Hedging Against Giants: Indonesia's Strategy towards India and China in the Indian Ocean

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Abstract
China’s growing military and economic influence in the Indian Ocean has posed security challenges to India as a regional power in the region. As the two countries are competing over hegemony in the ocean, tensions grow and unavoidably create security uncertainties between countries in the region. Located strategically along major sea lanes connecting East Asia and South Asia, Indonesia has a strong interest in keeping the Indian Ocean safe and secure. However, the enduring India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean has posed a threat not only to the Indonesia’s interest, but also the regional peace and security. This article analyzes how Indonesia as a middle power responds to these security uncertainties through hedging. This strategy is primarily aimed at mitigating risks Indonesia faces amid escalating tensions in the Indian Ocean. It is also geared towards avoiding conflict with target states — India and China. The article opens with an overview of the dynamics of India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean. It then examines Indonesia’s hedging strategy towards India and China. It argues that Indonesia prefers to strengthen bilateral relations with India and China through increased cooperation in the maritime sector as part of this strategy. It demonstrates that while the Indonesia-India’s increased maritime cooperation is forged in the area of defense and security, Indonesia enhances engagement with China in the area of economic and infrastructure development.

Keywords:
Hedging; Indonesia; The Indian Ocean; India-China Rivalry; Middle Power

INTRODUCTION
As a country with the largest archipelago in the world located at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia has an important role in the maritime sector to open up opportunities for cooperation with other countries in the region (Mubah 2019). Its position in the Indo-Pacific region is very

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also eager to make their maritime one of the important aspects of their national interests (Pattiradjawane and Soebagjo 2015).

Indonesia and India strengthen strategic partnerships in various important fields such as defense, security, and maritime affairs. India is eager to support the development of Indonesia’s military and defense industries as well as to enhance maritime security to protect its interests at regional and global levels. In addition, India also intends to increase cooperation in the defense sector with Indonesia through funding and technology transfer (Parameswaran 2015). The intensity of Indonesia-India maritime cooperation reached its peak in 2005, which showed an increase compared to previous years. In 2005, there were two important cooperation agreements between Indonesia and India, namely the establishment of New Strategic Partnership and a Memorandum of Understanding on maritime affairs and fisheries (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2005). However, Indonesia is not only increasing its cooperation in the maritime sector with India, but also with China that has the fastest economic growth in the world. China’s economic development is also followed by its progress in the military field, which has in turn, made this country an emerging superpower in the Asia Pacific region.

China’s rapid economic growth is what drives it to meet domestic needs for supply of natural resources, especially energy. To achieve this goal, China carries out a series of economic expansions and exerts its hegemony in various parts of the world such as the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and Africa (Rosinawati and Munabari 2021).

China also has the same vision as Indonesia in the maritime sector: Indonesia has a vision of the "Global Maritime Fulcrum", while China has the "Maritime Silk Road Initiative", which is an inseparable part of the big umbrella vision of this country’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s BRI vision has two main corridors, namely: 1) Land Corridor through the “New Silk Road Economic Belt”. This vision aims to connect China with Europe and Africa through Central Asia and Russia, West Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; 2) Sea Corridor through the “Maritime Silk Road Initiative” which aims to connect South China Sea, Indian Ocean, South Pacific Ocean, Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, and the eastern coast of Africa at various points (Palit 2017).

The cooperation between the two countries is carried out through developing maritime science and technology, increasing tourist visits from China to Indonesia, building power plants, building shipyards, as well as cooperation in the field of fisheries
(Sindonews 2015). The strategic competition between India and China affects the policies made by the governments of both countries and the vision of both countries towards their interests in the Indian Ocean. For India, competition with China in the Indian Ocean is driven by its quest for national pride and identity. India has always considered itself to be the region’s sole major power, including in the Indian Ocean. However, China refuses to recognize this claim (Collin 2019).

