

From Retail to Grocery: Money Politics in 2014 Indonesian Legislative Election

M. Faishal Aminuddin Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia

Natasha Hassan Attamimi Center for Innovation Policy and Governance, Indonesia

Abstract

Money politics is a serious problem for the improvement in the quality of democracy in Indonesia. In every election, there has been a shift or variation in the pattern of money politics. This article answers the important question of what pattern of money politics applied in the 2014 elections was. This study found that the pattern was more complex and that it involved more actors between not only candidates and voters, but also the election organizers. A case study had been used to view the pattern of money politics in the legislative elections in Surabaya and Sidoarjo during the 2014 election. This study explains the connectivity between the emergence of pragmatic-rational voters, the engagement of the party oligarchy in moving the political party machinery and the covert dealings with the election organizer.

Keywords:

Money Politics; Legislative Election; Indonesia; Political Party; Democratization

INTRODUCTION

Since the downfall of New Order authoritarian regime in 1998, money politics has become a common symptom in Indonesian elections. In 2014 legislative election, the practicing and spreading of money politics are more complex. For example, in East Java Province, there were at least 96 cases noted by the general election watch (Panitia Pengawas Pemilu, Panwaslu)

(Republika, 2014a).¹ Indonesian politics has been characterized by money politics during election, and how it controls voters, starting from grassroots people who receive a small amount of money to change their vote preferences until top-level political party's elite that get financial support from businessperson collaborators (Robinson & Hadiz, 2004). At the local level, money politics also appears in political competitions through direct local

M. Faishal Aminuddin is a lecturer at Department of Political Science, Universitas Brawijaya, Indonesia. His research focus on Democracy dan Election. Email: mfaishal@ub.ac.id.

Natasha Hasan Attamimi is a researcher in Center for Innovation Policy and Governance, Indonesia. E-mail: natashaattamimi@gmail.com.

We would like to thanks to anonymous reviewers for their comments.

¹ Anti Corruption Network East Java (Jaringan Anti Korupsi Provinsi Jawa Timur) release money politics by party in election 2014: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) with 20 cases, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) 15 cases, Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar) 14 cases, Partai Demokrat 13 cases, and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) 9 cases, Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) 7 case, Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (Hanura) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) each 5 case.

elections (Pemilihan kepala daerah langsung, Pilkada) where patron and clientilism is bounded by using the power of money (Choi, 2004).

The relationship model connecting the candidate and voters is the most important cause of the transaction. Hidayat, (2009) had shown that Pilkada in the 2005 produced massive money politics and informal governance. Electoral system changing from PR-closed list to the PR-open list with the majority vote in 2009 increasingly heightens the degree of dependency of voters to candidate figures. In terms of transaction pattern, money politics in Pilkada and legislative election were not far different. Otherwise, internal competition of candidates within political parties and the diversity of voters' backgrounds both make money politics in legislative election become more complex than Pilkada.

In other cases, corruption and electoral democracy are called the two sides of a coin, especially where the patron-client relationship is still very strong (Barr & Serra, 2010; Gupta, 1995; Mas'udi, 2002; Paldam, 2002). In a study conducted in North Sumatra, the mobilization of ethno-religious identity and money politics were found to characterize the so-called "patronage

democracy". In conclusion, the lack of capacity for democratic governance in the regions and the deep-rooted patron-client networks rendered the transition towards difficulty in democratization (Simandjuntak, 2012). Another important study on money politics in elections shows that the patron-client model links the political elite with the grassroots group (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016).

Money politics in local politics is an interesting topic. It deals with the low-income society in rural areas and How people accepting the money are affected. An insightful analysis on the stand of rural community to money politics in general election was conducted by Callaghan and MacCargo (1996). Their study in Northeastern of Thailand reveals that voters in rural areas expect lump-sum payment. The receivers of money were divided into three groups based on education and social class. Most groups outside the two categories receive cash. The middle class receive a gift in the form of goods and the upper class receive invitations for dinner and drinking before the election. In general, the study points out that a candidate needs to combine money, *phonngan* (achievement) and *bukaklik* (personal characteristic) to succeed in an election.

In other Asian democratic countries, there are different form and pattern of money politics, which were also found in established democratic countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In those countries, money politics works through scandals from politicians abusing the privilege and taking advantage of public fund for supporting their campaign (Pye, 1997). In 1999-2009 elections, money politics was done in the internal political party management where candidates gave financial support with the aim of getting support from the party machine.

This practice is commonly called "political cost" (*biaya politik*), where each of candidate must look and build an illicit relationship with their investors as financial back up (Vel, 2005); Buhler & Tan, 2007). Electoral system changing also affects the pattern of money politics spreading. However, the analysis in this article is limited to certain ways, in order to elaborate the impacts. A study by Cox (1998) demonstrates that election with PR-open list or SNTV resulted in a high-level of competition, affecting the expenses of campaign. Meanwhile, research on money politics generally uses qualitative approach; it is less able to measure the extent of money politics (Muhtadi, 2013).

