The Solidity of Islamist Parties in Contemporary Southeast Asian Elections: A Comparative Analysis between the Malaysian Islamist Party (PAS) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)

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Abstract
This paper analyzes the solidity of two Islamist parties in contemporary Southeast Asian elections, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia and the Malaysian Islamist Party (PAS) in Malaysia. The aim is to discover the best model of the party solidity, and, in turn, other Islamist parties can adopt the electoral performance of those two Islamist parties. Indeed, each party has its strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is fundamental to compare both of them. Methodologically, this study is qualitative research by employing appropriate literature studies, including news channels and social media platforms as the data collection. The findings demonstrated that PAS' solidity was good in terms of conflict resolution, as it could successfully govern the intra-party conflict between the conservative and the progressive factions. In the meantime, the PKS' solidity tended to have a good performance in the party ideology. Overall, PAS had better performance than PKS.

Keywords: Solidity, Islamist parties, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Malaysian Islamist Party (PAS), Election

INTRODUCTION
In a democratic country, general elections are an arena for political contestation in electing representatives every five years. Surbakti (1992), an Indonesian electoral scholar, defines elections as a mechanism to elect and delegate or transfer sovereignty to a trusted person or party. From another point of view, elections mean an essential part for the people to practice their freedom by the principles of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution (Moertopo 1974). Meanwhile, elections are also understood as a political mechanism to articulate the aspirations and interests of citizens (Napitupulu 2004). In other words, elections are one of the mechanisms for electing representatives of the people to implement democracy in a sovereign state. As one of the principal pillars of democracy, many countries have practised elections, and Indonesia and Malaysia are no exception. These two neighbouring countries, in terms of elections, are similar in their party...
systems, especially in the multiparty approach.

One year after President Suharto stepped down from power in May 1998, democratic elections were held with the participation of seven of the twenty-four political parties involved. The seven political parties include the Golongan Karya Party (GOLKAR), the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), the Democratic Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (Bland 2019; Budiardjo 2006, p. 454). PKS is among the Islamic parties that keep on to have significant influence and bargaining power in every general election to this day.

PKS has existed since its establishment of preaching activities in the 1980s carried out by campus activists such as ITB, UGM, UI, IPB, UNPAD, UNDIP, UNAIR, and other universities. The student movement is better known as the tarbiyah movement. In further years, the youth decided to form a political party named Justice Party (PK) on July 20, 1998 (Burhanudin 2012; Furkon 2004; Noor 2012). After participating in the 1999 democratic party, PK was in the seventh position, having votes of 1,436,565, equivalent to 1.36% of the total votes. Accordingly, it did not pass the 2% threshold regulated in Law No. 3 of 1999 on General Elections (Faiza 2019; Yumitro 2013). This condition has encouraged party cadres to develop new strategies by joining other parties with the same purpose and ideals. Furthermore, PK merged with a new symbol and name of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to participate in the 2004 election and had the opportunity to gain a parliamentary seat (Basyir 2014).

However, since the 2019 elections, PKS has often faced internal conflicts triggered by friction in leadership succession at the central board to elementary conflicts in the realm of ideology (Budge et al. 2010; Paturahman 2016). For example, there were two opposing parties at that time: the Justice Faction (Faksi Keadilan) and the Prosperity Faction (Faksi Sejahtera). Within the Faksi Keadilan, there are so-called conservative groups within PKS, including Shura Council Chairman Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, PKS President Sohibul Iman, and his followers. Meanwhile, the opposing faction gathered young cadres. Anit Matatta is a crucial actor in this group who carries the idea of PKS becoming a modern and nationalist party (Muchtar and Aliyudin 2019; Priohutomo et al. 2019). Although the offer eventually received opposition from the old PKS elite.

As a result of this internal split, approximately 300 PKS cadres resigned officially or unofficially. These cadres include all administrators in Bali Province, some cadres in DKI Jakarta, and West Java (Jawapos.com, 2018). Internal divisions in the PKS elite are not the only cause of some PKS cadres resigning. Some of them left this Islamic-based party because of their policies that violated the law, such as having to sign an integrity pact as proof of loyalty to the party. This obligation was strongly opposed by Luqman, Chairman of the DPD PKS Advisory Council from Mojokerto Regency who has been a loyal cadre of PKS since the party was first
established in 1998 (Budianto 2018). Some of the cadres who left PKS chose to establish a new party called Gerakan Arah Baru Indonesia (Garbi), which later changed its name to the People’s Wave Party (Gelora). Annis Mata and Fahri Hamzah are the main political actors behind the establishment of this political party. Gelora Party carries the ideology of nationalism, which is thus in contrast to PKS, which tends to be ideologically right-wing (Mawardi 2018). Similarly, placing Pancasila as a basic principle in the Gelora Party has made this PKS splinter political party more inclusive for various groups, not solely for Muslims (Hakim 2020).

