

Tandem in General Election Campaign 2019: A Strategy Supported by Political Parties and Political Patronage

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Abstract

This study examines the *Tandem* campaign's impact in a general election as a strategy, supported by the party, and political patronage in Indonesia. Tandem is a campaign for more than one candidate. The investigation finds that tandem not only has the parallel model in numbering tandem with candidates from the People's Representatives Council (DPR) and the Regional People's Representatives Council (DPRD), but the zigzag model also applies because of agreement from candidates. This pattern is supported by the political party, so the parliamentary threshold can be achieved, accounting for 4 % in DPR and 15 % in DPRD. During Regional Leaders Election (Pilkada), a political party can promote its candidate for a regional leader without paying another candidate from another party. Tandem can grow political patronage, and the candidates for DPR can be patrons of the DPRD candidates. This is because DPR members have many resources while candidates for DPRD as clients understand no further than the condition in their electoral district and social-political behavior, or they can even serve as broker-vote buyers. We hypothesize that this is a part of finding a solution to political costs in general elections.

Keywords

Tandem Campaign; Strategies; Political Party; Political Patronage

INTRODUCTION

The campaign is one of a set of urgency in processing general elections. All strategies are often used to attract as much attention as possible from voters

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to gain success. Each political party attracts voters with its regional reason, economic achievement, and even political identity tactics to gain power. However, when the vigor of liberalism in societies is getting solid, the political strategy of identity in general elections will be futile. At present, people are getting increasingly critical and unbelievably open. People are more aware of participating in political activities and they are involved in determining where policies will lead the state. Although their expectation is sometimes not even close to being ideal, voting candidates for people's

representatives and certain political parties for a leader are quite determined in deciding the state's future leader. The candidates aimed to sit in parliament must be immediately voted. It is common to see that the candidates fail to fit the voters' expectations. Surprisingly, others with better track records choose not to take part in politics. The general elections system has paralyzed people, and politics seems to have been under the control of political parties. As a result, people tend to be in a position with zero bargaining position to vote, and, one way or another, general elections bring the authorized-on stage.

Therefore, political parties have to make a change. Political parties offer their best candidates to vote in general elections by means of campaigns made in such a way to attract voters. Political campaigns not only will radiate political promises, distribute money and t-shirt, and hold political concerts, but campaigns will also be designed effectively.

However, it is not easy to design an ideal campaign. Many factors still affect changes in campaigns. A scholar [Kurniawan \(2019\)](#) argues there are seven factors over why campaigns are valuable: the increasing number of voters along with that in population, increasingly diverse and widespread media, substitution or change of laws and regulations governing elections and election campaigns. The rapid development of television, use of public opinion polls, rapid development of computer technology inseparable from the internet, and increasingly expensive

campaign costs are also the reasons for the campaign value.

On the other hand, campaigns are one of the supporting factors in political contestation ([Denver, 1992](#)), while social media is the device for campaigns. The use of social media is inextricable from campaign activities. However, this requires disseminating information backed up with economic strength to help develop a campaign industry. The political campaign industry is at the stage of involving social media. This has resulted in the emergence of buzzing, mobilization of social media use, and social media monitoring ([Saraswati, 2018](#)). Twitter is one of the media commonly used in campaigning. There is a communication structure that designs political organization opportunities to interact on Twitter.

On the contrary, this research's findings have indicated that Twitter usage is still small ([Jensen, 2017](#)). The result of the 2014 Presidential Election reveals that there is a strong relationship between incumbents, candidacy sequence numbers, and characteristics of candidates, and an open list proportional system. The author of this article argues that the excess of incumbents is mediated by choice of parties in ranking serial numbers between incumbents and prospective newcomers. Moreover, the proportion of not knowing more about the general election increases ([Dettman, Pepinsky & Pierskalla, 2017](#)). Also, there are results of research that talk about the reasons why people are happy with the mobilization campaigns. This is because there are personal factors that are highly

determining for the effectiveness of the mobilization campaigns.

