

Patterns of Power Relation of Street Vendors in Bandung City

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Abstract

This article discusses how power relation run in daily life and how they relate in governing public issue within multi-stakeholders' context. The setting of this relations is in the governance of street vendors in Bandung City. Street vendors is usually perceived as problem for urban governance, not only for public convenience and order, but also as spatial or territorial contestation among various actors, namely street vendors, the City Government of Bandung, and the public. In this spatial contestation, there is a power relation that connects various interests and demonstrates the network pattern of actors in fighting for their interests. This article is purposed for mapping of street vendor's power relation pattern. By mapping the pattern of power relation, it is expected that the handling of street vendors can be more substantive in addressing the source of the problem, and it does not just focus on the eviction on the surface. This research used qualitative method. Data collection technique contains participative observation, through interview with street vendors, city government officials, street vendors association, and focus group discussion. The research result found three patterns of power relation in governing street vendors. The first pattern, street vendors use the association of street vendors as the mediator in negotiating the problem they face. The second pattern, street vendors use the local community of street vendors as the mediator. The third pattern, street vendors use non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the mediator.

Keywords

Power Relation; Policy; Public Issue; Spatial Contestation; Street Vendors

INTRODUCTION

Power relations are not only about elite, it can also happen in very daily practices (Clegg & Haugaard, 2009; Isaac, 1997; Lukes, 2005), as among

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street vendors. Scrutinizing power relations amongst street vendors with the case study of Bandung city is interesting because the Government of Bandung City had implemented various policies to govern street vendors, from fully prohibition to zonation. This policies' transformation indicates how government perceives street vendors. From city convenience and order, the existence of street vendors is rather seen as disruption because of their occupation in public space (trotoar). This point of view contributed the policy model of prohibition for street vendors.

Local government apparatus is functioned as disciplinary institution to enforce local regulation regarding city's convenience, cleanliness, and order. Street vendors is prohibited to trade in public trotoar, and when they violated this regulation, the government would seize their shanties.

In recent years, mode of governing street vendors has changed into more friendly approach. Due to human right, democracy, and participatory issues, the government adopt more open policy to govern street vendors. They are considered as part of stakeholder in the city economy, which is as actors in informal sector of local economy. This point of view contributed the policy of giving limited permission for street vendors based on zonation. The Government of Bandung City declared three (3) zonation or permitted location for street vendors, which are red zonation (prohibit location), yellow zonation (partial location for street vendors), and green zonation (open location for street vendors). The implementation of this regulation is interesting because although this regulation acknowledges the existence of street vendors as informal economy actors, even permit them to trade in green zonation, but there are still obstacles in the policy implementation.

Policy implementation is far from just a technical dimension of policy process, rather it is a political contestation for governing resources (Grindle, 2017). Therefore, we need to look deeper into contextual dimensions of power relations behind the implementation of public policy. This

contextual dimensions is consist of identifying the strategic actors; what is their interests; and how they relate to each other's (Grindle, 2017), which at the end construct the pattern of power relation that could be used to optimize policy implementation.

The existence of informal sector is inseparable from the development policy which puts more importance on the urban sector that people migrate from rural areas to urban areas to pursue a better life. The percentage of urban workforces working in the informal sector is between 40% and 70% with the average of 50% (Todaro, 2000). Most of the informal economy sector operates in commerce. Therefore, there are many retailers, such as street peddlers, traveling vendors, or known as street vendors.

Street vendors' activities generally take place in centers of urban activities, mainly in trade centers. They occupy road surfaces, sidewalks, and narrow alleys and they even block public spaces not allocated for trading, hence the presence of street vendors has caused some problems, such as creating slum areas, disorders, traffic jams, reducing the function of sidewalks, degrading the beauty and aesthetics of the city, and causing social crisis.

The situation has urged the city government to make policies on street vendors, taking the form of eviction, relocation, arrangement, supervision, and others. However, the policies have not been able to optimally address the problem of street vendors. Although the street vendors have been frequently evicted, arranged, and supervised, their

presence in public places continues to become a trend and they continue to appear, and they even are flourishing.

