Space Politics and Policies: Chinese-Javanese Ethnic Segregation in Parakan and Integration Effort

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Abstract: This study aims to describe the history of the dynamic relationship between Chinese and Javanese in Parakan, Temanggung Regency, Central Java. The method used is the historical research method which consists of four stages. These are heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The study used qualitative analysis with a phenomenological approach. The ethnic Chinese-Javanese relationship in Parakan had ups and downs, especially during the colonial period until after the G30S incident. As a minority group, the Chinese were often racially discriminated against. Discrimination and negative sentiment are also driven by the inequality of socio-economic conditions between Chinese-Javanese. Moreover, the state, through various regulations, has contributed to strengthening this segregation, in the form of space politics and policies. That is, Parakan City is divided into two sub-districts, Parakan Kulon (Kauman) and Parakan Wetan (Chinatown). The colonial government also contributed to the existence of a different socio-economic stratification, prioritizing the ethnic Chinese as a higher stratum. This construction was preserved until the New Order era. These differences created disharmonious relationship, often ending in conflict. Moreover, the exclusive and elitist attitude were held by most of the ethnic Chinese. Some of these things eventually become the inhibiting factors for the integration process of perfect segregation. In the end, the eternal Javanese sentiment with the Chinese ethnicity hindered the process of recognizing the same national identity. Even there is an integration effort.


INTRODUCTION
The expansion of trade routes, especially the silk route, provided a new direction for the development of society in the archipelago. Foreign traders, including Chinese traders, also arrived in the archipelago and settled (Dewi, 2015. p. 46-47). In addition to trading on the coast, Chinese traders also traded inland. One of them is in Parakan, Temanggung Regency, Central Java. The abundance of agricultural produce from the fertile land of Parakan is thought to be the main attraction for the ancient Chinese people to settle and to carry out economic activities in Parakan (Suara Merdeka, January 3, 2018).

The arrival of the Chinese in Parakan mostly came from refugees from other cities such as Semarang, Yogyakarta, Kedu and Banyumas areas who were trying to find a safe place to live during the Java War (Syam’âni, 1995). The relationship between the Chinese and the Javanese in Parakan was harmonious because it spanned a long time. This harmony was reflected in the Chinese-Javanese alliance in the Chinatown Geger incident which resulted in resistance to the Dutch colonial government in 1740-1743 (Daradjati, 2013).

After this incident, the Dutch then gave special rights or legal status to the Chinese people since the mid-19th century. The separation also applies in the context of space, by creating settlements according to ethnicity. Chinese settlements or Chinatowns have large plots of land because they are used as residences for wealthy merchants and Chinese officials. While the Javanese Muslim settlements are called Kauman villages which are usually smaller. This creates social segregation that separates them from the Javanese community (Rustopo, 2007. p. 91-92).

The segregation based on space was intended by the Dutch colonial government to avoid the possibility of unification between the Chinese-Javanese who had previously united against the colonial government in the Chinatown Geger incident. Moreover, at this time the Chinese immigrants were getting bigger. These nomads are not only men but also women, even with their entire families. As the number of overseas Chinese people increased, there was a tendency to reduce the assimilation process that was often carried out by overseas Chinese people. In fact, they finally closed themselves off and formed a separate group complete with their traditional life (Hidajat, 1985. p. 61).

Such conditions continued into the post-independence period and were even more perpetuated after the events of the September 30th Movement. In the narrative of the New Order under Suharto’s leadership, this event is considered a coup attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). As a result, many Chinese people are affected by stereotypes and racial discrimination. Until finally the government implemented an assimilation policy for the Chinese. Through the policy of assimilation, the government banned all Chinese attributes and culture, severing the Chinese people’s relationship with their ancestors. Among other things, through the change of name for those who use Chinese names, and the prohibition of trading and distributing all kinds of goods that smell Chinese. Chinese organizations were also banned. For example, Totok organizations such as community associations based on place of origin or peranakan organizations such as the Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body (BAPERKI) (Sopiah, 2016. p. 1).

