

Candidacy Transformation as Electability Factor of the Legislative Candidate from Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Legislative Election 2004-2019

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Abstract

This article discusses candidacy transformation which is previously characterized as inclusive-exclusive to inclusive-pragmatic of Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) in the legislative election. The argument is based on the woman candidacy processes of PKS legislative candidates within different legislative election periods namely 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019. Based on the collected data, the 2009 General Election is the momentum where the most significant legislative seats are acquired by female candidates compared to the other three legislative elections. That phenomenon is this study's starting point in this article that explores the factors of PKS woman candidate electability, which are each candidate's social and political capital. This article's conceptual framework is the narration of male power relation as the effort to win seats for PKS woman legislative candidates, which is obtained from the relation with local elites in their respective areas in the 2019 General Election. In contrast to the three previous general elections, the PKS woman legislative candidate electability was sourced from their political and organizational experience and social network in the society. Through a qualitative case study, this article uses interviews as the primary data source, while related documentation and publication as secondary data.

Keywords

Candidacy; Woman's Electability; Male Power Relation; Political Capital; Social Capital

INTRODUCTION

One of the proportional electoral system's weaknesses is that it gives party leaders a strong position to determine the final legislative candidate

list. This provides an opportunity for the emergence of nepotism and cronyism, one of which is the male power relations that women have. This weakness can be overcome with the awareness of the political party administrators of the legislative candidate lists compiled ahead of the election. In compiling a list of candidates or a candidacy, it must contain people who are familiar with the problems faced in the regions they represented to then fight for the region's interests in the legislature (Prahara, 2013).

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In implementing the affirmative action policy, there are rules related to the list of numbers called a zipper system. This regulation calls for at least one woman in every three candidate Numbers since the 2009 elections. Affirmative action is one of the efforts to increase women in parliament.

From the 2004 to 2014 elections, the affirmative action policy has undergone several changes¹. To increase women's representation in parliament. However, based on election results from the 2004 to 2019 period, only one party could obtain women's expression of 30%, namely the Nasdem Party in the 2019 elections.

Although all political parties have not fulfilled the 30% quota for women, there has been a significant increase in women's representation after the affirmative action policy was implemented. In the 1999 election, women's representation was at 9% and experienced a rise in 2004 elections by 11.3%. In the 2009 elections by 18.4%. However, in the 2014 election, this percentage decreased to 17% and increased again in the 2019 election, amounting to 20.52%. These data indicate a fluctuation in women's representation during the implementation of affirmative action.

These fluctuations can also not be avoided in acquiring women's seats experienced by Islamic parties, namely PPP, PAN, and PKS, but not including for PKB.

Based on the number of women's seats in parliament, women's representation in Islamic parties since the implementation of affirmative action in the 2004 to 2019 elections has fluctuated except PKB which has always increased. PKB experienced an increase in women's seats in every election, namely in 2004 by seven seats, in 2009 by eight seats, in 2014 by ten seats, and in 2019 by 12 seats. The acquisition of women's seats in parliament for PAN tends to stagnate in 2004 by seven seats, 2009 by seven seats, increasing in 2014 by nine seats and decreasing in 2019 by seven seats. The acquisition of women's seats in parliament for PKS has tended to be stagnant and reduced, in the 2004 election, in 2009 by three seats, in 2014 by one seat, and experiencing a significant increase in the 2019 election by eight seats. The acquisition of women's seats in parliament for PPP has increased in the 2004 election by three seats, in 2009 by six seats, in 2014 by ten seats and is down in the 2019 election by five seats.

¹ Law Number 12 of 2003 concerning Elections considers and takes into account 30% of women's representation in the legislative candidate list. This regulation was later amended again in Law Number 10 of 2008 concerning Elections which states that 30% of women's representation in the legislative candidate list must be fulfilled. The Law also states that there is the use of a zipper system which requires at least one woman among the three serial numbers of the legislative candidate list. Furthermore, in the

2014 election, through the General Election Commission Regulation (Peraturan Komisi Pemilihan Umum/PKPU) Number 7 of 2013 the affirmative action policy was strengthened by the existence of administrative selection abortion sanctions for political parties that are unable to meet the 30% quota for women's representation in the list of candidates in a region. election.

