Cleric Depoliticization of the NU Pesantren in Former Karesidenan Surakarta at the New Order Era (1971-1997)

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Abstract: The study aims to explain the dynamics of the political life of NU pesantren ulama (clerics) in the Former Karesidenan Surakarta during the New Order era (1971-1997). The New Order regime attempted to maintain power and created political stability tends to use a repressive approach. One of the social groups that gained political pressure from the New Order regime was the NU pesantren ulama. The New Order Government assessed them as an interested social group seeking to uphold Islamic law and anti-government policy. NU pesantren ulama had experienced political pressure in the various situation in the Former Karesidenan Surakarta. It started from the regulations (Permen No. 12 the Year 1969 and PP No.6 the Year 1970) to the act of political intimidation ahead of the New Order election. From 1971 to the 1997 election, the New Order Regime tried to marginalize the NU Pesantren Ulama’s political role at the grassroots level. The New Order’s repressive policies made NU pesantren ulama in former Karesidenan Surakarta did some acts of experimentation to save the NU Organization and their NU pesantren survival. One of their activities is through the Khittah NU 1984, which provided personal freedom for NU pesantren ulama to choose their political affiliation. The conclusion of this paper shows that the New Order Government is an anti-political party regime that is ruling with an authoritarian approach.

INTRODUCTION
This article describes the strategy practiced by the New Order regime as an attempt to marginalize the political role of the NU pesantren ulama (the Islamic boarding school of NU ulama) in the former Karesidenan Surakarta from the 1971 to the 1997 elections. In this context, the New Order regime was known as a political regime that wanted political stability (Yulianto, 2002). Political stability was required during the New Order era, in order to ensure successful development (Crouch, 1999, pp. 276-277). However, democratic life has in practice been sacrificed by efforts to create political stability. During that time, citizen participation in political party, for example, is tightly controlled by the state. In this case, a hegemonic state was purposely created by the New Order regime. The aim is to prevent grassroots political forces from emerging that interfere with their interests (Hikam, 1999, pp. 276-277; Gonting, 2015).

The pesantren ulama who are affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama organization (NU) are a social group with authority and strong political influence at grassroots level (Anam, 2010). As an elite, the role of the ulama in a multi-faceted society. They are not only religious leaders, but are also capable of becoming a political elite (Zaman, 2002, p. 2). The political role of ulama pesantren NU as an elite was of considerable merit in the quest for the establishment of this country. Together with the NU organization, which was founded in 1926, pesantren ulama were actively involved in determining the direction of state politics, both in the Old Order era and in the New Order era (Haidar, 1999, p. 21).

Reading the strong political power of the NU pesantren ulama above, this was taken into account by the New Order authorities. In the former Karesidenan Surakarta, there were dimensions created by the New Order rulers wary of the political potential of NU pesantren ulama. Second, Islamic religious leaders who had the authority and significant political power at the grassroots were the NU pesantren ulama. Second, pesantren ulama are the figures who mobilize the NU jamaah and jamiyyah known to have a support base in the villages. This is the reason why the New Order regime saw the NU pesantren ulama as a political actor who needed to be watched out for (Fealy, 2009, pp. 43-45). Based on the context of the background above, this paper will focus on the issues of how the strategies carried out by the New Order authorities in marginalizing the political role of pesantren ulama in the former Karesidenan Surakarta during the implementation of the New Order elections (from the 1971 election to the 1997 election).

There have been many studies examined historically about discrimination and social conditions during the New Order era, some of these studies are among others; Abdullah (2013) examined the development of Islamic education in Indonesia from a historical perspective from the colonial period to the New Order era. Joebagio (2012) through the historical method described the relations between political groups in the religious-political power system of Javanese society. Ulama as people’s representatives have a consequence that every public policy needs the approval of the ulama. The political system takes the same form as descending of power. Zaiyardam and Lindayani (2017) examined economic policies of injustice which reveal that the lives of poor farmers have greatly lost their land, fields, forests and forests that have been achieved by the state and capitalists during the reign of the New Order and Reformation era 1970-2010. Darmawan et al. (2018) examined narrative expression in history learning textbooks for Senior High Schools published in the New Order and Reform era as ideology, this study revealed that material that has disappeared and appears in different versions in history school textbooks cannot be separated from the influence of interest. government or we call it ideology in history textbooks. The present study seeks to take stance from the aforementioned studies, this explains the dynamics of political life of the NU Ulamas (clerics) in the Surakarta region during the New Order regime of 1971-1997. The New Order regime in its attempt to maintain power and create political stability tends to use a repressive approach.

