Surviving in The Paradise:
The State of Civil Society in Post-New Order Bali

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Abstract
This study seeks to describe the development of civil society. In the realm of political science, the role of civil society is one of the benchmarks for the development of democracy. In Indonesia, the transition period was marked by the collapse of Suharto's New Order, accompanied by the rapid growth of civil society. However, there has not been much research on the development of civil society in the local sphere. This research seeks to fill the gaps related to civil society development and democracy in the local sphere by focusing on Bali. The study used a qualitative method, particularly participant observation, and interview. This study finds, first, the increasing tension between civil society actors and the state. It's shown in the state's efforts to limit the expression of civilian dissatisfaction with state policies. Second, the state's role is increasing in the life of civil society in Bali. In the context of Bali, Perda No. 4 of 2019 on Desa Adat shows recognition for indigenous peoples in Bali. The case of Bali displays the uniqueness of how the customs of the Balinese people, particularly in the civil society arena, influence the relationship with the state. It shows the inequality of power relations between the state and society. It confirms that tension between the state and civil society strengthened after policies that increased the state's intervention in civil society.

Keywords:
Civil society; Local politics; Democracy; Bali

INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to describe the development of civil society. In the realm of political science, the critical role of civil society is one of the benchmarks for the development of democracy in Indonesia. Civil society is a widely developed concept describing the relationship between the state and society. The fall of Suharto's New Order regime has been studied by looking at the efforts initiated by civil society (Aspinall, 2005).

In Indonesia, the concept of civil society is equal to *Masyarakat Madani*, which directly explains the strong inspiration of Islam to understand this concept (AS Hikam, 1999). Although most of Indonesia's population is Muslim, with Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah being the two most pr

ominent Islamic organizations in Indonesia, the diversity of Indonesian society makes this equivalent universally inaccurate.

The development of civil society, illustrated by the rapidly growing number of community organizations in

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the past few years, gives an optimistic view. According to a report released by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 431,465 community organizations were registered as of November 22, 2019 (Kompas, 2019). With such a large number, civil society organizations occupy a strategic position.

Elements of civil society have become an inseparable part of the democratization process that has been going on for over two decades in Indonesia. Islamic community organizations have an increasingly important position in Indonesian political life, especially after the wave of Islamic group revival. In 2017, a large wave of demonstrations from various Islamic elements demanded that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), the incumbent governor of DKI Jakarta, resign from his office. He was running again against the candidate for governor Anies Baswedan. In the context of this regional head election, these Islamic groups found their momentum. A wave of massive demonstrations then changed the face of Islam for other Indonesians. The discourse about the majority and the minority re-emerged to the public after Anies Baswedan's victory.

After winning the 2014 presidential election, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was seen as a break from the authoritarianism of the New Order and seemed somewhat cautious in responding to the rise of this Islamic group. The Jokowi government's response to the influence of this hardliner Islamic element is the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency's formation. In addition, the enactment of Law No. 17 of 2013 concerning

Community Organizations, which became the basis for the disbandment of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, further strengthened the state's position before civil society. The single principle of Pancasila, which was once a weapon for the New Order in suppressing civil society, seems to have come to the fore again. The rejection of various elements of civil society emerged because of the recent experience of New Order authoritarianism which raised concerns about the restriction of the civil rights of the people.

The intense competition in the 2019 General Election and Presidential Election has again raised concerns for the future of democracy in Indonesia. Jokowi seems to perpetuate his power by accommodating hardliner Islamic elements (Power, 2018). Prabowo's appointment as Minister of Defence during the second term of Jokowi's administration signals a reconciliation in the elites. This maneuver emphasizes the oligarchic tendency that emerged as a picture of the post-New Order political situation (Hadiz, 2017).

In general, this national political landscape significantly influences the development of democracy in Indonesia. Although it is necessary to be careful in looking at the extent of the effect of national politics on the configuration of local political power, the direct impact of the succession of power at the national level has blatant implications. At least, the map of support for Jokowi in the last 2019 presidential election shows this. In Bali, for example, Jokowi won 92% of the vote. Never before had a presidential candidate won votes by such a large margin. This overwhelming support

signals public concerns in response to Prabowo's closeness to hardline Islamic groups.