Money politics was done conventionally in election 1999, 2004 and 2009 under a retail system in which transactions were made directly between candidates and voters by involving some mediators such as heads of village and local strongman who became clients of politicians. The implementation ran hierarchically as it happened within the period of New Order regime. During that period, bureaucracy had a dominant position in the government structure at the national and village level. In rural areas, such as *pemerintahan desa* (village government), the power of bureaucracy in villages is used by politicians as political instrument to support them in elections and in getting votes. In fact, there was a changing condition in election 2014 in which rational-pragmatic voters cause bureaucracy up to village level to be not useful. It supposedly pushed the candidates to select a grocery system involving relation between candidates, voters, political party oligarchy, and the election organizer.

This article starts with the following questions: to what the extent the voters' stand against money politics has been shifting? How to identify that voters' stand to money politics influences candidacy in the legislative election? This article

proposes that money politics cannot work effectively without suffering from the network and other causes. Specifically, this study investigates the causality between characteristics of voter and their acceptance of money politics with shifting model of transaction by various stakeholders, including in the process of electoral campaign (Aspinall et al, 2017; Callahan & McCargo, 1996; Nichter, 2008).

In this article, we report on a case study conducted in the Municipality of Surabaya and Regency of Sidoarjo, covering election district area (Daerah pemilihan, Dapil) I of East Java province to the national parliament. This area was selected based on three categories. First, it can explain the two characteristics of different voters, between the urban represented by Surabaya and Sidoarjo representing the rural area. Second, the map of political power is more plural, proven by the distribution of political party votes. Money politics represents a condition which generally develops to fulfil praxis needs throughout the electoral agenda. The praxis terms of money politics can be seen in several patterns, such as money-giving and treatment to a stakeholder or shareholder even to a society or any activity relevant to the

electoral process. That activity is defined as money politics. This paper attempts to examine several conditions regarding money politics practice and its mechanism by the structure beforehand. It is clear that money politics becomes one of the most problematic issues to address political voters' behavior and preferences.

This article consists on four parts. The first part explains a new type of voters related their stand against money politics. This is based on a study which was performed by the Laboratory of Politics and Policy Engineering (LAPORA), Universitas Brawijaya (2014).² The second part analyzes candidates' responses to voters related to model of transaction. The third part explores stakeholders 'relationship within the electoral campaign process. The last section presents findings on the candidacy process in Surabaya and Sidoarjo, resulting in a grocery model of transaction by candidates as an effective way to win the votes. Survey data and interview results were descriptively analyzed with clarification from reliable

² Survey conducted in March-April 2014 with multistage random sampling to 390 respondents. Respondents shared their understanding that money politics is the use of money, goods and incentives with expectations of getting votes in in general elections.

mass media sources. The analysis included a causal relationship between legislative candidate as independent variable and dependent variables, comprising three parts: voter, political party and election organizer.

Data of Survey: Voters' Stand on Money Politics

Survey data are important to be further analyzed. Voters' behavior is closely related to their preferences. This condition also leads to the bargaining system conducted by candidates, manifested as one of candidates' platforms to obtain benefits which commonly trigger the ideas of money politics. Through the survey, it can clearly be seen that voters have their particular preferences to maintain or organize their own preferences, their consideration to vote or perhaps to receive those 'money politics' or to refuse, even to their own affiliation to the candidates. In Indonesia, these 'fraud' things were classified by their political view, such as their own eagerness to give brief research to the candidates' profile in order to make a proper vote, how exactly the pragmatic voters behave, or what kind of organization giving implications to the candidates related to voters' behavior to

vote. This voter s' condition is also related to how they pursued information from their political preferences and how they conducted certain way of voting.

A survey can measure more precisely the rise of money politics at the mass level. For example, it was contributed by the lack of voters' closeness to the party. Party ID trends continue to decline due to poor party performance in the eyes of voters. As a result, voters move away from the party and political costs are increasingly expensive as voters tend to resort to a transactional approach with the party (Muhtadi, 2013). These findings provide clues that as organizations, political parties have a very serious de-legitimacy of beliefs. However, it should be seen further, whether the candidate factors carried by the party also contributes to the assessment of the image of the party in general.