METHOD
This article is constructed based on the historical research method which has four operational steps: Heuristics, the process of searching and collecting data. The data used in this paper consist of written historical sources and oral history sources (interviews). Written historical sources include archives, newspapers and books. The oral historical source was conducted through interviews. Informants are historical actors selected from among the NU pesantren ulama scattered in the former Karesidenan Surakarta. They are (1) KH. Abdul Rozaq Shofawi, leader of Pesantren Al-Muayyad, Mangkuyudan, Surakarta, (2) KH. Dian Nafi, leader of Pesantren Al-Muayyad Cabang Windan, Kartasura, Sukoharjo, (3) KH. Abdul Hamid, founder and leader of Pesantren As-Salafiyah An-Najah, Dawar, Boyolali, (4) KH. Abdul Aziz Mahfuf, founder and leader of Pesantren Mambaul
NU PESANTREN ULAMA COMMUNITY GROWTH

The presence of the NU pesantren ulama community during the New Order era can be traced through the track history of the pesantren development. Likewise, the existence of the NU pesantren ulama community in the former Karesidenan Surakarta during the New Order era cannot be separated from the development of the pesantren. The world of pesantren has become a space for the regeneration process of NU pesantren ulama (Dhofier, 1984, p. 18). In the context of the former Karesidenan Surakarta, the existence and development of the NU pesantren ulama community during the New Order era can be traced through two channels. First, the religious education pathway was organized by the ulama of the Kasunanan Palace through the existence of the Madrasah Mambaul Ulum (Islamic formal school). Second, religious education organized by pesantren ulama scattered outside the palace walls. Several well-known pesantren ulama at that time were among others KH. M. Mansyur, Popongan, Klaten, KH. Umar Abdul Mannan, Mangkuyudan, Surakarta, and KH. Sirodj, Panularan, Surakarta. A new generation of pesantren ulama who lived in the New Order era would emerge through these two paths (Alam, 2017).

In the former Karesidenan Surakarta region, the ulama have a great contribution to the birth of the NU pesantren ulama during the New Order era was KH. Umar Abdul Mannan (1937-1980). KH. Umar Abdul Mannan is the second-generation leader and educator of the Mangkuyudan Islamic Boarding School, Surakarta after the death of his father in 1937. At that time, Umar Abdul Manan was still 21 years old and had replaced his father’s position as head of the Pesantren. For 43 years, KH. Umar Abdul Mannan devoted his life to his dedicated students as a scholar (Baidlowi, 1991, p. 41). The results of his upbringing from the 1980s to the 1990s had appeared new Pesantren Ulamas scattered in various regions in the former Karesidenan Surakarta. They were: (1) KH. Habib Ihsanudin, leader and educator of the Mangkuyudan, Surakarta, (2) KH. Minanul Aziz Shatori, founder and leader of the Al-Istiqlomah, Kartasura, Sukoharjo, (3) KH. Abdul Karim Ahmad, the founder of the Al-Najah Islamic Boarding School, Boyolali, (4) KH. Dian Nafi, the principal of the Al-Muallimah Student Islamic Boarding School, Windan Branch, Sukoharjo, (5) KH. Ismail Thoyib, the founder of Pesantren Al-Istiqlomah, Kartasuro, Sukoharjo, and finally (6) KH. Abdul Rozaq Shofawi. In addition, there are several other NU pesantren ulama, such as KH. Abdul Aziz Mafuf, founder of the Mambaul Hikmah Islamic Boarding School, Wonogiri, KH. Abdul Hamid, founder of the An-Najah Dawar As-Salafiyah Islamic Boarding School, Boyolali, KH. Mukhlis Hudaf, founder of the Mambaul Hikmah, Ceper, Klaten and KH. Muthi Ali, founder of the Nurul Hikmah Islamic Boarding School, Mojogedang, Karanganyar (interview with Nafi, 8 June 2020).

