JEJAK

Journal of Economics and Policy

Analysis Performance of Tax Effort and Privilege Funds Influencing Economy of Special Region of Yogyakarta in 2014-2019

Yustiko Arvandero Gilang Pangestu[1]✉

Woori Bank

Abstract

Privileges funds is a fund originating from the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget which is allocated to fund special authorities of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. This study aims to determine the effect of privileges funds on the economy in the Special Region of Yogyakarta during 2014-2019 as well as to determine the condition of the tax business during the privilege period. The method used in this research is quantitative by using descriptive analysis to analyze data development and regression analysis to analyze the effect of privilege funds on selected indicators. The data used in this research is panel data consisting of time series data for 2014-2019 and cross-section data of five districts / cities in DIY. The dependent variable used in this study are poverty percentage, Gross Regional Domestic Product per capita and Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), while the independent variable used in this study is privilege funds. The results of this research indicate that: Tax effort during the Privileges Law era showed an upward trend, the privileges funds has a negative and significant effect on the poverty percentage, the privileges funds has a positive and significant effect on GRDP per capita and the privilegs funds has a positive and significant effect on the GRDP. This study concludes that the role of privilege funds needs to be increase in order to maximize returns to the economy.

Key words : Privilege funds, Economy, Poverty, Tax Effort, DIY

✉ Corresponding author :
   Address: Woori Bank, District 8 - SCBD Lot 28 Jl. Jend.
   Sudirman - South Jakarta
   E-mail: gilangarvan55@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

Regional autonomy defined as the delegation of power for regions to operate the regional household itself, except for some affairs that are directly controlled by the central government (Tauda, 2018). The implementation of regional autonomy is strengthened in Article 18A of the 1945 Constitution which stated that law is a form of regulation of the relation of authority between the central and regional governments by considering to regional diversity and specificity. Fiscal affairs, public services, natural and non-natural resource management for the central and local governments are regulated by law and implemented fairly.

There are at least six special rules as the legal basis for special autonomy that has diversity, including Law Number 13 of 2012 concerning the privileges of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The privileges of the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) are included in the category of regions with special autonomy. This particularity inherent in DIY provides an understanding of asymmetric decentralization in the 1945 Constitution article 18B (Tanjung et al. 2018). Nurcholis (2017), explained that asymmetric regional government has three forms, namely government that has special and it is community unity with customary law. Then explained by Khaerina (2017), that asymmetric decentralization is basically the application of special authority in certain regions which is believed to be another way to solve problems between the central and regional governments.

Privilege funds are funding sourced from the APBN which is allocated to fund the privileged powers as well as part of the transfer funds to the regions and villages funds. Privilege funds are allocated based on the mandate of Article 42 of Law Number 13

of 2012 (Ministry of Finance, 2020). The privilege funds purpose are to fulfill justice, social welfare, human rights and basic community rights, improve local citizens, provide opportunities for the wider community to participate in the development process and reduce inequality (Effendi et al., 2017). These law is a hope for the DIY Government to be able to strive for the rights of the DIY peoples to be able to live prosperously, but this hope is considered not been fulfilled optimally (Sakir & Mutiarin, 2015).

Source: BPKAD DIY, 2019
Figure 1. DIY Privilege Funds 2014-2019 (IDR Billion)

It is explained that the amount of the budget ceiling for the aggregate privilege funds granted to DIY has increased each year except in 2016 which is the same as 2015. The privilege funds was first disbursed in 2013 as the implementation of the Privileges Law through the mechanism for submitting a budget from the provincial government to to the central government.


Source: BPS, 2020
Figure 2. Poverty by Province in 2019

Figure 2 shows the percentage of poor people to the total population in each province showing the highest poverty percentage in DIY compared to other provinces in 2019 also higher

than the national average poverty. These high poverty percentage is a question considering the island of Java is the largest contributor to Indonesia's GDP at 59% in 2019 (BPS, 2020). Miranti et al., (2013), stated that in terms of poverty alleviation efforts, decentralization although not directly targeted as the only strategy for poverty alleviation was expected to improve service delivery and provide better access to poor people by the government.

Source: BPS, 2020

**Figure 3.** Indonesia Economic Growth and DIY (Percent)

Figure 3 shows that during the Privileges Law era, DIY's economic growth experienced an upward trend and was higher than average national economic growth. 2019 showed the highest record of DIY economic growth with growth result of 6.59% while national growth was only 5.02%. The phenomenon of the high economic growth of DIY exceeding the average national economic growth is inversely proportional to the condition of poverty in DIY which is still above the national average poverty.

