Electoral Power Structure of Islamic Parties in Reform Era Indonesia

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Abstract
The Islamic political parties in the Reform era grew up exceeding the period of Parliamentary Democracy. In the electoral competition during the Reform era, Islamic political parties did not receive adequate votes. The votes won by Islamic parties tend to go down from election to election. There are several factors that have caused the Islamic party to fail to win the support of Muslim votes. First, Islamic parties are fragmented and internal conflict. Second, Muslim voters do a change in ideological orientation which no chooses an Islamic party but a nationalist party. Third, nationalist parties accommodate Muslim aspirations by forming Islamic organizations. Fourth, the crisis of leadership of the Islamic party. Fifth, the absence of a real party program. To improve the electoral, Islamic parties must concern on programs to improve people's welfare, democratization, eradicate corruption, and realize social justice. The leader of Islamic parties must be exemplary, visionary, integrity, and rooted in the community.

Keywords
Islamic Parties; General Elections; Electoral Power; Reform Era

INTRODUCTION
The presence of religion based political parties seemed like an unavoidable necessity. According to Th. Sumartana’s opinion, the existence of religion based parties comes from the fact that there is a theological support from the religion itself saying that establishing a political party is legitimate; religion based parties are the binding factor for these religious groups, and by establishing parties based on the same religion, the leaders and followers feel more comfortable (Sumartana, 1999). Apart from what Sumartana said, the presence of a religious or Islamic party is also in accordance with the principles of democracy. In a country that adheres to democracy, every group or class’ existence is recognized to form a political power organization in accordance with its aspirations and interests. This is also supported by legislation in which there is no prohibition against forming political parties based on religion as long as it does not conflict with Pancasila.

Additionally, the presence of Islamic parties cannot be separated from historical factors. Historically, the forerunner to the formation of the Islamic party was the establishment of Sarikat Dagang Islam (SDI), which later developed into Sarikat Islam (SI), then...
changed into Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) which contributed to the struggle of the Indonesian people in expelling colonialism. When Indonesia became independent, the Islamic groups formed the Partai Masyumi as the sole forum for Muslim aspirations. Unfortunately, as a result of a discord, other Islamic parties emerged such as: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Party, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), Partai Persatuan Tharikah Islam (PPTI), and AKUI.

The 1955 election showed Islamic parties’ failure to win: Masyumi got 20.9% of the vote and NU 18.4%. Other Islamic parties such as Perti received 1.3% of the votes, PPTI and AKUI both only got 0.2%. The total votes won by Islamic parties was 43.9%. This shows that not all Muslims, who are in the majority, choose Islamic parties. Some of them chose secular parties and might even vote for atheist parties, such as the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Those who belong to the Abangan Islamic group certainly prefer secular parties. Meanwhile, those who belonged to the Santri group choose Islamic parties (Lev, 1988).

Indonesia in entering the Managed Democracy era, Soekarno regulated the number of political parties and dissolved some that were not in line with the regime. Political parties dissolved were Masyumi for rejecting Managed Democracy. Meanwhile, other Islamic parties joined together. However, according to Noer (1988: 14), Islamic parties that have joined the Managed Democracy are not beneficial but instead were actually detrimental. This can be seen from the seat acquisition in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong (DPR-GR) equivalent to House of Representatives. The number of seats representing Islamic parties has not increased, but has decreased, from 115 seats (election results 1955) to 43 seats.

The New Order era, which was expected to revive the Islamic party, instead made it experience marginalization. The hope that Masyumi would be established was not approved by the regime, so it changed to Parmusi. The New Order government then settled on a political force called Golongan Karya (Golkar). The New Order regime also weakened political parties other than Golkar. In an effort to weaken other political party than Golkar the then Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Machmud, issued Ministerial Regulation No. 12 of 1969 and the concept of mono-loyalty for civil servants. Meanwhile, Ali Moetopo, Head of Opsus, Personal Assistant to the President and Advisor to Golkar’s Election Winning Bodies, is the “main supervisor” of Golkar’s election administration and campaign operations. These two men, especially Amir Machmud, were referred to as "bulldozers" of the political party. Seeing these actions, Subhan ZE, a young NU figure, stated that political games were no longer fair. The Minister of Home Affairs who should have been the referee, has instead become a "bulldozer" (Aminudin, 1999: 94).

The results of the 1971 General Election were won by Golkar, a newly founded party by the government that
gained 62.80% of the votes. NU gained 18.67% and Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) received 6.94% of the votes. The other parties, including the three other Islamic parties received very few votes, they were Parmusi with 5.3%, PSII with 2.39% and Perti with 0.70%. Liddle (1997: 64) said that all political parties, except NU, were buried under Golkar’s landslide vote. After the 1971 General Elections, all political parties had to fuse. Islamic parties formed Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). From this fusion, in the 1977 General Election PPP’s vote rose from the previous election. Before this fusion, the total vote count in the 1971 General Election was 27.11% and in the 1977 General Election it increased to 29.29%.

In the following elections the PPP’s vote acquisition further declined. Not only was this the result of intimidation, manipulation, and engineering in every General Election implementation but also due to the ideological changes experienced by PPP and the PPP’s own internal conflicts. The ideological change happening is the PPP’s principle change from Islam centered to Pancasila centered which was followed by the change of its symbol from the Ka’bah to a Star (Haris, 1991: 1). This incident led historian Taufik Abdullah to say that with the PPP accepting Pancasila as its principle it would be "the final page of political Islam in Indonesia" (Abdullah, 1987: 2).