DEPOLITICIZATION OF NU ULAMA (1971 ELECTION AND 1977 ELECTION)

The New Order regime had restructured political life since coming into power in 1968. To promote the development projects, the New Order authori-
ties desired the creation of a sustainable political order. Because of this, as in the Old Order era, the New Order authorities did not want the supremacy of political parties to return (Crouch, 1999; Mas’oed, 1989). From 1966 until before the 1971 election, the New Order regime gradually strengthened its political base. Its political strategies were, such as: (1) restructuring political law packages that benefited the New Order regime (Notosusanto, 1985, pp. 44-45); (2) Strengthening the function and position of Golkar as a government party (Kholil, 2009, p. 7). (3) Placing ABRI and the bureaucracy as supporting instruments for winning Golkar. All of these political measures for the New Order were directed towards winning Golkar in the 1971 Election. Another step that was no less strategic for Golkar’s victory in the 1971 Election was issuing regulations for civil servants (PNS) not to become party members (Permen No.12 of 1969) and New Order Government regulations stipulating that civil servants must be monoloyalty to Golkar (PP No.6 of 1970) (Nurhuda, 2008).

Facing the 1971 Election, the implementation of Permen No. 12 of 1969 and PP No.6 of 1970 regarding the monoloyalty obligations of civil servants to Golkar caused turmoil among NU Ulamas with civil servant status in the former Karesidenan Surakarta. During this period, there were several Ulama with civil servant status (generation from 1960 to early 1970s). They become civil servants in the Ministry of Religion. Being a judge, extension officer, leader and teacher. They initially became civil servants in the Ministry of Religion because, due to the NU Party which received the privilege. At that time, NU politicians always held the position of Minister of Religion (Kholil, 2009, p. 7). It was easy to understand that many civil servants in the Ministry of Religion had come from among the members of the NU. However, since the New Order regime released a PNS Regulation not allowing Golkar to engage in politics and mandatory the monoloyalty, many NU ulama with civil servant status were becoming victims of depolitical partisisation. They were forced to be loyal to Golkar and received sanctions if they did not obey. The New Order regime also built a stigma, for civil servants who were disloyal to Golkar were suspected of being sympathizers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This was one of the political pressures received by NU Ulama with civil servant status in the former Karesidenan Surakarta to support Golkar in the 1971 elections (interview with Ihsanudin, 29 July 2020).

There were many ulama from NU pesantren with a civil servant position in the former Karesidenan Surakarta who fell under the political pressure of the New Order regime. They are including KH. Umar Abdul Mannan, the head of the Al-Muayyad Islamic Boarding School, Mangkuyudan, who was also a religious judge in Surakarta, KH. Ismun Usman was indeed the head of the Department of Religion, Sragen Regency (Wiwik, 2012, p. 29). KH. Ali Mukhson, the leader of the Al-Hikam Islamic Boarding School, Banyudono, who became a civil servant religious teacher in Boyolali Regency, KH. Damsiri Mudzakir became a religious instructor in Karanganyar Regency, KH. Syaibani Ilham, the founder of the Pesantren Darussalam Pucangan foundation, Kartasura became a religious teacher in Sukoharjo Regency, KH. Lukman Suryani became a religion teacher in Sukoharjo Regency and KH. Habib Ihsanudin, the principal of Pesantren Al-Huda, Doglo, was a religion teacher in Boyolali Regency. In the 1971 elections, all NU pesantren ulama with civil servant (PNS) status were forced to support Golkar. This political pressure caused several pesantren ulama NU with civil servant status in the former Karesidenan Surakarta to split into two groups. First, pesantren ulama NU who became Golkar voters. Second, pesantren or Islamic boarding school ulama who remain at NU (interview with Mahfuf, 4 July 2020).

KH. Umar Abdul Mannan assessed that the political policies of the New Order Government in the 1971 Election had harmed NU. As a form of criticism towards the New Order ruler, KH. Umar Abdul Mannan in the 1971 election, deliberately made many kites with NU images. After it was finished, he ordered the small children around his pesantren to play the kites. The goal is that by flying the kite, the surrounding community knows that the NU party still exists (interview with Ishom, 11 July 2020). In Boyolali, KH. Habib Ihsanudin and KH. Ali Mukhson, who were the civil servants did not want to follow monoloyalty rules and remained loyal to NU. Both were willing to accept sanctions from the New Order government. However, before the 1977 elections, both of them only received warnings from their superiors (interview with Mukhson, 2020). The results of the 1971 Election in all of former Karesidenan Surakarta, Golkar won an absolute victory with votes above 50%. Meanwhile, the acquisition of Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti) slumped with votes below 20% (Archives of Central Java KPU).