The conflict in the PKS elite, which resulted in the resignation of several cadres, did not make PKS lose solidity in facing every election. In the 2019 elections, Hidayat Nur Wahid, one of PKS’s important figures, believes that the party can gain 61 seats in the 2019-2024 period House of Representatives. His confidence was based on the results of the PKS internal quick count (Dalimunthe 2018) as well as from the Litbang Kompas as of 18 April 2019. In the final calculation of the 2019 election votes, PKS obtained 11 million votes, equivalent to 8.21 per cent, which also meant seating 50 of its cadres in parliament (Farisa 2019).

Meanwhile, Malaysia owns a party concerned with Islamic ideology as popular as PKS named Partai Islam Se-Malaysia or The Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). It used to be the community of ulama within the UMNO party specified as the Department of Religious Affairs and Education. Considering the vital position of ulama among Malay Muslims, United Malays National Organization (UMNO) involved them due to their essential role in preparing for Malaysia’s independence (Ibrahim 1981). However, the religious members decided to found a new party because of different factions, nationalists and Islamists, later known as Party of Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), on November 24, 1951 (Kassim 2017). The ulama held three times meetings before the PAS was officially established. The three critical decisions taken at the first conference included the separation of the ulama organization, the establishment of a short-term committee for the establishment of the party, and the pursuit struggle to form a religious organization as part of the Federation of Malaya (Hasyim 1993).

PAS is also known to be part of the government opposition. PAS’ coalition is called Sejahtera in which three other political parties joined, namely Barisan Jemaah Islamiyah in Malaysia, Partai Cinta Malaysia, and the Malaysian National Alliance Party (New Straits Times 2017). According to PAS’ official website, the political party has gradually risen in votes since 1990. Currently, PAS has gained public trust, especially in Kedah, Perak and Selangor.

Similar to PKS, PAS also experienced internal divisions due to ideological contestation that split it into two opposing factions. The two factions are conservative and professional. The conservative faction is known to be pro-ulama, while the professional espouses progressive and democratic ideas. Mohamad Sabu, formerly PAS Vice President was among the key figures in leading the professional faction. He
developed the group which founded Partai Amanah, a democratic Islamic party on 16 September 2015 (Saat 2018; The Star Malaysia News 2015).

There are two main factors for PAS’ vote slump. Firstly, the division within the party elite in 2015. This factionalism is a repeat of a similar incident in 1970. Despite having a base in Malaysia’s largest Muslim community, PAS’ internal conflicts have had a significant impact on party solidity, especially in binding all members ideologically (Pas.org.my 2018; Saat 2018). The conservative faction of PAS, for example, was led by the late Asri Muda who split from UMNO. Meanwhile, when the party was under the control of Abdul Hadi Awang, the professional faction experienced a split from the ulama.

Secondly, PAS does not have a strong statesman figure, despite giving support to Mahathir Muhammad to attract more votes for PAS (New Straits Times 2018). In addition, PAS decided to be part of the Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Harapan coalition. Meanwhile, political parties need a grand coalition to have a more significant chance of winning elections, as is the strong tradition in parliamentary systems. Therefore, the Amanah Party, which promotes inclusiveness towards non-Muslims, good governance, and human rights, finds common ground with the spirit of Pakatan Harapan, with Mahathir Muhammad as its leader of political combat.

This research, therefore, aims to reveal the similarities between PKS and PAS, both in terms of the party’s ideology that promotes Islam, the experience of internal conflict that split into two opposing factions, and the establishment of new political parties (Gelora and Amanah) from former cadres of the two parties. Meanwhile, there are two differences between these two Islamic parties. Firstly, the electoral systems of Malaysia and Indonesia are different. On 17 April 2019, Indonesia’s election implemented an open proportional system, as mandated by Law No.7/2017 article 168. Malaysia’s election on 9 May 2018, on the other hand, applied the first-past-the-post system where the winner of the election would immediately drop the other candidates. This system is known as the winner-take-all method. Second, how these two political parties address and resolve internal conflicts, especially on solidarity between cadres. In particular, this research also compares the readiness and solidity of PAS and PKS for 2018 Malaysian and 2019 Indonesian Legislative Elections.