Nevertheless, the mass mobilization campaigns depend on the typology of participation which can be measured based on agreements, awareness, emotional stability, and the campaign environment (Dawkins, 2017). Therefore, a campaign is a long-term process that calls for consistency and continuity of political parties (Blumenthal, 1982). Some even believe that campaigns should be performed on a day-to-day basis (Norris, 2000). This article presents a new perspective about the *tandem* (collaborative) campaign in general election 2019 as a strategy supported by political parties and practices in political patronage.

RESEARCH METHOD

The data was collected based on a qualitative method, where the obtained data was described with oral or written words spoken by the people observed, and no figures were used in this research (Creswell, 2010). The observation was focused on a *tandem* campaign model in the form of billboards, printed media, outdoor media, with campaign props showing three to four pictures of the candidates of legislative members contesting for seats in the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in the District (*Kabupaten*) or Municipality (*Kota*), Provincial DPRD and People's Representative Council (DPR) in general election 2019 in Malang Municipality, Batu Municipality, and Malang District. In addition, a *tandem* is also performed through other forms of a campaign involving mass mobilization

such as influential Quran recitation communities or through social activities. Some legislative candidates are even found to dance around with their team members at road intersections or squares. The data of this article was obtained from an interview with several candidates, namely Arif Sucahyo, Sabarudin Baso, who are candidates for the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) Malang city but both were not elected, Ratna Sumarah is a candidate for the Malang Municipality DPRD member who was elected in 2019. While Slamet is the manager in PKS Malang municipality as well as the regional success team in East Java. This paper's data were also obtained through documentation where the result was photographs of campaign activities of the 2019 general election as data source and literature and literature review from journals on political marketing, general elections, or political parties.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Back in 2019, when a political contest for legislative members and the president took place, the political climate had risen since the governor election for Jakarta from 2018 to the end of 2019, or even till today. This is because all candidates used all their efforts and strategies to win the seat. Victory, in this case, is also affected by how candidates set their campaign strategies.

Several researchers in political communication define a campaign (Rogers & Storey, 1987; Perloff, 2020) as a sequence of conducts designed for the public to give them access to the goal as

expected. However, it understands a campaign as a political communication where political parties or individual contestants try to communicate their ideology or their work programs they offer (Norris, 2000). A campaign is a "short-term" process where it is believed that the relevance in the intensity among the candidates in introducing their ideas and political ideas is more established (Firmanzah, 2012). This is meant to simply attract public attention and their support. Political campaigns involving attributes like billboards, banners, political oration, and posters (Lilleker & Negrine, 2006). Several studies imply that general election campaigns can be facilitated through advertising and public debates on television to gain more voters (Franklin, 1991). Huckfelt, Spangler and Woycke (1991), in their research, also imply that these campaigns increase the affordability, certainty, and accuracy of political messages passed to the electorate by candidates. The success of a campaign is affected by designing the campaign package and using available resources (Simmons, 1990).

In a democratic setting, advertising candidates through campaigns is essential since this is highly competitive in politics. None of the politicians or survey agencies can guarantee the percentage of votes gained in an election. In *Marketing Yourself* was written by Kartajaya, Yuswohady and Ciptoharjono (2004), the concept of positioning-differentiation-brand (PDB) is closely related to marketing oneself and a political party. Hermawan argues that how one positions himself/herself

in the electorate's mind as customers is essential. This measure is aimed to embed identity that lasts longer in the mind of the electorate. To allow political promises and the type of campaign in positioning pattern to have credibility and to be seen positively, they have to be backed up by bold differentiation since this differentiation leads to strong brand integrity that will also further create a strong brand image that is essential to strengthen the positioning previously determined (Alfian, 2009).

Campaigns in General Elections

Campaigns are inextricable from what motivates them. Larson (2002) and Venus, Karyanti and Rakhmat (2004) categorizes a campaign into three: a product-oriented campaign in businesses, a campaign aimed to gain political power, and a campaign motivated for specific purposes intended for social changes. The first type involves commercial campaigns or corporate campaigns. This campaign is done to obtain financial benefit by introducing products and increasing sales for more profits. The second type is also known as political campaigns intended to gain public support for the candidates to win seats in executive and legislative bodies. This model involves billboards, banners, posters, calendars, t-shirt, free medical services, housewife's recital groups, and political oration. The campaign accommodates the candidates to express their promised agenda and through this, the candidates buy votes (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2017). The third type is motivated for specific purposes and social changes.