The Reform era gives freedom to every group and class to establish political parties. It seems that this opportunity was not wasted by the Islamic political elite to establish an Islamic political party. What is meant by Islamic parties here is in a broader sense, namely not only parties based on Islam principle but also parties that use symbols and are based on Islamic masses (Nurhasim, 2016). Even though many Islamic parties were formed, only 19 Islamic parties or Islamic mass-based parties participated in the 1999 Elections. Then in the 2004 Election, it fell to 7 parties. In the 2009 Election the number increased to 11 parties. In the 2014 and 2019 Election, there are 5 Islamic parties each.

Although the number of Islam followers in Indonesia is the majority, around 87.18% (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010), it turns out that Islamic parties do not receive large electoral support. Instead of winning the election, parties lose their votes to national or non-religious parties. The relatively strong support of Islamic voters for Islamic parties in the 1999 and 2004 Elections was untenable. In subsequent elections, Islamic party votes tended to decrease, even though the number of Islamic parties was relatively small compared to the number of Islamic parties in the 1999 Elections.

Why did the electoral support for Islamic parties decline during the reformation era’ election? What are the factors causing Islamic parties’ failure to reach most of the Islamic voters? This paper attempts to explain this by describing the voting map of Islamic parties in every Election in the reform era. Before discussing this issue, this paper presents a theoretical framework used to explain the failure of Islamic
parties in the Electoral support of Islamic voters.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are three paradigms of the relationship between religion and politics or the state. First, the integrated paradigm, which states that religion and state are an inseparable entity. Second, the symbiotic paradigm that religion and state are interrelated and interconnected. Third, the secularistic paradigm that separates the area between religion and state because the two are different entities (Syamsuddin, 1993). Of the three paradigms, in the context of discussing the presence of Islamic parties, it refers to the first paradigm that is integrated paradigm.

The integrated paradigm is in line with the opinions of experts who put forward different terms. Liddle (1997) refers to it as scripturalism, Roy (1996) and Rahmat (2018) as Islamism, Gülalp (1999) calls it political Islam. Meanwhile, Anwar (1995: 144-145) uses the term formalistic as opposed to substantialist Islam. Referring to Anwar's opinion, this group tends to have an imagined form of political society (imagined Islamic polity), such as the realization of an Islamic political system, an Islamic party, symbolic expressions, and other Islamic political idioms.

According to Effendy (1998: 12), this group argues that Islam should be the basis of the state, Sharia Law must be accepted as the state constitution, political sovereignty is in God's hands, the idea of a nation state contradicts the concept of the ummah which knows no political or regional boundaries, and the modern political system is put in a position opposite to the Islamic state. Meanwhile, Gülalp (1999) states that political Islam is Islam that appears or is presented as a framework or basis for political ideology which later transforms into a political party. Political Islam is Islam that seeks to be realized and actualized in official political power or institutions.

Apart from the above approach, the phenomenon of Islamic parties’ presence can also be explained by politics of sect. In this context, there are two theories, namely the political sect proposed by Geertz and the political current initiated by Feith and Castles. In his book The Religion of Java, Geertz (1981) divides Islamic society into three variants: Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi. Abangan and Priyayi are Islamic societies that do not adhere to Islamic teachings, while Santri are groups that adhere to Islamic teachings. The three variants of Islam have different political orientations: abangan and Priyayi orient towards nationalist or non-religious parties, while Santri orients itself towards religious or Islamic parties.

Meanwhile, Feith and Castles (1988) said that existing political parties were based on political currents, namely Islam, radical nationalism, communism, and democratic-socialism. They used this study to analyze political parties in the era of parliamentary democracy and managed democracy. Each current is represented by political parties, such as the Islamic sect with the Masyumi and NU parties,
the radical nationalist sect with the PNI, the democratic socialist sect with the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), and the communist sect with the PKI.

According to Dhakidae (1999: 34), the grouping of political parties by Feith and Castles is no longer relevant in analyzing political parties in the reform era because communism no longer existed. Nevertheless, he grouped political parties in the reform era which consisted of two main lines, one of which was the sect path. The party that adopts the sect will differentiate itself based on the view of the world and its problems and how to solve them. Religion and culture are the choices.

A note related to the presence of Islamic political parties in Indonesia, although at first during the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution, two Islamic political parties, namely the PPP and the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), were fighting for Jakarta Charter, as a form of Islamic formalism, but after that it seems that both parties were no longer oriented towards formalism of Islamic law. Meanwhile, other parties, such as Partai Keadilan or PKS, PAN, PKB and PDU, did not fight for the Jakarta Charter, but rather with other formulas (Romli, 2006).

Another theory to explain the electoral power of Islamic parties in the reform era is the theory of party institutionalization. Huntington (1968: 12) defines institutionalization as a process in which organizations and procedures gain value and stability. Randall and Svasand (2002: 12) define the institutionalization of political parties as a process of strengthening political parties both in the form of patterned behavior and in attitudes or culture.

Meanwhile, Mainwaring (2001: 186) states that a political party system is institutionalized if it has stability in inter-party competition; has strong party roots in society; the legitimacy of political parties and elections, and its level of political party organization where political party resources are sufficient both in terms of material and human resources.

Basedau and Stroh (2008) described the characteristics of political parties' institutionalization. First, parties have stable roots in society, which can be seen from the relative age of the parties, changes in electoral support, and relations with civil society organizations. Second, it has autonomy where the party is relatively independent from individuals inside and from groups from outside the party, a shift in electoral support after a change in the party's leadership, and autonomy for decisions from individuals and groups.