We will explain the results of the survey to identify voters' stand to money politics during 2014 legislative election. This is important to obtain the features of voters' stand and how far the effectiveness of partis' or candidates' campaign by using money to increase their votes. As table 1 indicates, the survey result can be classified into in three findings. First,

Table 1. Respondents' Stand on Money Politics

Variabel		Accept and Vote	Accept not vote	Accept amount of money	Accept on the giver	Refuse
Area	Surabaya	10	79	14	80	64
	Sidoarjo	4	23	12	71	33
Relious Organization	NU	4	49	3	53	28
	Muhammadiyah	0	4	0	1	2
	Not-affiliated	8	48	23	94	60
Party Affiliation	PDIP	1	3	0	9	4
	PKB	0	1	0	3	1
	Not-affiliated	12	93	26	128	87
Occupation	Housewives	3	27	12	20	17
	Private Sector	8	54	9	44	34
	Labor/Employer	3	16	4	62	21
Income	IDR 500.000 -1 million/month	1	12	7	30	17
	IDR 1-2 million/month	6	69	9	62	44
	IDR 2-5 million/month	3	19	3	45	34
Level of Education	Junior School	8	20	7	21	16
	High School	3	49	14	68	42
	Bachelor	2	4	4	29	27

Source: Political Behavior in Legislative Election 2014: case study in East Java electoral district I, FISIP Brawijaya University, 2015". Recounted by author.

there is no difference between the characteristics of voters from urban and rural areas as well as based on organizational affiliation or political party. Voters in Surabaya and Sidoarjo are pragmatic. In Surabaya, 183 respondents received money with a few notes. Those who refuse were only 64 respondents. In Sidoarjo, 110 respondents received money and 33 respondents refused. For respondents that expressed themselves in organizations, the followers of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) chose to receive money politics with consideration of who the giver is and received the money by considering the amount. NU reflected the

typology of religious and conservative organizations. From respondents affiliated to a political party, the biggest number is the followers of Indonesia Democratic-Struggle Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP). Their stand is similar to that of the NU followers (Table 1).

On average, there is a discrepancy of political views from members of NU and PDIP due to the formal policy by their organization. Officially, both NU and PDIP have an agreement to forbid the practice of money politics. In legislative elections, organizational authority of NU East Java regional board has called on rejection to

money politics and considers it risywah (bribery) which is banned by law (haram) (Biyanto, 2010); Masudi in Basyaib & Makarim (2010). The same opinion was expressed and affirmed by PDIP that condemned the beneficiary of money politics as small corruptors. This lack of political stand view from both NU and PDIP followers is the evidence that voters have an independent preference and neglect the organization's instruction. They select something that gives benefits directly without considering ethical and moral consequences from their preference.

Second, from the division of work variable, respondents working in private employment such as factory employees, shopkeepers, expedition drivers with incomes between IDR 1-2 million/month - about 85 respondents - had a stand to receive money politics. Small businesspersons cover merchants, workers, farmers and fishers with income IDR 2-5 million/month; 115 respondents received money politics. Households were also the biggest one receiving money. The data suggest that the acceptance to money politics was not only dominated by voters with low income. Voters with higher income that belong to the middle class also voluntarily receive money.

Money politics is considered an extra profit for them. In the first and second variable above, money politics was received widely. In the third variable, education background had different findings; money politics receivers came from group with high school education background (134 respondents), followed by bachelor (39); the lowest education background was junior school (16). Education is an important factor affecting the voters' stand on money politics. The more educated the voters, the greater the possibility they reject money politics.

The data above confirm that the number of pragmatic voters is larger than the numbers of voters who refuse the money. From the category of receivers, the highest one includes those who "receive but do not select the candidate" and "receive with consideration of who the giver is". However, the stands of the respondents to money politics in Surabaya and Sidoarjo were: receiving and selecting the candidate (3.6 percent), receiving but not selecting the candidate (26.2 percent), receiving with consideration of the amount of money or the gift (6.7 percent), receiving with consideration of who the giver is (38.7 percent) and refusing the money (24.9 percent). Voters have a stand to receives money politics

properly because it can give profit directly. It is determined by two causes. First, receiving money openly is caused by preliminary information that enables violation on the money politics which can affect the candidate and their party image. Second, there is a shifting understanding from money politics as bribery to an ordinary gift based on philanthropy from candidates.

Candidates' Response to Pragmatic Voter

How does money transform into votes? The majority of voters receives money politics as something fair and acceptable. Most legislative candidates for the national parliament must provide high political cost. It will be equal to the amount for campaign through mass media especially for advertisement. They spend extra budget assigned to treat the voters who need them. Based on data from Institutions Economic and Social Research, Universitas Indonesia (LPEM-UI), an average House of Representatives candidate needs to spend around around IDR 1,18 billion to conduct a campaign in order to occupy legislative seats (Republika, 2014b).

The use of money during the campaign period is considered a symbol of power. Potential voters tend to choose

leaders who show their prosperity as a manifestation of power that will ensure patron abilities to satisfy clients (Simandjuntak, 2012). In particular, the cases of money politics in some areas have different typologies, but the general picture can be judged; converting from goods or money to the votes. In other areas, such as East Java, money politics is regarded as common, even some clerics in Lirboyo, Kediri, declared that money politics is lawful and natural as an "effort" of those who want to serve as regional heads or council members. The amount of money also varies. In East Kalimantan, for example, money ranging from IDR 20,000 to IDR 5 million was given through successful teams, village heads and ordinary citizens (Qodir, 2014). This study provides empirical evidence that money politics has become a compulsory tool for politicians to gain support and it is compatible with the entire political culture already established in the society.