Visually, it has been proven by the increasing number of street vendors in public spaces and the increasing number of points occupied by street vendors. The development in the number of street vendors in public spaces indicates that they are not just the object of power obedient to the government's policy, but they put up various forms of resistance against the government's policy to retain their business. It may be in the form of closed resistance (pretending to be obedient when the officers appear, but when they leave the location, the street vendors return to sell their wares), partly open resistance (the effort to oppose in the form of psychological warfare, like consolidating their forces to stage a protest), and open resistance (physical resistance). These forms of resistance indicate that street vendors have the power to oppose the city government's policy.

This concept of power relates to the ability to use (continuously in daily life) a sequence of causal power, including influencing powers run by other people (Giddens, 1984). Power intrinsically relates to humanitarian agencies. There is no agency without power and it is impossible for agencies to act without power.

This article discusses the problem of street vendors by using the power concept. Street vendors is seen as agent who has capability to influence government power and others agents. Studies which indicate that street vendors are the subject of power are

studies on street vendors' interaction, social network, and resistance. These studies demonstrate that street vendors are active subjects that commit some actions to retain their existence. Efforts made by street vendors include building cooperation based on regional similarities (Wulandari, 2008) forming association/organization of street vendors (Setia, 2008; Siregar, 2011), putting up resistance both collectively and individually to efforts to evict them (Aisyah, 2012; Alisjahbana, 2006; Gibbings, 2011; Hanser, 2016; Hermanto et al., 2011; Turner & Schoenberger, 2012) or conducting negotiations and accommodation with civil service police officers (Satpol PP) through local thugs to retain sidewalks as their business places (Siswono, 2009). Other studies on street vendors' network depict the complexity of street vendors' network with other parties around them (consumers, suppliers, government institutions, and non-governmental organizations) in the forms of transaction, actualization, corporation, association, conflicts, and coordination (Mustafa, 2008).

This article would examine how street vendors exercise their power by exploiting forces they can access from within and around them to retain their occupation of public spaces. In the occupation of public spaces, many agents are involved, both official agents (government) and unofficial ones. These agents compete with each other, fighting for their own interests and they are in relations which influence each other in a complex manner.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptions of Power Relation

In the literature review, the debate about power takes place between elitist concept of power (Mills, 2017) with the concept of pluralist power (Dahl, 1971), between observable power (Dahl, 1971) and hidden power (Lukes, 2005), as well as between power in the state locus as in Weberian perspective with power in the social locus as in postmodern thinking (Clegg & Haugaard, 2009; Haugaard, 2002; Heiskala, 2001). In contemporary debate, the study of power began to discuss new issues about how power is managed in modern government (Dean, 2010). Along with the development of the administration of the state and government, power is no longer seen as a tool to dominate or hegemony other parties, but as a tool to bring about a better society. Therefore, the management of power requires more than political considerations but is also determined by the choice of power technologies that can accelerate the achievement of a better public life (Rose & Miller, 2018).

The concept of power is still associated with legitimacy, as stated by Weber (Clegg & Haugaard, 2009) who developed the study of power in relation to authority and administration organized in modern countries. According to Weber, power is a factor of dominance based on economic interests or authority. The legitimate source of power is from formal authority, obtained through social norms such as charisma, tradition, and rational-legal. The embodiment of legitimate power holders is the owner of legal authority,

namely the bureaucracy. Weber saw power as manifested in the opportunities that agents would use against other agents in social relations, even though it would trigger resistance from other agents. In this view, the agent tries to have the other agent behave as he wishes, and tries to reject any other agent's efforts that conflict with his preferences.

Power relations become asymmetrical because of the unequal distribution of power, so that there are parties who become superordinate's (principal) and there are those who are in subordinate positions (subaltern). In this relationship, the prerequisites that must be available for the relationship to work are the capacity to fight for its interests and the capacity to maintain the compliance of other parties.