Third, the party's organizational apparatus is present consistently at all levels of administration and acts within the framework of party interests, regular party congresses, and possesses personal and material resources. Fourth, coherence, where the party acts as an organizational unit and have a certain level of tolerance for disputes within the party, as well as moderate relations between groupings (factionalism) within the party (Romli, 2017: 6).
If you look at Islamic political parties (and also nationalist parties), referring to the criteria for party institutionalization, they tend to be weak. Islamic parties tend to be less rooted, based only on the support of traditional ties and not ideological support, it tends to have conflict which leads to party splits, party conferences or congresses tends to be engineered and less democratic, and the level of financial autonomy is relatively low so that it depends on the state through APBN or APBD projects (rent seeking).

To explain the electoral performance of Islamic parties referring to Gherghina’s opinion, which states that many factors can influence, one of which is policy or ideological factors. Parties as citizens’ representatives compete in elections and are elected by citizens based on the actions and policies offered by the parties themselves. In terms of whether the policies offered by the party are attractive to voters or vice versa. Surely, the policies offered are based on the ideology it promotes (Gherghina, 2015).

In the context of Islamic party, apart from merely carrying Islamic symbols, Islamic parties cannot be distinguished from parties that claims itself based on nationality, or claim to be a religious-nationalist party. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the eyes of voters, the existing political parties are the same, there is no difference. We can see this condition during the election where the differences between the parties are so blurred that the public/voters cannot differentiate between political parties. The public chooses parties not based on policies or programs but on the factors of leading person/figures and money politics (Romli, 2017: 13).

Meanwhile, related to party ideology which is often used as camouflage only as legitimacy for the elite’s interests to gain power. In other words, the party ideology was distorted. This can be seen from the unclear relationship between the party ideology and the main philosophical system of society and the state, the insubstantiality of ideology as the basis for party programs, and the weak role of ideology as a general guideline in determining the party’s struggle strategy (Sanit, 2003; Romli, 2017: 13).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Islamic Party Electoral Strength

After Suharto resigned from his position as president, who was then replaced by B.J. Habibie, one of his programs is to carry out elections. To carry out the General Election, two political products were issued, namely the Political Party Law No. 22 of 1999 and the Election Law no. 3 of 1999. The birth of the new Political Party Law was to cancel Law No. 3 of 1975 which limited the presence of political parties which could participate in the election to only three parties which were PPP, PDI, and Golkar. With the existence of the new Political Party Law, there are no more restrictions on political parties. Each group or class is free to form and establish a political party.

As stated in the General Elucidation of the Political Party Law,
“1. The formation of a political party is basically one of the reflections of the right of citizens to associate, assemble, and express opinions in accordance with Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution.... Therefore, in essence, the state does not limit the number of political parties formed by the people.” (Law No. 2 of 1999 on Political Parties).

Meanwhile, the conception of Law no. 3 of 1999 to revoke and cancel Law no. 15 of 1969 concerning the General Election of Members of the Consultative Body/People’s Representative Council, as amended by Law Number 4 of 1975, Law Number 2 of 1980, and Law Number 1 of 1985. In this new Election Law, all members of the DPR and DPRD are directly elected by the people and election organizers are carried out by an independent body, namely the General Elections Commission (KPU) (Law No. 3 Year 1999 on General Elections).

In the preamble Considering the Election Law No. 3 of 1999 it is stated that,

d. that in order to better realize sovereignty in the hands of the people and with the arrangement of laws in the political field, it is necessary to restructure the implementation of general elections in a democratic and transparent, honest and fair manner, by holding a direct, public, free, and secret voting;
e. that the Law Number 15 of 1969 concerning General Election of Members of the Consultative Body/People’s Representative Council, as amended by Law Number 4 of 1975, Law Number 2 of 1980, and Law Number 1 of 1985, is no longer in accordance with the development and demands of political life, therefore it needs to be revoked”.

With the opening of the gate of freedom to establish political parties, political elites have flocked to form and/or establish political parties, including the Islamic political elite. There are hundreds of political parties formed, about 141 parties with legal status. Of these, as many as 48 parties participated in the 1999 General Election. Of these, nearly half, namely 19 participants, came from Islamic parties, namely: the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Keadilan (PK), Nahdlatul Ummat party (PNU), Partai Persatuan (PP), Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (PPI Masyumi), Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU), Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (PKMI), Partai Ummat Islam (PUI), Partai Abul Yatama (PAY), Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB), Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (SUNI), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 (PSII 1905), Partai Masyumi Baru (PMB), dan Partai Islam Demokrat (PID).
The 1999 elections were held on July 7, 1999, which was attended by 48 parties. Of the total election participants, 19 parties came from Islamic parties. The results of the 1999 General Election, Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Perjuangan (PDIP) came out as winners (33.74%), while the New Order inheritance party, which turned into Golkar party, was in second place (22, 44%). Meanwhile, Islamic parties, namely PKB won 12.61% votes, PPP

### Table 1. Votes and Seats for Islamic Political Parties in the 1999 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)</td>
<td>13.336.982</td>
<td>12,61%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11,03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)</td>
<td>11.329.905</td>
<td>10,71%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>12,55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)</td>
<td>7.528.956</td>
<td>7,12%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7,36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)</td>
<td>2.049.708</td>
<td>1,94%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan (PK)</td>
<td>1.436.565</td>
<td>1,36%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Partai Nahdatul Ummat (PNU)</td>
<td>679.179</td>
<td>0,64%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan (PP)</td>
<td>655.052</td>
<td>0,62%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Parti Politik Islam Indonesia (PPI) Masyumi</td>
<td>456.718</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR)</td>
<td>427.854</td>
<td>0,40%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII)</td>
<td>375.920</td>
<td>0,36%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU)</td>
<td>300.064</td>
<td>0,28%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (PKMI)</td>
<td>289.489</td>
<td>0,27%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Partai Ummat Islam (PUI)</td>
<td>269.309</td>
<td>0,25%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Partai Abul Yatama (PAY)</td>
<td>213.979</td>
<td>0,20%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Partai Indonesia Baru (PIB)</td>
<td>192.712</td>
<td>0,18%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (SUNI)</td>
<td>180.167</td>
<td>0,17%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 1905</td>
<td>152.820</td>
<td>0,14%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Partai Masyumi Baru (PMB)</td>
<td>152.589</td>
<td>0,14%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Partai Islam Demokrat (PID)</td>
<td>62.901</td>
<td>0,06%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** General Elections Commission (KPU), 1999.
10.72%, and PAN 7.12%. Meanwhile, most other Islamic parties did not get significant votes. Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), which is considered the main heir to Masyumi, won only 1.9%, while Partai Keadilan was only able to collect 1.4% of the votes. Several other Islamic parties such as Partai Nahdatul Ummat (PNU), Partai Persatuan (PP), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), PPI Masyumi, and Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) only received less than one percent. Moreover, a number of other Islamic parties were unable to win votes to get seats in the DPR (See Table 1).