**Party Solidity, PKS and PAS**

Several previous studies related to party solidity and cohesion, party ideology, party institutionalization, and internal and external dynamics of the party serve as references for this research. Randall and Svåsand (2002) outlined four main indicators of solidarity: system, value infusion, decision autonomy, and reification. Meanwhile, Noor (2012, p. 349) in his study of political party cohesion, especially Islamic political parties in relation to party institutionalisation Noor revealed that parties have a significant chance of maintaining cohesion if more parties are institutionalised in decision-making.
Furthermore, he also revealed how the effectiveness of internal conflict resolution mechanisms, systematic regeneration programmes, and commitment to party values are the pillars of party cohesion. In line with that, Trianggorowati and Al-Hamdi (2020) explained that the loyalty of party cadres and sympathisers are two significant influences in determining party votes. This is none other because both play an important role in winning the democratic contestation.

Meanwhile, in the context of a study of ideology in PKS, Hidayat (2012) concluded that this Islamic party relies on ideological interpretation as the main source of popular trust and to deal with moderation. In contrast, Bashir (2014) asserted that political parties with Islamist backgrounds, such as PKS, tend to ignore party ideology because they often raise populist issues for practical political purposes. PKS is seen as an open party with a different ideology. From another perspective, Machmudi (2008) said that PKS has interpreted its party function to fit socio-political conditions with Islamic ideals. Thus, PKS’s goals are justice, social welfare, and political stability for all Indonesian people. Meanwhile, Saidin’s comparative study (2018) proves that Amanah, a party founded by former PKS cadres, pragmatically recognises important elements of democracy and individual freedom from an Islamic perspective.

In terms of PAS, this political party has long been known for its conservative tendencies when one of its political struggles is the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia). Therefore, the study by Besar, Basori, and Ghani (2020) found that PASS was unsuccessful in gaining support from non-Muslim voters, especially those living on the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia.

Concerning the institutionalisation of political parties, a study by Permata (2008) found that institutional influences are inevitable for the rational behaviour of any political actor. Therefore, it further affects the difference between PKS ideology and the actual behaviour of PKS politicians. The study of the impact of ideology on PKS political behaviour applies the neo-institutionalism perspective formulated by Douglas C. North. In affirming the institutional perspective of the party, Harjanto (2011) reveals that a well-institutionalised political party will develop recruitment and regeneration capacity. This allows political parties to become reliable contributors to leading figures. Similarly, another study from Anawati and Al-Hamdi (2020) which focused on PKS and the 2014 Legislative Elections, revealed that PKS was relatively stable to maintain institutional consolidation. Therefore, in 2014, PKS crossed the parliamentary threshold with a vote of 6.79% but fell 1.09% from the previous legislative election.

The last study is on the internal and external dynamics of the political parties. Munandar (2011) explains that PKS’s capacity for collective action has proven their increased vote in the 2004 elections. Meanwhile, Nurdin (2019) conducted a study on PAS’ views on democracy and their efforts to implement democratic rules in recruiting members and leaders. In his study, it was mentioned that PAS uses the Usrah method in member recruitment
deliberations to create loyalty and integrate Islamic values as the basic ideology. In another study of PAS and PKS in the 2013 Malaysian election and the 2014 Indonesian election, Nurdin (2015) found that several similar issues such as corruption, ethnicity, and the Islamic State emerged before the elections in both countries. In addition to these issues impacting the performance of PAS and PKS, the study also revealed that PAS and PKS could survive and follow democratic procedures well, by making elections a forum for channeling people's aspirations.

RESEARCH METHOD
This research employs a comparative method to analyse the application of the concept of solidity between PAS and PKS. As a part of the critical method, this study draws on a wide range of social phenomena and human behaviour. Comparative political analysis is commonly used in initiating theory development since its quantitative methods of analysis and its ability to reflect and conjecture (Holt and Turner 1970; Marsh et al. 2002). In addition, this research can present a systematic explanation by providing descriptions and classifications according to certain parts through qualitative methods. The approach applied focuses on visual and textual data, takes detailed procedures in data analysis, and builds various designs (Creswell 2013). This method, therefore, was also applied to extract data and information on the performance of PAS and PKS in each of the Muslim-majority countries in the Southeast Asian region.

The research itself also employs a case study, especially on the 2019 Indonesian and 2018 Malaysian elections. A case study, in this study, is an approach that investigates and understands an event by collecting various relevant information to be researched to obtain solutions to the possibilities that occur (Creswell 2013).