Weber's thought of placing power as the authority of some people was then continued by C. Wright Mills, with his conception of the power of the elite (Mills, 2017). The theory shows the characteristics of undemocratic power because only a small number of respected citizens can influence the course of government, namely the owners of capital, political party activists, business people, and those who become government officials. In this theory, power relations take place both openly and closely in a relationship that influences policy making. There are power relations that can be observed, and some are hidden, which is difficult to prove its existence. This elitist power model faces criticism from a pluralist view that sees government as a process of interaction of various groups in

society, therefore, this model is considered undemocratic.

On the other hand, the elite model also invites criticism from positivistic adherents because the hidden power relations are questioned because they cannot be observed. Dahl is one of the critics of the elite model. Through a pluralist model, Dahl (1971) shows that power is not dominated by one particular group. Conversely, power relations are interactions of various groups in society, both those that have a direct or indirect relationship with the decision-making process. Politicians, for example, are actors who have a direct influence on decision making, while constituents cannot directly influence policy. Although Dahl acknowledged that power was not evenly distributed, he rejected Mills's assumption that power was only owned by the elite.

Varying ideas about power indicate that the range of conceptions of power is very vast, ranging from the field of political philosophy, political theory, and even to the field of sociology. Power is identified in its locus informal organizations (state), communities, and relations among individuals. Based on the variety of ideas, some experts have attempted to create models to make the development of conceptions of power easier to understand. Isaac (1997) for example, has elaborated the concept of

power by using four models composed based on the tradition of thought which becomes the basis for the development of power theory in each model¹. The four models depict a very various range of meaning of the concept of power, from the meaning of power as causal act or behavior as adhered by the voluntarism model, which is then criticized by adherents of the hermeneutic model who state that power is constituted by the shared meanings of given social communities (Isaac, 1997). In the hermeneutic model, the concept of power relation is shaped by the varying symbols and norms prevail in a social situation (Isaac, 1997). This understanding of the context of the occurrence of power relation becomes the characteristic that distinguishes the hermeneutic model from the voluntarism model which just considers power relation to be causal acts, disregarding the context behind it; hence, the model seems to be mechanistic.

In the structural model, power can be defined as the capacities to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in whom they participate (Isaac, 1997). According to structuralisms, power relation does not arise *ex nihilo* in behavioral interaction, nor is it a purely normative or symbolic reality. Power has an attachment to

¹ The four models are:

- a. A voluntarism model rooted in the traditions of social contract theory and methodological individualism;
- b. A hermeneutic or communicative model rooted largely in German phenomenology;
- c. A structuralism model rooted in the work of Marx and Durkheim;

- d. A post-modernist model developed in different ways in the writing of Michel Foucault and certain contemporary feminists.

The complete explanation of the four models can be read in the work of Jeffrey Isaac (1997), *Conceptions of Power* in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (Eds), *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*, London and New York: Routledge.

structural rules, resources, positions, and relationships. Therefore, the position of parties in power relation is not determined by stimulus-response nor the existing social norms, but by the ownership of resources. Although the post-modernist model is almost similar to the hermeneutic and structural models, it remains different in term of its assumption about power. The post-modernist model understands power as energy, capacity, and potential owned by every individual (Isaac, 1997). The dimension of locality also draws the attention of the post-modernists, particularly Foucault who emphasizes that power is a complex and ambiguous social reality occurring in various social spaces, and hence it cannot be explained in general.

In general, it can be concluded that power is always related to behaviors of individuals and groups (social agents) in social relation. Power relation always involves the intention to bring in certain impact or to achieve a certain goal (Beetham, 2013). Therefore, power relation cannot be identified without revealing the intention and interests of the involved parties.

Power Relation in Management of Street Vendors

The presence of street vendors triggers a debate in the context of city planning because their presence is viewed more as a disturbance to city order and pedestrians' comfort. Therefore, the approach commonly applied to address street vendors is the repressive one, known as an eviction. The local government uses its authority

to restrict the presence of street vendors, and even to ban them from selling. The repressive approach is marked by expulsion committed by Civil Service Police Unit and confiscation of street vendors' wares. In this context, power relation is dominated by the government apparatus as the authority holder, while street vendors become the object of power that has no bargaining position because from the beginning their presence is considered to be a violation of city planning.