In responding to the India-China rivalry, Indonesia implements a hedging strategy against the situation of security uncertainty resulting from this rivalry. Hedging is an alternative strategy to balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing within the framework of the balance of threat theory. This strategy is applied by a state when it feels unsure about the intensity of the threat source. This strategy supports a state to establish a relationship with its partners that cannot be predicted in the future by relying on policies that help improve bilateral relations between them and secure an insurance policy against any future threats posed by these partners (B. F. Tessman 2012).

India and China are currently involved in an escalating conflict in the Indian Ocean (Brewster 2015). China proposed the concept of an integrated sea shipping lane inspired by its past glory through a trade route known as the “Silk Road”. China's proposal, which was later formulated into "One Belt One Road", was not supported by India because this concept was considered politically charged and threatened India’s national security (Hu 2017; Sutrisno 2017). Relations between India, China, Indonesia, and the United States in the Indian Ocean also add to the complexity of the conflict. The United States is an ally of India, which is also at odds with China. Meanwhile, Indonesia is a maritime country in Southeast Asia that is automatically affected by the conflicts of interest of these three major powers. It is undeniable that India and China have also important roles and great interests in the Southeast Asian region (Egberink and Van der Putten 2010). This background has prompted Indonesia to implement a hedging strategy in response to the India-China rivalry. This study demonstrates the nature and patterns of Indonesia's hedging strategy carried out by Indonesia against India is different from what it did with China. While the implementation of Indonesia's hedging strategy against India emphasizes cooperation in the fields of defense and security,
Indonesia’s hedging strategy against China is focused on economic cooperation.

**RESEARCH METHODS**

This study uses a qualitative method with the concept of hedging in international relations as an analytical tool for Indonesia’s strategy in dealing with the escalation of conflict in the Indian Ocean between two great powers that are competing with each other to exert their hegemony in the world. This study used secondary data, which are reference sources in the forms of journal articles, books, and diplomatic activities between Indonesia, India, and China that are documented in the news media. The period of this study started from 2015 to June 2021. The study period was taken since 2015 due to an increase in the tension of relations between India and China as well as an increase in cooperative relations between Indonesia and India as well as China during the President Joko Widodo’s presidency. Bilateral cooperation activities between these countries during this period were then analyzed with the concept of hedging to demonstrate the nature and patterns of Indonesia’s hedging strategy in dealing with the uncertainty of the security situation because of the India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

**The Concept of Hedging in International Relations**

The concept of hedging by most scholars of international relations is used to answer several questions regarding contemporary theory and practice of international relations, such as: 1) How do countries respond to the increase in the strength of other countries that can threaten their national security interests?; 2) When these countries strengthen cooperative relations with a number of major countries as partners, how do these countries anticipate the end of cooperative relations with these major country partners in the future?, and most importantly; 3) How do foreign policy makers address security challenges in a multipolar and uncertain global political environment? (Ciorciari and Haacke 2019).

Hedging is an alternative strategy to balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing within the framework of the balance of threat theory. This balance of threat theory is a critical theory of the balance of power theory positing that a state will always balance the power of other countries that are stronger. However, this balance of power theory cannot explain why there are countries that are not afraid of countries with greater power. Walt gave an example of a comparison between the power of the United States and the Soviet Union in the unbalance cold war era as an argument.
for the weakness of the balance of power theory. Walt argued that what actually happened was that the state did not do the balancing based on power, but based on threats presented by the state considered threatening (Walt 2013). Accordingly, the state is actually doing balancing based on threats against other states that pose bigger threats.

This strategy is carried out by a state when it feels unsure about the intensity of the threat sources. This strategy encourages a country to establish a relationship with partner countries that cannot be predicted in the future by relying on policies that help improve bilateral relations between them and, at the same time, help the country obtain an insurance policy against the threats posed by these partners. Hedging strategy emerged as a relatively new concept in the discipline of international relations to add an important element to the dynamics of the balance of threat theory.