A political campaign is the sole instrument candidates can use to win a seat through general elections. Candidates cannot guarantee themselves to be elected (Lewis-Beck & Tien, 2018). The personality of the candidates can attract a crowd of people. Appropriateness, awareness, preference, emotional stability, and environment encourage the increase in political participation (Dawkins, 2017).

However, the prevalence of dishonesty in general elections is sparked by the candidates' intention. Still, a rational response to the candidates' expectation is also responsible for this, which is also a lie. Even though honesty and integrity are values that have to be present in leadership later when candidates are elected, other public's hidden characteristics in general elections can turn dishonesty endemic for the democratically-elected leaders (Woon & Kanthak, 2019). This is because the candidates expect to gain votes in every voting booth. Political campaigns can improve relationships among elected candidates (Alfian, 2009) since the electorate is a subject, not an object of manipulation and exploitation (Firmanzah, 2012). *Tandem* campaigns as a unique form of implementing political marketing in the general election.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A campaign has been defined as an activity that draws a crowd, involves political speech, uses political attributes such as flags, posters, banners, billboards erected on the side of the road, and ads and political hymn played

on electronic media. These campaign strategies are in line with the thought of (Lilleker & Negrine, 2006) implying that a political campaign is a period spared by the General Election Commission (KPU) to all the contesting candidates, either to political parties or to individuals, to disclose their plan and influence public opinions and to mobilize the public to vote on ballots. A political campaign is also characterized by high cost for the candidates, with no certainty whether one will win an election. When this cost is increasingly high, *tandem* comes as a solution in which the campaign props can show two to three pictures of candidates. *Tandem* is a strategy that also requires banners, t-shirts, and leaflets. Lock and Harris (1996) argue that a political campaign has something to do with a strategy aimed to shape political image. Lock and Harris (1996) believe that the political campaign has internal and external relationships when it is underway. The internal relationship represents a process between political parties and constituents' process to achieve ideological bound and strong identity.

On the other hand, an external relationship is intended to communicate an image formed from external factors of political parties such as mass media and the public's members. Political image is usually formed by internal characteristics distinct from those of rivals. Similarly, the *tandem* campaign tells the public about the candidates' simplicity, spiritual aspects, and social awareness through their pictures on the campaign props. Therefore, it is not

surprising when (Hayes & McAllister, 1996) say that a political campaign is an activity aimed to position a political party among its rivals. So, *tandem* or collaborative campaign in general election 2019 could significantly draw electorates to vote.

What is a *Tandem* Campaign?

A *tandem* campaign facilitates one or more candidates on campaign props, in activities, and certain areas. *Tandem* was focused on the form of political marketing strategies in the campaign process through networking with candidates from the same political party, public figure in the general election but coattail effect based on the dimensions of election administration which are almost simultaneously at various level with the result of the votes. This is different from a campaign supported by props and mass events (Ufen, 2010). The props usually involve banners, leaflets, posters, and calendars. Those props can bear two or three pictures of the candidates contesting People's Representative Council (DPR) and Provincial DPRD. The candidates for the district or municipal DPRD come from the different electoral constituencies (*Daerah Pemilihan* or *Dapil*). The mass events in a *tandem* campaign may be performed through social gatherings such as "housewives lottery gathering", "monthly Quran recitation community", "training for housewives", "community services", "sports events", "mass circumcision", "free medical treatment". Those gathering-based activities are intended to draw a crowd of people. Activities

dealing with basic services in education and health have been used for patronage practices (Blunt, Turner & Lindroth, 2012) to help accelerate the campaign's number of votes. It is common for a candidate to interact and meet the public members earlier before the election so that his or her face is not new to the eye of his or her voters. Every candidate already occupied positions, jobs descriptions related to face to face with the community in the events. The aims of known public candidates. In other words, the votes gained from this tandem strategy are triggered by the coattail effect of the votes for the candidates chosen by the members of the public. Coattail effect in this context can best be described as an action that triggers an effect on the following action. The candidate promoted affects the electability of another candidate due to this tandem strategy. *Tandem* has two models as parallel and zigzag. There is a transition from a party-centered system to a candidate-centered system, leading to a personalization of campaigning (Ufen, 2010).

