

Parliament Opposition Strategy in Indonesia (Case Study of Gerindra Party During Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla's Era 2014-2019)

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Abstract

This research analyzes parliament opposition in Indonesia by Gerindra Party (2014-2019) as a party whose consistently outside the government and functioning as an opposition party. How is it implemented, and what kind of strategy Gerindra performs to influence the parliamentary decision-making process? To answer this, the study uses qualitative methods by collecting data through literature review, data tracking, and in-depth interviews. The theoretical perspective in this research used Steinack's argument about the opposition strategy who states that the behavior of the opposition party in parliament is the accumulation of the impact of the structural and institutional factors, socio-demographic, and party's informal rules of engagement. The research found that as an opposition party, Gerindra focuses on content-oriented strategies using the area of public policymaking as a medium of political interplays such as at the commission level or other work units.

Keywords

Opposition Party; Parliament Opposition; Opposition Strategy; Gerindra Party

INTRODUCTION

The discourse on opposition parties re-emerged after the 2014 presidential and legislative elections. In this case, the losing party in the election, Gerindra Party and its coalition, declared themselves outside the executive power and running the opposition's function to

the government. With running coalition mates for last presidential vice presidential candidate Prabowo-Hatta, Gerindra's decision showed a positive attitude as a balancing power in parliament. Budiardjo (2008) states that the opposition (inside and outside the parliament) is one of the six basic conditions for implementing a democratic government under the rule of law.

The existence of opposition as a part of the check and balance functions is necessary in a democratic system. Other authorities must oversee the branches of power in order to avoid domination or monopoly. Dahl (1966) says that there are three important milestones in the development of democratic institutions

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--participation in elections, the right to be represented in parliament, and the right to organize forces to oppose the government in elections and parliament. The latter shows that opposition groups' presence is an inherent part of democracy regardless of what kind of government system is run by.

As their established democracies, Western countries have become a research field on the development of political opposition. Most of their parliamentary government model, the legislative institutions in Western countries were divided into two institutional roles, support and oppose the government. The prime minister and cabinet members are part of the parliament appointed by and responsible to parliament. So, the relationship pattern is known as the relationship between the government and the opposition whereas parliament the locus of political struggle for both parties.

Further studies have seen opposition as a branch of the theory of political transition and civil society's role in dealing with government (Stepan, 1997; Blondel, 1997; Helms, 2004). The study of opposition developed in various parts of the world along with the transition process from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system Huntington (1997) called "the third wave of democratization" at the end of the 20th century. As Uddhammar, Green and Söderström (2011) expressed, the factors that increase support for the opposition are an appreciation of democracy, dissatisfaction with

corruption, and support for democratic values.

Unlike the parliamentary system, there is no clarity about the existence of opposition in a presidential system. This comes from the premise that the president is the sole and full executive power holder. The president has a fixed term in office and is elected by and responsible to the people (Arend, 1995). To maintain oversight, the parliament institutionally and individually has the function of overseeing executive power. With typical executive power in a presidential system, the pattern of relationships that occur is the relationship between the executive and the legislature (Morgenstern, Negri & Pérez-Liñán, 2008).

In recent researches, the study of political opposition in Indonesia focuses on the institutions of political parties and parliaments. Zaenuddin (2001) shows the strengthening of the DPR's oversight function of the executive led to Abdulrahman Wahid's impeachment from the presidency. Furthermore, Tuswoyo (2012) states that it is not a government system that creates a relationship between the opposition party and the government, as Dahl and Arend theorized. But it is likely because of political interests, personal relationships between opposition leaders and ruling party leaders, as well as political support in the opposition party, which ideology is used as justification to strengthen the role of the opposition.

After the 2014 election, the opposition was filled by parties' group that is members of the Koalisi Merah

Putih (KMP). However, the coalition did not last long. One after one of the four party's members of coalition crossed into the government coalition. Zuhro (2016) sees Indonesian political parties practicing the "Limited Permanent Coalition" whose permanence is dependent on the party's internal situation. Furthermore, Admojo (2016) sees the weakness of opposition coalition-building due to inequality of ideology or policy vision (policy blind coalitions) and internal divisions (fictionalization) of political parties within KMP. According to Noor (2016), this kind of condition looks similar. It shows a legacy of the past (especially the New Order Era), in which the opposition tends to disintegrate and seem to lose its position.