Several scholars have tried to develop different aspects of the concept of hedging in the international relations literature. Hedging strategies can be used in developing relationships among major powers due to future uncertainty (Medeiros 2010). In addition, hedging strategies can also be used by small and medium powers or second-tiers states as a strategic choice to maximize profits and to avoid dependence and conflict on one or more countries that have greater power (Goh 2005). Another more specific use of hedging strategies is as part of a new structural theory to explain competitive behavior among major powers in the contemporary global political scene that tends to be multipolar (B. Tessman and Wolfe 2011). This strategy is effective for middle powers to overcome threats in a multipolar system (B. F. Tessman 2012).

The hedging strategy serves to minimize threats by increasing the influence of countries that implement hedging strategy in response to threats from great powers. There are two types of hedging strategies. First, a hedging strategy that is oriented towards increasing military capabilities to reduce the imbalance of military capabilities against more powerful countries. This includes increasing economic capacity through various means such as maximizing the exploitation of energy resources, increasing the number of trading partners, and acquiring advanced technologies. The second type of hedging is oriented towards finding alternative sources of public goods or subsidies provided by the system leader and initiating the formation of new alliances to deal with uncertainties associated with changing international systems (B. F. Tessman 2012).
The Dynamics of India-China Rivalry in the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is a strategic area for countries that have national interests in the maritime sector. As the third largest ocean in the world, the Indian Ocean separates Asia, Oceania, Antarctica, and Africa. This ocean has a total area of 73.44 million square kilometers and accounts for about 20% of the total area of the world’s oceans. The Indian Ocean region also has abundant natural resources such as minerals, oil, and natural gas. Countries in the Indian Ocean region have more than two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves consisting of 35% of world gas reserves, 60% of uranium, 40% of gold, 80% of gem reserves and various other mining materials (Kaplan 2009). The Indian Ocean has also an important role for the world economy that connects international trade from Asia to Europe. It is a very strategic waters in the 21st century due to the high economic growth of Asia and the increasing need for countries in the region for natural resources to meet domestic needs due to the increasing economic growth of countries in the region (Reddy 2016).

China has built up its economic and political interests in the Indian Ocean region over the past few decades. Middle East and African countries are major exporters of China’s domestic energy needs. Saudi Arabia and Angola provide 33% of total oil imports to China. Russia, Iran, Oman, Iraq and Venezuela have also done the same. To maintain the security of its oil supply, China implemented a strategy known as the String of Pearls. This strategy was not officially issued by the Chinese government, but was coined by several foreign countries to refer to a manifestation of China’s increasing geopolitical influence to improve port access and air traffic, develop special diplomatic relations, and modernize military forces in a region of high strategic value starting along the coastline of the South China Sea, passing through the Malacca Strait, through the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormus (Brewster 2015).

Similar to China, India also has a great interest in the Indian Ocean because of its geographical position in the middle of the third largest ocean in the world. India is also the fourth largest energy consumer in the world after the United States, China, and Russia. India’s top priority in the Indian Ocean is to protect the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), because 95% of India’s total trade uses oceanic sea lanes. Today India has been trying to expand its influence throughout the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy plays an active role in developing security relations aimed at enhancing India’s ability to project its military might and limiting China’s ability to
develop security relations in the region. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015 launched a comprehensive set of Indian government policies in the Indian Ocean. First, India is committed to taking any necessary action to secure Indian mainland and its archipelagic territories and defend its maritime interests; second, enhancing security cooperation with regional partners; third, increasing cooperation related to efforts to improve maritime security and support sustainable development (Zhang and Sun 2019).

The heightening competition between China and India in the realization of their interests in the Indian Ocean region is marked by efforts to increase their influence on other countries in the ocean. For example, China is enhancing its strategic partnership with India’s rival — Pakistan — within the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China also finances investment in Port infrastructure projects in Gwadar, Pakistan; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Kyaukpyu, Myanmar; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Melaka, Malaysia; Kra Isthmus, Thailand (Stanzel 2019). China is also increasing its naval presence and role in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). This condition is exacerbated by India’s rejection of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which India considers a threat to its national sovereignty (Chang 2016).