Understanding the change of voters' political stand for money politics is more effective in spending their money. The candidates would bring more concentration and respond to pragmatic voters with various strategies, such as

combining money politics with philanthropic activities.

Each candidate has channel to introduce himself during campaign. This was conducted to open communication and access to voters in general. The most common way used is to paste up picture invitation and procedure being vote ballot which aim to make voting process is easily to do. The other way is presenting a dialogical campaign, but this is not popular because mass concentration is limited. The campaign technique above is different compared to transformation campaign as performed in Japan. Pye, (1997) mentioned that Japanese politicians performed indoor meetings in the house and inside hotel because the rule prohibited the spending of campaign fund for television, radio and mass media. Political party only installs the name of his or her candidate and party affiliation in open-air campaign. In addition, candidates must be attending near party constituent home to express their programs and political promise in limited forums.

In Indonesia, response by candidates against the rise of pragmatic-rational voters is different. The most commonly used strategy is to perform incentive adjustment given to voters intended to

make of money politics not vulgar. In the process, before doing serangan fajar (dawn attack), other word for delivering cash money early morning before election, each candidate has had certain programs that drew up themselves to voters. This is the safest way to avoid the risk related to money politics violation. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, 2014) found that half of the candidates has much smaller wealth than the cost of the campaign. Campaign cost at district level is estimated to be around IDR 2 billion. The program performed in early phase of socialization and campaign and spread between of a year to a week before election (Kompas.com, 2016). These programs aim to strengthen the bond with voter and to discover the two-way communication between candidate and voters.

The pattern of money distribution in a sporadic way as seen in the election 2004 and 2009 is going obsolete. Distribution of money is safer as far as deliver secretly by family member of candidate or someone who have special relationship with constituent. In previous method, money delivering and distributed by official member of party, village chief, government officer or broker (botoh) and people who do not recognized. The

money distributors had also should be able to find out its receiver to have measurable commitment and dropping choice to candidate. As mentioned in previous discussion that pragmatic-rational voter has a notion that whole gift from whomever for the sake of balloting is valid to received. They consider that gift as fortune. Usually, voter can receive four to five envelopes which contain small notes between IDR 20,000 to IDR 100.000.

In the region of Karangpilang, Surabaya, some candidates sold food package including rice, coconut oil, milk and sugar with 50 percent lower price than the market price. This way was used as part of potential voter inventory as well as a test case for the distribution network that can give their votes. As a lesson learned from the previous election, money or gift from candidate given with sporadic ways cannot affect the votes. In that condition, some treatments were performed by candidates and their team to build volunteer network similar to the model of multilevel marketing. They checked the beneficiary and assured voters to give their vote in the ballot. The involvement of the election organizer as a collaborator is needed. Responses from candidate is the important factor to the

effectiveness of vote gain in the election. Candidates that select retail strategy by delivering money and other materials are most likely to be defeated. Meanwhile, candidates that use grocery strategy may win the competition. The next discussion will show the mechanism or relationships among the actors in which the candidate is an independent variable and the dependent variables are party oligarchy, voter and general election organizer. Those are portraying grocery strategy.

From Retail to Grocery

In Indonesia, rules about district magnitude (Daerah Pemilihan, Dapil) produce a tight competition. For example, in one Dapil, there are between 3-10 seats at stake. High political cost resulting in tightened internal rule of candidacy makes it difficult for parties to provide funding for all candidates. Each political party only takes over the cost for candidate list socialization and campaign fares collectively. The goal is that the voter cans understand the party programs and the short profile of their candidates. Extensive campaign by each candidate is the responsibility of the candidates themselves even though the parties still get benefits directly from candidate expenses, especially, to increase party

image and also to recruit party agents in the field, and place them as eyewitnesses during the election time.

Voter pragmatism has a significant correlation with the candidate electability. Candidate must hold their political cost and share cash money not only at the moment of election, but also until the vote counting by election commission. In grocery system, there are not many differences between incumbent candidates and newcomers to gain the vote strategy, except in terms of public fund using. Incumbent candidates had chosen at election 2004 or 2009, in previous election having to use public financing that sticks at his or her task as members of parliament. They have program fund commonly called pork barrel funds that stem from government budget and channeled with their constituent (Aspinall, 2014). Incumbent candidates usually can use other sources of financial support by closely working with executive government that becomes their partner to formulate the budgeting allocation. As members of parliament, the incumbent have agreed to deal with bureaucracy regarding budget distribution for development program and other programs such as agriculture grant addressed to their constituency areas.

Program fund was used as part of money politics by members of parliaments and gave them an opportunity to be re-elected as candidates.