The New Order’s policy made the ethnic Chinese in Parakan Sub-district change their religion in droves so that the Parakan temple experienced a setback. However, on the other hand, the economic concessions granted by the government to ethnic Chinese actually perpetuate socio-economic inequality and result in increased social jealousy from the local community. Especially in socio-economic relations, the Chinese control the tobacco trade in Parakan. While the Javanese are always in the second position (Wihartatik, 2019. p. 159).

Research related to the relationship between the Chinese and the Javanese in Parakan was previously investigated by Husni Tamrin who highlighted the associative relationship between the Chinese-Javanese when they together expelled the Dutch during Military Aggression. A similar study taking a different location was written by Puji Riyanti and Farid Muzakky who looked at the economic aspect. While the deconstructive relationship between Chinese-Javanese was written by Yang Twang Peck by revealing the existence of the Chinese business elite. Wihartatik with his paper entitled Dynamics of Chinese Public Relations with Indigenous Peoples in Parakan Temanggung (1967-2001) showed the dynamics of relations between Chinese-Javanese during the New Order to the reformation period. In his findings, it is stated that the social conditions of the majority of the Chinese community are more prosperous than the Indigenous Muslim community.

From these various studies, a more complex discussion of Chinese-Javanese relations in Parakan has not been presented. Moreover, research that explicitly states that there are social and economic inequalities and segregation among the majority of
the Chinese-Javanese society is an obstacle in the process of integration or recognition of the same national identity in the context of Indonesian nationalism. For this reason, this study attempts to unravel how segregation and sentiment are formed in the dynamics of relations between the Chinese and the Javanese in Parakan, who are struggling to gain recognition of their national identity during the post-independence period.

METHOD
The research method used the historical research method. This method consists of four stages namely: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. Heuristics is a stage to collect library sources (Kuntowijoyo, 2013:95). At this stage, data were collected orally and based on the written documents. The characters were met, they were elders of the Chinese and Javanese elders in Parakan. Among them there were 5 speakers, namely Basori, Susyanti, Koh Handyong, Suhandoko, and Muhammad Binawan.

The primary sources used are news in various newspapers, such as Suara Merdeka and Tempo Magazine, and publications from the Department of Archives and Libraries of Temanggung Regency. Meanwhile, various kinds of books that were used as secondary sources are the works of Leo Suryadinita to the writings of Husni Thamrin and several related books. As for the journals used, among others, the works of Syarif Hidayat, Wasino and others. As for data analysis, this study used qualitative analysis starting from data collection, data display and verification with a phenomenological theory approach.

CHINESE-JAVANESE SEGREGATION: THE STATE’S ROLE AND CHINESE ELITIST ATTITUDES
Various conflicts caused by the sentiments of the Indigenous Javanese towards the ethnic Chinese in Parakan did not appear suddenly. The sentiment between the Chinese-Javanese ethnicity was originally constructed by the State through policies and politics. It all started with the Dutch colonial rule. The Dutch came to control the plantation area in Parakan. In the midst of the limited freedom to cultivate the garden, the ethnic Chinese held win-win solution negotiations with the Dutch. Finally, through the royal tax papers, the Dutch gave special positions to the Chinese who were officially under the protection of the VOC, so that only the VOC could get rid of their position. Gradually, the privilege benefited the Chinese from the economic sector (Rustopo, 2007:59).

The Dutch colonial government also regulated the composition of citizenship in the Dutch East Indies. They divided them into three groups which indirectly separated the ethnic Chinese (who at that time belonged to the East Asian group) from the indigenous group (Basundo, 2012:p. 94). In addition to the policy issue, the segregation between ethnic Chinese and natives became stronger when the Dutch colonial government implemented a spatial political system by creating residential blocks that were separated according to ethnicity.