From the four parties above, PKB is a party that tends to increase the acquisition of women's seats slowly. Meanwhile, the other three parties experienced fluctuations. Looking at the fluctuation in the acquisition of women's seats, PKS is the party that has experienced a sharp increase in the 2019 elections, while other parties have experienced a decline (PAN and PPP). There are several factors related to the growth and decrease in women's representation. PPP experienced a significant increase in the 2014 election due to party policies contained in the party's statutes and bylaws which placed women as number 1 in 30% of the electoral districts.

In the 2019 elections, women's representation in PKS has a sharp increase. This identifies a change in the pattern of candidacy in the recruitment of candidates within the PKS. One of the strong arguments is the emergence of the names of elected PKS female candidates who are the region's leaders' wives. Such as Netty Prasetyani (wife of the former Governor of West Java), Nur Azizah Tamhid (wife of the former Mayor of Depok), and Nelvi Zuairina (wife of the Governor of West Sumatra). In the previous elections, PKS tended to avoid candidacy that led to a political dynasty formation. Even the PKS women elected during the last elections did not have strong relations and is not in political dynasties. The female PKS candidates elected in the previous polls include: 1) Yoyoh Yusroh, a preacher who is one of the women made as an icon in PKS; 2) Nursanita Nasution, who is an academic; 3) Aan Rohanah, who is

an educator; 4) Ledia Hanifah Amaliah, who is an activist.

[Matland \(2005\)](#) and [Tremblay \(2007\)](#) state that women must go through three selection stages in the political process. There are women must select themselves to decide to participate in political contestation. Women must pass the supporting party's selection, and the final selection is that women must win votes. Selection from political parties and voters requires women to have a large capital, especially in an open-list proportional system that impacts stronger selection pragmatism.

Political pragmatism such as networks of relations and popularity is essential in the free list competition and majority vote. This is as stated by [Hillman \(2017\)](#) that the electability of women who have social capital in the form of networks or male power relations has shifted women who have the political capital or what he calls a political dynasty. Open competition among candidates has an impact on pragmatic competition right since the nomination process from political parties. Political parties tend to recruit women with extensive economic resources, high popularity, and women with male power relations, while political capital and individual capital are sidelined.

[Thompson \(2002\)](#) analyzes senior female politicians' political history in Asia using the term political dynasty to describe vital kinship elements with influential male politicians such as husbands or fathers as key factors in which women political leaders gain power. In local politics,

Kusumaningtyas et al. (2017) explained that the kinship factor is closely related to the oligarchic network. This is said by Hadiz and Robinson (2014) in that oligarchy is a system of power relations that allows the concentration of wealth and authority and the collective protection of both wealth and authority. Thus, political kinship and financial resources (oligarchy) are significant assets for women politicians to gain power. Lovenduski (2008) states that women have weaker resources than men. Women are considered lower than men and tend not to be placed in strategic positions that support political activities. Therefore, male politicians who have earlier on controlled material, social, and cultural resources become strong assets for women politicians who have a kinship to come forward and be elected in political contestation.

In this research, the focus is related to the candidacy process carried out in the legislative elections for the 2004 to 2019 period. While the 2019 election, it only focuses on the power relations between men and women.

RESEARCH METHOD

The method used in this research is qualitative research. This research method is chosen because it helps the author elaborate on discussing the political and social capital of elected PKS women candidates in more depth. Through this method, the authors can also see how the political and social capital of elected PKS women candidates is used in elections. The data source of this study is based on primary data sources and secondary data

sources. Primary data sources were obtained from interviews with elected and not-elected PKS women candidates, while secondary data sources were obtained from documentation and observation. The second data source is obtained from secondary data sources. Secondary data sources come from various written sources and documents in the Central Leadership Council PKS secretariat office, books, journals, research, and mass media to be used as supporting data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Influence of Women's Political Capital in the PKS Candidacy Process in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 Legislative Elections

Casey (2008) defines political capital as the utilization of all types of capital owned by an actor or a political institution to produce political actions that benefit or strengthen the position of political actors or political institutions involved. Hicks and Misra (1993) state that political capital focuses on giving power or resources to realize many things that can actualize the interests of gaining power. In essence, political capital is the power that a person has, which can then be operated or contributed to his contestation's success in a political process such as an election. Casey (2008) states that the primary market for political capital is electoral, policy, and institutional processes. This means that political capital can be used from the candidacy process to a legislative candidate's election process.