In 2014 election, incumbent candidate could freely use public funds to support their campaign. KPK took actions to prevent application of program fund by members of parliament. They released regulation number B-14 / 01-15 / 01 / 2014 dated 6 January 2014 on the prohibition of liquefaction of social relief fund close to elections. In this regulation, KPK has appealed to the grant and Social Fund (Bantuan Sosial, Bansos) adhering to the principles of fairness, decency, rationality and extensive benefits for the society. It is expected that the diversion of funds away from private interest groups and political interests of district administrations. Furthermore, they also mentioned that regional leaders were expected to pay attention to the timing of Bansos funds and grants, so unimpressed made in relation to the elections (Investor Daily, 03/02/2014). The regulation also spread, followed by all government institutions and state-owned enterprises that potentially have corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund. This is more effective to minimize public fund abuse, but with an exception for incumbent

candidates who had managed their official constituent budget such as dana reses (annual constituency fund) and jasmans (public aspiration fund). Pork barrel fund in their previous office can also be managed as social investment and ready to activate their network in the next election. For incumbents who have social capital previously established, they spend just a little money for their constituent, then securing their political cost to election organizer to find out that their vote will not steal.

Either incumbent candidate or newcomer must assign high cost for supporting their party. Every party need supporting fund for socialization, campaign and payment of eyewitness (biaya saksi) in ballot poll (Tempat Pemungutan Suara, TPS). Incumbent and newcomer candidate are struggling to gain support from party oligarchy. This oligarchy is the strongest faction that controls parties and has a major effect on the party machine. Both candidates also need good access and intensive communications with electoral organizer either through Local Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD) or lower level in chairperson of district election committee (PPK) and committee in ballot poll either PPS or KPPS.

Party internal management policy has some differences of procedure in managing constituent support bases to their candidate that profiting party vote. There are three common procedures chosen by parties to fit within their internal competition. First, parties allow free competition among their candidate. Second, parties have internal rules to scatter their candidate based on grass-root support. Third, parties through their oligarch have set up candidates who have special contribution or have high connectivity with the parties. Small parties choose the first procedure because they want to get votes as much as possible with their candidate efforts. They do not care who the candidates are. The second choice is popular among big parties that have traditional constituency.

In PDIP, candidates who are nominated in elections should not come from outside of party cadres. Despite handing over fully competition among their candidate, party still manage constituency base from each candidate. To the phase of candidate nomination, parties filtering grass-root support for their candidate then decided to each candidate to uphold their support in the area which had set up. For example: candidate A claim for constituent bases in area 1, 2, 3

and so on. He or she must prove with acceptable support from official member of subdivision of branch (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, DPC) including district level (Pimpinan Anak Cabang, PAC) and village level (Ranting). When candidate A has plenty support then party disallowed another candidate to expand their support around candidate A.

The third procedure is generally chosen by other big parties such as Golkar Party which have had a long tradition to support the inner circle of party oligarch. Besides that, Golkar is also accepted as a normal procedure in middle parties to picked up maximum vote for special candidate. Those candidates should be able to cope with several obligations given by the party, such as the requirement that the candidate must possess several things, such as dedication, electability, functionary assignment and level of education (DPP Golkar Decree, 2013). These parties are more selective, avoiding free competition among their candidates because their limited support bases and worry which caused confusion among the constituent and affected degradation of vote. This is reasonable because they do not have traditional constituency and just concern on rational and swing voters. Party settles

support to no more than two potential candidates informally which performed and proposed by elite official members of party. Decision to select certain candidate is followed with mobilization of party machine. This affected other candidates who are not selected as potential candidates; they must go with their limited capital and have a small chance to get significant vote. Selected candidates also spend higher political cost than their counterparts. Ordinary candidates who do not have big capital only stand passively in campaign.

Case Study in Surabaya and Sidoarjo

In this section, we will explain the relationships and causality amongst the actors based on the case study conducted in Surabaya and Sidoarjo. In table 2, we provide the patterns of relationships between candidate, political party and election organizer based on their strengths and abilities. The pattern can explain effectiveness by candidate to get support and guarantee to secure their vote. They need enough money and social capital which can affect voters through socialization through mass media and preserving relation with other external organizations.

Table 2. Relation among Stakeholder in Election

Stakeholder	Strength	Influence	Mobilization
Candidate	Money, popularity, campaign team	Mass media, society organization, professional association.	Public opinion, mass campaign
Political Party	Party machinery, Ideology,	Party wing, organizational structure	Party Eyewitness
Election Organizer	Authority, Procedure	Instruction, logistics	Local committee (PPK, PPS, KPPS)

Source: Developed by authors.