The policy was regulated in the Regional Law Regulations called wijkensetelsel and passenstelsel which regulates each group occupying their respective areas that have been determined. Passenstelsel was a policy that requires other ethnic Chinese people to carry a road passport when traveling outside the area. The reason for the Dutch government to enforce this policy was for control, security, and trade competition. Since 1816, ethnic Chinese were required to bring a passport if they want to leave their designated residential area (Honsiyah, 2016: p.972).

So that within a short period of time, ethnic Chinese-Javanese segregation was formed spatially in living. The segregation based on space was also intended by the Dutch colonial government to avoid the possibility of unification between the Chinese-Javanese who had previously united against the colonial government in the Chinatown Geger incident (Daradjati, 2013).

The politics of space and policies carried out by the Dutch Colonial Government also created sentiment among the Chinese-Javanese ethnicities and gave birth to horizontal conflicts. In the end, the Dutch succeeded in reducing the problem, and making Chinese-Javanese relations distant and not in the same fate. Hence, that they no longer regard the Dutch colonial government as a common enemy.

The politics resulted in Parakan City was vary. Administratively, this division makes Parakan city divided into two areas, namely Parakan Kulon (Kauman) and Parakan Wetan (Chinatown) sub-districts. Kauman has a small size because it is the residence of the people of the lower economic class, especially the Javanese. Meanwhile, Chinatown has a large plot of land because it is used as a residence for wealthy merchants and Chinese officials. In Parakan Wetan or Chinatown, Legi Market to be precise, it is the center of trade and services in Temanggung Regency (Hidayat, 2013:p. 195).
Especially when the rights or special legal status granted by the Dutch to the Chinese people since the mid-19th century, have boxed them into a separate social status from Javanese society. Therefore, perhaps most Chinese people are no longer interested in assimilation into the world of Javanese life (Rustopo, 2007, p. 91-92).

The construction and socio-economic stratification established by the Dutch colonial government provided a strong possibility for the socio-cultural life of the Chinese ethnicity, so that they could survive and develop exclusively. Since that time, the form of negative prejudice against ethnic Chinese have started to grow on the part of the Indigenous population.

The structure of the Indigenous feudal society also provides the possibility and opportunity for the Tionghoa to be more mobile and play an important role in economic life, which resulting the Tionghoa holds a higher socio-economic status than the Indigenous population. Therefore, the exclusivity and ethnocentrism and the stronger sentiments of ancestral culture provide a gulf that causes the assimilation process to fail (Hidajat, 1984, p.p 113-114).

Not only in the context of settlements, but segregation also includes schools. Such as HIS (Holands Inlandse School) for Indigenous people and HCS (Holands Tionghoa School) for Tionghoa. Even though there was an attempt to merge schools in 1955 in Jakarta through the decision of the BAPERKI (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, or Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body) congress, there were objections from the Tionghoa. The congress which decided to establish schools and colleges which were basically open to all Indonesian citizens was asked to give special rights to Tionghoa children. This attitude states that the Tionghoa people still maintain an exclusive lifestyle towards the society. The attitude of full integration was proven by some of the Tionghoa Communists who were members of BAPERKI and involved in the G.30.S/PK rebellion (Hidajat, 1984, p. 98).

The segregation gap began to be widened with communist issues on the Parakan Tionghoa ethnic community after the G.30.S incident. Because the existence of this Tionghoa group was considered involved. Not only that, the monopolistic system that was designed by a number of technocrats at that time also helped foster the practice of capitalism. This practice referred to a form of collaboration between Tionghoa businessmen and state, military and civilian officials. This collaboration was manifested in the form of capital support and business management provided to Tionghoa entrepreneurs. In return, the bureaucrats and the military provided licenses or concessions support (Schwarz, 1997, p. 126).

This practice then triggers inequality and so-
cial jealousy. As a result, various criticisms continued to be leveled against government policies that were considered to benefit the Tionghoa ethnic group. These were some of the things that ultimately make sentiment on both sides difficult to avoid. Moreover, most of the ethnic Tionghoa groups tended to be exclusive. The strong urge to accumulate abundant wealth also resulted in socioeconomic inequality which eventually creates social jealousy from the Parakan Native community (Husodo, 1985: p. 1).