The policy of city planning is part of the spatial management system, which according to Law Number 26 the Year 2007 on Spatial Management is a process to determine space structure and space pattern that consists of preparing and determining the spatial plan. Determination of spatial use practically is inseparable from the power relation and actors who fight for their interests to be accommodated in the space. Referring to Low, actors create interpretation and meaning of space based on their own interests (Low, 2003). The different interpretation and meaning cause the existence of contested spaces (space contestation). The contested spaces are the geographical location where conflicts occur among actors whose social position is determined by the diversity of control over resources and access to power. The struggle particularly is centered in the meaning instilled in the space or originates in actors' interpretation on the meaning. Therefore, the contested spaces are materially realized and act as loci to create and spread, oppose, and

negotiate dominant cultural themes which find expression in many aspects of social life.

Related to contested spaces, Low proposed the concept of spatial tactics, that is, the use of space as power strategies and/or techniques and social control (Low, 2003). Power is about territory and boundaries in which weapons of the strong are classification, delineation, and division—what he calls strategies—while the weak use furtive movement, shortcuts, and routes—so-called tactics—to contest this spatial domination.

This space contestation is clearly visible in the use of public spaces, such as sidewalks, road shoulders, parks, and others that it becomes a dilemma of its own in city planning. The space contestation is caused at least by conflicts in the use of space and conflicts of interests among related parties. The city government with its vision to make the city clean, orderly, and comfortable certainly makes some arrangements on city planning. One of the realizations of the arrangement on city planning is the policy on the use of public places, such as sidewalks, road shoulders, city parks, squares, and others. Normatively, those public places function as places where citizens meet, interact, and maintain a good relationship and also as recreational places with special activities, such as playing, sports, and recreation. To support the function, the city government bans activities considered to cause a decline in the functions of public places like economic activities/trade.

This normative idea about the use of public places, in fact, tends to be violated at the practice level in the finding of a variety of economic activities in public places, such as activities of street vending and parking. It indicates that the use of public places which normatively is regulated by the city government's policy in practice depends on negotiation between local apparatus and other agents (Kakiay, 2009). This practice of negotiation causes a tug-of-war between functions of public places as meant by the official regulation and public places as social space containing practices of the involved agents. The tug-of-war affects the formation of functions of public places other than their allocation.

Policy on city planning, including a prohibition on trading in public places and the zoning of street vendors basically are the city government's strategy for disciplining its citizens. Through the policy, the government defines classifications of places where vending is allowed and not, which of course are different from street vendors' interpretation in public places. This is because the government interprets space by using the perspective of control and esthetics, order and comfort of the city, while street vendors use the economic perspective. To retain their interests in public places, street vendors use some tactics aiming to weaken the government's policy, including the government institution. It is not surprising that the city government finds it is hard to control public places.

On the other side, the effort of eviction committed by the local

government is also responded by street vendors with varying reactions. In general, the reaction that emerges is in the form of secret resistance due to the weak bargaining position of street vendors. Considering unbalanced power relation, the weak parties who are positioned in the lower structure try to balance their relation through resistance so that they will not be too much suppressed/oppressed. The forms of resistance are manifested based on the goal of their action. In some literature, it is mentioned that typical resistance committed by people with the weak bargaining position can be divided into three forms:

The first is closed (symbolic/sociological) resistance, such as gossip, refusal of categories forced to the society, and withdrawal of respect for the authorities. This form of resistance emerges not to change the domination system, but just to refuse the prevailing system which is exploitative and unfair. The goal of the closed resistance is to reduce exploitation of them. The second is semi-open resistance like social protest and demonstration to make a claim to the competent authorities. This form of resistance is realized to avoid a bigger loss that may strike them. The third is open (true) resistance is a form of resistance which is organized, systematic, and principled. The open resistance has revolutionary impacts. The goal is to eliminate the base of domination itself. The manifestation of this form of resistance is the use of violent ways like a rebel (Scott, 2000).