When the results of the 1999 election were announced, the votes acquired by Islamic parties fell significantly: PPP received 10.72% of the votes, while two other Islamic mass-based parties, PKB and PAN, won 12.6% and 7.1% respectively. Most of the other Islamic parties did not get significant votes. Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), which is considered the main heir to Masyumi, only won 1.9% of the votes, while Partai Keadilan (PK) was only able to collect 1.4% of the votes. Several other Islamic parties such as the Partai Nahdatul Ummat (PNU), Partai Persatuan (PP), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), PPI Masyumi, and Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU) only received "zero-point percent" respectively, so they are referred to as "Decimal party", because it received less than one percent of the votes.

If in the 1999 Election there were 19 parties participating in the election, then in the 2004 Election the number dropped drastically, there were only seven Islamic parties. Thus, only a quarter of the Islamic parties participated in the elections. The seven parties consisted of four old parties, two parties that changed their names because they did not pass the electoral threshold, namely PK becoming the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), and PNU becoming Partai Persatuan Nahdatul Umat Indonesia (PPNUI) and one new party, namely Partai Bintang Reformasi, which is a fraction of the PPP, led by Zaenuddin M.Z., known as the preacher of a million people. From all these parties, only PKS has its votes increased significantly, from 1.4% to 7.34%. Meanwhile, the other parties were drastically dropping, including PKB (10.57%), PPP (8.15%), and PAN (6.44%).

The decline of these parties could be caused by internal conflicts within the party body, such as that experienced by PPP and PBB, including PKB after the overthrow of KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) from the presidency, where PKB chairman, Matori Abdul Djalil, defected and is not in favor of Gus Dur being maintained as president. Meanwhile, the vote for PKS increased because of the hard work done so far. With multiple tactics, on the one hand as a party that promotes Islam and on the other hand with a pro-people, honest, clean, and caring program. The issues raised by PKS regarding anti-corruption, law enforcement, anti-rotten politicians, touched the hearts of the people.
In the 2009 Election, the number of Islamic parties participating in the election increased to 9 parties, 7 old parties and two new parties, namely PKNU (Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Umat), which is a fraction of the PKB, and the Partai Matahari Bangsa (PMB) also a fragment from PAN. Just like the previous elections, in the 2009 Election, it is predicted that Islamic parties will not win the election. Islamic parties will remain the middle parties. Effendy (1998) said that Islamic parties cannot appear as the ruling party like secular-based parties, such as Partai Golkar, PDI-P, or Partai Demokrat. This is because the political area of Islamic parties is limited. Islamic parties often bring up old issues, such as the implementation of sharia law, the formation of an Islamic state, and a Muslim president.

The 2009 election showed that out of 9 parties, only PKS had an increase in votes, from 7.34% to 7.88%. Other Islamic parties suffered defeats. PPP experienced a significant decrease in votes from 8.15% to 5.32%. The decline in PPP’s vote was partly due to this New Order regime inheritance party was often plagued by internal conflicts and there was no figure with selling point. Although there are two PPP cadres who sit in the ministry, namely Bachtiar Hamsyah as Minister of Social Affairs and Surya Dharma Ali as Minister of Cooperatives and SMEs, it seems that they are not able to attract and garner support for PPP voters.

Meanwhile PKB, after the internal conflict with the establishment of PKNU and the departure of Gus Dur from PKB under the leadership of Muhaimin Iskandar, its vote also fell sharply. This occurred as a result of the party’s internal division between Abdurrahman Wahid’s camp and Muhaimin Iskandar’s camp. In the election, Abdurrahman Wahid’s camp urged not to vote for PKB led by Muhaimin. As a result, while in the 2004 Election, PKB received 10.57% of the votes, then in the 2009 Election it only won 4.94% of the votes.
Table 3. Results of the Islamic Party Votes for 2009 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</td>
<td>8.206.955</td>
<td>7.88%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional</td>
<td>6.254.580</td>
<td>6.01%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</td>
<td>5.533.214</td>
<td>5.32%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</td>
<td>5.146.122</td>
<td>4.94%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</td>
<td>8.206.955</td>
<td>7.88%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang</td>
<td>1.864.752</td>
<td>1.79%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama</td>
<td>1.527.593</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Partai Bintang Reformasi</td>
<td>1.264.333</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaa</td>
<td>671.244</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Partai Matahari Bangsa</td>
<td>414.750</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia</td>
<td>146.779</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Elections Commission (KPU), 2009.