Source: BPS, 2020

Figure 4. GDPR Per Capyta by Province in 2018

From the GRDP per capita data as of 2018 above, it is clear that DIY has a low per capita income of IDR 25.7 million, lower than Central Java of IDR 27.2 million, West Java of IDR 29.1 million, Banten of IDR 34.1 million, East Java at IDR 29.5 million and the highest is DKI Jakarta with a per capita income of IDR 165.8 million. This means that the average income of each DIY resident in 2018 just only IDR 25.7 million. The low income per capita of the DIY peoples also in line with the low Local Own-Source Revenue (PAD).


Source: BPS, 2020

Figure 5. PAD by Province in 2019 (IDR Billion)

In figure 5 it is proven that in 2019, DIY Local Own-Source Revenue was lowest in Java with a total of IDR 2.01 trillion. Then Banten amounted to IDR 7.34 trillion, Central Java amounted to IDR 14.11 trillion, East Java amounted to IDR 16.82 trillion, West Java amounted to IDR 19.76 trillion and DKI Jakarta amounted to IDR 50.63 trillion. The low PAD can be seen from the components that make up PAD as a view of the fiscal independence of a region.

In 2019, the largest PAD component in DIY was generated by local taxes with percentage of 85%. Then followed by other legitimate PAD, results of separated regional wealth management and regional retribution with a percentage of less than 10% each. Seeing at dominant tax composition in PAD, according to Keynes Mankiw (2007), which stated that the fiscal function in the form of government spending in an area related to taxation is related

and has an effect on economic growth or increasing fiscal capacity. Privilege funds as a government fiscal function here according to Keynes's thoughts are related to the regional fiscal capacity named taxes.

Source: Bappeda, 2020

Figure 6. Proportion of Local Own-Source Revenue DIY in 2019

Agency theory according to Jensen & Meckling (1976), explains the relationship between the agent and the principal. Principal-agent theory analyzes the contractual arrangement between two or more individuals, groups, or organizations. One of these theories is rooted in economic theory, decision theory, sociology and organizational theory. One of the principal parties makes a contract, either implicitly or explicitly with another agent to work in the interests of the principal, then the agent must be responsible for their work to the principal.

In connection with this research, agency theory is based on the existence of asymmetric decentralization between regions that received privilege or special autonomy funds that did not receive privileges or special autonomy funds, such as Special Region of Yogyakarta which received privilege funds from the central government as a region with a special government.

Lele (2019), stated that the asymmetric decentralization motive is related to the general literature which refers to the principle of subsidiarity where local units or agents are assumed to be more responsive in dealing with local problems and priorities. According to Gjoni et al., (2010), asymmetric decentralization is used as a political breakthrough to soften the demand for secession from a region that can jeopardize national integration. These are applied to countries that are racially, culturally and economically diverse because maintaining unity in the midst of diversity is a formidable challenge. Another determinant of the success of asymmetric decentralization according to Li (2018), is fiscal capacity.

The agency relationship in this study occurs between the central government and local governments, local governments with budget users and budget users with budgetary power, for example, DIY. According to Pronosokodewo (2018), the central government as the principal provides privilege funds to the DIY government as an agent to encourage people's welfare and preserve the privileges of DIY. Local governments act as principals who provide budgetary privileges to budget users to execute privileged authority. The budget users also acts as the principal who authorizes the use of the budget to the power of the budget user to spend privilege funds, in this case the regencies/municipalities government so that the use of privileged funds does not deviate from its objective. So Paniradya Kaistimewan is appointed as the function of monitoring, implementing and evaluating privilege funds.

Keynes Sukirno (2006), stated that government intervention determines good economic development. To ensure stable growth, the role of government in managing the economy through monetary and fiscal policies (regional spending). Government spending has a theoretical basis that can be seen from the identity of the balance of national income. The fiscal function in the form of government spending in an area related to taxation is related and has an effect on economic growth or increasing fiscal capacity.

$$Y = C + I + G + (X - M) \qquad (1)$$

C = Consumption

I = Investment
G = Government Expenditure
X = Export
M = Import

From this equation, it can be seen that an increase or decrease in government spending will increase or decrease national income (Dumairy, 2006). Keynes's view also explained by Samuelson (2005), which stated that to increase economic growth it is necessary to make a budget policy carried out by the government in the form of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN). Because the APBN is a plan for government program expenditures and revenues that will be received within one year.