The parallel model always includes candidates for DPR, Provincial DPRD, DPRD in District (*Kabupaten*), or Municipality (*Kota*) under the same political party, serial number, and electoral district. For example, a candidate from Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDIP) for People's Representative Council (DPR) from electoral constituencies (*Dapil*) V (Malang District, Malang Municipality, and Batu Municipality), Ahmad Basarah, number 1, is parallel to a candidate from Provincial DPRD Sri

Untari Bisowarno, number 1, and I Made Riandiana Kartika of electoral constituencies (*Dapil*) Lowokwaru number 1. This parallel model is significant, where the three candidates were elected as parliament members and the chairman of the council at the moment.

Banners are commonly found at road junctions and other crowded areas, and the campaign funding usually comes from contributions from each prospective member. The parallel *tandem* campaign is manifested in the form of open events by inviting the communities from the candidates' electoral constituencies. In such events, the candidates deliver a speech before the crowd to let them know the candidates.

The candidates for DPR of electoral constituencies V in Malang, for example, ordered 20,000 calendars, of which 15,000 *tandem* calendars showed the candidates from municipal DPRD, 3000 showed the candidates for DPR and DPRD of Province, and 2000 calendars with their photos. Candidates for DPR also printed 10,000 premium banners, each of which showed three photos of the candidates for DPR, Provincial DPRD, and Municipal DPRD or DPR, Provincial DPRD, and DPRD in the District. The grouping of the candidates in *tandem* strategy under the same sequence number is done because the candidates for the DPR, Provincial DPRD, and regency or municipal DPRD with number 1 are recommended by a political party to become the members of the parliament. There is an argumentation implying that it is

common in political parties that voters can vote candidates. Therefore, it holds that political parties' rules and norms will affect the nomination process (Ballington & Matland, 2004). Another reason for grouping is that number 1 consists of incumbent candidates who have held a party administration position at the central, provincial, municipal, or district level. Political parties only give an ordinal number, meaning that the candidates have a great likelihood of becoming parliament members since their loyalty and hard work are apparent.

Moreover, political parties with strong regeneration who can be the candidates for people's representatives in the general election are those at the middle and upper levels. According to the Key Performance Index (KPI) guidelines, this assessment standard is set at the branch to the central level. This KPI is arranged by Human Resource Department (*Kaderisasi*) for Political Parties, and this model is called a vertical pattern (Dewi et al., 2018), while according to research results from The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Haris et al., 2016), this strategy is called as merit system. The third reason for the grouping is the same sequence model facilitating public memory to determine political choices. Generally, voters want something simple when voting. Recalling that there are too many political parties on the ballot paper to remember, numbers, pictures, or other distinguishing features such as the mustache of a candidate and hat, are what the voters usually remember. The fourth is the political financing for

campaign models. A *tandem* is seen as less costly and massive than a solo campaign. It is apparent from the pattern of distributing responsibilities to prepare for props such as billboards, t-shirts, and flags.

Zigzag Model as Political Campaigning Strategy in Legislative General Election 2019

This zigzag model does not always require grouping under the same sequence number in each electoral constituency. This pattern is formed depending on similar issues over the campaign among parliament members candidates in each electoral constituency. For example, promoting young cadres as candidates to win a position has been the trend targeted to the millennial generation. Another example of targeting in the campaign is photos of Defender's Islamic Front (*Front Pembela Islam-FPI*) Habib Rizieq Shihab posted by Evi Silvi Yunatul Hayati, a candidate from Indonesian Democratic Party Struggle (PDIP) for Provincial DPRD of Banten on banners in Sub-District 10 of Cilegon City (Wicaksono, 2009). This *tandem* model is indeed contradictory, but it is aimed to draw Muslim voters. This strategy is considered a form of confrontation with the Islamic groups, while Habib Rizieq Shihab is highly loyal to Prabowo Subianto, a former presidential candidate. The figures for women as candidates for seats in people's representatives overreached the required number in general elections 1999 and 2004 (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012). Therefore, this zigzag strategy is used as

a way to gain votes from Moslem women-hating Habib Rizieq Shihab, and from this point, the coattail effect emerges.