In the candidacy process, political capital becomes one of the assets that

affect a legislative candidate's nomination in an electoral district and his/her number in the candidate list. However, the process of candidacy is something that has the potential to cause conflict within the party. This is as stated by [Rahat and Hazan \(2001\)](#) that candidate selection is an essential arena for power struggles within parties. [Schattschneider \(1942\)](#) said that the nature of the nomination process determines the nature of the party.

PKS is a party that is well known in its cadre system. In interviews, elected PKS women candidates said that the nomination in PKS was an appointment by the party proposed by cadres through *Pemira* (grand election) and *kaderisasi* (a structured process of forming a cadre). The respondent said that there was no competition in the nomination process because candidates did not propose themselves but were asked and elected by the party. They said that the party nominated the reason cadres was because of their political capital such as position in the party structure. This is based on image of national leadership, economic conditions, popularity, competence, experience, education, social interactions, and loyalty to the party, also their activities during their time in regeneration process. There is no difference in recruiting a candidate from party cadres other than these factors mentioned above. This shows that PKS is a political party whose policies are gender-biased and even patriarchal in women's legislative candidacy, especially in the placement for Numbers in the candidate list.

The Number is quite influential in winning a seat for a legislative candidate in the election. The candidate in the topmost Number has a relatively high chance of winning a seat. However, in reality, Numbers' placement is one of the problems in supporting affirmative action policies against women. Women are often placed on a significant Number even though the zipper system policy has been implemented.

Although the 2009 and 2014 elections determined that electability is based on majority votes, the Indonesian parliament's major electability factor still exists. Based on data from the Center for Political Studies Universitas Indonesia, most women elected were number 1 in the Number. In the 2009 election, women's electability in Number 1 was 44%, Number 2 was 29%, and Number 3 was 21%. In the 2014 election, the electability of women in Number 1 was 47%, Number 2 was 21%, and Number 3 was 15% ([Margaret et al., 2018: 51-54](#)). In the 2019 election, women's electability in Number 1 was 48%, Number 2 was 25%, and Number 3 was 12% ([Puskapol UI, 2019](#)).

Based on these data, the choice of Number 1 has always increased from the 2009 to 2019 elections. This shows that the trend of the people choosing Number 1 is getting stronger. Suppose the affirmation policy is an effort to increase women's representation. In that case, the approach should no longer be based solely on the 30% quota. Still, it must also pay attention to the Numbers' placement, which is political parties' policy. But unfortunately, the order of women as number 1 in PKS is still very

Table 1. Women in the PKS Legislative Candidate List

Election	Quantity of PKS Women Candidates based on Number					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
2009	2	8	61	8	24	39
2014	1	27	52	11	28	41
2019	6	25	53	17	37	31

Source: General Election Commissions data in 2004, 2009, 2014
(Processed by the researcher, 2019).

minimal. The zipper system's use is often interpreted as women in the 3rd Number of three legislative candidates. This is indicated by the ample number of women in Numbers 3 and 6 compared to numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5.

The data in the table above shows that the use of the zipper system is still mis-interpreted. The zipper system requires at least one woman among the three numbers submitted. This means that women can occupy Numbers 1, 2 and 3 both in one number and in all three numbers. However, PKS female candidates are more likely to be placed in the third number out of the three sequences, and there is only one woman among the three candidates. This can be seen in every election period since the zipper system is implemented in 2009 and even until 2019. Looking at the placement percentage of Number 1 of the number of PKS female candidates, the highest was in the 2019 election, which is 2.8%. In the 2009 election it was only 1% while in the 2014 election only 0.5%. The placement of the Number of PKS women candidates shows that there is no effort by PKS to increase the representation of female cadres, so it is unlikely that women will qualify for parliament.

Initially, carried out the Numbers in PKS through an election process (grand election). The electability of candidates in the election process usually prioritizes cadres' position in the party structure and their character. This aims to see how much support the cadres have. Based on these strengths, parties can plan support maps and strategies for winning elections, including Numbers' assignment determined by the Central Level Leadership Council. Research by [Irwansyah, Panjaitan, and Novitasari \(2013\)](#) found that the longer the women's membership in political parties, the greater the support provided by political parties. However, in PKS, women with long membership terms do not have the same opportunities as men to get party support. This can be seen from the strategic position in the management structure and figures within the party that are difficult for women to achieve in PKS. This causes women's role in the general election to be in a Number that is not favorable for their election.