Every candidate must have a good relationship with the political party board and election organizers. Through political parties, candidates have the ability to organize party witnesses to secure vote acquisition. The candidate must also have a large social capital when they do not have big money capital. By doing so, they are able to influence voters through various activities, socializing their personal image or program through mass media and establishing good relations with certain civil society organizations. This influence can be used to mobilize voters and reduce cost for public opinion campaign (Buehler & Tan, 2007; Erb & Sulistiyanto, 2009). In the Indonesia's post-2009 election with PR-open list voting system with the most votes, political parties had an interest to display their legislative candidates listed in the specimen of ballot paper even though the strength of the support of political parties lies in the party infrastructure at the lower level. Mobilization of support can be done

on the basis of ideological ties and the achievement of the ideals of the party program. Nevertheless, in some political parties, the high level of factionalism causes fairness in the intra-party competition amongst the candidates cannot be executed properly. The impact is that the factions fought not over the will of political parties as an organization, but a handful of political elites and directed all party forces to win certain candidates.

How much political cost must a candidate spend? For candidates selected by a party, they have a responsibility to account partly equal to the expenses of the party. Biggest cost is for the payment of eyewitness, then campaign in mass media and meetings with official members at the lowest level. Extra budget must also be spent by the candidate for the charge to cover media socialization, network formation, internal meeting and honorarium for their team (Hadiz, 2004; Sidel, 2005). As an illustration, party needs fund to pay eyewitness in ballot

polls. On average, one eyewitness is paid between IDR100,000-200,000/day. If a party needs 5000 persons in each Dapil to work on more than 60 percent of total coverage of ballot poll, then the party spends at least between IDR.500 million to IDR 1 billion. That cost does not include preparation of data, transport and training fare.

In 2014 election, parties which earned their seats for national parliament were PDIP (3), PKB (2), Golkar, Gerindra, PAN, PKS and Demokrat which obtained 1 seat for each party. PDIP has traditional constituency in Surabaya and PKB has votes mostly from members of NU in Sidoarjo. For their candidate, all parties put member of national board or party figure in local level in the first and middle list of ballots. This is part of strategy to response of PR -open list electoral system with majority vote which party has goal to making their potential candidates' power and influence as vote-getter. Even the existence of sequence number is not ending the candidate can get higher vote than candidate who put in bellow list. PDIP and PKB have benefit from mobilization by their local leader and party majority in parliament. PDIP is the main party in Surabaya local parliament and placed their representatives as mayor

of municipality. PKB also is the main party and dominate Sidoarjo local parliament which put their local board chairperson as Head of Regent of Sidoarjo.

PDIP has an internal procedure as discussed in the previous part and give an opportunity to newcomer candidates to get many votes. Candidates from PDIP winning the seat for national parliament both were incumbent candidates, Guruh Soekarno Putra, a member of national board and Indah Kurnia (Tempo, 2014). Another seat was obtained by Henky Kurniadi widely known as a professional and cultural event activist. He was not a party board member but was able to organize constituent from middle class voters. The procedure chosen by PDIP Surabaya resulted in fair competition among their candidates and reduced impacts on political cannibalism. For other parties like Golkar and Demokrat, they must compete in tightening to fight over constituent bases that are equal. This is the cause that pushes parties to manage their strategy and avoid free competition among their candidates. Mobilization of party machine does not only rely on the ideological consideration or attainment of party goal, but also has

to exceed party factions to give support to potential candidates.

It is interesting to see Golkar as a party which can explore how they manage party backing to potential candidates. Adies Kadir is a member of Surabaya local parliament from Golkar and runs as national parliament candidate in the 2014 election. His position as a provincial board member of a party also becomes an important credit to obtain support by local parliament candidates both from Surabaya or Sidoarjo (Kompas.com, 2014). Both Adies and local parliament candidates had shared the same constituent with different choice of level candidacy from local, provincial and national parliament. He just brings donation as contribution to local candidate to mobilizing constituent in each area which they running for. Networking partner between candidates with same party but different of candidacy level is effective. Adies have not good access and support from voter in Sidoarjo but his partner in local area support him through his or her campaign.

Golkar did not declare officially to support Adies as potential candidate who have special support from party machine. Although it could be trace with statement and party organization works to support

his candidacy. The support from party oligarchy and its factions can obtain when there is no problem in communications about capital distribution between candidate and oligarch. Inner circle of Adies success team named with AK5 also gather many organizations of Golkar political wing (underbouw) such as MKGR. Their back up can recognized when Adies had attacked by outsider related to vote burglary allegation. Adies was counter back that allegation with accused that electoral watch commission (Badan Pengawas Pemilu, Bawaslu) receive amount IDR 1 billion to issuing recommendation (Detik). Internal support also came from chairperson of Golkar provincial board released officially that all cadre and official member of Golkar to guard and winning Adies (Tribunnews, 2015). After investigation and recounting the ballot box by authority, Bawaslu recommendation was invalid. Adies defeated his rival, Priyo Budi Santoso, vice chairperson of national parliament as incumbent candidate.