From the perspective of ideology, when parties are facilitated with the campaign involving billboards and banners, female candidates from The Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) tend to be less dominant in their campaign. Thus, the appearance of the campaign becomes less attractive, tacky, or irrelevant to Islamic values. Moreover, female cadres (*Kader*) from The Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) are seen to work better as housewives since it is believed to be as noble as becoming parliament members. It is not easy to find cadres willing to be promoted in general elections through candidacy for representative council members.

In addition, to complete this strategy, political parties through open recruitment of candidates for DPRD members come from external circles. It is common for a political party to conduct an observation prior to recruiting cadres from external parties for the candidacy. The parameter referred to by a political party lies in whether candidates have a good track record and whether the public accepts them. Following the observation, the political party orders those in charge at the branch level to approach competent people in society to be involved in the party. The political party is responsible for covering the cost required for political events with an expectation that the number of votes increases (an interview with Sabarudin

Baso)¹. Principally, putting one in candidacy is not merely aimed to win the seats, but rather to draw votes for the political party since it spares an advantage when the party gains more voters than the candidate promoted in general elections (an interview with Ratna Sumarah)². The Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) of Malang Municipality from the sub-district of Kedungkandang promoted Dwi Haryadi, a cleaner from the village of Madyopuro as a candidate for the member of DPRD Malang Municipality. He spread leaflets showing his photo and other two candidates' photos for DPRD of East Java Province and DPR on number 9 from their electoral constituencies during the campaign. The leaflets were distributed door to door while collecting people's rubbish. It ended up that Dwi Haryadi, the cleaner was in the last position in the general election 2019.

The number for the external party candidate was not the preferred number, but it was in the last order. The zigzag model also touched areas outside party organizations such as social organization networks (Muhammadiyah people, Nahdlatul Ulama community, and youth organization such as Indonesian Youth National Committee (commonly known as *Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia*-KNPI), Pancasila Youth (PP), Youth Organization at community association level (commonly known as Karang

Taruna), local culture-based organization through political visits.

Surprisingly, several political parties in Malang promoted ex-campus activists actively involved in their campus organizations such as Students' Executive Body (commonly known as *Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa*-BEM), Students' Representative Council (commonly known as *Dewan Perwakilan Mahasiswa*-DPM), and intra-religions organization during their university years. Their intended involvement in the candidacy is to gain votes from the millennial scope. Such a model of candidacy is done by The Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), National Mandate Party (PAN), and the People's Awakening Party (PKB). Dito Arief is one of the examples of the candidate seen from his involvement in a campus organization in Faculty of Administrative Science (FIA) Universitas Brawijaya, where he used to be active in Islamic Students Unity (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*-HMI), and once became a member of DPM back in the 2000s. Upon his study, he joined The National Mandate Party (PAN) of Malang Municipality. Surprisingly, he served as a vice secretary of DPD PAN. Trio Agus Purwono, graduating from The Faculty of Agriculture Technology (FTP) Universitas Brawijaya, had been previously active in KAMMI. He once served as a president of BEM in the university. Upon completing his study, he decided to run a business in an agricultural sector while being active in

¹ Sabarudin Baso, Board of Branch Office of National Democrat Party (NasDem) Lowokwaru Malang Municipality.

² Ratna Sumarah, Regional Board of Golkar Party Malang Municipality.

Table 1. Political party in Malang promotes ex-campus activists

Name	Track Record	Party
Dito Arif	HMI Malang, a former member of DPM UB	PAN, member of DPRD 2014-2019
Trio Agus Purwono	KAMMI Malang, former president of BEM UB	PKS, Floor Leader of PKS DPRD Malang City 2019-2024
Ahmad Farih Sulaiman	PMII in UIN Malang	PKB, Chairman of DPRD Malang City 2019-2024
I Made Riandiana Kartika	GMNI, Universitas Gajayana Malang	PDIP, Chairman of DPRD Malang City
Hari Sasongko	DPM FIA UB, GMNI	PDIP, Chairman of DPRD Malang Regency 2014-2019

Source: Modified by author 2020.