Women are in a less strategic and profitable position in the legislative nomination process. This can be seen in the Number position given by parties to female candidates. Based on the five

Table 2. PKS Elected Women Candidates in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 Elections

Candidate Name	Election	Number	Electoral District
Nursanita Nasution	2004	2	DKI Jakarta 1
	2009	3	DKI Jakarta II
	2014	3	Jawa Barat VI
Aan Rohanah	2004	2	DKI Jakarta II
	2009	2	Jawa Barat VIII
	2014	2	Banten III
Yoyoh Yusroh	2004	1	Jawa Barat V
	2009	1	Banten III
Herlini Amran	2004	1	Kepulauan Riau
	2009	1	Kepulauan Riau
	2014	1	Kepulauan Riau
Ledia Hanifa	2009	2	Jawa Barat I
	2014	3	Jawa Barat I

Source: Researcher's processed data (2019).

female candidates who were elected from the 2004 to 2014 elections, only two were placed in Number 1, while the other three were in Numbers 2 and 3 under male candidates. Yoyo Yusroh and Herling Amran are women who are placed in Number 1. This is done because their status has been recognized nationally by PKS cadres.

Meanwhile, the other three female candidates are ranked 2nd and 3rd under men with high management positions and popularity levels. This placement is PKS's effort to secure party votes without paying attention to the electability of women. In this case, women's electability has not become the party's concern, but only to fulfill the 30% quota for women.

In the 2004 election, Nursanita Nasution was number 2 under Anis Matta (PKS Secretary-General), Aan Rohanah was number 2 under Hidayat Nur Wahid (PKS president 2000-2004).

In the 2009 election, Nursanita became candidate Number 3 under Mohammad Sohibul Iman (Member of the Syuro Council 2005-2010) at Number 1, and Akhmad Faradis (Chairman of the PKS Central Leadership Council Youth Development Division 2005-2010) at number 2, while Aan Rohanah became candidate number 2 under Mahfudz Siddiq (Incumbent, Chairman of the PKS Faction, Chairman of the PKS Central Leadership Council Da'wah Planning Agency 2005-2009). Ledia Hanifa Amaliah received Number 2 under Suharna Surapranata (Chairman of the PKS Advisory Council). In the 2014 election, Nursanita was placed at number 3 under Mahfudz Abdurrahman (General Treasurer) at Number 1 and Sitaresmi Soekanto (Deputy Secretary-General for Archives and History) at Number 2. Aan Rohanah was placed at number 2 under Jazuli Juwaini (The incumbent and Chairman

of the Economic and Entrepreneurship Development Sector 2010-2015). Ledia Hanifa was placed in Number 3 under Asep Saefulloh Danu (Head of Scouting and Sports for 2010-2015) at number 1 and Ahmad Kuncaraningrat (Chairman of the PKS faction Regional Representative Board in Bandung 2009-2014) at number 2.

Based on the placement of Numbers, PKS policy seems to prioritize positions in the management structure. According to Nursanita, the strategic role in the PKS management affects the level of popularity, character, experience, and loyalty within the party. For example, elected PKS women candidates are women who have strategic positions in the party. But unfortunately, this position is limited to the field of womanhood. Meanwhile, in other areas in the party management structure, many are occupied by men. This shows that women are losing when compared to men, whose numbers occupy more strategic positions in the PKS management structure. This is a series of reasons why women are placed more in the significant Number below men.

The procedure for nominating candidates in PKS is not a written procedure, so the exact reason is unknown. The voting process system is carried out through internal elections for cadres at each level but does not have any regulation regarding the selection. Aan Rohanah said:

“A legislative candidate is appointed through a grand election in PKS. This election is seen from

the competence, education, social interaction, experience of the legislative candidate in society, morality, and how a candidate handles problems in society”.

Meanwhile Herlini said:

“The nomination mechanism is carried out through the grand election, where the cadres are used to choosing candidates who have a high management structure in the party”.