The other five Islamic parties did not pass the parliamentary threshold (PT), namely the PBB, PBR, PMB, PKNU, and PPNUI. PBB for instance, which in the 2004 Election received about 2.62% of the votes, in the 2009 Election only received 1.79% of the votes. The decline in PBB votes could be from the factor of Yusril Ihza Mahendra no longer in charge of PBB. As is known, after Yusril, the Chairman for PBB was MS Kaban. Even though Yusril is a PBB icon. The Islamic party that suffered the same fate was the PBR. The party that was born as a product of PPP’s internal conflict in the 2004 Election with the icon KH Zaenuddin MZ, as a well-known kyai (spiritual guru) with the nickname preacher of a million ummah, received 2.44% votes. Instead of being able to raise votes, the fate of the PBR is not much different than that of PBB, both of them did not pass PT of 2.5%. It seems that with the departure of the preacher of a million ummah, the PBR became confused because of the loss of a central figure and an icon for PBR. Another Islamic party that suffered the same fate was PKNU. This party was initiated by a number of "Kyai Langitan" who were disappointed and dissatisfied with PKB under the leadership of Gus Dur and Muhaimin Iskandar. Although supported by a number of Kyai Langitan, PKNU's electability level remains low, it only won 1.47% of the votes. PMB also experienced the same fate, which also did not pass PT of 2.5%. Even though supporting Din Syamsuddin, the former Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah, PMB was still unable to attract Muhammadiyah constituents.

In the 2014 Election, the number of Islamic parties participating in the election decreased to 5 parties. Of the 5 parties, 3 parties experienced an
increase in votes, namely PKB, PPP, and PAN. The 2014 election is a phenomenon for PKB. The is party which has mass-based from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), increased its votes from 4.94% to 9.04%. The increase in PKB votes was due to the fact that the party is relatively solid and united. PKB also received full support from the NU Executive Board (PB) led by KH. Agil Siradj. The chairman of PB NU often said that PKB is NU and NU is PKB. The Rhoma Irama factor also had an effect on raising PKB’s votes because it had a mass and/or was popular in the public eye as the King of Dangdut and the Head of the Soneta Dangdut Orchestra, who were made an icon by PKB as a presidential candidate.

Another factor could be that PKB has consistently promoted pluralism, which in its implementation is to make non-Muslims become PKB administrators and become candidates for legislative members. In several regions, such as Papua, West Papua, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), and North Sulawesi, PKB is led by non-Muslim cadres. This policy had a positive impact on PKB so that it won seats in areas based on Christian masses. In NTT, for example, there are several priests who become the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) and PKB Branch Leadership Council (DPC) and are elected to become Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD).

Apart from PKB, the Islamic mass-based party, namely PAN, also experienced an increase in the number of votes, although not much, from 6.01% in the 2009 elections to 7.59%. The factors that caused PAN’s vote to go up were that of Hatta Rajasa, who wanted to become a presidential candidate since long before. In this context, PAN and Hatta continued to conduct socialization and consolidation, including placing advertisements in various mass media. On that basis, it will have an impact on public awareness about PAN. Besides that, the factor of Amien Rais. Like it or not, Amien Rais still has a mass base, especially among Muhammadiyah. Another factor is the solidity of the Muhammadiyah vote base in supporting PAN. While in the 2009 Election there were two party representatives from Muhammadiyah, namely PAN and PMB (Partai Matahari Bangsa), in the 2014 Election only PAN participated therefore Muhammadiyah vote unanimously gave support to

### Table 4. Results of the Islamic Party Votes for 2014 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</td>
<td>11,298,957</td>
<td>9.04</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional</td>
<td>9,481,621</td>
<td>7.59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</td>
<td>8,480,204</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</td>
<td>8,157,488</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang</td>
<td>1,825,750</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Elections Commission (KPU), 2014.
PAN, and is no longer divided. In the 2009 Election, when there was PMB, PAN gained votes of only 6.01%.

If in the 2009 Election PPP only won 5.32% of the votes, then in the 2014 Election it became 6.53%, an increase of 1.21%. Despite the increase, however, as a party that carries the "big house of the Islamic ummah", it has failed to attract support and unite the votes of the Muslim ummah into this "big house". The failure of PPP as the "big house of Muslims" in gaining votes for Muslims was due to its mass base being relatively the same as the mass base of PKB, namely traditionalist Islam and/or the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) mass. When PKB's votes go up significantly, there will be less votes for other Islamic parties. So, PPP which tried to attract the traditional mass base, was unsuccessful because it was losing prestige to PKB, which had several figures who could attract votes.

If in the 2004 Election PKS became a phenomenal party because its votes had risen significantly, it would no longer be so in the following elections. This can be seen in the 2009 Election, PKS only won 7.88% of votes, an increase of only 0.54%. Facing the 2014 elections, the struggle to raise votes for PKS is getting tougher. This happened because of the “tsunami storm” that hit PKS which were the appointment of President of PKS, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq (LHI), as a suspect in beef import corruption by Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). With PKS President as a suspect, PKS received "blows" and "beatings" from its political opponents.

In the 2019 Election, there were more and more political parties from nationalist circles compared to political parties from Islamic circles. Nationalist political parties reached 11 parties, consisting of 7 old parties (PDIP, Golkar Party, Gerindra Party, Partai Demokrat, Partai Nasdem, Hanura Party, and PKPI) and four new parties (Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Partai Garuda). Meanwhile, there are five Islamic parties or Islamic mass-based parties, namely PKB, PPP, PAN, PKS, and PBB. There is one Islamic party formed by Rhoma Irama, namely Partai Idaman, which did not qualify to participate in the election.