However, Gerindra still tries to critical oversight of the government even though the KMP opposition coalition-building is gone. As the opposition party, Gerindra actively takes the function of check and balance of various government policies based on party policy lines. Referring to formal documents and the history of the party's founding, Gerindra builds a grand narrative about Indonesia's socio-economic reality, which does not stand with the small community and deviates from the state constitution's objectives. The effort to achieve party goals was implemented in the capacity of Gerindra as an opposition party.

The author is interested in researching the implementation of the Gerindra opposition during the Jokowi-JK administration. Research is directly focused on the internal political process

of the party where opposition strategy is produced. Through research on specific aspects of parties, including the sociodemographic of legislative members, they will explain opposition parties' characteristics in Indonesia. Therefore, this study will discuss by answering the question: How is Gerindra's strategy as an opposition party in influencing decision-making in parliament during the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla's Era?

RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses a qualitative approach that seeks to analyze the data gathered on the power interplay and power struggle in the Gerindra opposition activities in parliament. So that researcher can accurately explain what kind of opposition strategy Gerindra practicing. The researcher has a varied way of collecting the necessary data. The Source of research data is taken from the Gerindra elite informants by conducting interviews related to the studied phenomenon. To balance the informant's data, the main information is obtained from the Gerindra and DPR archives, as well as other published data. Considering that the archives' data is more accountable and represents the opinion of parties, not individuals. This study collects secondary data through literature studies similar to the topic that the author raised to strengthen the data above.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

First, this discussion describes the concept of parliamentary opposition practiced in Indonesia contemporary.

Table 1. Opposition Strategy Steinack

	Mode of Contest	Place of Contest
Power-oriented politics	Confrontation	Plenary, Media and outside public parliament
Content-oriented politics	Cooperation	Committees and informal contacts within parliament

Source: Two Patterns of Opposition (Steinack, 2011).

This is important because the concept of opposition in Indonesia is different from the practice in other countries, especially countries with established democratic systems. In the context of the Indonesian presidential system, the concept of opposition uses Morgenstern, Negri and Pérez-Liñán (2008) and Andeweg, de Winter and Müller (2008) explanation which means a group of legislators outside the ruling parties or government cabinet parties. These efforts aim to provide a clear conceptual explanation of opposition practices' fluidity in Indonesia's multiparty presidential system through a relatively general explanation.

Furthermore, this study uses the theory of "Two Patterns of Opposition" Steinack (2011). This theory is an analytical development that combines the institutional-system aspects of the opposition in parliament with the party and socio-demographic aspects in explaining the opposition's behavior in parliament. From the limitations of each of the above aspects, Steinack discusses the state parliaments in Germany in a broader context to explain how opposition parties influence majority policy in parliament.

This theory argues that opposition strategies are divided into two types, cooperation and confrontation.

Steinack's research identifies it into several levels of strategies:

1. The strategy of power-oriented politics focused on confrontation in the plenary and on mobilizing the public outside parliament.
2. The matter-of-fact co-operation sought to change things within parliament through co-operation in committees and by trying to influence decision making in non-public areas aside from the committees.

In one period of power, opposition parties (groups) may use different strategies. One opposition party could use both strategies interchangeably depending on certain topics.

The opposition strategy discussion seeks to explain political power interaction between the opposition party and other parliament groups. The table above illustrates the choice of modes and places used by the opposition. Power-oriented politics uses public instruments which are mostly delivered outside the parliament and plenary sessions. Meanwhile, content-oriented politics uses the area of public policy-making as an interaction place of political units such as at the commission or work unit level.

The description of the opposition party's behaviors also discusses legislation preferences. In general, political parties as organized political groups have certain orientations, values and ideals. Usually, each party has its preferences toward legislation on particular issues which become the party's political agenda. An analysis of the power-oriented or content-oriented strategy can explain opposition parties' law-making orientation to achieve their own goals.