Nursanita said the same thing that her nomination was through the grand election. The election is made based on the cadre process followed by a legislative candidate. Meanwhile, according to Ledia Hanifa, the grand election's legislative candidate election process is seen from the candidates' track record and popularity. Each candidate has a different understanding of the criteria in the internal party nomination process during the grand election but does not know how to determine it in the Number list and electoral district conducted by the Central Leadership Council and Central Level Leadership Council.

The small representation of PKS women in parliament is the impact of gender-neutral policies, one of which is recruiting candidates for legislative candidates. The mechanism for placing candidates in the candidate list is carried out in several stages. Cadres will select candidates at the grassroots through a grand selection. The election made by the cadres then becomes a

recommendation from the DPW (Regional Management Council) and DPP (Central Leadership Council) to be recommended to the DPTP (Central Level Representative Council). The Central Level Leadership Council is tasked with arranging legislative candidates' placement to be determined by the Central Leadership Council and submitted to the DCS (Provisional Candidate List) PKS in the election. Thus, the Central Level Leadership Council has an essential role in placing women on the candidates' list (Darmastuti, 2010).

The Central Level Leadership Council is an organizational structure filled by leaders in the PKS management structure at the central level. Since the Central Level Leadership Council's establishment in 2004, the Central Level Leadership Council's management has never been occupied by party women activists (Atthahara, 2016). There are no women who serve in the Central Level Leadership Council structure because no women become Chairman in central management. The absence of women from the Central Level Leadership Council structure means that women do not influence in determining Numbers. Even in the PKS management structure at the central level, women still occupy minimal strategic positions so that women's political experience is far behind that of men.

Women's political experience is an important form of political capital in political contestation. Randall (1987) requires political feasibility to be based on political experience, both election participants' experience, and the track

record of party structures' positions. Political feasibility is part of the political capital used in electoral administration. Political parties have the role of nominating women against winnable voting pockets. As gatekeepers, the political parties must look for female candidates who have potential and quality and then carry out capacity building for women (Norris & Inglehart, 2001; Verge, 2012; Krook & Norris, 2014). Political parties act as gatekeepers and facilitators who control the nomination process and have the duty to select their cadres to occupy political positions.

Political capital is one of the considerations for political parties to place their legislative candidates in positions and regions that will correlate with the chances of being elected (Kenny & Verge, 2016; Sun, Hu & Hillman, 2016). Casey (2008) stated that one of the functions of political capital is used during general elections. In the general election process, if someone wins, he has already benefited from the political capital he/she has. Thus, PKS women candidates' political capital provides an advantage in being elected during the general election.

Based on the research results, the capital that has the most influence in the appointment by PKS is political capital. In political capital, apart from the management structure's track record, the grand election process is also taken into consideration. The PKS election process is carried out by each cadre from the DPC (Branch Management Council), DPW (Regional Management Council) to the DPP (Central Leadership

Council). After the election process, the party's elected candidates are screened by the party based on their position in the party, level of popularity, and character. It was in this screening process that PKS appointed the cadres it wanted to nominate.

According to Hazan and Rahat (2010), the candidacy process involves who the candidate chooses and who determines the candidate. Based on the results of the study, it shows that the candidacy in PKS involves party officials and members according to membership levels. Meanwhile, those who select and determine candidates are the party's structural officers, namely the DPTP (Central Level Leadership Council). Looking at the degree of the inclusive-exclusive spectrum presented by Hazan and Rahat, PKS is a party that has a path of candidacy from inclusive to exclusive. In the inclusive stage, all party members can be involved in the electoral process either as voters or elected as candidates through grand elections. This is done to see how big party members support a candidate at the grassroots level. Candidates who have been selected in grand elections then enter the exclusive candidacy process through a screening. The DPP (Central Leadership Council) and the DPTP (Central Level Leadership Council) carried out the screening process by considering and determining candidates' lists based on the party winning strategy. In the screening process, parties can remove candidates deemed to be detrimental to the party. PKS exclusivity is seen in the screening process when the informants did not

know the candidacy process's clear qualification standards. This seems to show that the screening process mechanism does not have transparent and open standard procedures so that the process looks very elitist.