It does not mean that national politics determines the sustainability of local politics. The relationship between politics at the national and local levels can be dynamic as a logical consequence of regional autonomy since 2004. The picture of local politics cannot be called simply a mirror of national politics. The particularity of each region causes a variety of interactions that take place in the local area. Ethnic, regional, economic, social, and cultural factors influence local political dynamics.

Previous studies on civil society in Bali have shown how adat of the Balinese people has influenced its civil society development (Warren, 2007). The state's policy also shapes civil society in Bali. While offering an overview of the rise of civil society in Bali, this paper mainly focuses on the recent development after the latest state policies. What then is the position of civil society in Bali in the context of local political dynamics in Indonesia in the post-New Order era?

RESEARCH METHOD

This research is qualitative research with a case study method. The case study method allows an in-depth investigation into the complexity of the problem under study. The main focus of this research is civil society in Bali in the post-New Order period, which is revealed through the actors' experiences. Case studies emphasize an in-depth understanding of the subject of study, the specific experience of the subject, the context surrounding the phenomenon in

the case, and the knowledge that emerges from the case (Creswell & Poth, 2018, 153). The steps in this research include (1) Literature study by browsing archives, documents, and news to understand (a). mapping of civil society actors in Bali; (b). advocacy issues and themes; (c). various forms of protest practice and non-formal political participation; (d) the general political context surrounding civil society and its relationship to the state and the market. (2). Field research generally aims to obtain detailed data on interactions carried out by civil society involving the wider public. The data collected focuses on the motives and dynamics of the actors. Actor mapping is done on the actors or social partners involved in political processes. The mapping of actors looks at the interdependence of interests of each actor, their perceptions of other partners, their perceptions of the roles and functions of civil society, and the bargaining position they use in practice. Overall, this process determines their position on public issues. The next stage explores matters involving civil society and its political process: (a). The preparation stage is the initial period for the actors to determine the issue. In particular, the preparation and planning process will be described; (b). Practices include the forms of dialogue, the problems, and themes they discuss, (c). This final stage seeks to see the results of the actor process, the interaction between actors, the impact of the organization's work on the public sphere, and its response. In addition, this section seeks to understand the practice and place civil society in a broader political context. The primary data collection method in this

research is: (a). Semi-structured and in-depth interviews will be conducted with civil society actors; (b). Participatory observations. The data analysis was carried out through three stages (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 2014), including: (a). Data Condensation (Data Condensation) The first cycle of the data analysis stage is data condensation which refers to the selection, focus determination, simplification, abstraction, and/or transformation of the data corpus obtained through field notes, interview transcripts, documents, and other empirical materials; (b). Data Presentation (Data Display), The second cycle of the data analysis stage is data presentation. At this stage, the data will be compiled to obtain information that allows the conclusion/verification process to be carried out. The presentation of data in this study will be in text, charts, and tables to make it easier to understand the findings; (c). Drawing and Verifying Conclusions, the third cycle of the data analysis stage in this study is the drawing and verification of conclusions. From the beginning, studying patterns, explanations, causal relationships, and propositions for findings is one of the two sides of this third cycle. The other side is data verification, where the results will be elaborated to ensure the validity of the data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Explaining Civil Society in Bali

In political science, the concept of civil society occupies an important position, especially since the fall of communism and authoritarianism in various parts of the world. In this context, the rise of civil society is associated with democratic transitions in multiple countries.

This study seeks to continue the study of Michael Edwards (2011; 2014) and Muthiah Alagappa (2004). Edwards (2014) examines the re-emergence of the concept of civil society as a global phenomenon. He traces the development of the conception of civil society from the polis era of Aristotle and Plato, then Thomas Hobbes. In addition, the concept of civil society is also studied by the tradition of thought developed by Hegel, Marx, Gramsci, Arendt, and Habermas. However, Edwards shows that the conception of civil society developed by James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville, who saw civil society as an associational life, is dominant in reading civil society phenomena globally (Edwards, 2014, 10-14).

