

# Electoral Manipulations and Fraud Political Contestation: The Case of Regional Head Election

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## Abstract

Political contestation in the context of the General Election is related to the importance of the role of constituents as the owner of sovereignty, especially to guarantee the quality of an election. But in practice, the important role of the constituents seems to be an irony when elites who fight as actors are trapped in a latent condition that shows there is a misconception in interpreting the nature of power and how to get it. In reality, for the actors, the post-conflict local election is only a means to gain political power superficially and ignore other things. Therefore, cheating in political contestation also seems to be a necessity for those who think it is a rational act.

## Keywords:

Politics; Fraud; Election

## INTRODUCTION

Generically, democracy is a form of government based on popular sovereignty. The people are the holders of sovereign rights over the state, and to actualize it as a political culture requires a process of democratization, which can, among other things, refer to certain models of political democracy that are best suited to the available and conducive social conditions for that purpose (Sorensen, 2008). Even so, how the real construction of the people's role in showing their sovereignty depends on the adjective attached to the term democracy itself so that the praxis model of democracy certainly varies. In other words, the discourse of democracy is only

a metaphor of the importance of the role of the people in the state order (Axtmann, 2007), whereas how the praxis of democracy with all its implications must be seen case by case and depends on objective conditions that support it (Cunningham, 2002).

If the basic principle of democracy is to prioritize values that prioritize equality and freedom, and there is a guarantee of justice because everyone is equal when under the law, then one ideal type of democratic state that practices it is probably the present United States (Morlino, 2002). Like it or not, the discourse about the modern democratic model that refers to US standards also colors the conceptual thinking and praxis of political democracy in Indonesia (Abdullah, 2009), even since the beginning of the republic was founded (Latif, 2011). The obsession with the

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democratic model "similar to the United States" seemed to be increasingly inscribed in the minds of the elite "pro-democracy" who imagined the future of the Republic of Indonesia after the New Order. The designers of political change then saw the urgency of the availability of legislation needed to reform politics in this republic. There is an assumption that in the condition of transition to democracy, the rule of law is the main condition for the establishment of the rules of the game and the creation of habituation of democratization. With the existence of the rule of law, the people can be actively involved in the process of influencing public policy decisions, as happened in Western countries whose democratic politics have matured. To achieve this condition, structurally it must start from political participation in elections because the democratic order requires the people's sovereignty to be formulated as such that (Gaffar, 1999).

With such a preference for democratic political reforms, several new laws were born which adopted liberalism as an ideology to regulate social order and the rules of politics in the public sphere in Indonesia. Regarding such preferences, since 2005 in Indonesia a new democratic procedure has been conditioned to replace and fill the position of Regional Head, conceptually called "Regional Head General Election". In the scenario, it is envisioned that the community members needed a local election. Through the Regional Head General Election, residents in a region can freely

support a person to become a Regional Head, following their various aspirations, and according to their respective rationality. In this regard, each actor who is a candidate is then required to make political commitments, as another interpretation of the importance of the 'social contract', to fight for the aspirations of the people whose main issues are usually not far from issues of people's welfare and sense of social justice. The political commitment was made and delivered during the campaign period by the candidate in the form of a vision and mission of the pro-people policy program, and that political commitment (imagined) could be collected later on when the candidate had been elected as ruler.

But in later reality, the ideal scenario for the post-conflict local election did not turn out as it should. In 2010, for example, out of 244 post-conflict local elections held in 33 provinces in Indonesia, 230 of them (94.26%) ended in disputes, because of "cheating" problems, and their cases were included in the Constitutional Court session. The most alleged regional election fraud is the case of using money and abuse of power (political office) for "buying and selling political support" or "bribery pretending to donate" and other things which can then be categorized as "money politics" (Renwick, 2010).

The implementation of Regional Head General Election in Indonesia also does not seem to be an ideal political contestation as envisioned by the

policymakers on Regional Head General Election. Even with the fact that a large number of Regional Head General Election are full of disputes reflect the symptoms of Regional Head General Election in Indonesia has experienced a kind of "gaps" (Huntington, 1965; Huntington & Fukuyama, 2006), or accountability flaws so that theoretically it is feasible to identify as being in a condition "democratic deficit" (Luckham et al., 2000).