Furthermore, the discussion on the party's structural and institutional aspects and the socio-demographics of party members. The quantity of members of parliament directly influences the party attitudes represented by each member of parliament. Besides, the age and gender distribution of parliament members also influence the behavior of an opposition party. The last thing is related to the party's aspect, which covers history, ideology, and internal culture. The Social Democratic Party in Germany which focuses on content-oriented politics is quite relevant because of its history as a mass party representing workers' groups. As an old party, this party is more focused on real political solutions than idealism. Meanwhile, the Green Party from a contemporary grassroots movement is still mobilizing protest actions outside the parliament.

Two arguments support the implementation of this theory in the case of the Gerindra Party. The first argument is in line with the discussion of this research which focuses on a comprehensive analysis of political

party actors. The second argument is that this theory can be applied in various state systems with opposition groups in parliament. The reason is, this theory focuses on political party institutions. However, there are differences in the area coverage aspect because this theory is on a state scale, whereas in the Gerindra case it was in the national parliament level.

Concept of Parliamentary Opposition in Indonesia

The explanation of the opposition party in Indonesia has become a long discourse because the political system's framework and the opposition party's behavior do not provide confirmation of its existence. The description of opposition parties in presidential countries can be explained through an institutional approach. Several studies take place the Indonesian presidential system on a consensus democracy model, which is a theoretical concept regarding a fragmentation power-sharing model to produce socio-political stability (Arend, 1995; Andeweg, 2013; Blas, 2018). Various consensual political practices that occur also involve opposition parties, so that the legislative body is such a "*turah* coalition" that maintains cartel practices (Ambardi, 2009). Therefore, the cartel thesis rejects the existence of opposition in Indonesia's political system since the implementation of multiparty presidentialism in 2004.

The rejection of the opposition party's existence by the cartel perspective is due to the strict translation of the opposition's concept.

Hanan (2012) views the fact that there are opposition parties and the cartel thesis's weaknesses. However, in practice, the culture of opposition is not strong enough in the Indonesian political system. Meanwhile, Tuswoyo (2012) states that the PDI Perjuangan initiated the opposition tradition of multiparty presidentialism after the 2004 elections. Referring to the above conditions, at least this paper needs to present the arguments of Morgenstern, Negri and Pérez-Liñán (2008) that the opposition in the presidential system is a group of legislators outside the ruling parties or government cabinet parties. Somehow, election constantly results both winning and losing groups, so naturally there are always groups outside the government.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Gerindra: Between Figures and Populist Nationalist

Gerindra Party is one of the parties that was born after the 1998 Reformation. Gerindra was founded on February 6, 2008, with Prof. Suhardi as the first general chairman. Gerindra's birth cannot be separated from the character of Prabowo Subianto, who is the Commander of Koppasus (1995-1998) and the former son-in-law of President Soeharto. At the beginning of Gerindra's establishment, Prabowo was mostly behind the scenes. Whereas, by its founders, Prabowo repeatedly was presented ideas and concepts of a new party. After Gerindra was declared a party to participate in the elections, on July 12, 2008, Prabowo had lately registered as a Gerindra cadre at the

same time announcing his resignation from the ranks of the Golkar Party Advisory Council.

Gerindra's birth was based on its founders' joint reflection on evaluating the Indonesian nation's journey since the 1998 Reformation. They considered that the Government had practiced a capitalistic economic system that did not produce people's welfare (Zon, 2011). The political system is considered to have not produced a strong national leadership. Through such narratives, Gerindra offers a genuine and consistent re-application of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in order to lead the Indonesian people to prosperity with justice.

As a party icon, Gerindra cannot be separated from Prabowo's work in various socio-economic fields. Prabowo is the chairman of the HKTI (Indonesian Farmers Association) for the period 2004-2009 and the APPSI (Association of Indonesian Market Traders) for the period 2008-2013. Therefore, the Gerindra board uses Prabowo to represent the party image not yet widely known. Prabowo's character was effectively able to convince the public to the ideas championed by Gerindra. Moreover, those organizations became the main real mass when Gerindra to face the 2009 election. They became Gerindra support organizations outside the party structure (Amrillah, 2016). By campaigning for the idea of a people's economy through Prabowo's figure, Gerindra was able to take on the traditional-nationalist voter base and the middle to lower economic

community belonging to the PDIP (Aminuddin & Ramadlan, 2015).