Resistance is then understood as a response to an initiative of change, a

response to the result of a stimulus that forms reality where individuals live. Resistance is an act aimed to oppose and control inharmonious power relation, as a different thing from the concept of relative autonomy, in which the powerless party usually move away or avoid the reality of oppression. Resistance can also be viewed as the most actual materialization or realization from the desire to refuse domination of knowledge and power (Hujanikajenong, 2006). Therefore, resistance is a vast concept, although basically, it intends to explain the occurrence of opposition committed by subaltern or the oppressed, because of injustice and others.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research would apply the qualitative approach, aiming to obtain the whole description of street vendors' efforts to build and maintain power relation with various parties. The activities of data collection were conducted through surveys, in-depth interviews, observation, and documentation.

Surveys were conducted on organizations/associations of street vendors in Bandung City to find out the characteristics of organizations of street vendors, such as the history of the founding, organizational structure, membership, funding, and affiliation of the organization with other organizations. Based on the preliminary data, distinguished characteristics of organizations were selected for in-depth interviews. In outline, topics for interviews related to organizations/

associations' position on the government's policy (eviction, relocation, arrangement, and supervision) in dealing with the policy and relation which is builder by organization/association for continuing street vendors.

The participatory observation was conducted to find out directly the trading activities of street vendors, the atmosphere, and the interaction they built, and the strategies they develop to retain their existence in public places. During the activities of participatory observation, the researchers closely observed what they did, when, and with whom, in what condition, and asked them about their action. Meanwhile, documentation materials used in this research particularly relate to characteristics and distribution of street vendors, organizations of street vendors, activities of the city government in handling street vendors, and strategies of street vendors in dealing with the city government's policy. These documents were obtained through Civil Service Police Unit, the Office of Cooperatives, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, and Industry and Trade, Local Development Planning Agency, associations of street vendors, the Internet, blogs, photos, videos, and other references.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Patterns of Power Relation of Street Vendors in Dealing with the Policy of the City Government of Bandung

The pattern of power relation between street vendors and stakeholders occurs in in equivalent

relation context because the presence of street vendors is considered to be a disturbance. Regulation on security, order, and cleanliness in the city that bans all trading activities in public places has made street vendors become an illegal business that must be curbed. As a result, street vendors cannot access aid from the city government, whether it is in the form of financial support or skill development. This condition makes street vendors feel they have been pushed aside. Moreover, street vendors cannot access loans from formal financial institutions such as banks. Difficulties in accessing loans make street vendors rely on moneylenders.

Street vendors' access to loans and business aid has not been opened until the imposition of Regulation Number 4 the Year 2011 on Arrangement and Supervision of Street Vendors. Although this regulation legalizes the presence of street vendors, the recognition is limited; hence, implicitly the character of this local regulation tends to be a form of dispensation for street vendors to trade at certain time and locations. In fact, the implementation of the local regulation is dynamic, determined more by the relation between street vendors and local government apparatus as the enforcer of local regulation. Apart from local government apparatus, power relation in the implementation of local regulation on street vendors occurs between street vendors and associations of street vendors and other actors, both in formal and informal relationships.

Another difficulty faced by street vendors is competition with their fellow

street vendors, particularly those who have bigger financial support because they are part of the selling chain of big companies. These “modern” street vendors become competitors of traditional street vendors, who do not have big capital.

On the other side, some parties exploit the presence of street vendors in public places. Data on charges paid by street vendors indicate that illegal fees are big potential for the city government’s revenues. Unfortunately, this potential of revenues does not go into the government treasury, but it goes into the pockets of government officials and non-governmental organizations that collect fees, compensated with protection for street vendors. The presence of parties who get advantage from the presence of street vendors has made the problem of street vendors hard to solve. It is not only certain government apparatus and non-governmental organizations who get economic advantage from the presence of street vendors but also the formal sector through products sold by street vendors. It indicates that there are other actors who have interests to retain the presence of street vendors.

In order to build this power relation, street vendors conduct consolidation process, both internally and externally. Internal consolidation is conducted by street vendors to unite their forces, while external consolidation is conducted to build relation with parties, they consider being able to help street vendors fight for their interests.