This attitude made community groups difficult to assimilate. Vice versa, the ethnic Tionghoa in Parakan were less mingling. This was mainly done by those who have middle to upper socioeconomic status.

THE ACCOMPANYING CONFLICT

Anti-Tionghoa attitudes began to develop after the Java War. Mainly because the Dutch colonial government’s spatial politics in the form of settlements and policies have been implemented. This is understandable because the Tionghoa during the forced cultivation system (1830-1870) had a special position, both as foremen and traders. As a result, jealousy arose from the Javanese. The construction continued to develop so that the Tionghoa later emerged as the main economic competitors of the Javanese until the first decades of the twentieth century (Wertheim and The Siauw Giap, 1962: p. 239). Efforts to fight against the economic structure organizationally emerged during the period of the first Indonesian political movement. When the Islamic Trade Union (Syarekat Dagang Islam, or SDI) was born, which later changed to the Islamic Association (Syarekat Islam, or SI) in Surakarta. The purpose of establishing SDI was as a cooperative of local anti-Tionghoa indigenous batik makers.

The ambiguous attitude of the Tionghoa Indonesian community from the early 20th century until the war for independence (1945-1949), as well as their dominance over local trade and the main market which lasted until 1959 became a source of negative prejudice among the Javanese people. It was this strong economic position of the Tionghoa that madem them hated and placed as a different or foreign group (Jayusman, Wasino, Suyahmo, 2019: p.1). For this reason, they were often the target of acts of discrimination and attacks.

The unequal socio-economic construction continued until post-independence. The sentiment between the two was still ongoing. Like a time bomb, which at any time could explode into a racial riot, even though the triggering factor was relatively small (Rustopo, 2007: p. 93).

It was proven during the G 30 S incident. As a result of that event, many people in Parakan were affected. Innocent people were imprisoned without knowing the cause. Others were allowed to participate in an activity. In the Indonesian Youth Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pemudi Indonesia or FKPPI) it was also discussed but the Parakans did not understand what caused the G30S PKI (Susyanti, interview, 21 August 2020).

There were Tionghoa people who were the administrators of BAPERKI. BAPERKI was a community organization for the Tionghoa, which then some of the members were considered to be affiliated with the PKI. They were mostly detained. Some were only for a few months, but some were detained for years until they did not return (Aryodiguno, 2018: p.6).

Not only Tionghoa, but detention also applied to natives who are considered affiliated with the PKI. This was because they were thought to have participated in a Javanese traditional art called Jaran Kepang, in celebration of the PKI’s anniversary. Some were exiled to the island of Buru, Maluku, but after being released they did not want to return to Parakan. They chose to stay there by trading because they think that life is better there. (Koh Handyong, interview, 17 August 2020). Some teachers were also imprisoned, but it did not last long. The release was carried out shortly after the G 30 S event was declared over (Susyanti, interview, 21 August 2020).

The conflict between the Tionghoa and Javanese in Parakan re-emerged in 1997. The result was that a lot of glass was broken along Jalan Diponegoro in Tionghoa-owned houses. However, in 1997 the riots occurred just before the general election. The clashes were triggered by the PPP and Golkar parties. PPP represents the Javanese Muslim group and Golkar is the embodiment of the government party which was financially backed by the Tionghoa ethnic. In the riots, government officials intervened by taking repressive measures. This had a bad impact and the PPP responded by holding a Krendo parade. Krendo was the term for the Javanese for the coffin, which was used to carry corpses. Krendo was carried around the city of Parakan. After the action was finished, it was accompanied by throwing stones at houses, causing chaos and fear (Suhandoko, interview, 17 August 2020).

In 1998, when a large-scale demonstration was held to overthrow the Suharto regime, riots broke out in Parakan again. The riots were caused
by the issue that Tionghoa ethnic were part of Suharto’s cronies. This caused a lot of sentiment back sticking out. As a result, many buildings belonging to Tionghoa ethnic were burned. It was recorded that at least 10 houses were burned. As a result of this riot, many Tionghoa people in Parakan were frightened. They then created an institution called Piras, to anticipate the security of China and Java (Basori, interview, 15 August 2020).