The occurrence of various violations of the rules of the game in the local election event in Indonesia can be seen as two sides of a pattern that has a cause and effect pattern. On the first hand, violations of the rules of the game can be meaningful as a result of the Regional Election Group, with all the implications. In this connection, the Election Integration is a result. On the second hand, the violation of the rules of the game indicates that there is an important but hidden element that makes the perpetrators trapped in a misguided behavior that is shown in banal political behavior (superficial). Banality (shallowness) understanding the meaning of power by political elites is thought to be a major factor in the act of justifying any means.

When Regional Head General Election is envisioned as a democratization scenario in the local realm, political banality is an "anomaly" of institutionalizing Regional Head General Election as a pillar of democratization. This "anomaly" cannot

be measured as a steady social reality, because it involves a variety of specific but abstract settings of interest (such as the ambition of power) and the rationalization that underlies one's political actions in the public sphere. Even so, political banality, in general, can be seen as actions that tend to ignore normative political rules or manipulate rules as if they prioritize valuable social values while on the contrary, and or an act that gives the impression as if shows dignified political glory when it is fake.

The question then is, why did the anomaly in the form of political banality occur? Is it a form of "moral damage" perpetrators of political action, or is it a result of a system that does not work to support the presence of a dignified democratic political model. The study by taking the case of the Regional Head General Election in East Kalimantan is intended to answer that question, by explaining the symptoms from a structural perspective.

## RESEARCH METHOD

This study was conducted using a meta-theory approach. Such a methodology adopts an understanding of the social theory that defines meta-theory as reflective monitoring of the objectives, processes, and products of an existing study (Zhao, 2003). Meta-theory is a normative effort aimed at understanding and giving direction to the first-level studies (which produce scientific assumptions about the object of observation) which are intended to

produce meta-theorization from the perspective of the ontology of the social world. In praxis, the meta-theory can be carried out by following the interpretive paradigm, which argues that the purpose of theorizing activities is not to express the law of society, but rather to interpret the meaning of human action and understand the 'real world' (lifeworld) where human actors live. Therefore the keyword is how to try to find answers, what exactly is happening? (Zhao, 2003).

As a locus of study, this study takes the case of the Regional Election of East Kalimantan Province which was carried out in 2015 and 2018, especially in the context of the election of Regents, Mayors, and Governors. The case of the East Kalimantan Regional Head General Election was certainly not to be used as a generalization of the issue of Regional Head General Election in Indonesia. However, there are three reasons why the East Kalimantan Regional Head General Election case should be used as an "example of Indonesia". First, the rules of the game for the East Kalimantan Regional Head General Election apply equally to all of Indonesia, with the organizing agency (KPU) which is also no different in its organizational system because the legal considerations are the same. Second, residents who live in East Kalimantan and are involved as constituents in the Regional Head General Election are "miniature Indonesians" who are pluralist, both in terms of diverse ethnic groups (though dominated by the Banjar, Javanese, Kutai,

and Bugis ethnic groups) or various religions that are embraced by their citizens (although dominated by Islam). Third, empirically, the dynamics of local politics in East Kalimantan is a "part of" the dynamics of national politics that are never devoid of latent conflicts and the conspiracy of political elites to gain power. Frictions and political factions at the national level undoubtedly provide an impact on the dynamics of local politics, although it does not have to be the opposite. Even when political conflicts occur in the local realm, conflict resolution is almost always resolved by parties holding authority at the central level.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies on political financing, especially campaign finance, have been carried out in various circles, both in Indonesia and in other countries. By reviewing previous studies, it is hoped that more comprehensive information on campaign finance can be obtained. Through a study conducted by IDEA (Falguera, Jones, & Ohman, 2014), obtained information related to the practices and patterns of financing political parties and campaigns in various countries. Unfortunately, this International IDEA study is still limited to an overview conducted by comparing the practices of financing political parties and campaigns. This is not surprising because the purpose of this study is to find general patterns of financing practices for

political parties and campaigns in various countries in the world.