In the research, primary data was collected from online news of mainstream media such as Kompas.com, CNN Indonesia, and Straits Times News, including Media Centre Malaysia as the main media. The official websites of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) were also applied as initial data references. Secondary data was collected from the Indonesian Election Commission (KPU) and the Malaysian Election Commission/ Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (SPR), election survey agencies, journals, and other relevant scholarly texts. Documentary studies were applied to data collection. After the data were collected, descriptive analysis was applied through four stages, namely, data collection and processing, data selection, analysis between variables, data verification, interpretation, and conclusion drawing (Al-Hamdi et al. 2020). The results of this study contain reliable quoted data and data analysis exposure.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Procedural Leadership
Decision-Making Mechanism
The mechanism of PAS and PKS to make a decision is different. PAS implements Muktamar according to PAS Constitution Amendment 2011 Chapter III Article 7(2). In the meantime, PKS puts Shura Council to hold the highest authority
among others councils as 2014 PKS Articles of Association Chapter VI article 13. The details are delivered below.

There have been two opposing factions in PAS since the 1900s, often heard in terms of the old and the young. The old is more traditional and conservative, while the young are more modernist and progressive. However, those who tried to change PAS from its conservative attitude were the ones who were eventually side-lined and even eliminated as the results of the Muktamar 61 in Kuala Selangor. The reformists were given two options to decide whether to remain loyal and willing to accept defeat or retreat from the party and create a party—the reformists preferred the second option. Therefore, the progressive group agreed to form a new political party on September 16, 2015, under the name AMANAH (Sopi and Jaafar 2018). Many policies contradict the two parties because AMANAH concentrates on justice and governance, whereas PAS emphasizes applying Islamic criminal Law in Kelantan and beyond (The Straits Times 2015).

Meanwhile, the decision-making of the Shura Council of PKS is carried out through consensus or deliberation (Muktamar), but if both are unsuccessful, PKS will consider voting (Ghafur and Saifudin 2020; MPP PKS 2008). The vote is usually taken to change a cadre’s position. The deliberations are held in the same manner as meetings in other organizations. Some cadres can have different views, opinions, and responses during the discussion since it is a forum for evaluating party policies and various programs (Munandar 2011).

However, PKS’s liability in using deliberation has been challenged by the case of factions. Prosperous faction cadres resigned, triggered by the PKS action that fired Anis Matta’s loyalists via short message without following the legal procedural AD/ART. PKS began to clean up the party aggressively since Anis Matta ended his leadership in 2015. It worsened with the party integrity pact asking PKS cadres to give their signatures (Bayhaqi 2018).

The PKS clean-up involved Fahri Hamzah, a senior PKS cadre from the prosperous faction. He was a PKS cadre currently holding a position in the House of Representatives of the Indonesia Republic. As he left the party, his role in parliament would be replaced by a justice faction cadre. Furthermore, Fahri fought his dismissal through the legal channels of Article 27 Paragraph 3 and Article 43 Paragraph 3 of Law Number 19 of 2016 concerning Amendments to Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) and/or Article 311 KUHP and/or 310 KUHP (Aji 2018). Fahri Hamzah won twice against PKS and defended his position until the end of parliament (Damarjati 2018).

Both cases concluded that although PAS’s internal conflict has existed for a long time, its procedural leadership in decision-making still has ethics, patience, and legal mechanism through Muktamar 2015. Meanwhile, the Shura Council of PKS’s mechanism fired its cadres was not by the Law. PKS must go through a legal process to officially select a cadre because a political party is a legal entity.
Charismatic Figure

The evidence depicts that PAS’s charismatic figure points to Abdul Hadi Awang, whereas PKS owns Anis Matta Abdul. Hadi Awang has become a figure who defends PAS’s conservative ideology from people with a different vision, namely the progressive, modernist group. He even decided PAS to separate from the PH coalition after the 2013 election but still won seats in parliament. Thus, Abdul Hadi Awang has become a figure performing great service to PAS by keeping the identity of PAS as an Islamist conservative-nationalist party for many years. He also championed the Hudud bill into becoming Law (New Straits Times 2016). Besides, he has been active in both national and international movements, as he was inaugurated as an expert in the office of Harmonizing Islamic Movement based in Istanbul, Turkey (Nor 2009). Moreover, he has written dozens of books related to politics and Islam.