Against the backdrop of this escalating competition, China outperformed India in the struggle for influence in the Indian Ocean. However, potential conflicts and tensions resulting from the competition between the two countries loom large, considering that India tends to forge alliances with Western countries to counter China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean. For example, India has the potential to enhance its naval cooperation with the United States, France, and Australia by offering some of its naval bases that can be used to replenish the logistics of these countries’ naval fleets or to increase the frequency of further naval cooperation such as joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean (Mukherjee 2018).

Indonesia’s Hedging Strategy towards India

Indonesia’s hedging strategy against India is implemented through enhancing cooperation in the maritime sector. Cooperation between the Indonesian and Indian navies within the framework of the India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (IND-INDO CORPAT) has increased since 2015 marked by a number of maritime development projects such as joint maritime exercises, joint maritime patrols, friendly visits of Indian Navy ships to Indonesia and vice versa, as well as the two countries’ maritime defense and security agreements (Indian Navy 2015; Singh
2018). In December 2016, Indonesian President Joko Widodo paid a state visit to India. The visit was also aimed at increasing maritime cooperation between the two countries. During the visit, a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed under the heading of “Maritime Cooperation” between Indonesia and India with a focus on improving maritime security and promoting maritime industry (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2016).

Indonesia is strengthening maritime cooperation with a number of countries in the Indian Ocean including India through its leadership in IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) in the 2015-2017 period. In the organization’s Summit held in Jakarta in March 2017, the six priorities of IORA cooperation that India rolled out during India’s leadership at IORA in the 2011-2013 period were strengthened by Indonesia as the host, namely: maritime security, trade facilitation and investment, fisheries management, disaster management, academic and technological cooperation, and tourism and cultural exchanges (IORA 2017). Indonesia’s willingness to become the leader of the IORA during this period indicates the country’s great interest in the maritime sector in the Indian Ocean. After all, maritime security in the Indian Ocean is a top priority, which is why it is set at the top of the six priorities of the IORA.

In response to President Joko Widodo’s return visit to India in 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Indonesia in May 2018 on a five-day visit to several countries in Southeast Asia. In his meeting with President Joko Widodo, Prime Minister Modi brought up three important topics of discussion, namely maritime security, China’s potential threat in the Asian maritime region, and increasing trade cooperation (Kaura 2018). In order to realize its Global Maritime Fulcrum vision, Indonesia took the opportunity to further strengthen maritime security cooperation by providing the Indian Navy with strategic access to Sabang Island for the purpose of supplying logistics for its marine patrol operations in the eastern Indian Ocean including Malacca Strait.
Table 1.
The Major Manifestations of Bilateral Cooperation between Indonesia and India in the Context of Indonesia’s Hedging Strategy in the Indian Ocean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s State Visit to India.</td>
<td>The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in the maritime sector under the heading of “Maritime Cooperation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2017</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) High Level Conference (KTT) in Jakarta.</td>
<td>Strengthening maritime cooperation through six priority issues: 1) maritime security; 2) trade and investment facilitation; 3) fisheries management, 4) disaster management; 5) academic and technological cooperation; 6) tourism and cultural exchanges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s State Visit to Indonesia.</td>
<td>- Strengthening bilateral cooperation under the “New Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”; - Agreement on “Joint Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” with the realization of joint naval patrols between Indonesia and India in the Indian Ocean.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Joint Task Force entitled “Development of Connectivity in Aceh and the Andaman-Nicobar Islands”.</td>
<td>- The manifestations of cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, tourism, fisheries, and energy; - Feasibility study of construction and development of Sorong Port by Indian infrastructure and transportation company RITES Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2020</td>
<td>Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto’s visit to India.</td>
<td>Cooperation to increase the capability of Indonesian military defense equipment with the Indian Ministry of Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2021</td>
<td>Joint naval exercises between the Indonesian Navy represented by KRI Bung Tomo and the Indian Navy by the Indian Warship INS Talwar in the Arabian Sea</td>
<td>The realization of increased cooperation in the field of maritime security contained in the six priority issues of the IORA in the form of joint naval exercises to maintain security stability in the Indian Ocean.</td>
</tr>
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In 2019, as a realization of the Joint Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia and India formed a Joint Task Force entitled “Development of Connectivity in Aceh and the Andaman-Nicobar Islands” that aims to facilitate the realization of cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, tourism, fisheries, and energy. As the first step, Indian infrastructure and transportation...
company RITES Ltd has conducted a feasibility study for the construction and development of the Sabang Port (Tempo 2016). The Sabang Port is not only aimed at facilitating connectivity between Aceh and the Andaman-Nicobar Islands. It also serves as a strategic outpost in the Indian Ocean and helps boost Indonesia’s geopolitical leverage in the region (Shekhar 2020).

