorism that the government is concerned about. In fact, the dissolution of HTI was the beginning of the transformation of the meaning of radicalism. Radicalism which was once interpreted as an understanding created by a group of people who want drastic social and political change or renewal has now become an understanding associated with terrorism and threatening the state.

Previously, the characteristics of radicalism refer to Ibn Qayyim al-

Jauziyah who asserted that there are four dimensions in providing a solution to the possibility of radicalism, namely: first, getting rid of the evil and replacing it with *ma'ruf*; second, get rid of *munkar* by reducing it even if it doesn't eliminate it completely; third, get rid of *munkar* by bringing up a similar *munkar*; and fourth, to get rid of the evil by bringing out the evil which is more evil than him. Meanwhile, the government through the BNPT, is trying to eliminate these progressive characteristics by reducing the characteristics of groups that should be suspected as groups of radicalism and terrorism, such as exclusive, intolerant, often making marriages without guardians, easy to disbelieve other groups, even reluctant to pray at mosques that are not mosque groups, including the Friday prayers (Ariefana, 2018).

The HTI movement, which was characterized by clandestine movements and which was outside the government structure, would not stop. Such dissolution tends to result in black lash because there is no direct supervision from the state. HTI will become more closed and its agenda more difficult to track by the government because the country has shown its non-cooperative face by disbanding HTI. The dissolution has further strengthened its under brow movement. The under brow movement is devoted to expressing disappointment with the government. As a concrete example #2019GantiPresiden, led by Mardani Ali Sera, was supported by HTI. The

#2019GantiPresiden Movement is basically a political Islam movement by the PKS which has the support of fundamentalist Muslim groups. The campaigns carried out by this group allude to the failure of the pro-foreign Jokowi government and the failure to fulfill campaign promises in 2014. The #GantiPresiden campaign which is also intended to support Prabowo tends to use a buzzer strategy that causes toxic political conditions in democracy in Indonesia. HTI has on several occasions been flying its flag. This involvement was also seen from Ismail Yunanto's statement as a spokesman for HTI in several press institutions and raising the flag of the HTI monotheism flag in many activities affiliated with #2019GantiPresiden. As a result, public opinion emerged about the interests of HTI riding the #2019GantiPresiden and Prabowo movement (Pebriansyah & Sari, 2018).

In addition, the dissolution of HTI has also become a stepping stone for securitization of other Islamic mass organizations. Recently the Indonesian government issued a discourse on the disbanding of Front Pembela Islam (FPI), a fundamental group which has military style (Asrori, 2015; Alvian, 2018), on the grounds that they explained that they were not Pancasila. The author assesses that the Indonesian government does securitization through law and court. The state has the right to determine who is anti-Pancasila and at the same time apply the sentence. as was done when securitizing HTI.



## CONCLUSION

The HTI securitization explained several things including: (1) The concept of the maximal state which is still a reference in dialoguing national security because security construction is still held by the military represented by the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Human Rights; (2) international bias on the dissolution of HTI in a number of countries such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc.; (3) there is an assumption of "Second Syrian Indonesia" because the political movements carried out by HTI have the same idealism as ISIS; (4) the existence of genealogical knowledge efforts on Pancasila and anti-Pancasila carried out by the Indonesian government; 4) the unfriendliness of the state in viewing the idea of deconstruction is considered to threaten the integrity of the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) and the Pancasila ideology and ignore the value of political imagination on the good of humans in the future; and 5) securitization of HTI is first done by non-state actor, namely NU, and continued by state actor through Kemenkumham.

The Securitization of HTI on the other hand is a preventive measure for the Indonesian government over the concept of security that they have created themselves. However, the absence of dialogue between the Indonesian government and HTI led to the emergence of black lash. So, it is necessary for the future, the Indonesian government to establish two-way communication with groups who have different ideologies and provide

solutions to their critics towards the condition of Indonesia itself.

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