On the other hand, PKS’s charismatic figure is referred to as Anis Matta because he could maintain the party’s electability during two election periods from 2014 to 2019. When PKS was hit with bribery by the former president of PKS named Lutfi Hasan Ishaaq in 2013, Anis and his party gained the votes above the threshold of 6.79% in the 2014 election (Anawati and Al-Hamdi 2020; Badan Pusat Statistik 2019). He conquered better achievement during the 2019 election since PKS could increase votes by 8.62%. This study considers Anis Matta’s campaign strategies effective, consisting of lifetime Driving License (SIM); motor vehicle tax abolition; protection of ulama, religious leaders, and religious symbols; and tax abolition for people with an income of up to IDR 8 million. The campaign strategy adopted by Anis Matta is under the PKS self-image with the slogan “Serving the People” (Astuti 2018).

Furthermore, he was promoted by the party to become one of the nine presidential and vice-presidential candidates from PKS to advance in the 2019 Legislative Elections (F. Hidayat 2018). Even though during his leadership, there were two factions in PKS, he was able to act pretty and give these two factions a portion with an equal percentage. Unfortunately, after Anis’ leadership was over, PKS, controlled by the justice faction, tried to rid the party of cadres supporting Anis.

Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Conflict Prevention

According to PAS Constitution Amendment 2011 Chapter III Article 8, usrah and the Shura Council are the tools or institutions for conflict identification. Usrah is the first action plan to settle disagreement or division (Nurdin 2019). Meanwhile, PKS created a peaceful and unified atmosphere for the party by implementing the halaqah. Noor (2015) stated that halaqah is considered an essential element, so the regeneration department in each local management must guarantee its sustainability. Apart from halaqah, PKS believes that heated conflicts can be reduced by deliberation of the Shura Council.

Since the Shura Council of PAS ratified the cancellation of the political partnership agreement with DAP in
the post-2013 election, the internal PAS tensions have been increasingly relentless until the establishment of AMANAH (Amanah.org.my 2017). The decision of the Shura Council has caused the conflict to be larger, splitting the party. However, the positive impact from the conservative PAS perspective is the purge of the party from the opposite group considered to interfere with PAS in achieving the traditional faction goals.

Like PAS, the Shura Council of PKS also plays a role in reducing tension and maintaining party balance. Unfortunately, Halagah and the Shura Council under Salim Segaf Al-Jufri are deemed unable to prevent the conflict and inevitable divisions between the justice and prosperous factions (Taylor 2018). If both methods are carried out with reasonable efforts, the PKS’s institutional integrity will also be nurtured.

Conflict Resolution
The existence of faction’s results from disparities in values, approaches, and priorities reconciled between party members. In PAS and PKS, opposing factions emerged as the mismatch and point of view consequences between cadres in terms of the methods used by the party to achieve its goals. Comparing one of these Islamist parties, only PAS correctly solved such a problem based on Law.

Two internal factions have triggered a problem within PAS, the conservative faction with PAS senior figures such as Abdul Hadi Awang and the progressive group pioneered by Fadzil Mohd Noor and Nik Abdul Aziz Nik. The advanced group wanted to bring PAS continuing its works with the People’s Justice Party (PKR) and Democratic Action Party (DAP), affiliated with the PH coalition. However, the conservative faction refused because it considered those parties to have crossed the PAS ideology (Amanah.org.my 2017) and accused the opposite faction of being wala’ (loyal to the enemies), a hypocrite and a betrayer. Then the progressive faction was purposely eliminated by Abdul Hadi Awang at Muktamar 2015. In brief, the progressives became uncoordinated. Since then, each of them stands on their party with different concepts, and PAS eventually returns to its conservative-nationalist origins (Jan 2018). Hadi Awang responded to the split members that splinter groups would not last very long (Malaymail.com 2015).

Regarding PKS conflict resolution, its internal conflict refers to Fahri Hamzah’s dismissal that does not seem an individualistic conflict but a factionalist one. Central Level Management of PKS argued that Fahri carried out actions not reflecting the value of PKS (Akmar 2019). The following is the classification of PKS accusations against Fahri Hamzah:

1) Fahri Hamzah’s character and identity in politics and his opinion in the media were rude and incompatible with the party identity.
2) Fahri Hamzah did not heed the party’s instructions regarding signing the revised KPK Law. Even statements in the media
regarding changing the KPK Law contradicted party decisions and instructions; public officials defamed the party’s name.

3) Fahri Hamzah disobeyed the leadership’s decision played with PKS officials because, at first, he was willing to resign, then later refused. Moreover, he refused to leave the DPR by taking massive acts of resistance and treason, mobilizing internal cadres and other people to join his opposition in a structured and systematic manner.

4) Fahri Hamzah threatened the party chairman by saying he would consult lawyers and constitutional experts.