If the International IDEA study applies a comparative perspective, another case is the study conducted by Mietzner (2015), who applies a formal legal perspective. In his study, Meitzner stated that illegal campaign financing in the direct Regional Head General Election in Indonesia was alleged to have increased very high. It was stated, many elements of campaign finance were not officially reported, such as contributions from lobbyists and wealthy entrepreneurs. Meitzner found that the practice of illegality in campaign finance was actually "permitted" by the state, and "accepted" by the public. Completing the study, it is worth looking at other Meitzner studies conducted in 2007; where Meitzner highlights the phenomenon of increasing fundraising efforts by parties whose legality is questioned (Mietzner, 2007). The fundraising effort was allegedly carried out illegally because of the policy of cutting state subsidies for political parties in Indonesia in 2005.

Regarding campaign finance, it is interesting to look at studies conducted by Samuels (2012), who look at it from an economic perspective. In his study, Samuels stated that political campaigns had become a kind of "industry" that encouraged economic growth in a new democratic country. The campaign process is envisioned as a market where there are credible supply, demand, and commitment to supporting a pattern of

"market exchange". In another study, Samuels deepened the influence of the "pork barrel" in helping incumbents increase revenue from the interests of the private sector. The author sees the pork barrel as an effort to get votes and as a form of exchange between the incumbent and its constituents. Research in Brazil shows that the pork barrel is a form of incumbent exchange with campaign fund donors.

By using three indicators Habibi & Suswanta (2019), prove the phenomenon of the pork barrel that occurred in Samarinda City Regional Head General Election, Allocation of regional discretionary funds with incumbent candidates before and during Regional Head General Election experienced a drastic increase in the lead up to Regional Head General Election and social assistance spending decreased by a tendency to fluctuate but there were findings of the allocation of goods expenditure in 2015 distributed through 100 Technical SKPD of Rp. 504,938,020,140.34 to the public at a time when regional financial conditions are in deficit. There is an increase in expenditure on grant and social assistance spending, still occurring despite the financial condition of the 2013-2015 budget deficit. This is an indication that the incumbent is trying to keep assisting to attract voters' interest in Regional Head General Election 2015. There is an increase in expenditure on grant and social assistance spending, still occurring despite the financial condition

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Another study conducted by Mas'ood & Savirani, (2011), did not directly touch campaign finance. From a socio-historical perspective, the study of Mas'ood and Savirani alludes to political financing, not just campaign finance. The study explained strategies at the individual level to carry out political financing, as well as factors that helped explain their performance. This study shows how political finance with money politics is no longer relevant, because cultural capital, political capital, and social capital can also contribute to support one's political career.

Likewise, a study conducted by Aspinall (2014), challenged the role of "brokers" in elections. Unfortunately, the Aspinall study does not specifically link with campaign financing. Reality shows the role of the "broker" can not be separated from the funds provided by the candidate pair to mobilize voters. The Aspinall Study explains broker behavior into its three types. First are "activist brokers", who support candidates based on politics, ethnicity, religion, or other commitments; second, "clientelist brokers", who want a longer-term relationship with a candidate or more senior "broker", to receive future prizes; and thirdly, "opportunistic brokers", brokers who seek short-term material benefits during the campaign. Formed and the presence of 'broker', whatever the

type, can not be separated from the funding issued by the candidate pair; and this certainly affects the campaign financing of the candidate pair earlier.

From several studies that have been carried out, it appears that the common thread under the inevitable campaign financing practices for political parties involved in election contestation. In practice, wide-open campaign financing activities are carried out in ways that are of questionable legality. Besides, it is also possible for campaign financing to be dragged into the vortex of "industry" because campaign activities have become a kind of "industrial commodity". Likewise, previous studies show the involvement of actors present as third parties who play a role in campaign finance.