Amalia et al., (2015), and Pratama & Utama (2019), stated that the types of government spending identified have a direct or indirect effect on poverty. Fiscal capacity reflected through fiscal transfers and public spending plays important role in poverty so it can be concluded that increasing fiscal capacity will reduce poverty in Yogyakarta (Sriyana, 2015). This is reinforced by Mahendra (2017), who stated that economic growth as the effect of government spending affects the number of poor people. Setiawan et al., (2020), found the same thing which shows that special autonomy has an influence in reducing poverty in Aceh.

Research by Pratama & Utama (2019), Dauda (2010), and Yahya et al., (2012), stated that government spending proved to increase economic growth. But Pronosokodewo (2018), stated privilege funds have an effect on economic growth. This means that the more privilege funds increase, the economic growth will increase. This is confirmed by Anwar et al., (2018), which stated that special autonomy funds have a positive effect on economic growth or GRDP. Nuraeni & Suratno (2015), stated that special autonomy

funds have a positive effect on economic growth or GRDP.

Tax effort is the ratio between tax revenue and the fiscal capacity or ability of the people to pay taxes in an area (Sujarwati, 2018). According to Asmawanti et al., (2016), tax efforts are used to determine the results of a tax system compared to the ability to pay local taxes concerned. Prastiwi & Aji (2020), in their research found that PAD has a positive significant effect on financial performance. This means that the increase in PAD will improve regional financial performance. Mirsan et al., (2019), stated that GRDP and PAD affect the degree of fiscal independence. Putri (2015), stated that regional revenue sources such as PAD and balancing funds in the form of DAU and special autonomy funds are expected to increase economic growth.

This is in line with Keynes's thoughts which stated that the fiscal function in a country, especially regarding the taxation system has relations and influence on economic growth for the country. In relation to Keynes, the transfer in question is a privilege funds which is expected to stimulate local government fiscal efforts.

Based on the explanation of some figures above, the reality that occurs in DIY is that decentralization and special autonomy in the form of privilege funds has not been able to bring the people of Yogyakarta to be considered prosperous (Sakir & Mutiarin, 2015). It is proven by the high percentage of poverty, low GRDP per capita and low PAD. This reality is not in line with the increase in the privilege funds each year and the purpose of the privilege funds itself in Article 5 of the Privileges Law, which is to realize public welfare and peace also to realize good governance.

METHOD

This research is quantitative research that used descriptive analysis to analyze the

development of data, namely tax effort and regression analysis to analyze the effect of privilege funds on selected indicators.

The type of data used is panel data or combined data from annual time series data from 2014 to 2019 and cross-section data consisting of 5 regencies/ municipalities in DIY. The number of observations used were 30 observations consisting of 5 regencies/ municipalities in 2014 – 2019. The basic data taken in 2014 because the Privilege Law was only enacted in 2012 and the privilege funds in 2013 were disbursed in the fourth quarter so that the allocation for districts/cities city is not allocated.

This study used three dependent variables and one independent variable to run three empirical models. The dependent variable in this study are the percentage of poor people, GRDP per capita and GRDP, while the independent variable is privilege funds. In this study there is only one independent variable because the selection of this independent variable is a variable related to asymmetric decentralization where the variable used is a fiscal transfer based on the Privileges Law that is not owned by other regions or provinces in Indonesia. The research only focused on looking at the effect of the selected independent variables on the selected few by sticking to the flow of the frame of mind.

Quantitative descriptive analysis is used to provide an overview of regional financial performance, especially tax efforts as the main component of PAD in the era of the Privileges Law. According to Patra (2017), quantitative techniques are used to determine tax efforts as a source of PAD.

Tax Effort = Realization of Tax Revenue / GRDP x 100 % (2)

To assess tax effort used the criteria between the numbers 0-1. The greater the value of tax effort means that it shows the ability of the local government to collect or generate local taxes. Bahl (1991), declare if the value of tax effort > 1 (more than 1) means tax effort bigger than tax capacity but if the value of tax effort < 1 (less than 1) means tax effort smaller than tax capacity. Measurement of tax collection capability also based on comparison criteria tax capacity-tax effort so that it can produce an implication with criteria high capacity and high effort, low capacity and high effort, high capacity and low effort and low capacity and low effort.