DPD the Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) of Malang Municipality. In the general election 2019, Trio Agus was brought to candidacy and made his way as a member of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) of Malang 2019-2024. Ahmad Farih (*Gus Farih*) was active in the Indonesian Islamic Students Movement in (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia-PMII*) Islamic State University (*Universitas Islam Negeri-UIN*) Malang. He won the election representing electoral constituencies of Lowokwaru in the general election 2019 and as a member of DPRD of Malang Municipality 2019-2024 from People's Awakening Party (PKB).

I Made Riandiana Kartika was also a former activist of the Indonesian National Students Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia* known as GMNI) in Law Faculty Universitas Gajayana Malang. He was promoted as a candidate from PDIP representing the electoral constituencies of Lowokwaru.

A candidate member of the Indonesian parliament (DPR) from the National Mandate Party (PAN) was in coalition with social organizations, Muhammadiyah cadres in the candidacy for members of Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the Republic of Indonesia. The candidates for members of DPR and DPD are usually in an open forum in the activities of social organizations to deliver a speech to let participants know more about the candidates. This is like what has been done by Totok Daryanto, a candidate for DPR RI member from electoral district V in *tandem* with a regional board chairman of social organizations, Muhammadiyah East Java in the campaign distributing banners installed not far from Muhammadiyah offices in East Java.

Some candidates for DPR members also attended the *Haul Ulama* program held by Islamic boarding schools (*Pondok Pesantren*). During the general election 2019, there was an argument over whether Islamic boarding schools

can be used as a political campaign location. However, Islamic boarding schools (*Pondok Pesantren*) often house candidates as visitors (*Jama'ah*) to ask for prayer and best wishes from a cleric. When the cleric (*Kyai*) delivered a speech in a Quran recital community, the cleric also underlined that the boarding school welcomed the campaigns, and voting the candidate the cleric had trust in was encouraged to all his students. In this case, the candidates expect to have prayer and support from the cleric and all his followers for the upcoming election.

Moreover, several political parties and their candidates sometimes pay a senior cleric visit, and their visit is to ask for prayer and spiritual support from the cleric. In return, candidates usually give material contributions to the Islamic boarding schools they visit and promise to give more like medical facilities for the schools later when they win the election. It is indeed impossible for the cleric to stop their visit. Of course, this political trend is not without the awareness of clerics, and thus, it is not surprising when clerics are seen as though they were there to "tow the broken car. Once the car regains power, it moves along leaving clerics behind". This research found out that to gain a huge number of votes, political parties concentrate on holding events that touch the dimension of the poor's welfare (Warner, 1995).

***Tandem* Campaign Supported by Political Parties**

To win the contest in every region, political parties form regional

coordinator or commonly known as *Korwil* (*Koordinator wilayah*). The formation of *Korwil* is intended to strengthen the votes at the coordinator level in each region. Central Board (DPP) appoints a person to be in charge of *Korwil* responsible for two to three provinces with characteristics and close geopolitical position. Regional Board (DPW) also positions a person in charge of *Korwil* responsible for two to three in the regency or municipality. The structure of DPP takes this position to house the elites of political parties in Jakarta to keep them busy, and it is designed in such a way to transmit this atmosphere to coordinators at the local level. For example, *Korwil* in East Java and Bali is led by a coordinator from DPP. *Korwil* in East Java and Bali is responsible for gaining as many votes as possible for seats in the Indonesian parliament (DPR) from several electoral constituencies in both of the provinces; the presence of *Korwil* is also intended to serve as the supervisory body from political parties over the performance of the regional coordinators (Katz & Mair, 1995; Baker, 2015). Intriguing findings can be seen in the Golkar Party and PKS. East Java VI, *Korwil* is also responsible for winning seats in provincial DPRD from electoral constituencies VI (Malang Municipality, Batu Municipality, and Malang District). *Korwil* for Malang is also responsible for the district area. The chairmen of *Korwil* from several winning regions encourage every candidate to work mutually and smartly in a *tandem* campaign.