Golkar’s single majority victory in the 1971 Election added to the belief that the New Order regime strengthened its power. One of the strategies
is controlling the emergence of political parties through the simplification (fusion) mechanism of political parties. In 1973, the New Order authorities encouraged Islamic parties (NU, PSI, Parmusi, Perti) to fuse and then gave birth to a new party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). The aim of the New Order authorities was to avoid religious ideology from becoming a state. In addition, it made it easier for the New Order state to control the political power of Islam (Ismail, 2017, p. 155). Similar cases were also carried out by nationalist party camps, such as the PNI, Parkindo, the Catholic Party, IPKI and the Murba Party combined with one party, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) (Yulianto, 2002, pp. 283).

After the 1973 party fusion, the political affiliation of the majority of NU pesantren ulama in the former Karesidenan Surakarta turned to support PPP. The reason is that PPP was a party established to fight for the aspirations and interests of Muslims. Because of this, most of the ulama of the NU pesantren in the former Karesidenan Surakarta were eager to develop this party. They were KH. Habib Ihsanudin (Boyolali) who felt happy that PPP could unite the interests of Muslims. He should support and grow the party. KH. Habib Ihsanudin later became one of the ulama of the NU pesantren who participated in declaring PPP Boyolali in 1973. Other Islamic boarding school ulama (pesantren ulama) hold the same political views, including KH. Ali Mukhson (Boyolali), KH. Abdul Hamid (Boyolali), KH. Haris (Sragen) and KH. Idris (Wonogiri). However, there were ulama with other views who do not agree with NU’s fusion to PPP. One of them is KH. Syaibani Ilham (Pesantren Darussalam, Sukoharjo). He argued that joining NU to PPP would only lead to new conflicts. The fusion of NU to PPP was only the political strategy of the New Order rulers to weaken the political power of Islam (interview with Ilham, 15 July 2020). The success of the New Order regime in simplifying political parties through the party fusion mechanism meant that the following New Order elections were only attended by three contestants. (1) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), (2) Golongan Karya (Golkar) and (3) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) (Kholil, 2009, p. 17).

In the 1977 Election, the New Order rulers again carried out political engineering for Golkar’s victory. The birth of Law No.3 of 1975 was one of the efforts of the New Order to secure Golkar’s victory. The political law provides provisions for the simplification of parties (PPP, Golkar and PDI) as well as closes the emergence of new parties. In addition, the political law was deliberately drafted to limit political parties from competing with Golkar. Such as limiting the PPP and PDI structures to the district/city level. The goal was to cut off political communication between the party and the mass supporters at the grassroots. Thus, Golkar’s position will benefit from socializing party programs at the grassroots. In the run-up to the 1977 general election in Surakarta, New Order administrators were faced with the emergence of the seeds of political Islam, particularly Darul Islam (DI) congregation activities. This Islamic organization is driven by Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar and Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. These two Islamic figures openly criticized the political policies of the authoritarian New Order regime. Besides that, the ideals of their struggle are to completely enforce Islamic law in Indonesia. The form of his lecture which was agitational and harshly criticized the New Order regime, Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar was detained and released after the end of the 1977 Election (Solahudin, 2011, p. 140).

The case experienced by Abdullah Sungkar is a lesson for the NU pesantren ulama in Surakarta to be careful in politics. The repressive actions of the New Order authorities against these Islamic groups showed that political Islam was positioned as a movement that had the potential to threaten the stability of the country. Reflecting on the case of Abdullah Sungkar, KH. Umar Abdul Mannan preferred to be impartial, not to be interested in practical politics. Maintaining personal safety and the survival of the pesantren are his priorities. KH. Umar Abdul Mannan in the 1977 Election referred to the fiqh principle of Ahlusunnah wal Jamaah which reads: dar’ul mafasidi muqoddamun ‘ala jalbil masholih. This means that avoiding danger took precedence over obtaining goodness (Haidar, 1994, p. 9).

Unlike KH. Habib Ihsanudin and KH. Ali Mukhson, in the 1977 Election remained on the political path by becoming PPP campaigners. During the campaign of the two NU pesantren ulama of Boyolali, they did not show a provocative anti-government attitude. This method was to avoid repressive actions by the New Order Government. They put forward their religious approach in order to attract the masses from among the nahdliyin (NU communities). The two NU pesantren ulama were motivated to fight for the interests of the people through PPP. They were more motivated after the issuance of the fatwa of Rois Aam PBNU who was also the General Chairperson of Majlis Syuro PPP, KH. Bisri Syansuri, who stated that it was the duty of muslims to choose PPP in the 1977 Election.
In reality, KH Bisri Syansuri’s political fatwa did not significantly affect the PPP’s number of votes in former Karesidenan Surakarta. Given that sociocultural society in this area was not the santri community basis. This can be seen from the vote acquisition in the 1977 election, Golkar again won an absolute victory. Further details could be seen in this table 1.