According to Sitaresmi, there are problems with the placement of Numbers and electoral districts within the party which is covered up. She added that grand election implementation is just a party formality where there is a conflict in it. This is because there is no transparent and open procedure for candidacy in PKS, which creates conflicts of interest within the party.

The Numbers placement has its advantages for candidates who are in the top Number in the 2004 elections. The benefits of using a semi-open candidate list system were obtained by all PKS women candidates elected in the 2004 election. Nursanita was in number 2 and received an abundance of party votes and Anis Matta, which reached the Hare Quota (*Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih/BPP*) figure of 220,455. Aan Rohanah also received a similar advantage at number 2 and received an abundance of Hidayat Nur Wahid votes with 262,019 votes who had reached the Hare Quota figure 232,355. Besides, the two women are in the electoral district of DKI Jakarta, which incidentally is the area with the highest vote gain for PKS. While Yoyoh Yusroh received 139,967 votes, she has not reached the Jawa Barat electoral district's BPP number, which is 219,993, but because she is a Number 1, she gets an abundance of votes from the party.

Apart from Numbers, the electoral system division is one of the most important technical instruments of the electoral system. This is because the placement of an electoral district has a direct effect on an electoral system. The relationship between votes and seats or the number of people's representatives deserves to represent an electoral district and the opportunity for one political vote to win a seat. The distribution of political representation or the party system can also be directed and controlled through electoral districts. Generally, the electoral district can be defined as a competition area for all election contestants to gain votes. Every people's representative who sits in the parliament has an electoral district base where there are constituents in the area they represent. Electoral districts are determined based on the population in the region concerned. Two things that must be considered in the placement of electoral districts include the equality of each seat's value that is contested, that is the population, and the background of other factors such as geographical conditions, history, culture, and access to communication-transportation (Kartawidjaja & Pramono, 2007).

Political parties have a significant role in the nomination of women with internal party policies such as women's placement in strategic and potential electoral districts. A strategic electoral district refers to an electoral district with a narrow area such as DKI Jakarta with 6-8 seats. This makes women more comfortable collecting votes than a large electoral district such as Kepulauan Riau, an archipelago and has relatively

difficult access and consists of 3 seats. Meanwhile, a potential electoral district refers to mapping the PKS voting base, which is mostly located in the DKI Jakarta and Jawa Barat areas. The biggest chances of PKS winning are in these two regions. In addition to placement in strategic and potential electoral districts, placement in the same electoral district from the previous election period is an important factor in women's vote accumulation process.

In the 2004 to 2014 election periods, out of the five elected PKS female candidates, only two were placed in the same electoral district. The other three were placed in different electoral districts. Nursanita Nasution was elected in the 2004 election because she was in DKI I. Even though Nursanita was in second place, DKI is the area where PKS won the vote. Nursanita received an abundance of votes from her party during the 2004 election in which a closed list is still used. Apart from that, the electoral district of DKI I is the area she very actively visited because of her other profession as a lecturer at one of the academies there. Many students say that they have chosen PKS and her.

Meanwhile, in the 2009 election, she was placed in the electoral district of DKI II and the 2014 election in Jawa Barat VI's electoral district. DKI II and Jawa Barat VI are the addresses of Nursanita's residence at the 2009 and 2014 elections. Although Nursanita is still in an electoral district with a high PKS voting base, since the 2009 elections, the system for determining elected candidates uses a majority vote. She is placed in the number three

position, so she has to start again from zero to introduce herself to constituents.

Aan Rohanah and Yoyoh Yusroh experienced the same thing. Both are incumbent candidates whose electoral district has been moved. In the 2009 election, Aan Rohanah was transferred to Jawa Barat VIII's electoral district because the area was her birthplace, namely Cirebon. Likewise, Yoyoh Yusroh's transfer to Banten III in the 2009 elections was her home in Tangerang. The relocation of electoral districts carried out by PKS is called an effort to expand the PKS vote. However, in reality, the transfer was not wholly successful. Yoyo Yusroh won and successfully held her seat, while Aan Rohanah did not. The placement of Numbers is also a success factor for Yoyoh Yusroh. According to Sitaresmi, apart from the Number factor, Yoyoh Yusroh's election was also due to her prominent character wherever she was placed. However, this success could not be obtained by Aan Rohanah when her electoral district was moved and she became number 2. Even though she was transferred to the electoral district, Aan Rohanah admitted that she had never been active in the area before. Aan Rohanah said:

"I was transferred to Cirebon by PKS. The party reads that I am originally from Cirebon and have many large families there. It's just that I haven't been there for a long time; I don't have any activities there. But I was there and even though I have many relatives I was a new person who was not known".