The presidential election in 2004 has prompted political parties to seek popular figures to serve as their potential presidential candidates. Therefore, it is not surprising that new parties have emerged that rely on certain figures to run for the presidency. The Democrat Party (2004) proved this party's behavior, which immediately won the presidential election by carrying the party icon, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in the 2004 presidential election. According to Ufen (2006), a party that has been designed to carry an individual (founder) as a presidential candidate from the beginning of is called a vehicle party or "presidential party". The Democrat Party, the Hanura Party and the Gerindra Party appear to fall into the vehicle party category (Alhamid & Perdana, 2018).

Statement mentioning Gerindra as Prabowo proved the presidential party nominated as the vice-presidential candidate in the 2009 elections and the presidential candidate in the 2014 election. In 2009, Gerindra was quite settled about making Prabowo a presidential candidate. But, in looking for coalition partners, it seems that Gerindra does not have a high enough bargaining position considering that they only collected 4.46% in the 2009 preliminary legislative election. However, Gerindra experienced difficulties because other parties have declared themselves to support the incumbent SBY-Boediono immediately. After tough negotiations, the PDIP-

Gerindra coalition agreed to carry Megawati-Prabowo in the 2009 presidential election. In the 2014 presidential election, Gerindra was able to carry Prabowo as his presidential candidate after gaining 11.81% of the election. At that time, Gerindra built the Red and White Coalition (KMP) with four parties (Golkar, PAN, PKS, PPP) which Prabowo paired with Hatta Rajasa.

Being in Opposition from the Beginning

Gerindra is the only political party that has consistently been outside the government since its first participation in the 2009 election. Gerindra's failure to win Prabowo Subianto in the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections was one reason for Gerindra's political choice to be outside the government. This is a common practice in various countries where the losing parties fill the opposition group. Although constitutionally, the executive control function is the legislative body's duty, in practice the ruling party groups in the parliament tend to always support government programs. For this reason, the opposition is expected to balance the function of parliamentary control over the government.

In expressing his opinion on various issues in the country, Gerindra has been using the internet and social media platforms. Gerindra is the leading political party in public communication by adapting the corporate public relations model into political parties through the Gerindra Media Center (Zulfikar, 2009). Through an

Table 2. Characteristics of Gerindra (the composition of the DPR RI in 2014)


	Factor	Gerindra
Structural	Size of Party Group	73 members.
	Number of committee members	Average of 7 members in each commission (at least five members); and 13% in AKD and Special Committee/Working Committee.
Socio-demography	Background	Highly educated 38% for master's level, relatively old age with 67% over 50 years, male dominance 85%.
	Legislative Career	13 people (18%) incumbents, 15 people (25%) former legislators at the regional/regional level.
Party Specific	Party Tradition	People's economic movement.
	Political Self-Image	Figure Party.
	Programmatic Focus	Combines fundamentalistic ideas and realistic strategies.
	Voters' Expectation	PDIP Political alternative.
	Experience in Parliament	Has only been an opposition party for one period.
	Communication Structure	The conventional model which in important topics is taken over by the faction leaders.
	Culture of Discussion	Internally disagreements resolve. Aiming at reaching consensus in many interests of the party.

Source: Steinack's theoretical framework (Steinack, 2011).

independently developed public communication structure, Gerindra narrated various oppositional arguments against the government in addition to advertising the party's profile, vision and mission, and various activities. The Gerindra social media strategy, been built for a long time, is considered by observers to be the neatest with campaign messages and a top-down-centered communication system (Utomo, 2018) so that it can produce direct communication space with the public while shifting the role of mainstream media (Kusumadewi, 2016).

Strengthening Institutions: Becoming Leader of the Opposition

In the 2014-2019 government period, the Gerindra opposition's role became more significant with the composition of the parliamentary power totaling 73 people (a total of 560). Gerindra Party Faction members also filled important positions and all the Complementary Organs (AKD). In addition, the figure of Prabowo Subianto is one of the important factors that has made Gerindra labeled the leader of the opposition party. Prabowo is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and General Chair of the Gerindra Party

Figure 1. Gerindra's Members in House

Source: Website www.dpr.go.id.

as well as the party's representative in the national leadership. Gerindra nominated him as a vice-presidential candidate in the 2009 presidential election and as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election. In his second term as an opposition, Gerindra took an important role in exercising control over executive power.