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

### *Context of Construction of Democratization Habituation*

In the Regional Head General Election contestation in East Kalimantan, it is undeniable how important the role of capital is to improve the bargaining position of candidates. The candidate can arrange any strategy that is most likely to improve his bargaining position because the matter is not regulated in the rules of the post-conflict local election. The problem is when to improve the bargaining position, political actions taken by candidates can be categorized as inhibiting the desirable political democratization scenario, namely

negating the aspects of transparency and honesty.

In terms of transparency, it is important to know how many political funds are provided by candidates and where the sources of funds come from. Normative rules should be implemented by the organizer of the General Election. But that scenario cannot be carried out when the candidate deals with "bohir politics", who give him funds without the public knowing how much they will be. Bohir politics are funders who play a role similar to patrons. In the East Kalimantan Regional Head General Election, this political forum is usually a rich coal mining entrepreneur. The lack of transparency in the source of funds from the political bohir was not without reason. Candidates do not want to be known "owed" to Bohir. On the other hand, Bohir himself did not want to be tracked how much money he gave to candidates. There are rumors that the matter of funding from the Bohir has something to do with money laundering and tax fraud. The issue of money laundering cannot be proven by its empirical data, because it involves illicit money transactions (usually related to corruption) which are always covered closely by the perpetrators. Whereas the problem of tax fraud, can be based on logical assumptions, that rich Bohir, the result of coal mining, is paying income tax. Data from the tax office does not seem to be directly proportional to that. While the agency authorized to prove transparency in the matter of funding

"political costs" was not very clear performance. The Election Commission has never been able to thoroughly track it. Moreover, Panwaslu, for various reasons, justifies the inability of the institution. Whereas law enforcement agencies always reason that the origin of political funds is not their realm. Therefore, although the role of bohir is very crucial in the General Election, its role is usually behind the scenes, so it is difficult to trace what tactics are being carried out in the affairs of the General Election.

In terms of honesty, the candidates must present themselves as they are, so that voter groups can assess their capacity. But the scenario was never carried out when the candidate took political imaging actions to capture the sympathy of the masses. Candidates appear "not as he is". In an imaging political scenario, the appearance of a candidate is always polished in such a way as to enchant and invite the sympathy of his constituents. Though imaging politics is not prohibited, and is not forbidden, and will be carried out by candidates who think rationally. Whether voters will be fascinated by imaging politics is one thing. That there is "dishonesty" demonstrated in the politics of imaging is another matter. The researcher thinks that it is about dishonesty that hinders the idea of the democratization scenario that wants to be realized through the Regional Head General Election contestation. Imagine, the voting community has been "deceived" by information deliberately

built by the candidate (and his Success Team), both regarding social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital displayed by the candidate.

Such is the case of the post-conflict local election habituation which involves the interaction of actors on the one hand with the election, and with voter groups on the other hand. The concept of habitus does not determine the actions of agents as 'practical operators of object construction' (Bourdieu, 2015). This is a conscious action developed through objective structure and personal history. This micro-oriented definition allows habitus to adjust and accommodate dynamic meso-level structures that involve other actors in a durable disposition. As stressed by Bourdieu, habitus is the "product of structural internalization" of the social world (Bourdieu, 2014). Habitus was obtained as a result of the long position in social life occupied. In this sense, habitus can also be a collective phenomenon. Habitus is a historical product that creates individual and collective action and is, therefore, following the patterns evoked by history. In that context, voter preferences are determined by his long experience as a member of the community in which he is located. Therefore, if we agree with Bourdieu, we certainly cannot force certain lives to be imposed uniformly on all agents. Because habitus produces and is produced by, social life. Habitus is a structuring structure of social life. On the other hand, habitus is a structured

structure (structured structure) by the social world (Bourdieu, 2013).

In other words, there is nothing strange in the process of creating a power habitus in the political sphere such as Regional Head General Election, including manipulation by actors to win contestation. The problem is, the actual conditions that support the habitus seem to be a serious problem when we look at it from the perspective of the quality of democracy that accompanies the election contestation. Because, if the quality of democracy becomes the focus of our attention, the local election habitus that tends to side with the owners of capital (economy) to control the arena may not be following the scenario of democratization which is committed to the principles of equality, justice, and honesty in the arena of political contestation. Because it is feared that in such conditions negative impacts will arise in the form of oligarchic politics that threaten democracy.