Although the number of nationalist parties was higher (11 parties) compared to the number of Islamic parties (5 parties), the total votes obtained by nationalist parties was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>% Votes</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</td>
<td>13,570,097</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</td>
<td>11,493,663</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional</td>
<td>9,572,623</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</td>
<td>6,323,147</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang</td>
<td>1,099,848</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

higher than that for Islamic parties. One of the Islamic-based parties that has consistently increased its votes is Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) which won 9.96% of the vote. PKB under the leadership of Ahmad Muhaimin Iskandar continues to consolidate by embracing people who were previously in opposition, by making them PKB administrators and candidates. In addition, this party promotes pluralism and nationality, carries non-Muslim candidates in several non-Muslim areas, which made PKB win voter support not only in East Java but also in West Kalimantan, NTT, and Maluku. This party also maintains a close relationship with PBNU so that most NU members provide voting support to PKB. Likewise, the approach to Pesantren and kyai has had a positive effect on PKB.

The vote of support for PKS in the 2019 election has increased by 8.21%, after it has decreased in the 2014 election. This increased votes of support for PKS was due to several factors. First, even though they were hit by internal conflicts, these figures who left PKS did not join other parties and so deflated PKS votes. As is known, after the election of Sohibul Iman as the party president, several PKS leaders came out and founded a mass organization called GARBI (Gerakan Arah Baru Indonesia), such as the former PKS President and PKS Secretary General Anis Matta, former PKS DPP center managers Fahri Hamzah and Mahfud. Second, just like with PDIP, PKS militancy and regeneration are so strong and high. By promoting it as a da‘wah party, this party continues to expand its wings so that it has succeeded in gaining electoral support both in cities, among universities and BUMN employees. Third, support from alumni of 212 (mass demonstration on December 2nd, 2017 demanding that the Governor of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Purnama, often called Ahok, be imprisoned for insulting al-Qurán). Third, Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno’s campaign which tends to be Islamic by carrying out Islamic themes certainly benefits PKS as a representation of the Islamic party.

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) has also experienced or stagnated in gaining electoral support. It seems that PAN cannot spread its wings, unless it depends generally on the niche of Muhammadiyah voters. Amien Rais’ factor as a PAN icon is still strong, including his influence in the party he used to join in the post-reformation era. However, the icon of Amien Rais in PAN was unable to increase PAN’s vote. It could be that, just as PKB was supported by the majority of NU voters, so was PAN which was majorly elected by Muhammadiyah.

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) also experienced a significant decline, from 6.53% to 4.60% of votes in the 2019 Election. This Islamic party that has existed since the New Order was unable to maintain voting support, let alone raise its votes. The decrease in PPP votes could be caused by several factors. First, the internal conflict factor that has not been resolved after the resignation of Surya Dharma Ali as the general chairman. Instead of being able
to unite (islah) between the support groups of Djan Faridz and Romi (Romahurmuziy), a third group emerged, namely the PPP Rescue Council (MP) group led by Anwar Sanusi, Habil Marati, and Sukri Fadholi (Chairman of the DPP PPP from Djan camp). Second, Romi, as the chairman of the party who was arrested by KPK’s arrest operation (OTT), was a factor in the deterioration of this party’s vote which bears the Kaaba symbol. After the arrest of its chairman, it made the party stagger.

Meanwhile, the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang) only won 0.79% of the votes, which is further down from the 2014 election results, which at that time received 1.46% votes. Since the implementation of PT, PBB has always failed to continue to Senayan. The PBB under the leadership of Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who even though is known by the public as a reliable lawyer, cannot raise its votes so it could pass PT. There are attempts to raise PBB’s votes. First, there was a proposal for PBB to be led by Rhoma Irama, the king of dangdut, who was popular in Indonesian society and had become an icon for PPP during the New Order and promoted PKB in the 2014 Election. However, for some reason, Rhoma Irama did not step forward as Chairman of PBB and instead established his own party. Second, inviting the officials of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) to become candidates for PBB. However, when Yusril and PBB joined the Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin coalition party, they declared that they were leaving PBB.

The Failure of the Islamic Party

Based on the 2010 Indonesian Population Census, the number of Islam followers is 87.18%. With such a picture, it shows that Muslims in Indonesia are the largest majority population compared to other religions recognized in Indonesia. If statistically Muslims are the majority, Islamic political parties should have won great support and won the election. In fact, it did not happen, and the opposite is instead true. Even though Muslims are the majority, none of the Islamic political parties came out as winners, instead becoming "middle parties" and "small parties". On the contrary, it was the nationalist parties that came out victorious. In the 1955 election, which was a democratic election, the winner was Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI). In the election of the reform era too: PDIP won the 1999 election, the 2004 election it was Golkar Party, the 2009 election it was Partai Demokrat, the 2014 election and the 2019 election were won again by PDIP. All three parties are nationalist parties.

Meanwhile, in the reform era there were no major Islamic parties, only in the 1955 Election there were two major parties, namely the Masyumi Party and the NU Party. In the 1971 Election, the initial election in New Order era, only NU was relatively large, while other Islamic parties were small in its number of votes. In the elections in the reform era, Islamic parties that received relatively large votes were PKB, PAN, and PKS. Other Islamic parties were small in terms of vote numbers. Although the three parties above were
relatively large in gaining votes compared to other Islamic parties, they were still in the "medium party" group, and not the "big party".

Regarding the vote support for Islamic parties and nationalist parties, the votes were cumulatively far apart. Voting support for Islamic parties from election to election throughout the reform era tended to decline, instead of as in the 1955 election where the votes obtained by Islamic parties and nationalist parties were only 6.10% apart. In the elections in the reform era the votes were even further away. In the 2009 Election, the votes gained by Islamic parties were only 26.08% and in the 2019 Election it was only 29.90%. The number of votes was also obtained by including PKB and PAN as Islamic mass-based parties. If PKB and PAN votes were not included, the votes acquired by Islamic parties will be even less, only 17.98% in the 1999 election and became 13.98% in the 2019 election.