Regression analysis is used because the supporting data are in the form of numbers and the results sought are the influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Panel data used to determine how much influence the privilege fund variable has on the number of poor people, GRDP per capita and GRDP in regencies/ municipalities in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. For data processing, this research uses the E-views analysis tool. There are 3 empirical models that will be examined in this study. Each empirical model has one dependent variable and one independent variable (privilege funds) with the following model equation:

$$POV_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \, LogDK_{it} + \mu_{it} \qquad (3)$$
$$LogPDRBK_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \, LogDK_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (4)$$
$$LogPDRB_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \, LogDK_{it} + e_{it} \qquad (5)$$

Where:

POV = Percentage of Poor Population

LogPDRBK = Logarithm of Gross Regional Domestic Product Per Capita

LogPDRB = Logarithm of Gross Regional Domestic Product

LogDK = Logarithm of privilege funds

β, α, γ = Regression coefficient

μ, ε, e = error

i = 5 regencies/ municipalities in DIY

t = Year t (2014 – 2019)

There are several steps taken to process panel data regression such as: Estimating panel data with three approaches, namely Common Effect Model, Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model to determine the best model to use. Test the estimation results of the selected model

using the Chow Test, Hausman Test and Lagrange Multiplier Test. Classical Assumption Test. Goodness of Fit Test with the coefficient of determination (R2) and Interpretation.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1. Tax Efforts 5 Regencies/ Municipalitie s DIY 2014 – 2019 (percent)

Regency /Municipality	Tax Effort						
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Average
Kulon Progo	0,145	0,406	0,477	0,677	0,769	0,736	0,535
Bantul	0,670	0,791	0,815	0,962	1,003	1,115	0,893
Gunungkidul	0,268	0,324	0,321	0,356	0,397	0,426	0,349
Sleman	1,221	1,328	1,379	1,697	1,800	1,842	1,842
Yogyakarta	1,190	1,358	1,419	1,720	1,560	1,630	1,479

Source: Secondary data processed, 2021

Based on the average tax effort from 2014 to 2019, the tax effort for realization of taxes on the GRDP of Kulon Progo Regency shows that the ability of the Kulon Progo Regional Government in collecting local taxes is still quite low at 0.535%. Then the tax effort of tax realization on the GRDP of Bantul Regency shows that the ability of the Bantul Regional Government in collecting local taxes is quite high with a value of 0.893%. Tax effort of tax realization on the GRDP of Gunungkidul Regency shows that the ability of the Gunungkidul Regional Government in collecting local taxes is relatively low with a value of 0.349%. Meanwhile, the tax effort realization of taxes on the GRDP of Sleman Regency and Yogyakarta City shows that the ability of the Sleman Government and Yogyakarta City Government in collecting local taxes is quite high with a value of 1.842% and 1.479%, respectively.

There are three approaches in panel data regression analysis, namely the Common Effect Model, Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model (Widarjono, 2013). In order to determine the best model to be use, tests were carried out such as the Chow test,

Hausman test and LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test. Chow test used to find the best model between CEM and FEM.

Ho: Common Effect Model
HA: Fixed Effect Model

After Chow test, Chi-Square Probability value was obtained, then this value was compared with the significance used, which was 5% (α = 0.05). If p-value > = 0.05, then Ho is accepted, which means that the best model used to estimate panel data is Common Effect Model. On the other hand, if p-value < = 0.05, then Ho is rejected, which means that the best model used to estimate panel data is the Fixed Effect Model.

Hausman test used to determine the best model between the Fixed Effect Model and the Random Effect Model.

Ho: Random Effect Model
HA: Fixed Effect Model

After Hausman Test, Cross Section Random values and Chi-Square Probability are obtained. Then this value is compared with the significance used, which is 5% (α = 0.05). If p-value > = 0.05, then Ho is accepted, which means that the best model used to estimate panel data is Random Effect Model. On the

other hand, if p-value < = 0.05, then Ho is rejected, which means that the best model used to estimate panel data is Fixed Effect Model.

    Lagrange Multiplie test used to determine the best model if there are no consistent results between Chow test and Hausman test.