Not only is *Korwil* responsible for the candidacy to gain seats in DPR,

Provincial DPRD, municipal DPRD, and DPRD in the District, but also it is responsible for taking care of political parties that are involved in political financing, while the candidates have to propose for the rest of the funding coming from external stakeholders (Mietzner, 2010). The expected target is to pass four percent for parliamentary threshold (PT) in DPR. A person in charge of *Korwil* is a mastermind, a warlord in general elections at the local level. The model of administering the same presidential and legislative elections has forced the political machinery to work to meet the target. Due to the dominating position of *Korwil*, conflict often emerges at the regional level. It is sparked by a clash of aspirations of cadres and differences between sympathizers of parties and political elites at the central board. Decisions and policies of parties coming from the central board follow the top-down rule, oligarchy (Rahman, Ulfah & Danar, 2018).

There are two contributing factors why oligarchy emerges in a political party: first, it is due to the absence of a clear and consistent mechanism to gain aspiration from cadres, sympathizers in the process of policymaking, the current of political parties either during pressing or normal condition. Second, political parties are often pragmatic-oriented. Party elites infringe rules for parties to simply approach particular elites such as conglomerates and business people. People's Conscience

Party (*Hati Nurani Rakyat-Hanura*) refined by a retired General Wiranto caused the ceaseless conflict (*an interview with Arif Sucahyo*)³. This strategy is usually intended to back up the party's finance needs, while the party does not have any levies or other income coming from cadres or sympathizers. When this is the case, the danger looms above parties in Indonesia since transactional politics grows wilder. This practice, moreover, contradicts the initial agenda regarding the existence and role of political parties as an essential requirement to run modern democratic practices. Modern democracy is even the democracy of the party (Katz, 2007). Studies on democracy imply that independent, autonomous, and competitive political parties are a condition *sine qua non* in democratic practices. The democratic political system is believed to facilitate the survival of independent, autonomous, and competitive political parties. Thus, the democratization of political parties first requires the political system's democratization (Prasetyoningsih, 2014). However, the undemocratic political system will bring to dependent, non-autonomous, and uncompetitive political parties (Manan, 2012).

On the other hand, in Malang, Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*) and Greater Indonesia Movement Party (*Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya-Gerindra*) insisted on promoting their members as candidates despite their involvement in

³ Arif Sucahyo, Legislative candidate for DPRD 2019-2024 from electoral constituencies (*Daerah Pemilihan-*

Dapil) of Lowokwaru Malang Municipality, General Election 2019.

a corruption case over Regional Budget-Amendment (APBD-P) year 2015 in candidacy in general election 2019 (Allahi & Rahman, 2020). When the general election was in progress in April 2019, these two suspects still had their pictures printed on the ballot paper for electoral constituencies of Lowokwaru as candidates for people's representative 2019-2024. This is evidence that political parties are rotten, where the inappropriate undemocratic practice like this was seen at the district level. Therefore, with this *tandem* campaigning strategy, the public was deceived by the candidates that were, to say, ethic-illiterate since corruptors were still put in the candidacy. Political parties, therefore, should not serve as bunkers for corruptors (Haboddin, Rahman & Faizah, 2013).

In addition, political parties encouraged a *tandem* campaign pattern to obtain 15 % of the total seats in DPRD. Why 15%? Political parties no longer need to spend a large amount of money to invite other political parties to be in coalition when direct elections of local government leads (hereinafter, *Pilkada*). In a political tradition, if a political party wishes to be in coalition with another party, the intending party should "pay it with more strategic position or a huge amount of money". Mohamad Anton or "Abah Anton" bought a party with IDR 1 billion in *Pilkada* 2018, meaning that the purchased party supported Abah Anton to go further for *Pilkada* (*an interview with Slamet*)⁴. For a political

party, this amount can feed the party and its members. Abah Anton was involved in a corruption case over a regional budget (APBD) in 2015. Funding a campaign is wiser than buying another party with an unbelievable amount to get support ahead of the election. Political parties design *tandem* campaigning models along with their attributes, layout, social aspect, and programs to significantly boost votes.