In July 2020, Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto paid a visit to India to establish cooperation in the defense sector. Together with his partner, the Minister of Defense of India, Rajnath Singh, Prabowo was exploring potential cooperation opportunities to increase the capability of Indonesia’s defense equipment (Wirawan 2020). After all, increasing military capability is part of a hedging effort aimed at reducing the military capability gap between great and middle powers (B. F. Tessman 2012) . In February 2001, the Indonesian warship, Bung Tomo, held joint naval exercises with the Indian warship, INS Talwar, in the Arabian Sea as a realization of increased cooperation in the field of maritime security contained in the six priority issues of the IORA. These exercises were also carried out by India a few months earlier with some other partner countries such as Japan, Russia, Australia, and the United States with a view to countering China’s maritime expansion (The Economic Times 2020).

Differences in Characteristics between Indonesia-India and Indonesia-China Cooperation

From the two tables of cooperation activities between Indonesia-India and Indonesia-China above as the manifestation of Indonesia's hedging strategy, it can be concluded that cooperation between Indonesia and India focuses on defense and security cooperation, especially in the maritime sector. In contrast, Indonesia-China cooperation is more focused on the economic sector. Although Indonesia’s cooperation with India and China are both forged in the maritime sector, the alignment of the vision of the Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum and the China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative is focused on the economy, including infrastructure development, rather than on defense and security. The focus on the fields of defense and security in maritime cooperation between Indonesia and India is due to the common perception of China’s threat that is getting stronger in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea between the two countries. The common perception of the threat prompted the two countries to further enhance maritime cooperation with a focus on defense and security, as reflected in the Indonesia-India bilateral
cooperation activities in the table above, such as cooperation in increasing Indonesia’s and India’s defense equipment capabilities and routine joint naval exercises.

Indonesia and India are also members of the IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association) forum which makes maritime security and safety one of the main pillars of this forum in addition to the economic pillar. Furthermore, in addition to the common threat perception factor, Indonesia and India both project themselves at the representatives of regional powers in their respective regions — Southeast Asia and South Asia — in the current multipolar global order. Another similarity is the fact that the security cooperation carried out by the two countries with the United States is believed not only to help Indonesia and India balance against China, but also increase their power and reputation in their respective regions (Brewster 2011). In contrast to India, the character of maritime cooperation between Indonesia and China is more focused on the economic sector. Indonesia and China see a lot of potential for cooperation that can be maximized through the Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum’s vision and the China’s Maritime Silk Road. The direction of this cooperation follows the five pillars of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, namely: 1) policy coordination; 2) facilities connectivity; 3) unimpeded trade; 4) financial integration; and 5) people-to-people bonds (Chance 2017). These five pillars predominantly aim to increase the effectiveness of economic and trade cooperation between China and other countries in the world by minimizing obstacles that can impede the effectiveness of this cooperation, such as constraints on infrastructure limitations, the integration of economic and finance regulations, and in the long term is the improvement of people-to-people relations. The table of Indonesia-China cooperation above clearly reflects the implementation of these pillars. The absence of bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and China in the field of defense and security owes to the fact that Indonesia considers it more appropriate if cooperation in this field is carried out through the ASEAN multilateral framework rather than through a bilateral cooperation framework, especially through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where China is one of its dialogue partner countries.