Piras was an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) which was built by the Tionghoa and Javanese communities to maintain security so that conflicts between Tionghoa and Javanese do not occur. It was built during the monetary crisis and there was a conflict between China and Java. Hence, Piras was a kind of business entity with funds originating from Tionghoa entrepreneurs that is rotated to care for the Indigenous people in the form of savings and loans, which was founded in 1998.

THE INTEGRATION EFFORT FROM THE TIONGHOA ETHNIC

Since the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia, the Tionghoa minority is considered to always cause “problems”: But the “problem” is not always the same, at first during the colonial era they were considered pro-Dutch and anti-Indonesian, exclusive and their work was only for profit, then they were considered communist elements or communist sympathizers. Lately, they are considered as capitalists and conglomerates who dredge the country’s wealth without feelings of patriotism. The riots that occurred repeatedly aimed at residents of Tionghoa descent were inseparable from negative perceptions (Suryadinata, 2010, p. 184).

Realizing this, the Tionghoa ethnic did a lot of assimilation. This effort was also influenced by the strict regulations of the government under President Soeharto by issuing Presidential Instruction No. 14 of 1967 concerning Tionghoa Religion, Beliefs and Customs. The compulsion to assimilate was an effort to reduce discrimination and as a preventive measure for the trauma of massacres and looting of Tionghoa ethnic in the G 30 S incident (Christian, 2017, p.18).

The issuance of this discriminatory regulation made the Tionghoa descent group have a very narrow freedom of space. Everything related to religious rituals, customs, and Tionghoa cultural practices such as lion dance performances, toapekong processions, wayang potehi, and Chinese New Year celebrations can only be celebrated within the internal or family environment.

For this reason, the Tionghoa ethnic in Parakan changed their religion in droves and also changed their Tionghoa names to Javanese names. They also cooperated with the Javanese. The social relationship between the Tionghoa and the Javanese can be described in the Tan family in Parakan. It is said that one of Diponegoro’s former followers was known as Mbah Bagelen. He was friendly and reconciled with the Javanese clan, one of the earliest Tionghoa families, who became their ancestors. The Hoo family still had some old manuscripts in Javanese language and script. Among other things, Serat Anbiya shows the existence of mutual understanding between religions (Department of Culture and Tourism of Temanggung Regency, 2016, p. 54).

In 1970, there was one form of the Parakan City Board of Trustees, namely the NPL (Noto Parakan Luwes) or the Parakan community that cares about Parakan. It consists of Heads of Agencies in Parakan from the Tionghoa group. There are two people, namely Suhandoko and Tirtojoyo (late). They participated in planning the development in the city of Parakan. Until now, the relationship is very good, as in the committee commemorating 17 August 1945. Suhandoko said during such a commemoration he tried to raise funds from the Tionghoa to participate in the financing of the 17 August 1945 celebration in Parakan (Suhandoko, interview, August 17, 2020). From the Javanese group there are Binawan, Basori, Hartoyo (Muhammad Binawan, interview, August 20, 2020).

The development of the NPL was experiencing problems. Because this relationship tends to be pragmatic and momentary and is driven by certain motives. As a result, the relationship was not harmonious (Basori, interview, August 15, 2020).

Another form of cooperation is the establishment of a death institution/foundation called Darma Bakti. This institution is owned by the Tionghoa community in Parakan. Led by Koh Handyong. The death institution Darma Bakti was founded with the permission of the Javanese. Darma Bakti is a kind of monthly contribution or insurance to reduce the burden of death costs. When a Tionghoa dies, the family does not participate in the management of the corpse. So those who do are Javanese who work in the Darma Bakti foundation (Muchamad Binawan, interview, August 20, 2020).