In its capacity as an opposition party during the Jokowi-JK administration, Gerindra tried to implement supervisory politics based on the vision and mission and the party's manifesto. Gerindra optimized its cadres' role to oversee the government's work, especially through its representatives in the Indonesian Parliament. The existence of the opposition in parliament clearly plays a central role in a system of representative democracy. Aside from being more effective, institutional opposition instruments are able to

maintain a conducive conflict compared to opposition movements outside parliament. Even Hans Daalder stated that "strong opposition forces in parliament can maintain accountability on a regular basis and ensure a system remains open" (Admojo, 2016).

Explanation of the Opposition's Strategy

In simple terms, the opposition strategy is an attempt to change or prevent changes in government policy. Furthermore, this discussion seeks to offer explanatory answers to the problems raised in this study: Gerindra's opposition strategy in influencing parliament decisions. The theoretical basis used to analyze this problem is the theory of two patterns of opposition which in general states that the identification of the opposition strategy covers many factors in such a

way as to shape the behavior of the opposition party in parliament.

This theory states that the oppositional strategy's preference is determined by the institutional framework, party aspects, and socio-demographic factors. By analyzing these factors, this study is able to provide arguments for the choice of opposition strategy used more deeply. This study shows the large involvement of the Gerindra opposition party in each phase of the parliament discussion. This means that Gerindra uses content-oriented politics (content strategy) by cooperating with other political parties. Several arguments can explain the preference for this opposition strategy.

First, structurally Gerindra is the opposition party with the most representative composition according to content strategy (Table 2). With significant representatives, Gerindra indeed able to involve itself in many discussions and is quite influential in every decision-making process. Each faction parties assign their representatives to discuss the draft bill in a commission/working committee with other representative party groups. Meetings held uses a deliberation mechanism based on the principle of equal rights for all representatives of political parties. The difference of views and debate is an inevitable part.

Second, the socio-demographic background of the Gerindra party faction also influenced the party's oppositional nuances. Nearly 50% of Gerindra legislators have experience with parliamentary activities (incumbents, former representative

members at the local level, as well as local executive leaders). The majority of parliament members are over 50 years old (67%) and mostly complementary organs (AKD) positions are held by the elderly. Furthermore, the presence of party founders and early Gerindra politicians who are still active as legislators. These factors above assumed that they have had quite a long political experience and have influenced the internal party culture and formed the image of the party in plenary and in the media.

Third, the content strategy argument comes from the rivalry between the ruling party PDIP and the Gerindra opposition party which have similar party aspects. At least the people's economic movement factors, the image as a figured party, and the same voting base make the opposition party avoid extreme positions against the ruling party.

Implementation of the Opposition in the DPR for the 2014-2019 Period

An explanation of the implementation of the opposition Gerindra regards to parliamentary functions in legislation, budget and supervision. In legislation functions, Gerindra tries to be consistent with the Law's struggle on the protection of national commodities, oriented towards the people's economy, and anti-liberalization according to the Party Manifesto. Gerindra's commitment to the legislative agenda is proven by its preparation for the National Legislation Program (Prolegnas).

In legislation, Gerindra's attitude towards the People's Housing Savings (Tapera) Bill clearly shows its siding with the lower-class society. The regulations of homeownership accessibility for low-income people are considered burdensome for companies where employees work, housing entrepreneurs, and the property investment environment. Gerindra argues that the backlog crisis needs to be intervened by policies the small favor community. With a legal umbrella, Gerindra hopes to give the government flexibility in drafting various technical regulations (Transcript of the Tapera Bill Special Committee meeting, 17/11/2015).

In ensuring the fishing profession's sustainability, Gerindra has become one of the vocal factions by initiating Law Number 7 of 2016 concerning the Protection and Empowerment of Fishermen, Fish Cultivators and Salt Farmers. Proposing the bill in 2015, Gerindra's commitment was also seen by holding an audience (RDPU) with Fisher Associations at Commission IV of the DPR (Commission Meeting, 16/5/2015). The bill comprehensively obliges the government to support all categories of fishermen. One of the oppositional topics against the government is Article 11 which prohibits the Central and Local Governments from "making policies that are contrary to the protection and empowerment of fishermen, fish raisers and salt farmers". The legal consequences make the government have a tough task in fulfilling the mandate of this law.