The direction of defense and security cooperation within the multilateral framework is believed by the Indonesian government to be more effective in binding China into regional and international norms. Furthermore, Indonesia also encourages ASEAN and ARF to become an open forum for great
powers in the world, including the United States, to actively share its roles in maintaining security stability in the Southeast Asia region. Thus, the escalation of tensions and conflicts in the South China Sea can be reduced by the active presence and role of other great power countries such as the United States in the region (Sriyanto 2018). In addition, since 2003, China has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) together with other ASEAN partner countries. This treaty serves as the basis for the code of conduct that regulates cooperative relations between ASEAN member countries and their partner countries based on the principles of peace in problem solving and mutual respect for the sovereignty and interests of each country. After several incidents of border disputes in the South China Sea between China and several ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, China and ASEAN have also drawn up a Declaration of Conduct to resolve the disputes with more detailed guidelines and peaceful manner as well as mutually beneficial (Munabari 2012).

CONCLUSION

This study analyzes Indonesia’s hedging strategy against India and China as an inevitable policy to deal with the uncertainty of security situation resulting from escalating India-China rivalry, particularly in the Indian Ocean. Using the concept of hedging, this study has presented a series of hedging strategy implementations carried out by Indonesia in the period 2015-2021. As a middle power, the choice of hedging strategy is deemed appropriate by Indonesia as a strategy not only to deal with security uncertainty, but also to cope with the negative consequences of the heightening India-China rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Since the beginning of President Joko Widodo’s administration, hedging has been implemented by promoting increased cooperation in strategic fields such as the economy, including infrastructure development, defense, and security.

There are differences in the patterns and characteristics of the cooperative relationship between Indonesia - India and Indonesia - China. While the cooperation between Indonesia and India is focused on the fields of defense and security, the cooperation between Indonesia and China is more focused on the economic sector and infrastructure development. The focus of cooperation in the field of defense and security between Indonesia and India is mainly due to the similar threat perception between the two countries regarding the increase in China’s hegemony in the world, including in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the two countries are also jointly establishing security cooperation
with the United States to balance against China in areas that are Indonesia's main concern, namely the South China Sea, and in the Indian Ocean that is also the concern of both India and Indonesia. In contrast, increasing cooperation between Indonesia and China as a form of implementation of the hedging strategy is not focused on the fields of defense and security, because Indonesia holds that it would be more appropriate if this cooperation is carried out within a broader framework of cooperation within ASEAN and ARF.

In other words, Indonesia encourages China to manage security challenges, especially in the South China Sea, through a multilateral framework. Moreover, there is a common maritime vision between Indonesia through its Global Maritime Fulcrum and China through its Maritime Silk Road Initiative, which has a lot of potential for cooperation in the economic sector that can be optimized. Although cooperation in many areas within the maritime sector between Indonesia-India and Indonesia-China remains stable, a number of recent studies suggest that there are still challenges and obstacles that need to be addressed to improve Indonesia-India and Indonesia-China cooperation more effectively and with more tangible outcomes. For example, Gopal and Alverdian (2021) argued that the cooperation in the fields of defense and security between Indonesia and India has neither been carried out effectively nor produced tangible outcomes. Similarly, in the context of the Indonesia-China cooperation, Negara and Suryadinata (2019) suggested that although Indonesia and China both share the need to prioritize their maritime sector through the Global Maritime Fulcrum and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative, efforts are still needed to synchronize visions, interpretations, rules and regulations as well as to manage conflicts of interest between the two countries. For this reason, further research is necessary to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of cooperation between Indonesia-India and Indonesia-China in the maritime sector and to recommend strategies that need to be implemented in order to improve this cooperation more effectively with more tangible results.

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