Ho: Common Effect Model

HA: Random Effect Model

After Lagrange Multiplier Test, Breusch Pagan value and probability are obtained. Then this value is compared with the significance used, which is 5% ($\alpha = 0.05$). If p-value > = 0.05, then Ho is accepted, which means that the best model used to estimate panel data is Common Effect Model. On the other hand, if pvalue < = 0.05, then Ho is rejected, which means that the best model used to estimate panel data is Random Effect Model

Table 2. Regression Output

Model 1	Fixed Effect Model				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**T-Statistics**	**Prob**	**R-Squared**	**Summary**
DK	-0.75751537	-2.266.684	0.0327	0.958183	Significant
Model 2	**Random Effect Model**				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**T-Statistics**	**Prob**	**R-Squared**	**Summary**
DK	0.063727	2.861.887	0.0079	0.223733	Significant
Model 3	**Fixed Effect Model**				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**T-Statistics**	**Prob**	**R-Squared**	**Summary**
DK	0.077142	3.7886699	0.0009	0.973513	Significant

Source: E-views Output (processed)

This result supports, in line with Keynes's thoughts which stated that the fiscal function in a country regarding the taxation system is correlated with economic growth in that country. In relation to Keynes, the transfer in question is special autonomy which is expected to stimulate local government fiscal efforts. After the enactment of the Privileges Law, it can be seen that the regencies/ municipalities tax effort in DIY has an increasing trend each year. The increase in government spending in terms of special autonomy (privilege funds) has been proven to increase economic growth as evidenced by an increase in GRDP. Sania et al., (2018) and Arianto (2014), stated that increased economic growth will ultimately increase the tax occupancy of a region. Similar results were described by Efitriana & Khoirudin (2021), in their research in DIY which stated that economic growth will increase tax occupancy.

In the privileges era of DIY in 2014 – 2019 along with privilege funds as a result of asymmetric decentralization, the condition of tax efforts as a maximum source of PAD has been able to be carried out by the Sleman Government and the Yogyakarta City Government while the Kulon Progo, Bantul and Gunungkidul Regencies have not been able to maximally collect local taxes from taxpayers or in other words local governments has a low ability to collect local taxes as a source of PAD. Then by Marlisa & Blesia (2018), local governments can optimize regional potential to increase PAD through local taxes to minimize fiscal dependence on the central government. The ability of PAD for the regions used to fund regional expenditures.

Based on the estimation results on model 1, privilege funds variable has negative and significant effect on poverty percentage. The coefficient value of the dependent variable is -0.751537. The value of R square as of 0.958183 in

the Fixed Effect Model, it means that the dependent variable (poverty percentage) can be explained by the independent variable (privilege funds) of 95.81%. While the remaining 4.19% can be explained by other variables outside the model.

This is in accordance with Pronosokodewo (2018), stated that privilege funds which are negatively related to poverty. Higher privilege funds will reduce poverty rates in DIY. This implies that privilege funds will increase growth which is negatively related to poverty.

Based on the estimation results model 2, privilege funds variable has positive and significant effect on GRDP per capita. The coefficient value of the dependent variable is 0.063727. The value of R square as of 0.223733 in Random Effects Model, this means that the dependent variable (GDP per capita) can be explained by the independent variable (privilege funds) of 22.37%. While the remaining 77.63% can be explained by other variables outside the model. In model 2, the value of R square just only 22.37% because the number of independent variables is only one. In addition, the low R square results indicate that the relations between the privilege funds variable and other factors outside the model is much larger than the GRDP per capita variable.

This result is supports by Badrudin & Pronosokodewo (2019), which states that privilege funds encouraged economic growth. The higher the allocation of privilege funds, the higher the GRDP which has implications for economic growth. Economic growth positively correlated with the welfare of the people in DIY. But Sakir & Mutiarin (2015), found that justifies the non-maximum output of privilege funds to encourage a significant increase in per capita income where some stakeholders do not understand that privileges programs or activities are regional

development programs. Unprepared and concern lies in the provision of goods and services for the region in DIY. Privilege funds are considered to have not maximally contributed to the acceleration of the welfare of the DIY community.

Based on the estimation results model 3, privilege funds variable has positive and significant effect on GRDP. The coefficient value of the dependent variable is 0.077142. The value of R square as of 0.973513 in Fixed Effect Model, it means that the dependent variable (GRDP) can be explained by the independent variable (privilege funds) of 97.35%. While the remaining 2.65% can be explained by other variables outside the model.