Consistently criticizing the ratio of state income and tax targets makes Gerindra quite a dilemma with the Tax Amnesty Law discourse. In the midst of the country's difficulties in filling the APBN debt gap, Gerindra does not have an alternative solution than the potential for instant revenue from tax amnesty. This is reflected in the change in Gerindra's attitude, which initially rejected this law. However, the critical power of the opposition still appears at the evaluation stage. Related to this, further discussion will be delivered to the implementation of the Gerindra opposition in the supervisory function.

Besides KPK Bill, Gerindra's counter-argument towards the KPK institution's weakening is also evident in the Wiretapping Bill. As known, KPK was given the exclusive right to tap without the court's permission. This authority is a legal breakthrough because Indonesian legal norms place corruption cases as a special crime. However, the wiretapping authority has the potential to violate human rights, endanger, and have the potential to be politicized. Therefore, when this bill was proposed, there was a bias towards the interests of regulating the KPK wiretapping authority. In its argument, Gerindra convinced the public that his faction agreed with the law on wiretapping but gave an exception to the KPK. In fact, the Gerindra faction is committed to strengthening the authority of the KPK by including the SOP of KPK internal wiretapping into the Wiretapping Law.

Through populist economic ideas, the state-owned corporation (BUMN)

Bill has become one of Gerindra's agendas since the 2015-2019 Prolegnas proposal. The issue of privatization, loss, and corruption are discourses conveyed by Gerindra politicians in numerous forums. Gerindra's argument seems consistent with their line party's struggle and public discourse. In DPR internal discussion, Gerindra pushed for a clause that closed all privatization gaps, including through the company's subsidiaries "children and grandchildren" scheme (Public Review of the BUMN Bill-Baleg with Experts).

Early in its parliament period, Gerindra has always displayed a prominent profile in the field of budget politics. Several times, Gerindra Faction undoubtedly conveys rejection of the state expenditure proposal and accountability for the State Budget (APBN). A similar situation has often been repeated since Gerindra first entered the Indonesian Parliament (2009-2014 period), with the most recent Gerindra's abstinence on the 2018 State Budget draft as another expression of rejection.

This attitude seemed attributed to Gerindra's profile, which often delivers jargon about the people's economy. In its manifesto document, Gerindra's budget politics explicitly supports national protection policies and rejects economic liberalization practices. Through its self-sufficing paradigm, Indonesia's economy is believed to be able to be independent by the APBN policy and the role of BUMN people-based economic oriented. The Gerindra Manifesto explicitly contrasts the concept of a people's economy with a

liberal and capitalistic economic system so that the state is considered to have deviated from the state's goal.

Instead of boosting tax revenue in the 2015 State budget, the early second term of the Joko Widodo government undoubtedly provided incentive tax and import duty to certain industries. Indeed, the 2015 APBNP was an initial exercise for Gerindra's budget controlling. Gerindra held series of internal discussions with experts to jointly criticize the draft state budget proposal.

At least, Gerindra found anomalies such as massive cuts in fuel subsidies in contrast with reducing the budget deficit targets. Foreign loans to cover the deficit state revenue accompanied by project and program loans, the government was reluctant to raise tax targets and the massive issuance in foreign currency. Through this discussion, Gerindra attempted to provide objective inputs to a more credible APBN.

Even though various notes accompanied it, nine factions agreed to the 2016 Draft State Budget. Meanwhile, Gerindra completely rejected it. The Gerindra faction argued that it would be better for the government to use the previous year's APBN because some draft points were deemed unfit for approval. Gerindra assessed that the budget posture places too large for routine expenditures (60%). The tax revenue target is considered unrealistic. The government seemed failed to interpret the implementation of subsidies as a constitutional mandate. Referring to these points, the Gerindra

Faction assessed that the 2016 State Budget was still not based on a planned schedule to strengthen the national economy's foundations.

Gerindra's rejection of the state budget was certainly accompanied by criticism. Rejection of the APBN was considered unwise and tended to have a branding motive because the APBN formulation mechanism is a shared responsibility between the government and the DPR. Impact APBN rejection also has the potential to disrupt the wheels of state administration. But, the rejection of the one-party faction did not have enough influence on the parliament's institutional decisions. In practice, the government has always succeeded in passing APBN annually due to the combination of formal-informal institutions from executive-legislative relations which always creates consensual behavior in the Indonesian political system (Hanan 2012; Haris, 2014).