However, there were irregularities in dismissing Fahri Hamzah, namely, (1) Irregularities in the request to resign; (2) Irregularities in the BPDO examination; (3) Irregularities in the trial of the Qodho Council on January 28, 2016; (4) Irregularities in the new party guidelines; and (5) Irregularities in media operations and socialization of structures (Akmar 2019).

Fahri took extreme action to prosecute PKS. Those charged were the President of PKS Shohibul Iman, the Head of Sharia Council Surahman Hidayat, the Deputy Head of Shura Council Hidayat Nur Wahid, Abdul Muis, and Abi Sumaid. Fahri also demanded that they restore his good name (Erdianto 2018). Moreover, Fahri Hamzah won against PKS in three stages of judgments. First, his lawsuit in the South Jakarta District Court was granted. Second, the decision before was confirmed by the Jakarta High Court. Third, his victory was won at the cassette level of the Supreme Court (Saputra 2020).

Based on the conflict management related to the Fahri Hamzah, PKS has not been able to handle its internal conflict, so in this case, PKS has failed to resolve the dispute. Fahri Hamzah’s dismissal was not based on the mechanism for changing the leadership of the member parliament, which refers to the MD3 Law. Thus, the role and function of the Party Court were ineffective because it was adequately standardized.

Systematic Regeneration
Regeneration Mechanism
Similar to conflict prevention, in terms of regeneration mechanism, PAS holds on usrah, while PKS stands with halaqah. PAS began to broaden its recruitment in the 1980s when Malaysians became familiar with it. While its top leaders still maintain their face-to-face approach, PAS also bases its energies on hiring members from the university, mosques, madrasahs, and Islamic boarding schools. PAS recruiting tactics are inspired by the Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun method in Egypt. The aim usrah meeting is to organize and encourage PAS members to learn, establish and support the party ideology. PAS applies the da’wah goal to three categories: leaders and party members, Muslims in general, and non-Muslims for recruiting members (Nurdin 2019).

PAS offers coaching to keep party members’ integrity and
influence Muslims and non-Muslims to be part of the party. The *usrah* is held periodically, involving PAS elites to enclose all members among the party (berita.pas.org.my 2019). Mostly, the implementation of *usrah* cannot be separated from religious advice as Abdul Hadi elaborated his Islamic assertion to *usrah* members (malaysiakini.com 2016). To illustrate, the table below is the list of PAS members and former PAS members before some became pioneers of the AMANAH party.

**Table 1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Internal Party Position / Legislative / Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Raja Bahrin Shah</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Kuala Terengganu Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dr. Sulaiman Abdullah</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former PAS Assemblyman of Ladang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ustaz Roslan Ismail</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former PAS Assemblyman of Bukit Besi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ustaz Aziz Abas</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former PAS Assemblyman of Jerteh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Syed Azman Syed Nawawi</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former PAS Batu Buruk Assemblyman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hasbie Muda</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former PAS Youth Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mohamad Sabu</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former Deputy President of PAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Salahuddin Ayub</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former PAS Youth Chief and Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dzulkefly Ahmad</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Former member of Kuala Selangor Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Abdul Hadi Awang</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>President of PAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Fadzil Mohd Noor</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Former President of PAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>12th Menteri Besar of Kelantan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nasharudin Mat Isa</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Former Deputy President of PAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Minister of Environment and Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Awang Hashim</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ahmad Yaakob</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Former Assemblyman of Kelantan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Saiful Bahari Mamat</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Former Assemblyman of Terengganu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mohd Shukri Ramli</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Former Assemblyman of Perlis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ghapar & Razali (2017),

Meanwhile, the regeneration mechanism of PKS is managed according to the PKS AD/ART. Article 9 Paragraph 4 states that six regeneration levels are divided into two types. The first is named fostered members, encompassing novice and young members. The second type is core members, consisting of intermediate, adult, and expert members. To upgrade to a higher membership level, cadres must attend several training and activities.

PKS requires its member candidates to take part in party orientation training. *Halaqah* is the leading institution for PKS regeneration in which there are informal activities such as *Riblah* (physical activity), *daurah* (incentive study), *mabit* (overnight activities to improve spirituality), and seminars (Noor 2015). Referring to the phenomenon of the internal conflict of the PKS before the 2019 election, this study presents a table of differences in regeneration position between the two periods. First, the 2010-2015 period when Anis Matta officially replaced Luthfi Hasan Ishak as the PKS
President. Second, the 2015-2020 term and Sohibul Iman from the period when Anis Matta ended his justice faction took over the post.