Concerning the East Kalimantan Regional Head General Election, it is clear that there is an oligarchic role for local political parties. In 2005, it was undeniable that some local political parties, such as PPP, PKB, and Golkar Party, were only determined by the general chairperson and several core officials. Why? Because they are the ones who "finance" the party and cause the political party to exist. In 2010, in addition to the three political parties mentioned previously, the oligarchic tendency of the local party was also shown by PAN (whose head of the regional board is a



Mayor), the United Nations (whose head of the regional board is a Regent), PBR (who chairs the council the area manager is a coal businessman; and the Gerindra Party (whose head of the regional board is also a coal businessman). The only local political party whose existence is still determined by its cadres is PKS. Because PKS as a cadre party is still consistent with the party platform it supports and is not dependent on several ruling elites. Whereas PDIP, since 2012 is also inevitable from oligarchies, because the political party is finally controlled by regional heads who are known to have the strong financial capital to support the party. As a result, all party policies are almost always determined by the regional chairperson. No exception in the determination of candidates to be carried by the party in the General Election contestation. Sometimes the determination of candidates who can advance in the Regional Head General Election battle is determined exclusively by the core management. As a result of such tendencies, inevitably, local political parties are merely tools of the interests of a handful of people who have contributed to political parties, which when under certain conditions can open up space for transactional politics.

#### *Context of Banality of Action*

Basically, political behavior is a person's social action (actor) in the political sphere, and whether for some reason, sometimes tends to deviate alias is not following existing norms or political

ethics. Therefore, the terms banal and banalitas can be used to describe political entities, and they should include political contestation such as Regional Head General Election. However, political banality is not an entity, but it is a direction of behavior (direction) that allows a political actor to do (or not to do) a certain action. There is a kind of scenario, and political banality is part of that scenario. Banal political actors are naturally aware of what they are doing, but consciousness can be interpreted by the person concerned as merely a scene that is supposed to exist, following the agreed scenario, even though it is not pleasing to him.

Political banality, when embodied in a social act, may represent despicable and rotten political actions. Therefore, political crime can be justified by the presence of political banality, however, political banality is not a political crime itself. Political banality is perhaps more appropriate if it is positioned as a conditional supporting factor, and political crime is the result. An example is when an actor practices slanderous politics in the form of an evil campaign (black campaign) to his political opponents, simply because he thinks it can condition his victory in political battles in the arena of political contestation he is following. Because of that, political banality can be positioned as an intervening variable of a rotten political act, political fraud, or whatever factors influence the quality of political democracy. As a precondition of events,

political banality becomes a problem because it can frame a political act that is evil or rotten to be as if there is a justification so that it makes sense to do.

In other words, ethical issues, or rather moral issues, are the main issues in political banality. The problem is that political morality is often only regarded as a philosophical problem because it is difficult to measure indicators and validity empirically. Various moral systems are impossible to compare and evaluate differentially. But borrowing Bauman's reflection, the needs served by each system were born in the community where the system is nested, and importantly, in every society, there must be a moral system, not the substance of certain community's moral norms which happen to be imposed to maintain its unity (Bauman, 2007). If morality is considered as a consequence of society or a product of society, then moral behavior becomes a synonym of social conformity and obedience to the norms implemented by the majority (Bauman, 2007). Because such awareness encourages Bauman to argue that "the factors responsible for the presence of moral capacity must be sought in the social, or the social context, but the appearance of moral behavior is not the result of the presence of an agency which is a social context" (Bauman, 2007).