**Table 1. Number of votes on 1977 Election in Former Karesidenan Surakarta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>PDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surakarta</td>
<td>17.22%</td>
<td>51.06%</td>
<td>31.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonogiri</td>
<td>5.12%</td>
<td>79.84%</td>
<td>15.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukoharjo</td>
<td>11.27%</td>
<td>48.95%</td>
<td>39.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaten</td>
<td>20.33%</td>
<td>46.37%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyolali</td>
<td>26.43%</td>
<td>56.12%</td>
<td>17.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanganyar</td>
<td>8.69%</td>
<td>62.36%</td>
<td>28.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sragen</td>
<td>15.39%</td>
<td>48.91%</td>
<td>35.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KPU Central Jawa archive

In the world of party politics, the majority of NU pesantren ulama in the 1980-1990s generation in the former Surakarta region did not become PPP politicians. There are reasons that make them choose not to be active in practical politics. First, the authoritarian New Order policy towards NU pesantren ulama. The NU pesantren ulama are aware that the New Order regime was a repressive political regime towards its political opponents. In the 1980s, the New Order regime’s repressive political policies towards Islamic politics were getting stronger, including towards NU ulama who were known to be supporters of PPP. For example, before the 1982 elections, KH. Habib Ihsanudin, principal of the Al-Huda Islamic Boarding School, Doglo, Boyolali (civil servant status) who was a member of the parliament from the PPP (1977-1982 period) was summoned by the minister of religion in Semarang. In the summons, KH. Habib Ihsanudin was told to choose to remain a civil servant or become a PPP politician. KH. Habib Ihsanudin preferred to become a PPP politician and at that time he was dismissed as a civil servant without receiving a pension (interview with Ihsanudin, 26 July 2020). KH. Ali Mukhson, the principal of the Al-Hikam Islamic Boarding School, Banyudono, Boyolali, is a civil servant but in the 1977 elections he was sanctioned not to receive a monthly salary for two years (1982-1984). These were some of the political pressures experienced by some of the NU pesantren ulama with civil servant status in the former Karesidenan Surakarta ahead of the 1982 Elections. The depoliticization of the NU pesantren ulama was one of the factors in securing Golkar’s position as the winner of the single majority (interview with Mukhson, 27 June 2020).

Second, the PPP’s internal conflict. Since its establishment in 1973, the presence of the PPP is supposed to become a political platform for mus-
lims, but unexpectedly on its journey it also encounters internal conflicts. The cause of conflict between factions, especially between NU politicians and Indonesian muslim politicians, regarding the distribution of seats that will later sit in parliament. It is this internal party conflict factor that makes the majority of NU pesantren ulama in the former Kerajinan Surakarta not interested in joining party management or becoming PPP politicians in the regions (Haris, 1994, p. 35). This political reality is one of the reasons why KH. Rozaq Shofawi, the principal of the Al-Muayyad Islamic boarding school, Mangkuyudan, Surakarta, has become disinterested in politics. He tends to follow the political stance of his late uncle, KH. Mianul Aziz Shatori, the principal of the An-Najah Islamic Boarding School, Gondang, Sragen, KH. Abdul Karim Ahmad, the principal of the Al-Quraniy Islamic Boarding School, Tegalsari, Laweyan, Surakarta, KH. Dian Nafi, the principal of Al-Muayyad Student Islamic Boarding School, Windan Branch, Kartasura, Sukoharjo, KH. Ismail Thoyib, the principal of the Al-Istiqomah Islamic Boarding School, Kartasuro, Sukoharjo, KH. Abdul Aziz Mahfuf, the principal of the Mambaul Hikmah Islamic Boarding School, Selogiri, Wonogiri and KH. Abdul Hamid, the principal of the An-Najah Dawar As-Salafiyah Islamic Boarding School, Boyolali (interview with Nafi, 27 June 2020).