Internal Consolidation

The unity process among street vendors is built by forming the identity of street vendors as a big family. This identity formation process has been established through street vendors’ habit of chatting and gossiping while selling their wares or after finishing it. During their chats, street vendors usually discuss some problems, including personal problems, economy, and politics and also the situation they consider may disturb the continuance of their business. This forum of complaints and grievances has instilled the sense of belonging.

This identity is subsequently nurtured and developed by organizations of street vendors. Through amicable ways, organizations of street vendors have instilled the habit of knowing each other personally among the members of the organization, including their families. They often meet in informal activities, such as gatherings at least once in a week, *arisan* (social gathering involving informal credit and saving schemes in a form of lots), motorbike touring, attending banquets together, or visiting sick people and people in difficulties. These social activities are effective in forming their identity as the Big Family of Street Vendors.

Besides that, the position of organizations which attempt to protect street vendors has affirmed the identity of street vendors as a big family. When street vendors are affected by eviction, organizations try to provide advocacy and accompaniment. When street vendors have trouble in meeting their

necessities of life, such as health and education, organizations of street vendors unhesitatingly provide their help. Some forms of help they receive are the help in processing SKTM (Certificate of Poverty) and requesting a relief in hospital fees and tuition fees.

Organizations also play a role as the "father" when street vendors have a dispute or have a family problem. Disputes among street vendors which are usually caused by the difference in prices or words that hurt their feelings are settled by organizations by mutual agreement. The disputing parties are gathered, invited to dialog, provided with the solution and encouraged to come to an agreement. Similarly, when street vendors have a family problem, they often share it with organizations and asked for their opinion to settle the problem.

Apart from personal and social problems, street vendors are usually united by political issues, particularly leadership, both at national and local levels. Prior to the general election, gubernatorial election or mayoral election, the organization asks their members to vote for certain candidates and sometimes they declare their position to the public.

These developed relational patterns have made street vendors feel they are a big family and very much depend on the organizations. This identity formation is supported by the jargons contained in the values of Sundanese culture, "*Kudu sapapait samamanis, sabagja cilaka* (an obligation to share happiness and sadness)" or "*Silih Asah* (Teaching Each Other), *Silih Asih* (Loving Each Other)

and *Silih Asuh* (Taking Care Each Other)" which are defined as the necessity to protect and love their fellow street vendors. These values are instilled by organizations of street vendors through informal talks or the process to settle disputes among street vendors.

This identity formation is successful when street vendors have felt they are a unity of a big family, which means that the identity as "we" has been established. This *guyub* (harmonious) relation has become an important asset to build power relation. *Guyub* (harmonious) relation does not discriminate against places of origin, religions, or other identities because they live in one identity as street vendors.

However, not all organizations of street vendors are able to go through this period. Some organizations of street vendors have been broken up due to an internal conflict. The internal conflict is triggered by some street vendors' (organization members') distrust of the board. Accusations that the board has embezzled membership fees or different positions on an issue are usually effective enough to make them break up. This condition is accelerated by the board's inability to provide "a feeling of safety" for street vendors.

Other problems relate to the relationships among organizations of street vendors. Varying affiliations of street vendors in the organizations have made the unity established by street vendors limited to the unity within the circle of each organization. If there is cooperation among the organizations, it is just practical and incidental when

they face the same problem that their areas are all affected by the eviction. Meanwhile, a permanent unity cannot be found. Even, rivalry often occurs among the organizations of street vendors to fight for “territories” to increase the number of the members. Although the rivalry never causes an open conflict among the organizations of street vendors, it has caused a “cold war” among them.

Another important process of identity is to identify enemies and friends. Identification of common enemies is easy enough to do. Street vendors’ experience of being evicted and relocated is enough to make them allergic to the city government. The experience is supported by knowledge spread by the organization about who street vendors are, who the city government is, and why they are diametrically opposed to each other.

Organizations of street vendors personify the city government as the position of mayor, therefore organizations of street vendors and street vendors state that the mayor is their enemy, and he is considered to be the party most frequently opposes them. However, sometimes street vendors play ambiguous politics. On one side they consider the city government/mayor their enemy, on the other side, they make an informal approach to get aid from the city government.