In a condition where party has supported their candidate, the next agenda is how to create a relation with the election organizer. Role of election organizer, in this case including KPU and their hierarchical committee and Bawaslu

or Panwaslu as electoral watch and supervision, are important to viewed. KPU has authority to handling the election that means in procedures, logistics until counting vote. They have hierarchical committee that covers all ballot poll (TPS) such as PPS, KPPS and PPK. KPU also held performs summarizing of vote, announcement of result and certify the vote to seat conversion. With the big authority, either party or candidate must have good access and communications with all KPU's commissioner member or one of them. The purpose of relation could be guaranteeing the safety of their vote and protect it from burglary from summarization of vote in TPS until validation in national level. Case of money transaction between candidate with PPK had reported to Bawaslu was appear in Pasuruan Regent. Candidate gives IDR 128 million to 13 member of PPK to arrange vote bribery. But it did not work and the candidate failed to get high vote (Tempo, 2014). Election organizer can play role and performs insincerity in summarizing vote. Official report has acclaimed that public complain on vote bribery in East Java province on election 2014 reaches 200 reports (Kompas.com, 2014).

Illicit games by election organizer to support the candidate who had paid to them are not easy to prove. Candidate build informal relations through party oligarchy or directly for make sure that they can collaborate with party eyewitness in ballot poll. Eyewitness has position as spearhead for party alignment that some candidate would supported by party. Occasionally, eyewitness with PPK under party oligarch order can change the vote in term of adding or subtraction of vote in counting vote process. This has been emerging problem of vote distension, bribery, and vote trading where the main commodity is result of vote summary before validated by KPU. Committee member of KPPS and PPK have the right to open and change security form (C1 form) which contain summarization of vote in each ballot poll. PPK also have strategic right in voter enrollment, compiling PPS committee and deliver election logistic. For they work, state had paid them around IDR 450,000 for chairperson and IDR 400,000 for member (Jawapos, 07 February 2015).

In an interview, a member of PPK in Surabaya mentions that insincerity in election that involves PPK can happen when they opened to make transaction with party or candidate. For exception,

even are PPK committee that holds firmly his or her neutral position as election organizer, but they also had seen their colleague playing cheating game. Before validated by KPU, ballot poll that contain vote summary result saved by PPS and PPK and this phase to become starting point for emerging vulnerability to vote manipulation. From some information, candidate must release average between IDR 40-100 million to buy and broke the credibility of KPPS and PPK. Candidate or their success team lobby to KPPS must be done with smooth. For example, in Surabaya, a party had asked KPPS to look for 100 votes in TPS and party offering new motorbike unit. KPPS or committee of PPS and PPK also ask to perform data of potential voter by collecting signature and identity card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, KTP) of voter. For this job, each committee given cash money more than IDR 500,000 for hundred potential voters (Interview with Dayat, 06/04/2014).

From the case study above, there is a relationship between stakeholders or actors with the impact on the candidacy process in the legislative elections. Each actor has a strength as capital to be exchanged. Besides having the money, candidates must also ensure possessed influence and mobilization tools. They

also need political party machinery to support and ensure the mobilization done effectively. After that, the candidate must establish good relationships with the organizers of the election. Thus, the transactional process involving money politics of the candidates, can be controlled starting from distribution, effectiveness and safety. In the 2014 legislative elections, the candidate who uses the grocery model had shown getting much higher level of success. Even if the cost can vary, depending on the model the relationship between candidates with other actors such as political parties and election organizer.

The relationship between legislative candidates, party oligarchy and election organizers is key to explaining transactional politics on a more massive and systematic scale. The costs incurred by candidates can be more predictable, with a higher success rate. Transactional politics in the 2014 election has a different pattern than the previous elections. The conditions that drive the behavior of political actors involved in transactional politics are: the emergence of rational-pragmatic voters. They are willing to accept money from candidate brokers who are identified as having proximity to voters.

CONCLUSION

This article presents three important findings that explain why money politics works has shifting variation in 2014 general election. First, emerging rational-pragmatic voters that make candidates who perform money politics is not only build relationship only with voter but more systematic and involves both political party and general election organizer at once. I called this phenomenon is transformation from retail to grocery system. Second, electoral system with PR-open list with majority vote pushes political cannibalism among candidates even for exception in a few parties like PDIP. This system makes candidate not able and only rely on party support. They must have maximum struggle to get support from the voter. This condition results in the increase of political cost because it must be used to ascertain support from the voter, oligarch and electoral organizer. Third, grocery system in money politics has a big destructive power for democratization in Indonesia.

This system works effectively and systematically under the lack of supervision by the independent electoral watch. Consequently, it raises straightening of violation of election, weakens and disability of party

accountability to deliver good candidate selection and both party and their politician have high dependency against money as main capital and transaction as a tool to winning election. Different from the findings of research in Thailand, in the Indonesian 2014 legislative election examined in this case study, there are strategies of diversification and extension of network depending on money politics. It confirms there is combination between money politics with other causes including personal such as individual figure and candidate achievement. Additionally, also involving various actors who have special authority to exchange their power under political transaction.