Badrudin & Pronosokodewo (2019), also mentions that privilege funds has positive influence on economic growth. This means that if there is an additional allocation of privilege funds, it will have an effect on increasing economic growth in the DIY region. It was recorded that since 2014 or the beginning of the Privilege Law era, DIY's economic growth was above the average national economic growth despite experiencing growth fluctuations. BPS (2020), recorded the highest growth in 2019 of 6.59% where this figure was the highest growth achievement in the last decade. Meanwhile, the national economic growth in 2019 was 5.02%.

CONCLUSION

In the Privileges Law era, the condition of tax effort in 5 regencies/ municipalities in DIY experienced an upward trend. It is due to the effect of the increase in privilege funds which has an impact on increasing economic growth which will then increase tax occupancy, but the increase in tax effort is felt to be not optimal in several areas in DIY such as Kulon Progo, Bantul and Gunungkidul Regencies, but on the contrary high tax effort has been achieved. Sleman Regency and Yogyakarta City.

Privilege funds has negative and significant effect on the percentage of poverty in DIY. The increase in the privilege funds budget each year are slowly able to reduce the percentage of poor people in the DIY region. The decrease was caused by several special powers contained in the use of privilege funds either through incentives or programs sourced from privileged funds. However, the privilege funds not been able to reduce the percentage of poverty to the maximum in DIY because until 2019, the percentage of poverty in DIY still exceeds the national average and record as the highest in Java.

The privilege funds has positive and significant effect on GRDP per capita in DIY. The increase in privilege funds each year are able to increase the income per capita of the DIY peoples. Utilization of privilege funds able to increase GRDP through increasing economic capacity in community such as culture, spatial planning, and public facilities. However, the ability of privilege funds in increasing the income per capita of the community felt to be not optimal in increasing the income per capita of the community, one of which is due to the low regional minimum wage in DIY.

Privilege funds has a significant positive effect on GRDP in DIY. The increase in privilege funds each year are able to increase economic growth in DIY through increasing the economic capacity of the community in accordance with the privileges authority of the privilege funds. It is evident that the economic growth of DIY during the privilege era experienced an upward trend and was higher than the national average growth.

REFERENCES

Amalia, R., Madris, & Razak, A. (2015). The Effect Of Government Spending On Poverty In West Sulawesi Province [*Pengaruh Pengeluaran Pemerintah Terhadap Kemiskinan Di Provinsi Sulawesi Barat*]. *Journal Of Analysis* [*Jurnal Analisis*], *4*(2), 183-189.

Anwar, A., Abdullah, M., & Hadi, S. (2018). Analysis Of The Effect Of Regional Original Income, Special Autonomy Funds And Capital Expenditures On GRDP In KAB/City Of Papua Province [*Analisis Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Dana Otonomi Khusus Dan Belanja Modal Terhadap PDRB Di KAB/ Kota Provinsi Papua*]. *Journal Of Economics* [*Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi*], *2*(1).

Asmawanti , D., Elvandari, N., & Baihaqi. (2016). Analysis Of Tax Effort, Effectiveness, Contribution And Growth Of Bengkulu City Tax In 2011 – 2014 [*Analisis Tax Effort, Efektivitas, Kontribusi Dan Pertumbuhan Pajak Daerah Kota Bengkulu Tahun 2011 – 2014*]. *Accounting Journal* [*Jurnal Akuntansi*], *6*(1), 35-52.

Arianto, P. (2014). Factors Affecting Local Tax Revenue In The City Of Surabaya [*Faktor-Faktor Yang Mempengaruhi Penerimaan Pajak Daerah di Kota Surabaya*]. *JIRA*, *3*(1), 1-14.

Badrudin, R., & Pronosokodewo, B. (2019). The Effects Of Privilege Funds On Public Welfare And Poverty In Special District Ff Yogyakarta. *3rd International Conference On Management & Entrepreneurship*, 8-19.

Dauda, R. (2010). Investment In Nigeria: An Empirical Evidence. *International Research Journal Of Finance And Economics*, 158-169.

Dumairy. (2006). Indonesian Economy [*Perekonomian Indonesia*]. *Jakarta: Erlangga*.