To explain why the votes for Islamic parties in the reform era have continued to decline, there are several factors that are interrelated.

not homogeneous. Sociologically, if we use Geerzt’s framework, Islam in Indonesia is abangan Islam and not Santri Islam. These two Islamic groups differ in providing support to political parties. Abangan Islam goes to nationalist parties, while Santri Islam tends to go for Islamic parties. Meanwhile, ideologically, Muslims have various political orientations. According to Noer (1988), there are four groups of Muslims, namely: (1) groups of people committed to Islam; (2) groups willing to cooperate with the authorities; (3) groups that see Islam as "the teachings of the people only"; and (4) groups that do not want to associate Islam as a religion with politics.

At the cohesiveness level, Islamic parties were fragmented and internal conflicts resulted in divisions. This fragmentation of Islamic parties can be seen from the number of Islamic parties that were formed and established, both from modernists and traditionalists circles. It seems that it would be difficult to unite these two political cults, even though at the beginning of independence they had been united in the Masyumi organization. However,
due to different levels of political culture and different theological understandings, it is difficult for the two Islamic sects to unite in the same political party. Not only that, even though Muslims are the same sect, they are spread across the board in politics so it is not surprising that they also have or join different political parties.

Internal conflicts of Islamic parties continue to cause party consolidation to be weak. Islamic parties such as PKB, PAN, PPP, and PKS continued to be hit by internal conflicts. Within PKB, internal conflicts caused some of its cadres to leave and establish another party, such as the formation of Partai Kejayaan Demokrasi (PEKADE), with its leader Matori Abdul Djalil, Partai Kemakmuran Bangsa Nusantara (PKBN) with its leader Zarruba Arifah Chafsoh (Yeni Wahid) and Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (PKNU). Within PAN, there was a conflict in the election of the General Chairperson and some of its cadres established PMB (Partai Matahari Bangsa). Within PPP, there was an internal conflict which resulted in a double management between Djan Faridz or Suryadarma Ali camps versus Romahurmuziy. PKS as a cadre and da'wah party also had internal conflicts which caused its cadres to leave and establish GARBI (Gerakan Arah Baru Indonesia). Likewise, with PBB, there was an internal conflict which caused some of its cadres to establish another party.

Second, the failure of Islamic parties was related to the modernization project undertaken by the New Order government. In the context of modernization, the New Order regime emphasized economic development, created political order, and undertook de-ideologization. In that context, the main doctrine as part of modernization is to carry out development stages listed in the State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) which were later revealed in the Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita). In order to carry out a political order, political parties are simplified, only two parties, namely PPP and PDI. Meanwhile, by the New Order, Golkar was not considered a political party. This is because for the New Order regime, parties were the culprits of the commotion that caused political instability, such as what happened during the Parliamentary Democracy (Moertopo, 1974). The de-ideologicalization project was implemented and Law no. 3 of 1985 and Law no. 8 of 1985 was issued. Both laws require all political parties and community organizations to be based on Pancasila. De-ideologization for society is implemented by floating mass policies, in which society must stay away from politics.

This development project was then responded to by some Muslim scholars, one of whom was Nurcholis Madjid with the slogan: "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No". As a result of said development and de-ideologicalization projects, there was a socio-economic transformation among Muslims. Not only did it create an educated middle class, but also a shift in political views and orientation. Their previously formalistic view of the relationship
between religion and politics has turned into a substantialist one. For them, Islam is sufficient as an ethical and moral guideline in coloring the life of the nation and state. In addition to having a substantialist view, in their actions they also use a cultural Islamic approach. This movement offers a discourse where the Islamic movement does not have to dwell on the political plane, but on the cultural plane. With Islam as a cultural movement, Islam is present in state life as a value and source of ethics. There are three submovements with Islam as a cultural movement. First, Islam as an intellectual movement, namely a movement that elevates Islamic values as a scientific concept in the social, economic, political, and other fields. Second, Islam as an ethical movement, which is a movement that fosters a series of attitudes or ethos about something. For example, in the economic sector, growth is also needed to be added with equity, justice, togetherness, and etc. Third, Islam as an aesthetic movement, which is a movement that seeks to create a symbolic environment that is more Islamic in meaning (Tebba, 1989: 63).

Third, the existence of an Islamic wing within the nationalist parties. The dichotomy between Islam and nationalism, which initially faced each other, is now converging. Within Islamic parties, not only did Muslims exist in these political parties either as members, cadres, or as party administrators, but also in the nationalist parties formed a suborganization based on Islamic masses.

In the Golkar Party, there are three Islamic organizations that accommodate the aspirations of the Muslim community, namely Satkar (Satuan Karya) Ulama, Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI), and Pengajian Al-Hidayah. In Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), which is known as the secular nationalist party there is also an Islamic suborganization, namely Baitul Muslimin. The existence of this Islamic suborganization also shows that PDIP is not anti-Islamic, and it is successful, so it is not surprising that Muslim circles in Indonesia support this party by a large margin. Other nationalist parties which also have an Islamic suborganization is the Partai Demokrat (PD). Apart from being a religious nationalist party, this party also formed the Badan Koordinasi Silaturahmi Ulama dan Umaroh (Bakosiru), Ikhwanul Muballighin, dan Aliansi Nasional Religius (ANR). Meanwhile, the Gerindra Party formed the Gerakan Muslim Indonesia Raya (GEMIRA) which captured the aspirations of the Indonesian Muslim community. The current Chairman of GEMIRA is Habib Mahdy Alatas.