In harmony with Bauman's argument, the analytical focus in Levinas's writings is on the relationship between humans and others. Subjectivity is understood in an ethical sense. The node from the subjective is intertwined in

ethics which is understood as accountability. And that responsibility is described as "the structure of essential and fundamental subjectivities" (Levinas, 2013). Contrary to the tradition of mainstream philosophy in the West, in the tradition of mainstream philosophy in the West, there is a correlation between knowledge, understood as impartial contemplation, and the meaning of an event for Levinas ethics was the first composer of philosophy (Levinas, 2013). However, the ethical accountability relationship that constitutes human existence is recognized by Levinas to be deadlocked when sociality extends beyond face-to-face interaction. Because in his view, after more than two people were involved, the ethical relationship changed and became political. In the "sociopolitical order that organizes and enhances our survival" this is morality in the sense of "a series of regulations relating to social behavior and civic obligations" comes into force. Levinas (2013) argues that ethics, namely the sensitivity of a subject to the call of other subjects, "becomes morality and harden the skin once we move into the world of impersonal third-party politics such as the world of government, judiciary, correctional institutions, schools, and so on". Or in other words, important issues of political morality must be understood in a social context, not a matter of which society it should be placed, because it is a reality that is not a product of society (Bauman, 2007). Based on this understanding, I want to argue that

political morals related to the merits of contestation, such as honesty, openness, and justice, however difficult it is to measure, are ideals that can be understood by every member of society but may not be carried out by each individual. Why it cannot be carried out, if it is done consciously and deliberately, it should be suspected because the individual concerned has been trapped in political banality that understands the meaning of power superficially.

In the case of the East Kalimantan Regional Head General Election, the phenomenon of political banality was quite clear in the contestation arena. It was empirically recorded at least three symptoms. First, party political support means having to provide cash. Although they still need an intermediary agent, the transaction is more overt regarding the price to be paid to whom and for what. It doesn't need a lot of alibis as a transaction-smoothing language. All parties seem to be in the condition of knowing and knowing what is their job. In a more open phrase, if you don't have money, don't try to find support by taking the party's path. Just choose individual channels (and even then in practice need money, but of course less than the path of political parties).

Second, people's political participation must be converted with money. Whether the euphoria of political reform is over, it turns out that more and more groups of people are weighing how much money they get from their involvement in the campaign. In a general

case, I can grasp the symptom, that the emergence of "constituent rationality" has to do with the increasing difficulty of lower-middle-income groups getting jobs that generate money. This is evident from the enthusiasm of marginalized groups to offer "money politics". But this phenomenon does not apply to marginal groups who already have a choice. This is why the phenomenon does not seem to be generally accepted. The time allotted to attend a political forum that is packaged in the form of a political gathering must also be compensated. Whatever it is called, whether gasoline or cigarette money, etc., certain community members are no longer shy about asking for compensation for the time they have provided to attend political campaigns or gatherings with candidates. The logic that develops in society is, who needs support? Time is money. For what a waste of valuable time (and can be used to find another fortune) by attending political meetings that do not directly affect the improvement of their welfare. Therefore, at least in a political gathering, there are "gifts" given by the candidate (or Team of Success), the most gift given is in the form of sarong for prayer. So the reason for giving gifts is packaged under the pretext of "put on for prayer" (worn to pray). That is, those who give can be rewarded; while those who are given a gift can do worship that can undoubtedly be rewarded as well. If not, the political gathering might threaten to fail.

Third, there is support for votes, if paid in advance. The term "dawn attack"

is considered ancient. For certain constituent groups, whenever the "money politics" can be done. The positive aspect is that constituents who have received advance payments usually don't want to accept money from other candidates. There is a certain kind of commitment, that the promise must be kept. In the 2018 Regional Head General Election, it was tracked that a few days before the voting day there was a member of the Team of Success and his guerrillas were guerrillas from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. They offer monetary compensation to constituents, to elect a candidate who fights in political contestation. There was no coercion, let alone intimidation. But usually, an agreement occurs if the "price" paid is considered appropriate by the constituents. The money is received, and the middleman only needs to record the name of the person who received the money as a receipt. One person can receive compensation money for several members of his family. Usually, the "price" paid varies between Rp 100,000 and Rp 250 thousand per person. But if the constituent does not like the name of the candidate offered by the Success Team or his accomplice, he will refuse compensation money, and the transaction does not take place. However, such cases of money politics generally only occur among the lower-middle-class people, especially the poor marginalized and unemployed groups. For the upper-middle class, there is almost no such mode. Why did it not happen, maybe

because the compensation money was considered too small. It may also be that the upper-middle-class community groups are considered well-established in their political choices, so they do not need to be bribed, and cannot be bribed with coins. But certainly, the upper-middle-class tends to be more independent in making their choices; and more considering the track record in selecting candidates.