In December 1983, the NU Alim Ulama National Conference was held in Situbondo, East Java. The National Conference resulted in two important decisions: (1) Restoring the Khittah NU 1926, and (2) strengthening Pancasila as an organizational principle (Karim, 1994). The results of this decision were then confirmed at the 27th NU Congress in Situbondo in 1984. Based on the context of politics at that time, the Khittah NU 1926 decision had a strategic value in re-establishing the authority of the ulama and saving NU’s future (Nuh, 2004, p. 151). The important meaning of the Khittah NU 1926 decision was the affirmation of the ulama’s political stance that NU’s jamiiyyah were no longer tied to any political party, PPP was no exception. This means that NU’s jamiiyyah returns to its original identity as a socio-religious organization (jamiiyyah diniyyah ijtimaiyyah). Furthermore, NU is no longer organizationally tied to any political party or community organization. Ulama and NU members were given the freedom to channel their political aspirations to any parties. The famous slogan after NU’s Khittah at that time was NU nowhere, but everywhere. This is the political middle ground taken by the NU pesantren ulama when they are faced with the risk of facing pressure from the New Order regime (Marjani, 2012, p. 138-139).

The decision to return to the Khittah NU 1926 in 1984 made the ulama NU pesantren in the former Surakarta region gain autonomy in channeling their political aspirations. As well as making it easier for them to interact with all circles of society without having to look at their political affiliations. The changes that began to appear after the Khittah NU in 1984, some pesantren ulama began to openly build communication and relationships with government and military officials (both at the central and regional levels). The relationship between the NU pesantren ulama and the government elite in practice brings benefits between the two. On the one hand, NU pesantren ulama who are good at taking advantage of the opportunity to be close to government officials will make it easier for them to obtain material assistance and facilities. This can be used for the benefit and welfare of the NU’s fellows. On the other hand, the NU pesantren ulama who did not join Golkar did not get material benefits. The reason they are not interested in supporting Golkar is because of their dislike of the way the government is trying to win the election (Habib, interview, June 2020).

For the New Order regime, the Khittah NU 1926 decision in 1984 was the right moment to approach the NU pesantren ulama joining Golkar in the 1987 election. Moreover, it was accompanied by a political fatwa from Rois Aam PBNU, KH. Ahmad Siddiq, who said that there was no obligation for NU residents to vote for PPP and it was not sin (haram) to vote for Golkar and PDI. This fatwa was widely spread among ulama and NU’s fellows in connection with the systematic effort to crush PPP. Therefore, on various occasions leading up to the 1987 Election, regional government and military officials were increasingly enthusiastic about attending major events held at Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). The goal is to take a political approach so that NU pesantren ulama will turn to support Golkar. For example, government and military officials do not miss visits to various Islamic boarding schools at large Islamic events which are generally attended by large numbers of people. Such as recitation of haul and recitation of Islamic holidays. In its development, the personal approach of government and military officials to the NU pe-
In the 1987 election, it was the New Order government's efforts to approach PPP figures from the ulama element of the NU pesantren that intensified. As the story experienced by KH. Habib Ihsanudin, the principal of Pesantren Al-Huda (Doglo, Boyolali) ahead of the 1987 General Election. On the occasion of the event in Semarang, he met Mbak Tutut (Siti Hardijanti Rukmana), President Soeharto's eldest daughter, who was actively conducting political safaris at various Islamic boarding schools in Central Java. In his meeting with Mbak Tutut, he was persuaded to join Golkar. He is given a blank check to write himself how much money is needed for the development of his pesantren. He declined the offer of conditional financial assistance. Personally, he did not fit Golkar's methods of winning the election. Moreover, he felt reluctant to leave PPP, which he has been fighting for since the 1977 elections (interview with Ihsanudin, 12 July 2020).

The different political attitudes shown by KH. Rozaq Shofawi, after the Khittah NU 1984, the principal of the Al-Muayyad Islamic Boarding School, remained consistently inactive in practical politics. In the 1987 Election, he remained open in communication with government and military officials. However, he does not mean that he supports Golkar. His standpoint about Khittah NU was this khittah provides flexibility for the NU pesantren ulama in establishing communication with any groups, including government and military officials. The middle way political attitude adopted by KH. Rozaq Shofawi was also followed by KH. Minanul Aziz Syatori, the principal of Pesantren An-Najah, Gondang, Sragen), KH. Abdul Aziz Mahfuf, the principal of Pesantren Mambaul Hikmah, Selogiri, Wonogiri, KH. Dian Nafi, the principal of Pesantren Al-Muayyad in Windan branch, Kartasura, Sukoharjo, and KH. Isma'il Thoyib, a principal of Pesantren Al-Istiqomah, Kartasura, Sukoharjo (interview with Nafi 24 June 2020).