Effendi, D., Sanahadi, R., & Putra, A. (2017). Big Budget, Low Impact: An Alternative Evaluation On Benefit And Impact Of Special Fund in DI Yogyakarta 2013 - 2015. *The 2nd Journal Of Government And Politics International Conference*, 263.

Efitriana, D., & Khoirudin, R. (2021). Analysis Of Tax Revenue In DIY And The Factors Affecting It [*Analisis Penerimaan Pajak di DIY Dan Faktor Yang Mempengaruhinya*]. *Simantek Scientific Journal* [*Jurnal Ilmiah Simantek*], 5(1), 99-106.

Gjoni, R., Wetterberg, A., & Dunbar, D. (2010). Decentralization As A Cconflict Transformation Tool: The Challenge In Kosovo. *Public Administration And Development,* 30(5), 291-312.

Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory Of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost And Ownership Structure. *Journal Of Financial Economics*, 3(4), 305-360.

Ministry Of Finance [*Kementerian Keuangan*]. (2020). Yogyakarta Privilege Fund [*Dana Keistimewaan Yogyakarta*]. *Jakarta: Ministry Of Finance* [*Jakarta: Kementerian Keuangan*].

Khaerina, H. (2017). Comparison Of Asymmetric Decentralization Policies Between Southern Philippines And Indonesia [*Perbandingan Kebijakan Desentralisasi Asimetris Antara Filipina Selatan Dan Indonesia*]. *Journal Of Asymmetric Warfare Study Program* [*Jurnal Prodi Peperangan Asimetris*], 3(2).

Lele, G. (2019). Asymmetric Decentralization And The Problem Of Governance In Indonesia. *APP Asian Politics And Policy, 11*(4), 544-565.

Li, Y. (2018). Asymmetric Decentralization, Intergovernmental Tansfers, And Expenditure Policies Of Local Government. *Frontiers Of Economics In China*, 13(2), 223-248.

Mahendra, A. (2017). Analysis Of The Effect Of Economic Growth, Per Capita Income, Inflation And Unemployment On The Number Of Poor People In North Sumatra Province [*Analisis Pengaruh Pertumbuhan Ekonomi, Pendapatan Perkapita, Inflasi Dan Pengangguran Terhadap Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Di Provinsi Sumatera Utara*]. *Journal Of Accounting And Finance Research* [*Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Keuangan*].

Mankiw, G. (2007). Macroeconomics, Sixth Edition [*Makroekonomi, Edisi Keenam*]. *Jakarta : Erlangga.*

Marlisa, E., & Blesia, J. (2018). Fiscal Dependence In A Special Autonomy Region: Evidence From A Local Government In Eastern Indonesia. *Journal Of Economic Development, Environment And People, 7*(8), 55-72.

Miranti, R., Vidyattama, Y., Hansnata, E., Cassells, R., & Duncan, A. (2013). Tends In Poverty And Inequality In Decentralising Indonesia. *OECD Social, Employment And Migration Working*, 148.

Mirsan, M., Hamzah, N., & Sjufri, M. (2019). The Influence Of Investment, Per Capita GRDP And Regional Original Income On The Degree Of Fiscal Independence [*Pengaruh Investasi, PDRB Perkapita dan Pendapatan Asli Daerah Terhadap Derajat Kemandirian Fiskal*]. *PARADOX: Journal Of Economics* [*PARADOKS: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi*], 2(2).

Nuraeni, Y., & Suratno. (2015). The Influence Of PAD, DAU, DAK And DOK On Gross Regional Domestic Product [*Pengaruh*

PAD, DAU, DAK Dan DOK Terhadap Produk Domestik Regional Bruto]. Journal Of Accounting And Taxation Research [*Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Perpajakan,* 2(1).

Nurcholis, H. (2017). *Asymmetric Local Government And Its Model Of Oversight* [*Pemerintahan Lokal Asimetris dan Model Pengawasannya].*

Patra, A. (2017). Analysis Of Regional (Tax Efforts) In Supporting The Increase Of PAD In Palopo [*Analisis Upaya Pajak Daerah (Tax Effort) Dalam Mendukung Peningkatan PAD Kota Palopo].* Prosiding Seminar Nasional, 3(1), 72-81.