**Tabel 2.**
Comparison between the Justice and the Prosperous Factions on Several Strategic Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Internal Party Position/ Legislative/Ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hilmi Aminudin</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>Head of Shura Council of PKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>President of PKS 2010-2013 Deputy Chairman of the DPR 2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Muhammad Anis Matta</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>PKS President 2013-2015 (Replaced by LHI) Deputy Secretary-General for Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fahri Hamzah</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>Communication, Deputy Chair of the DPR for the 2014-2019 period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mahfud Siddiq</td>
<td>Prosperous</td>
<td>Secretary-General Chairman of Commission I DPR RI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hidayat Nur Wahid</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Chairman of the Faction 2009-2014 Deputy Chairman of the MPR for the 2014-2019 period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Tifatul Sembiring</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Minister of Communication and Informatics 2009-2014 Member of the Central Advisory Council Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Moh Sohibul Iman</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Chairperson of the DPR 2013-2014 (replaced Anis Matta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Salim Segaf Al-Jufri</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Minister of Social Affairs 2009-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jazuli Juwaini</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Head the DPP for Economic Development and Entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Period of 2015-2020 |
|---------------------|------------------|
| 1                   | Salim Segaf Al-Jufri | Justice Faction | Head of Shura Council |
| 2                   | Surahman Hidayat  | Justice         | Head of Central Sharia Council                           |
| 3                   | Moh Sohibul Iman  | Justice         | Party President                                            |
| 4                   | Untung Wahono     | Justice         | Secretary of the Shura Council                            |
| 5                   | Tifatul Sembiring | Justice         | Head of MPR RI Faction                                    |
| 6                   | Jazuli Juwaini    | Justice         | Head of Faction DPR RI                                    |
| 7                   | Ledia Hanifah Amalia | Justice         | Head of Employment, Farmers and Fishermen Affairs       |
| 8                   | Abdul Muiz Saadih | Justice         | Head of the Organizational Discipline Enforcement Agency  |
| 9                   | Muhammad Anis Matta | Prosperous     | Head of International Cooperation                        |
| 10                  | Fahri Hamzah      | Prosperous      | Not involved in the Management of the DPP                |
| 11                  | Mahfud Siddiq     | Prosperous      | Not engaged in the Management of the DPP                 |

Source: Akmar (2019)

Based on the table above, when Anis Matta was in office, the percentage of the two PKS internal camps was balanced. However, after changing leadership, justice faction cadres tended to dominate the critical PKS positions under the auspices of Sohibul Iman. Being the next generation of PKS, cadres need another approach besides the
following *halaqah* instead of involving a large group such as the justice faction.

**Political Recruitment**

Each party must have differences in political recruitment, so do PAS and PKS. Firstly, PAS determines to keep Muktamar at national and district stages as the platform to facilitate as many members as possible to participate in elections (Nuradin 2019). Party leaders such as the Youth, the Muslim, and the Scholar Councils are elected through Muktamar annually. PAS Constitution Amendment 2011 Chapter V Article 19 states that each year before the national Muktamar, several branches and factions in the country hold local elections. It indicates that electoral processes have been applied at federal and local levels to appoint party leaders where all members enable to have equal opportunities as leaders.

Secondly, PKS has formulated additional requirements from previous periods and has caused controversy under the legal experts since it is considered a dictatorship and violates the Law. Although Indonesian elections have been regulated in legislative candidates in Law No.8 of 2012, PKS had three additional special requirements in the 2014 election for cadres who wanted to volunteer: no legal record, have no morality defects and have a relatively stable family (Anawati and Al-Hamdi 2020). In the 2019 election, the controversial requirements covered an integrity pact and a letter of willingness to resign for legislative candidates. Fahri Hamzah responded that many prospective legislative candidates chose to leave because they had to sign those documents (Bayhaqi 2018).

Asep Warlan Yusuf, an expert on Constitutional Law from Parahayang University, stated that political parties could not arbitrarily dismiss cadres who sit in parliament. He assessed that PKS was also considered inconsistent with democratic principles because parliament members have immunity rights regulated by the constitution, while rules issued by the PKS are the same as putting aside people’s votes since the election of legislative members is based on the people, not on political parties. Interim replacement can only be carried out if the parliament member is proven to have violated the applicable Law (Aji 2018). Regarding the explanation above, the conflict related to controversial conditions for registering legislative candidates gives this study insight that PKS requires a more comprehensive understanding of Law and proper ethics to deal with legislative candidates.