Meanwhile, friends are defined as parties who are able to help street vendors’ struggle, among others are the mass media, university students, academicians, social activists, non-governmental organizations, mass

organizations, and the public. As for political parties and the legislative institution, although they formally play an important role in channeling street vendors’ aspiration, street vendors feel that it is not urgent to make friends with them. This is because when political parties are approached, they tend to want something, getting votes from street vendors, and the legislative institution is considered to be sensitive to street vendors’ aspiration.

External Consolidation: Building Relation with Formal and Informal Institutions/Channels

Organizations of street vendors build relation with various parties they consider to be able to help the continuance of their business or fight for their interests. Three patterns of power relationships have emerged as a response to the implementation of a policy that regulates street vendors conducted by the City Government of Bandung. The first pattern, street vendors use the association of street vendors as the mediator in negotiating problems they face, for example, in the time when they face new street vendors or thugs that ask for “protection money” in their business location. The association of street vendors is a liaison to the government, particularly the Civil Service Police Unit, and together they control the disturbance experienced by street vendors.

The second pattern, street vendors use local communities of street vendors as the mediator. The community of street vendors is different from the association of street vendors because

they are naturally formed from street vendors in the same location, and they have a historical relationship with the development of street vendors in the location. Because their own communities have existed, the association of street vendors actually becomes the outsider that tends to be less trusted. In this pattern of relation, the trust factor becomes capital that determines which side is used by street vendors to fight for their aspiration or to solve problems emerging from the regulating policy.

The third pattern, street vendors use NGOs as the mediator. In this pattern, the relationship between street vendors and NGOs occurs dynamically and tends to head for a transactional relationship. Street vendors, who need protection when they face authoritarian government officials, will ask for mediation with the NGOs' help. However, if the situation is safe, the existence of such social organizations is not needed. Moreover, NGOs that cannot provide optimum protection will be left by street vendors who will find new ones.

The relation built with those various parties uses informal social networks established through personal relationships. Based on the relationship they have established, we can find three forms of coalition established by the organization of street vendors, political, economic-political, and economic coalitions. The political coalition is established between street vendors and NGOs, university students, social activists, Legal Aid Society, and the mass media. They make a coalition in

order that the existence of street vendors is recognized, they are provided with space, and their voice is considered. In reality, this coalition appears in the activities of a demonstration staged with NGOs and university students and the negotiation process with the city government.

The economic-political coalition is established between street vendors together with mass organizations and agents of the city government. This coalition is called an economic-political one because street vendors cooperate with mass organizations and agents of the city government in order that they are permitted to run their business in public places and that they obtain the information on the eviction, empowerment programs, et cetera. Meanwhile, mass organizations and agents of the city government gain the economic benefit from the coalition in the form of monthly payment. The economic coalition is established by street vendors together with owners of stores, distributors of goods, producers, bank institutions, and buyers. There is no political interest leading to the goal to achieve recognition of the existence of the informal sector or other goals.

CONCLUSION

The findings analyzed in previous part conclude that power relation is existed in daily life between multi-stakeholders in governing public space for street vendors. Organizations/associations of street vendors are established mainly to retain the existence of street vendors in public places. Considering that the

organizations/associations find it is difficult to struggle by themselves, they establish informal power relations with the government apparatus and more powerful mass organizations. This relation is fluid, as far as the interests of street vendors can be retained.

In general, we can find three patterns of power relation among street vendors: the first pattern, street vendors use the association of street vendors as the mediator in negotiating problems they face, for example, in the time when they face new street vendors or thugs that ask for “protection money” in their business location. The second pattern, street vendors use local communities of street vendors as the mediator. The third pattern, street vendors use NGOs as the mediator. In this pattern, the relationship between street vendors and NGOs occurs dynamically and tends to head for a transactional relationship. Street vendors, who need protection when they face authoritarian government officials, will ask for mediation with the NGOs’ help. However, if the situation is safe, the existence of such social organizations is not needed. Moreover, NGOs that cannot provide optimum protection will be left by street vendors who will find new ones.

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