Pratama, N. & Utama, M. (2019). The Effect Of Government Expenditures And Investments On Economic Growth And Poverty Levels In Regency/City Of Bali Province [*Pengaruh Pengeluaran Pemerintah Dan Investasi Terhadap Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Dan Tingkat Kemiskinan Di Kabupaten/ Kota Provinsi Bali].* E-Journal Of Economics And Business Udayana University [*E-Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Bisnis Universitas Udayana],* 8(7), 652-80.

Prastiwi, N., & Aji, A. (2020). The Influence Of Regional Original Income, Balancing Funds, Privileges Funds And Capital Expenditures On Regional Government Financial Performance [*Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah, Dana Perimbangan, Dana Keistimewaan dan Belanja Modal Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah].* Journal Of Business Studies [*Jurnal Kajian Bisnis],* 28(1).

Pronosokodewo, B. (2018). The Effect Of Privilege Funds On Community Welfare And Poverty In The Special Region Of Yogyakarta With Capital Expenditures And Economic Growth

As Intervening Variables [*Pengaruh Dana Keistimewaan Terhadap Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Dan Kemiskinan Di Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta Dengan Belanja Modal Dan Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Sebagai Variabel Intervening].* Repository STIE YKPN Yogyakarta.

Putri, Z. (2015). Analysis Of The Effect Of Regional Original Income (PAD), General Allocation Funds (DAU) And Inflation On Economic Growth In Regencies, Cities, Central Java Province [*Analisis Pengaruh Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD), Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) Dan Inflasi Terhadap Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Di Kabupaten Kota Provinsi Jawa Tengah].* Journal Of Business And Management ESSENCE [*Jurnal Bisnis Dan Manajemen ESENSI],* 5(2).

Sakir, & Mutiarin, D. (2015). Budget Policy For The Special Region Of Yogyakarta [*Kebijakan Anggaran Dana Keistimewaan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta].* Journal Of Government Science And Political Policy [*Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan Dan Kebijakan Politik],* 2(3).

Sania, H., Yunita, E., & Mutaqqin, I. (2018). The Influence Of Population, Gross Regional Domestic Product And Inflation On Regional Tax Revenue In Regencies And Cities In Central Java Province [*Pengaruh Jumlah Penduduk, Produk Domestik Regional Bruto Dan Inflasi Terhadap Penerimaan Pajak Daerah Pada Kabupaten Dan Kota Di Povinsi Jawa Tengah].* Permana Journal [*Jurnal Permana],* 9(2), 74-86.

Setiawan, D., Ulfa, K., & Purwaningsih, T. (2020). Poor Aceh: The Impact Of Special Autonomy As Effort Poverty Reduction In Aceh. *Journal Of Public Administration* [*Jurnal Administrasi Publik],* 8(2).

Sriyana, J. (2015). Fiscal Capacity And Poverty Alleviation: A Panel Data Analysis For Yogyakarta Special Province, Indonesia. *Journal Of Development Economics [Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan], 16*(1), 1-10.

Sujarwati, Y., & Ananda, C. (2018). Analysis Of Tax Elasticity And Tax Effort Of Land And Building Rights Acquisition Fees (BPHTB) After Transfer Of Regional Taxes (Study In Gresik And Lamongan Regencies) [*Analisis Elastisitas Pajak Dan Tax Effort Bea Perolehan Hak Atas Tanah Dan Bangunan (BPHTB) Sesudah Pengalihan Pajak Daerah (Studi Pada Kabupaten Gresik Dan Lamongan)*]. FEB Student Scientific Journal [*Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa FEB], 6*(2).

Sukirno, S. (2013). Introduction To Macroeconomic Theory [*Pengantar Teori Makroekonomi*]. *Jakarta: King of Grafindo* [*Jakarta: Raja Grafindo*].

Samuelson, P., & Nordhauss, W. (2005). Macroeconomy [*Makroekonomi*]. *Jakarta: Erlangga.*

Tauda, G. (2018). Asymmetric Decentralization In The Indonesian Constitutional System [*Desentralisasi Asimetris Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Republik Indonesia*]. *Adminitrative Law & Governance Journal, 1*(4), Nov 2018.

Widarjono, A. (2013). Introduction To Econometrics And Its Applications [*Ekonometrika Pengantar dan Aplikasinya*]. *Jakarta: Salemba Four* [*Jakarta: Salemba Empat*].

Yahya, M., Muhammad, F., Hussein, M., & Razak, A. (2012). Education Expenditure And Economic Growth: A Cause Analysis for Malaysia. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 3*(7), 71-81.