Meanwhile, Herling Amran and Ledia Hanifa are female legislative candidates who are placed in the same electoral district for three election periods. Since the 2004 election, Herling was placed in the Kepulauan Riau electoral district. Helen said that she was born in Riau and is active in publishing Ummi magazine, whose subscribers are most people in the Riau Islands, where previously they were a province with Riau. Ledia was stationed in the Jawa Barat I electoral district, Bandung Cimahi, from the 2009 elections to the 2019 elections. The media acknowledged that her family network structure is vital in the region. The extended family of Ledia Hanifa is a prominent figure in the Bandung area. According to Ledia, this is a factor in her always being placed in the same electoral district for every election.

Apart from the candidate factor, PKS women candidates' electability cannot be separated from constituent communities' choices. The four elected PKS women who were interviewed agreed that social capital through networking and organizational approaches in the community is important during elections. The electability of PKS women candidates in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections in using social capital is influenced by two factors, namely closeness to networks and relationships with members of organizations or groups. Female candidates build intimacy to networks in the community long before the campaign period, such as the *majelis taklim* (Muslim non-formal education institution) network. Meanwhile,

building good relations with members through social service activities, healthy gymnastics, and free medical examinations are party work programs carried out with party structures. However, this capital was not fully able to raise votes at the time of the election.

The value of ties or networks of social capital depends on the number of networks they can mobilize and the volume of cultural, social, and economic capital that each network has (Kilpatrick, Field & Falk, 2011; Ferragina & Arrighi, 2017). Bourdieu's opinion shows that social capital does not fully benefit or influence someone if other capitals do not accompany it. This was proven when PKS women candidates had built networks with the community, but these networks did not fully support them when the voting was conducted. Herlini revealed that the network in society that she had built over a long period was swept away by a pragmatic approach by other candidates in her constituency, which was related to money politics.

Also, Putnam (1993) includes elements of reciprocal norms. The reciprocity norm can be used as an analysis related to the network built by elected PKS women candidates. Reciprocity occurs when the network created by PKS women is strong and has a high level of trust, namely in *majelis taklim*, after this when the election is held, the network automatically selects the PKS women candidates. The common goal to be achieved in the election is clear: to win the vote of PKS as a party that is close to the da'wah network into the government system,

namely the parliament as their representative. Taking a look at the interchange of the elected PKS women's network, it can be categorized as binding (exclusive) social capital. Putnam (2000) describes binding social capital as something that can sustain specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity while at the same time being the strongest glue of social relations in maintaining loyalty and strengthening particular identities. This is in line with what is conveyed by Aan Rohanah that *majelis taklim* was the most substantial network in providing support to her during the 2004 elections.

Meeting through the activities mentioned above creates solidarity and mutual assistance (reciprocity). It is a social investment for the community. Besides, the interactions formed from social activities also give rise to individual personal bonds. This association then becomes social capital for PKS women candidates to get support in voting.

Male Power Relation in the Candidating Process of Elected PKS Women Candidates for the 2019 Election

Putri (2017) explains that social capital in the electoral process is horizontal and vertical. Horizontal social capital is built from systematic and organized network members through formal organizations. In contrast, vertical social capital is built up from community members' social structure who have influence or can be called relations with local elites or power relations.

Male power relations are social capital for women who come from kinship networks with local elites who influence women's electability in elections. This capital was successfully used in the election of PKS women candidates in the 2019 elections.

In the 2019 elections, several PKS women candidates' electability looked different from the electability of previous elections. If in the previous election, PKS avoided a pattern of candidates that involved elements of political dynasties, in the 2019 election, there were four names of women candidates who had a kinship with political elites at the local and national levels. These four women include (1) Netty Prasetyani, wife of the Governor of West Java for the 2008-2013 and 2013-2018 periods, Ahmad Heryawan; (2) Nur Azizah Tamhid, wife of the Mayor of Depok for the 2005-2010 and 2010-2015 periods, Nur Mahmudi Ismail; (3) Nevi Zuairina, wife of the Governor of West Sumatra for the 2010-2015 and 2015-2020 periods, Irwan Prayitno; and (4) Sakinah Al Jufri, younger brother of the Chairman of the 2015-2020 PKS Syuro Council, Salim Segaf Al Jufri.