Fourth, a leadership crisis. Islamic parties in the past (Parliamentary Democracy) had capable, charismatic, idealist, and visionary leadership. Not so with the leadership from Reform era Islamic party. At first hopes were placed on K.H. Abdurahman Wahid and Amien Rais, but instead the two leaders within the party experienced delegitimization. Abdurhaman Wahid was eliminated from PKB due to the
party’s internal conflict. While Amien Rais was also unable to bring PAN as a major party. Instead, since Amien Rais lost in the presidential election competition of 2004, his influence has decreased not only within the Muslim masses, but also within PAN. For a last case, after the conflict in the election of the chairman of PAN at the 2020 PAN Congress, due to his defeat Amien Rais left PAN and will form a new party.

The leadership crisis also occurred in other Islamic parties, PPP, PKS, and PBB. On the one hand, the PPP in the congress tends to have conflict in the election of the General Chairperson. On the other hand, the General Chairperson of PPP is caught in a criminal case of corruption, as happened to Suryadharma Ali and M. Romahurmuziy. Within the PKS body, which was originally considered a solid party, after Muhammad Sohibul Iman was elected in 2015 as PKS President (General Chairman), this party experienced a split. The leadership of Shohibul Iman was not recognized by the Anis Matta group and his friends, who later formed Garbi Ormas (Gerakan Arah Baru) and formed a party called Gelora Party (Gelombang Rakyat). Meanwhile, in the PBB body although there was no internal conflict, under the leadership of Yusril Ihza Mahendra and MS. Ka’ban it is unable to become a magnetic hoist for voters. These two figures are not rooted in the Muslim community grassroot. Instead, in every election PBB always fails to pass the PT (parliamentary threshold) therefore no representatives in DPR, except in the 1999 election which applied ET (electoral threshold).

Fifth, platform and party branding. Islamic parties do have party platforms and programs formulated in its Statutes and Bylaws (AD/ART). However, the problem is that the platform and program have not been formulated in a real and concrete manner, they are still general in nature. Instead, the programs that are presented to the public are in the form of slogans, as in the PPP case, with its slogan "Big House of the Islamic Community". It seems that Islamic parties also tend to follow national parties in making programs in the campaign. This makes Islamic voters unable to, for example, differentiate between political parties related to national and global political issues. As an Islamic party it has a certain position that is consistent from time to time regarding various kinds of public issues (Romli, 2017).

CONCLUSION

The presence of Islamic parties in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim is an unavoidable thing. Especially if there is a doctrine that religion and politics (the state) cannot be separated, but is instead integrated in which religion also includes state and political affairs. Even so, there are also those who interpret the unity of religion and state, but that does not mean there is a need for formalism in the form of Islamic parties. In an effort to uphold Islamic law, political approaches and struggles are not the only way. A socio-cultural approach may also be important and
relevant in the effort to uphold Islamic law.

For Muslims who emphasize the importance of Islamic formalism and then establish Islamic parties. There are not only one Islamic Parties in Indonesia. In the era of Parliamentary Democracy, there were six Islamic political parties which were Masyumi, NU, PSII, Perti, PPTI, and AKUI. In the New Order era, the government required Islamic parties to be in one party which was PPP. During the Reform Era, again, Islamic parties were growing. In the 1999 Election, 17 Islamic parties participated in the election. Every election, new Islamic parties emerge, although some of them do not qualify as election participants. In the 2019 Election, for example, Partai Idaman was established and chaired by Rhoma Irama, an artist known as the King of Dangdut and leader of the Shoneta Malay Orchestra.

The existence of Islamic parties in the elections failed to get the support of Islamic voters. The success story of 1955 Election where Islamic parties received 43.90% votes no longer happened in subsequent elections. During the New Order era, with its repressive policies, the Islamic parties' votes were stunted. Not only that, even the presence of Islamic parties is prohibited. PPP which was originally an Islamic party must be based on Pancasila. The highest votes achieved by PPP during the New Order era was only 29.29% of votes. In the reform era, with its numerous Islamic parties, the cumulative votes gained only reached 38.35%. Votes of this size were because it was combined with the votes for PKB and PAN, which were not based on Islam but were based on Islamic masses, namely NU and Muhammadiyah. If the cumulative votes are reduced and is without PKB and PAN votes, the highest vote of Islamic parties is only 20.55%.

With the decreasing number of Islamic party votes, it can be said that Islamic parties experienced electoral failure. This electoral failure can be caused by several interrelated factors, namely weak institutionalization of the party (internal conflict and lack of roots), the Islamic masses change in its orientation who finds that it is no longer ideological to choose an Islamic party, the existence of an Islamic sub-organization in nationalist parties, a leadership crisis, and the absence of a real program that differentiates it from nationalist parties.

The electoral failures of the Islamic party performance must become a note for its existence in the future. The existence of an Islamic party is very much needed as part of Indonesia's pluralism and diversity. Abolishing Islamic parties in this beloved country of Indonesia is an a-historical act. To overcome the suspicion that an Islamic party will formalize Islam in the state structure, it must be proven by the Islamic party itself that as a legitimate legacy of this republic, the presence of Islamic parties is in order to jointly prosper the people, democratize, eradicate corruption, and realize social justice. The failures of the electoral performance of the Islamic party must be in the context of improving electoral performance in elections, this issue
must be a concern, which is not only at the level of ideas and programs, but in real action.

The leadership crisis that had hit Islamic parties must be corrected immediately. What the Muslim masses need is not a leader who is fake, pragmatic, and corrupt, but a leader that is exemplary, visionary, with integrity, and is rooted in society. If such leader of an Islamic party has not appeared, it will be hard to be able to raise the parties’ electability in every election in the midst of pragmatic and transactional politics. The leader of the Islamic party needs to came forward to show the face of ideal Islamic leadership as practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and Khulafa’r Rasyidin.

REFERENCES