Through the support of the bureaucracy and the military, the results of the 1987 General Election, Golkar, once more retained their position as the winner of the single majority throughout the former Karesidenan Surakarta. Further details could be seen in table 2.

Golkar's fantastic vote result above 70% showed that the 1980s New Order regime was at its peak. No political power in Indonesia at that time was able to match the power of the New Order Regime. According to KH. Haris, the leader of Pesantren ulama before the 1987 election was packaged in the form of political safari activities. In practice, this covert Golkar campaign strategy carried out by government and military officials was effective in getting Ulama to support Golkar. The fact is that several NU pesantren ulama in the former Karesidenan Surakarta want to join Golkar. NU pesantren ulama who switched to support Golkar would receive financial assistance for the advancement of their pesantren (interview with Haris, 21 July 2020).

The following are some of the NU pesantren ulama in the former Karesidenan Surakarta who changed their political affiliation to Golkar in the 1987 Election. They are KH. Ali Mukhson, the principal of Pesantren Al-Hikam (Boyolali). He was willing to accept the invitation from the Boyolali Regent, Moh. Hasbi (1984-1994 period) joined Golkar. In his political view, joining Golkar has more benefits for the progress and welfare of NU members than any other party. Since he joined Golkar, it is easy to get development funding assistance from the government for the development of his pesantren and madrasah. Starting in the 1987 Election, he became a campaigner for Golkar in Boyolali Regency. KH. Syaibani Ilham, founder of the Darussalam Islamic Boarding School Education Foundation, Kartasura, Sukoharjo. He is willing to join Golkar after confirmation is made that the banyan tree party will support its Islamic dakwah activities (interview with Ilham, 21 July 2020). However, there are NU pesantren ulama in the former Karesidenan Surakarta who dared to criticize the arrogance made by the New Order government in the lead up to the 1987 elections. The arrogance of the New Order regime referred to was the forms of the covert Golkar campaign carried out at the NU Pesantren. Generally, government officials invited to attend what the Pesantren hold will be used for the Golkar campaign. There is an interesting story experienced by KH. Mukhlis Hudaf, the principal of Pesantren Mambaul Hikmah (Ceper, Klaten) ahead of the 1987 Election. He dared to criticize Golkar's covert campaign carried out by local officials. The story is, Boyolali Regent, Moh. Hasbi (1984-1994 period) was invited by KH. Idris (Kacangan, Boyolali) to attend the Haul Syadzilliyah recitation. However, this recitation program was used by the Boyolali Regent for the Golkar campaign. This has made him unhappy with Golkar. According to KH. Mukhlis Hudaf, the recitation event held at the pesantren, is not appropriate to become a political arena. KH. Mukhlis Hudaf assessed that in the 1980s the New Order rulers were very strong in de-
santren Al-Alawy (Sragen), he thinks that Golkar’s fantastic victory cannot be separated from a lot of manipulation and fraud during the voting. He witnessed many polling stations in Sragen regency without witnesses from PPP and PDI attendances. They were intimidated by local military officers or they wanted to be paid for Golkar’s victory. According to him, New Order politics was bonsai politics. In terms of political parties other than Golkar, such as PPP and PDI are intentionally left alive but cannot become big parties. According to him, with this election model, Golkar will always win. This is what made him not interested in joining Golkar (Haris, interview, 12 July 2020).

Elections filled of intimidation and pressure on their political opponents remain a precedent for the implementation of the 1992 Election. On the one side, the public is apathetic about the 1992 election results. In their discourse, Golkar is confirmed to be the winner again. As happened in the former Karesidenan Surakarta, Golkar’s political domination has occurred again. Further details on 1992 Election Vote result in former Karesidenan Surakarta could be seen in table 3.

The experiences of the New Order elections, from the 1971 Election, the 1977 Election, the 1982 Election, the 1987 Election and the 1992 Election, seem to be only a stamp of re-validating the power of the New Order regime. The strong hegemony of the power of the New Order regime did not leave way for the construction of a true democratic party. The resounding achievement of Golkar in the 1992 elections is no longer big news in society (Soon, 2008).