The 2019 election is the first political contestation experience for Netty Prasetyani, Nevi Zuairina, and Nur Azizah Tamid. Apart from participating in the general election for the first time, the three women have never served in any management structure at PKS, both at the central and regional levels. In the legislative election, Netty was ranked number 1 in the Electoral District of Jawa Barat VIII. In the election, she was able to get 57,047 votes. Meanwhile,

Nevi ran as a PKS candidate in the Electoral District of Sumatera Barat II and was in Number 2. Nevi was able to get 52,141 votes. Meanwhile, Nur Azizah Tamhid ran in the Electoral District of Jawa Barat VI with Number 3. In her first election experience, Nur Azizah was able to collect 63,963 votes.

Unlike the three women above, Sakinah Al Jufri had previously participated in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections. In the 2009 election, she took part in the contestation at the DPRD (Regional People's Representative Council) level of Central Sulawesi Province with Number 1. She was elected with a total of 4,457 votes. Meanwhile, in the 2014 election, she was nominated as a legislative candidate for the DPR RI (The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia) in the Central Sulawesi Electoral District with Number 1. But unfortunately, in that election, she was not able to win a seat. Sakinah again participated in the contestation in the 2019 election, with the same electoral district and Numbers, and she was elected with a vote of 50,305.

Dynastic political practices have occurred in Indonesia and other countries. Richter (1991) in 1990-1991 analyzed the factors behind the emergence of successful women in politics in South and Southeast Asia. Richter concludes his analysis that there are family ties or kinship relations with their family, namely male politicians who have influenced such as fathers, husbands, and siblings, which are the factors behind the emergence of women in politics. These kinship relationships

enable women to overcome various obstacles to progress in politics, such as a lack of financial capital, skills, popularity, experience, networks, and information.

In Indonesia, many problems regarding political dynasties have occurred both at the local and central levels. However, in PKS, the political dynasty issue is something that PKS does not naturally do. Even in the 2004 to 2014 elections, in candidacy, a legislative candidate depended on the political experience and structural management positions in the PKS to occupy the maximum Number. Meanwhile, in the 2019 election, 4 out of 8 women elected had never held a position in the management structure in the PKS. This shows an increasingly elitist (exclusive) and pragmatic shift in candidacy in the 2019 legislative elections.

CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion results, the process of candidacy for PKS women candidates in the four election periods of 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 has experienced a significant shift in the 2019 election. In the 2004-2014 election process, the candidacy process was carried out through a grand election process by all party members. All party members are involved in the electoral process either as voters or as candidates for legislative candidates. In grand elections, the election tendency is based on a candidate's popularity level because of some factors. The position and occupation in the party structure, competence, experience, education,

social networks through the community or *majelis taklim*, loyalty to the party, also his/her activities during the cadre process. Candidates who have a strong tendency to ease their candidacy process in the nomination and placement of strategic electoral districts. According to [Hazan and Rahat \(2010\)](#), the candidate process can be categorized into an inclusive to exclusive process.

Inclusive-exclusive candidacy is seen in the insufficient number of women who are placed in nominations and strategic electoral districts compared to male candidates who have more substantial roles. Women's difficulty in occupying strategic positions in elections shows that elected women candidates can win in elections already. As the profile has explained, PKS women candidates elected in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections have strong social and political capital.

Meanwhile, in the 2019 elections, the candidacy process has shifted to be inclusive-pragmatic. Several women candidates participate in legislative elections with a kinship with local and national elites who have or are currently in office. Pragmatism can be seen from the women candidates who occupy the top Number even though their political track record is not much seen in internal and external party activities. Also, they also occupy constituencies with large PKS mass bases such as West Java and West Sumatra.

PKS, which initially had difficulty placing women in strategic positions, has shifted towards being pragmatic. Women are found in strategic positions because of their capacity and character

and their kinship with local elites who can quickly get ballot votes.

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