Since the livelihood of the Tionghoa from the start has been trading and the majority of the Javanese in Parakan work as farmers, both food crops (rice and corn) and other commodities, the relationship between the Tionghoa-Javanese in Parakan is also formed through economic channels. Mainly because it is well supported by the tobacco com-
modity which is the mainstay of the Parakan people. The Javanese are always the ones who plant and the Tionghoa are the ones who buy and trade it (Department of Culture and Tourism of Temanggung Regency, 2016, p. 54).

A harmonious relationship is shown by Suhandoko. He, as a tionghoa who has a storage warehouse, where the workers are Javanese. The relationship even lasted from 1976 to 2000. Everyone who worked at Suhandoko’s warehouse were old people and they were all from Java. Suhandoko himself is a follower of Tri Dharma. In Parakan they tend to give up religious attributes in trade and are more general in nature. There is no prohibition on trade relations with other traders of different religions. For the Tionghoa themselves in the field of trade, they have to be free from ethnicity and religion, to blend in with the Javanese (Koh Handyong, interview, August 17, 2020).

Another form of cooperation is in the field of transportation. In Parakan, in the past, the Javanese who owned horse-drawn carriages were only nobles, who were then hired by the Tionghoa on a profit-sharing system. Over time, many Tionghoa people were able to buy their own horse-drawn carriage, so that the ownership of a carriage between the two became more and more equal (Koh Handyong, interview, August 17, 2020).

Besides horse-drawn carriages, another collaboration in the field of transportation is a travel agency whose name is Sumeh Sumber Agung. This business is owned by the Tionghoa. At that time the Colt T vehicles produced in 70-71, which were limited in number were used as a transportation business for the Javanese. Apart from Surya Agung’s transportation, CV Setia also has a transportation bureau runs by a Javanese, whose garage is located west of Pasar Legi.

In its development, the owner of CV Setia is no longer able to manage so it is run by his son. But still, his son also couldn’t manage because he moved to Japan, which then was eventually sold and bought by the Javanese. The Transportation Bureau was initially controlled by the Tionghoa, suffered a lot of losses. Finally the Javanese bought so many of them. The result, the The Javanese then own some transportation bureaus (Basori, interview, August 15, 2020).

Unfortunately, although the cooperative relationship between the Tionghoa-Javanese is going well, there are socio-economic disparities. Mainly because it puts the Indigenous people in a secondary position (Sarah, 2003,p.342). In Parakan, this is reflected in Suhandoko’s trading business. The socio-economic relations that exist in his tobacco trading business place the Javanese only as tobacco seekers in the villages. The results were then brought to Suhandoko’s warehouse. After that, Suhandoko gave the price and paid it. Tobacco that has been purchased was then sold again to the Salt warehouse. Only then after the end of the season, the profits were divided in half (Suhandoko, interview, August 17, 2020).

CONCLUSION
Although the construction of the Tionghoa-Javanese segregation was initiated by the Dutch East Indies government, it persisted until post-independence. The over-established structure turned out to be difficult to melt because the construction of spatial separation which is clearly reflected in the settlements still exists. For instance, there are two areas in Parakan city which are becoming symbols of that difference: Parakan Kulon (Kauman) Village which is the residence of Javanese Muslims and Parakan Wetan (Chinatown) which is the residence of the Tionghoa ethnic. It is undeniable that this has hampered the integration efforts even though various integration efforts were made by both parties. For example, the efforts to change religion and names carried out by Confucians in Parakan sub-district during the Soeharto era. They converted to Islam and changed their Tionghoa name to Javanese name. They were forced to take this step even though it caused the decline of the temple in order to remain accepted as part of the citizens and local community. Unfortunately, such integration does not change the existing socio-economic structure. Inequality remains lasting, the domination of the Tionghoa ethnic in the socio-economic field remains eternal because the Javanese always occupy the second position in the structure. Therefore, this causes the sentiment between the two to remain eternal even though it looks unpretentious on the surface. As a result, although the relationship between China and Java looks good, conflicts can arise from time to time, as seen in the riots during the 1997 elections and the 1998 riots.

REFERENCES