Commitment to Shared Values/Ideology

**Party Platform**

Ideology and platform are two core that characterizes and identify a political party. Several parties in Indonesia and Malaysia have each feature in various ideologies and platforms. For example, Golkar and UMNO are nationalist parties, while PAS and PKS are Islamist parties. Since the inception of PAS and PKS due to Islamist ideology, it has led them to use da’wah as their platforms.
Da’wah is the central core of PAS’s struggle to realize its goals. Abdul Hadi Awang mentioned that if PAS could hold the balance of power as an opposition party, he would bring Islam into the political policies as he planned to enforce Islamic Criminal Law (straitstimes.com 2015; Japantimes.co.jp 2018). PAS has become the place of aspiration for Malaysian Muslims since it split from UMNO. The effort to realize those aspirations is by participating with other parties to get a seat in parliament. PAS could win Muslims’ votes, especially in Kelantan and Terengganu, by combining da’wah into politics and providing political education to the community (Nurdin 2019).

In line with PAS, PKS runs and implements da’wah or the Islamic teaching among the cadres and societies as the Introduction of 2014 PKS Articles of Association and Chapter 1 article 2(1). It mentions that PKS’s principle is Islam, which concerns Qur’an and Sunnah. Furthermore, the Chairman of the DPW PKS in Gorontalo Province, Adnan Entengo, emphasized that the improvements to increase enthusiasm as a da’wah party must be carried out by prioritizing the implementation of da’wah (Priohutomo et al. 2019).

According to its legal document, PKS used da’wah because it is considered an effective method to gain people’s aspirations as they need to have listened regarding Muslim necessity. The research also discovered the other perspective possible to recognize regarding the advantages of using da’wah as a party platform. First, it could select and consolidate the cadres. Second, the platform used could attract numerous voters of Indonesia and Malaysian, especially from religious groups.

**Cadre Commitment**

To evaluate PAS and PKS commitment, it is significant to consider the Islamists as a political party and a social movement with the relevant institutions to develop cadres and leaders and mobilize grassroots effectively. PAS cadre commitment is strengthened and weakened by youth movements (Liow 2011; Pas.org.my 2017). On the contrary, PKS practices ideological infusion approaches to tie the cadres tightly (Anawati and Al-Hamdi 2020).

The youth of PAS contributed an important part to social mobilization, such as the transition to the Ulama law in 1982 and the victories in the 1999 and 2008 elections. To strengthen the cadre commitment, PAS youth is reminded to be clear about the objectives of the struggle and be sure of PAS’s basis (Pas.org.my 2017b). However, the mobilization process has also led to internal conflicts and high tensions within the party, particularly between two factions (Liow, 2011). Both groups have committed to spreading Islamic values in public policy, but there is a mismatch between them, especially in formulating methods and strategies to achieve their goals (Jan 2018). Thus, it caused PAS’s separation, and another faction formed AMANAH in 2015. Since then, they have become a rival in the 2014 election. Therefore, PAS could gain solidity with the highly committed cadres after the progressive faction took steps away from the party.
Besides, PKS has carried out several activities to strengthen the party using ideological infusions through halaqah for regular cadres and usrah for the elite party level. Although PKS has an ideology infusion program, many PKS cadres decided to remove their membership and join Garbi. It happened because they did not benefit from any decisions and policies of the Shura Council, and their opinions were also ignored. The justice faction demands justice. Most strategic positions have been occupied only by the prosperous faction in the PKS Executive and the Legislative Institutions at both region and center levels (Akmar 2019). Thus, it resulted in the low commitment of PKS cadres. The development of ideological infusion is supposed to be successful if all cadres hold the same ideology.

CONCLUSION

Based on analysis from numerous Indonesian and Malaysian news reports, this article indicates that in the 2018 Malaysia and 2019 Indonesian Legislative Elections, PAS had a superior performance than PKS in dealing with the issues of factional and internal conflicts based on four indicators: procedural leadership, well-managed conflict resolution mechanisms, regeneration systems, and a solid commitment to shared values and ideologies. The analysis unveiled that, even though PAS successfully solved the problem legally between the conservative and progressive factions by implementing the 2015 Muktamar, it lacked conflict preventing the party from being united. Despite PKS’s excellent performance as a party platform, its downsides comprise conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and cadre commitment. Da’wah is an excellent platform to attract Muslim voters, but the PKS’s handling of conflict, especially party split, needs much improvement. Therefore, this research deduces that PAS has a better performance than PKS.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors express sincere gratitude to the Research and Innovation Institute (LRI) Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia, for providing a generous fund of this research under the grant number 20/RIS-LRI/II/2022. Special thanksgiving is addressed to Dimas Subekti who managing technical issues.

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