The supervisory function is the main function of the representative institutions towards the executive. Parliament is people's representation to control potential deviations from executive power. Within the framework of people's representation, the Gerindra faction with other factions' oversight over the implementation of the State Budget and Laws and the process of government administration.

The DPR is given authority to form an ad hoc team to respond to certain issues or policy implementations. The House leaders also have the authority to form a team consisting of various representatives from the factions

chaired by the DPR leadership directly. Meanwhile, each AKD has the authority to form a Working Committee (Panja) and Special Committee (Pansus) whose composition is agreed upon by the team. Panja is formed from internal commissions, while the Special Committee has members from across commissions. The Gerindra Faction admitted that the budget deficit and economic recession led the DPR to search for alternative state income sources. But the amnesty policy for tax evaders, especially the big players, made the Tax Amnesty policy like opening a "pandora box" that other interests could potentially infiltrate. As a tax observer, Yustinus Prastowo in Tempo Magazine (December 7, 2015) stated that the fraud potential was high due to the Indonesian tax system's unpreparedness.

On the foreign worker's issue, Gerindra is one of the factions that reacted strongly after the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 20 of 2018 regarding the use of foreign workers. Although DPR has formed a Panja TKA in 2016, Gerindra Party Fractions thought Panja's recommendations were not strong enough to force government performance improvements. In doing so, Gerindra mobilized the House to form a special committee for foreign worker's issues. But that initially rejected by the forum. But, Gerindra still has the authority to oversee foreign workers' issue through Commission IX of the DPR, which oversees the labor sector. In addition, the extent of coverage issues created by the opposition party certainly makes the

government more careful in implementing policies.

In relation to the Tax Amnesty Bill, the Gerindra Faction admitted they were initially created on this issue. The reason is, the Tax Amnesty Bill was drafted quickly by the Legislation Body and its emergence was accompanied by the KPK Law Revision at the end of 2015. Regarding that condition, the Gerindra party faction said in Tempo Magazine (December 7, 2015) that the KPK Bill was only topic destruction from the "hot stuff" Tax Amnesty.

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The Gerindra faction voiced the leakage of 800 thousand tons of imported refined sugar into traditional markets. The need for imported refined sugar for industry created a crack for sugar rent networks and import

corruption. Gerindra, who rejected the import paradigm, revealed an additional sugar import quota permit was deemed unnecessary. Previously, through the Sugar Working Committee, the Gerindra faction exposed the sugar mafia's deviant practices and encouraged the sugar trading system for domestic farmers' welfare (Komisi VI, 2015). In the statement on Twitter (August 30, 2018), Gerindra again questioned the government's policy of preferring imports to buy local sugar. Economist Faisal Basri in Tempo Daily (May 9, 2019) said the government's tricky strategy was too pseudo-categorize refined sugar and crystal sugar on the grounds of protecting local producers. The total sugar import of 4.6 million tons, above the industry's needs, eventually spilled into traditional markets.

The discussion on various cases above illustrates the Gerindra opposition party's involvement in each phase of the discussions. This means that Gerindra uses content-oriented politics (content strategy) by cooperating and influencing other political parties in commissions, special committees, legislative bodies, and informal lobbying mediums. However, differences in views and debates are an inevitable part. Therefore, Gerindra's persistence in the discussion process indicates that it has an opportunity to influence the House institutional decisions.

CONCLUSION

This article concludes that the explanation of parliamentary opposition

can be expanded from discussing constitutional and institutional aspects. Taking the Gerindra case study at the DPR RI during the Jokowi-JK era, this paper suggests some additional factors such as party ideology, history, socio-demographic background, and institutional culture which influence the practice of opposition parties. Through this explanation, the character of the opposition can be further explained. This article argues that Gerindra used a certain opposition strategy in carrying out its role as an opposition party. Gerindra – a figure party with populist-nationalist ideas – focuses on a content-oriented strategy using the area of public policy-making as a medium for the interaction of political forces such as at the commission or other work unit level.

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