This *tandem* strategy comes from internal and external ideas of political parties. This method has affected the bargaining level of candidates and demand from a gatekeeper. Therefore, Norris and Lovenduski (1995) argue that theoretically, in terms of demand-side, gatekeepers will choose a candidate based on several criteria such as personal characters, formal qualifications, and political experience, each of which weighs a different score.

A *Tandem* Campaign is a Set of Activities of Patronage in Political Parties

Political parties are one of the pillars supporting the continuity of democratic practices in a nation, but it turns out that political parties have failed to perform these democratic practices at an internal level. Political parties in Indonesia heavily rely on leadership charisma. Political parties have become personal appeals, not institutional appeals (Muhtadi, 2019). Thus, it is common for scholars to call them *fans club*, a herd.

⁴ Slamet, Success Team (*Tim Sukses*) for candidate pair Anton-Samsul Sub-District Lowokwaru *Pilkada* Kota Malang 2018.

Articles of Association of political parties can be managed as expected by the members. Therefore, the proportion of faith and patronage to a chairman is a determining factor for the cadres' political career instead of their merit system. A chairman has a right to determine the amount of "dowry" when a candidate is hoping on a political party as his/her carrier during the general election. Political parties have become an asset for chairmen.

Moreover, political behavior is exactly in line with the findings on post-New Order implying that politics is that patronage motivates much of party behavior (Fossati et al., 2020). Especially since the transition to a candidate-centered electoral in 2009, when Indonesia induced open-list proportional representation (Dettman, Pepinsky & Pierskalla, 2017), many analysts have argued that pragmatism and clientelism trump ideology when it comes to voter-party linkages and inter-party coalition building (Aspinall, 2014). In general elections in April 2019, candidates for the new People's Representative Council (DPR) were not from their electoral districts. The arrival of candidates for members of the DPR has opened up opportunities for patronage politics. Prospective members of the new DPR usually have strong economic capital so that the supporting team can quickly build a strong network with candidates for Provincial DPRD, Municipality DPRD, and District DPRD from the same electoral constituencies. In addition, candidates for the DPR meet many members of the public in such a

condition. Conflict is easily sparked due to the competition for resources. Disputes among cadres are common to take place under the same political party due to the competition to get voters. In a different analysis, the autonomous level of a political party, either at the central or local level, has been submissive to a patron's interests outside political parties in collaboration with those in charge of parties. A cadre of a political party once failed to recommend a candidate for people's representatives simply because the "dowry" was smaller than what was given by the external party despite the fact that the person with a bigger "dowry" was not a political cadre. External parties usually contribute materials and promise to the Daily Governing Body of political parties about a recommendation for the candidacy in legislative election 2019.

The candidates for provincial DPRD, municipal DPRD, and district DPRD are even client-based brokers to vote. Like the campaign team, the client loyalty team was built strongly because the patron was a wealthy candidate (Tawakkal et al., 2017). The patron couldn't find another client because his client could contribute votes for him. Commonly, clients continue to ask for money from their patron because they aim to campaign in their electoral constituencies (Shin, 2015). The requested money is spent on needs such as calendars, small bags, dolls, leaflets, banners, business cards, fans, glasses, mugs, and key chains (Aspinall, 2014). Then the clients distribute the campaign props to prospective voters on a door-to-door basis like direct selling. However,

the new DPR candidates tend to be boastful since they feel they are senior members in the Central Board of a political party but without any social base. This is what has been predicted by [Bardhan and Mokherjee \(2000\)](#) by referring to the term elite capture.

CONCLUSION

Tandem strategy can be used to get votes, and it can increase electability and popularity. However, this strategy is not only a determining factor for voters ([Lewis-Beck & Tien, 2018](#)). A *Tandem* campaign is also a practice of symbiotic relationships between political parties and candidates. *Tandem* strategy can help eliminate conflict among candidates in one political party, minimize campaign cost, and introduce candidates to voters more effectively. Further research on the correlation between the tandem campaign and vote results in elections can be conducted.

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