The implementation of the 1997 Election was not much different from the previous New Order elections. The New Order regime continued to show its arrogance in power. As an example of the politics of yellowing (painting various public facilities in yellow) by the Surakarta City Government, the community views it as a form of Golkar’s covert campaign ahead of the 1997 Election. In this case, the Surakarta PPP management (DPC) protested through white-ization (repainting white). The political polemic between the Surakarta City Government and the Surakarta City DPC PPP was unavoidable and each took legal action. On the other hand, ahead of the 1997 Election, the ulama of the NU pesantren affiliated with the PPP, such as KH. Muthi Ali (Karanganyar) is still under surveillance from the local security apparatus. He was intimidat-ed not to carry out a PPP campaign in his neighborhood. Meanwhile, the NU pesantren ulama in former Karesidenan Surakarta are no longer enthusiastic about being involved in the political power stage (Ali, interview, 11 April 2016). Not long after,

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**Table 2. Number of votes on 1987 Election in Former Karesidenan Surakarta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>PPP’s Number of Votes</th>
<th>1987 Election</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>PDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surakarta</td>
<td>14,55 %</td>
<td>54,65 %</td>
<td>30,80 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonogiri</td>
<td>1,38 %</td>
<td>96,15 %</td>
<td>2,47 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukoharjo</td>
<td>10,06 %</td>
<td>73,45 %</td>
<td>16,49 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaten</td>
<td>15,81 %</td>
<td>73,70 %</td>
<td>10,49 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyolali</td>
<td>15,70 %</td>
<td>73,70 %</td>
<td>9,02  %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanganyar</td>
<td>6,00 %</td>
<td>82,36 %</td>
<td>11,64 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sragen</td>
<td>11,35 %</td>
<td>79,36 %</td>
<td>9,29  %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KPU Central Jawa archive

**Table 3. Number of votes on 1992 Election in Former Karesidenan Surakarta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Party’s Number of Votes</th>
<th>1992 Election</th>
<th>Golkar</th>
<th>PDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surakarta</td>
<td>15,16 %</td>
<td>49,06 %</td>
<td>35,78 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonogiri</td>
<td>3,36 %</td>
<td>87,52 %</td>
<td>9,12  %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukoharjo</td>
<td>11,58 %</td>
<td>60,19 %</td>
<td>28,23 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaten</td>
<td>19,05 %</td>
<td>51,02 %</td>
<td>29,93 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyolali</td>
<td>18,31 %</td>
<td>63,26 %</td>
<td>18,43 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanganyar</td>
<td>8,27 %</td>
<td>66,82 %</td>
<td>24,91 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sragen</td>
<td>11,33 %</td>
<td>67,10 %</td>
<td>21,57 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KPU Central Jawa archive
the New Order regime rejoiced in celebrating Golkar’s victory, mid-1997 the economic and monetary crisis hit Indonesia. From the economic and monetary crisis, this was the initial sign of the fall of the New Order regime which had been in power for 32 years (Tobing, 2013, p. 12).

CONCLUSION
The New Order regime saw the NU pesantren ulama as not only religious leaders, but the political elites as well. In fact, the religious authority claimed by ulama can be used for political purposes. It stands to a reason, if the New Order regime placed the NU pesantren ulama as a social group that was waried of their political roles. During the New Order elections, the New Order authorities actively depoliticized NU pesantren ulama through various means. Such as making policies on caretakers’ discriminatory political regulations and the use of repressive politics. The goal is depoliticalization and depoliticization of ulama at the grassroots.

In the former Karasidenan Surakarta, the strategy of depoliticizing NU pesantren ulama has been carried out since the 1971 Election. Through political regulations (Ministry Regulations No. 12 of 1969 and PP No. 6 of 1970) the New Order regime forced civil servant NU ulama to support Golkar. This non-populist political regulation was deliberately designed to win Golkar. Another New Order political engineering for Golkar’s victory was through party fusion policies. Islamic parties are combined in one party called PPP. The aim is to control the political power of Islam. Heavy political pressure made the NU pesantren ulama choose to take a middle course through the Khittah NU decision. The consequence was that NU as an institution was no longer involved in practical politics and gave its citizens the freedom to choose political parties according to their conscience.

From the 1987 Election to the 1997, the political life of the NU pesantren ulama in the former Karasidenan Surakarta was divided according to the party he chose. Ulama from the NU pesantren close to Golkar are reluctant to get government assistance. On the other hand, NU pesantren ulama who do not support Golkar remain marginalized. Thus, the depoliticization strategy carried out by the New Order regime against ulama at the NU pesantren in the former Karasidenan Surakarta has created two political typologies of ulama. First, idealist ulama who are consistent with the Islamic party (PPP). Second, pragmatic ulama who tend to be opportunistic take advantage of opportunities to make a profit.

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