## CONCLUSION

In this study, it is questionable why an anomaly in the form of political banality has occurred, which is characterized by fraud and practices of money politics, so that Regional Head General Election tends to become compromised or flawed in accountability. To answer that question, one thing must first be agreed on, whether political banality is indeed an "anomaly" of democratic politics. If we borrow the perspective of the habitus theory, perhaps the term "anomaly" is more appropriate when it is treated as mere "necessity". In the post-conflict local election system, the conditions for open contestation involve the mobilization of all capital resources (social, cultural, economic, and even symbolic capital) possessed by candidates. That is a rational choice if someone wants to win political contestation. On the other hand, in the political sphere tends to accommodate facilities to the capital owners who have the most resources. That is why every contestant is empowered to accumulate

all kinds of capital that are proper to be used in the contestation. Including by becoming a client of a patron who has excess economic capital. In terms of ownership and use of capital, the pattern of contestation justifies the social recognition of an actor. That is why popular candidates are usually actors who have adequate social and cultural capital. But in the realm of local politics, social and cultural capital alone is not enough. In the case of Regional Head General Election contestation, economic capital ownership is the most decisive resource to be able to compete on the contestation stage which memorizes the practice of imaging politics and the existence of formal support from political parties.

By having strong economic capital, a person will be more calculated by political parties, to carry themselves as candidates. By having sufficient economic capital, candidates will be freer to carry out political campaigns to seek mass support. Even by having economic capital, an actor can "buy" other capital, including symbolic capital, which is only owned by certain people. However, in the Election-contestation that adheres to the zero-sum game rules, it does not accommodate second place. Besides, in the General Election contestation, the number of fighters are usually small, less than ten pairs of candidates. All candidates can count who their strongest opponents are, and what their chances of victory will be. When the mapping of political contestation has been carried

out, the candidates must install strategies to win the contestation. This is where the critical point of the practice of money politics and political fraud. All fighters don't want to lose. Those who do not want to lose usually try in every way to win the contestation, including those which are prohibited according to the existing rules of the game. In terms of using money to win, it is a rational choice also for candidates who fight in the contestation. That it is considered violating the rules of the game is something else. The problem is, whether the use of money is included in the category of money politics or not, the formulation of legislation referred to as the rules of the game is unclear. The category of money politics is the same as buying votes (vote buying) or not, also not clear.

These two things are categorically often confused so that in practice invites ambiguity of meaning. Whereas money politics in the sense of using money to facilitate matters getting political support is a necessity in the realm of political culture. Someone can't take part in political contestation without using money, regardless of the issue of whether it will have a positive impact on those who use the strategy. Whereas the purchase of votes, whatever the reasons and the mode, is undoubtedly an offense of fraud that damages the spirit of democratic politics. Why fraud can occur in the realm of political contestation, is inseparable from the actual conditions of the political struggle mechanism that

occurs. Rules of contestation (made by the KPU, or based on the Law) may have been agreed by all parties. But as with any regulation intended to bind the agent (and the actor), he cannot be assumed to be able to force all agents to obey it (even if the person concerned states he has agreed).

Habitus logic applies in this case, that it is a dialectic of internalization of externalities and externalization of the internalities of the social world. In the case of the post-conflict local election, the existing rules may benefit certain candidates, but may also not benefit other candidates. For candidates who benefit, existing rules may not be considered a problem, and are not a problem, to be applied. But for candidates who are not benefited, they may look for loopholes so that the existing rules can be manipulated so that they benefit themselves more. Cases of fraud in the post-conflict local election contestation can be seen from this perspective.

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