REFERENCES

- Aspinall, E., & Sukmajati, M. (Eds). (2016). *Electoral dynamics in Indonesia: Money politics, patronage and clientelism at the grassroots*. NUS Press.
- Aspinall, E. (2014). The distribution of money, goods and other benefits is an integral part of electioneering in Indonesia. *Inside Indonesia*, 116: Apr-J.
- Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2010). *Corruption and culture: An experimental*

- analysis. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(11–12), 862–869.
- Basyaib, H., & Makarim, N. A. (eds). (2010). *Korupsi Pemilu di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Indonesian Corruption Watch.
- Biyanto. (2010). Pemberantasan Korupsi dan Perwujudan Integritas Publik dalam Perspektif Muhammadiyah dan NU. *Jurnal Penelitian Keislaman*, 1(7), 29–56.
- Buehler, M., & Tan, P. (2007). Party-candidate relationships in Indonesian local politics: A case study of the 2005 regional elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province. *Indonesia*, (84), 41–69.
- Callahan, W. A., & McCargo, D. (1996). Vote-buying in Thailand's northeast: the July 1995 general election. *Asian Survey*, 36(4), 376–392.
- Choi, N. (2004). Local elections and party politics in post-Reformasi Indonesia: a view from Yogyakarta. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 26(2), 280–301.
- Erb, M., & Sulistiyanto, P. (Ed.). (2009). *Deepening democracy in Indonesia?: direct elections for local leaders (Pilkada)*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Gupta, A. (1995). Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state. *American Ethnologist*, 22(2), 375–402.
- Hadiz, V. R. (2004). Decentralization and democracy in Indonesia: A critique of neo-institutionalist perspectives. *Development and Change*, 35(4), 697–718.
- Hidayat, S. (2009). Pilkada, money politics and the dangers of “informal governance.” *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia*, 125–146.
- Kompas.com. (2014). Rebutan Kursi Sesama Golkar, Kubu Priyo Budi dilaporkan ke Polisi. Retrieved October 3, 2017, from <http://indonesiasatu.kompas.com/read/2014/05/07/1327295/rebutan.kursi.sesama.golkar.kubu.priyo.budi.dilaporkan.ke.polisi?>
- Kompas.com. (2016). Mahar Politik, Serangan Fajar, dan Suap. Retrieved September 12, 2017, from <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/03/03/10490381/Mahar.Politik.Serangan.Fajar.dan.Suap>
- KPK. (2014). KPK: Dana Bansos Rawan Dikorupsi Jelang Pemilu. Retrieved October 3, 2017, from <http://kpk.go.id/id/berita/berita->

- sub/1669-kpk-dana-bansos-rawan-dikorupsi-jelang-pemilu
- Muhtadi, B. (2013). Money Politics And Electoral Dynamics In Indonesia: A Preliminary Study Of The Interaction Between "Party-Id" And Patron-Client. *Jurnal Penelitian*, 12–25.
- Pye, L. W. (1997). Money politics and transitions to democracy in East Asia. *Asian Survey*, 37(3), 213–228.
- Qodir, Z. (2014). Politik Uang Dalam Pemilu-Pemilukada 2014: Modus dan Resolusinya. *Jurnal Administrasi Pemerintahan Daerah*, 8(2), 39–54.
- Republika. (2014a). 96 Kasus Politik Uang terjadi di Jawa Timur. Retrieved October 4, 2017, from <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/14/04/29/n4swif-96-kasus-politik-uang-terjadi-di-jatim>
- Republika. (2014b). Hasil Riset, Ini jumlah rata-rata dana kampanye Caleg DPR. Retrieved August 14, 2017, from <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/14/03/19/n2o11c-hasil-riset-ini-jumlah-ratarata-dana-kampanye-caleg-dpr>
- Robinson, Geoffrey & Hadiz, V. R. (2004). *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: Routledge.
- Sidel, J. T. (2005). Bossism and democracy in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia: towards an alternative framework for the study of "local strongmen." In *Politicising Democracy*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 51–74.
- Simandjuntak, D. (2012). Gifts and Promises: Patronage Democracy in a Decentralised Indonesia. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 11(1), 99–126.
- Survey Report. (n.d.). Voter behavior changing in Surabaya and Sidoarjo. 2014.
- Tempo. (2014). 56 Kasus Pelanggaran Kode Etik Pemilu dilaporkan. Retrieved September 17, 2017, from <https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2014/05/07/078575926/56-kasus-pelanggaran-kode-etik-pemilu-dilapo>
- Tribunnews. (2015). Ditunjuk jadi anggota MKD, Adies Kadir bantah jadi loyalis Setya Novanto. Retrieved October 3, 2017, from <http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2015/11/28/ditunjuk-jadi-anggota-mkd-adies-kadir-bantah-jadi-loyalis-setya-novanto>

Vel, J. (2005). Pilkada in East Sumba: an old rivalry in a new democratic setting. *Indonesia*, 80, 81–107.