Civil society has various meanings as a phenomenon, which makes it challenging to use it as a concept. Inspired by M. Walzer, Edwards (2011) states that civil society is "the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market." (Walzer, 1998, 123-4 in Edwards, 2011, 3-4).

Critics of civil society generally see the development of civil society as a distinctly Western phenomenon. However, this does not mean that in other parts of the world, Asia, for example, a similar phenomenon does not develop, as Alagappa puts it: "Civil society in Asian countries, as elsewhere, is an arena of power, inequality,

struggle, and cooperation that is populated by a wide array of voluntary and nonvoluntary groups whose political orientations, interests, resources, capacities, and methods span a wide spectrum. These nonstate groups, operating in urban and rural areas and at times in foreign countries, function independently or in small networks to advance specific causes and interests that may diverge and conflict with one another." (Alagappa, 2004, 5).

Essential aspects to explain civil society can be formulated based on the form, norms, and space it grows. In this sense, two things need to be considered. First, civil society organizations cover a large number of entities of various types, sizes, objectives, and levels of formality, including grassroots or community associations, social movements, trade unions, professional groups, advocacy, and development NGOs, legally registered non-profit organizations, social enterprises, and many others. Second, associational ecosystems are not something that can be easily predicted because they are organic, human creations that are constantly evolving, with a success rate that is strongly influenced by soil and water from local conditions and the availability of support mechanisms (Edwards, 2011, 7- 8).

The approaches that examine normative aspects of civil society look at normative aspirations, which provide the impetus for collective action for some people. This aspiration departs from understanding the values of civility, equality, and diversity. This conflicting value is a significant concern in explaining the extent to which civil society struggles have been achieved (Edwards, 2011, 9). The concept of social capital (social capital) introduced by Robert Putnam is associated with this approach's tradition.

The spatial aspect of civil society talks about the interaction of society with institutions like the state and the market. This approach focuses on citizen participation in the public sphere and the structural conditions that influence it. The power structure is the focus, where debate and efforts to reach consensus are decisive factors. So that threats to civil and political liberties, security threats, and inequality become essential issues.

The synthesis of the three approaches described above, namely aspects of form, norms, and space, is the approach offered by Michael Edwards to gain a comprehensive understanding of civil society, as stated by him: "Understanding the forms of civil society helps to illuminate which kinds of collective action are most important around specific issues and their contexts, and where gaps or disconnects in the associational ecosystem may require attention … Understanding the norms of civil society takes us on a journey into just these areas, penetrating more deeply into the forces that drive social change such as the values, beliefs, and ideologies that exert their influence beneath the surface of citizen action and underpin the success or failure of social movements and other attempts to shift the rules of the games. Furthermore, understanding the spaces of civil society is vital if we are to get to grips with the tasks of debate and consensus building around these norms, contesting and reshaping the power relations that ultimately determine the success of

social action. When the analysis of forms, norms, and spaces is incorporated into a single, integrated framework, new light can be shed on civil society's achievements even in the most complicated circumstances. In this way, civil society is simultaneously a goal to aim for, a means of achieving it, and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means" (Edwards, 2001).

In the local context, Henk S. Nordholt (2007) describes the dilemmatic condition of Bali, where the free market, on the one hand, and the exclusive cultural identity, on the other, are not compatible. Quoting Degung Santikarma, the experience of the Balinese people shows that authenticity has become a valuable new commodity in today's industrial era of cultural capitalism.

Taking a relatively different position from Nordholt, this research is closer to Jim Schiller's study of civil society in Jepara, Central Java. Schiller (2007) shows that civil society is the central locus for encouraging local governance to be more inclusive, a picture of the situation that shows the progress of civil society in Bali.

The State and Civil Society Relations: It's Rise, and Policies Responds

The rise of the community movement found its momentum after the reformation. It is marked by the variety of community movements based on identity as one of the foundations chosen by the community. The fragility of the post-new order nation-state has become an essential driver for people to choose and define their groupings in identity-based communities. The era in which the development of civil society organizations is more responsive to the long history of solid states that have achieved the highest level of domination over their citizens is intertwined with the growing influence of Islamist groups who also have a long history and are very politically influential.

In this context, it's essential to look at the historical trajectory of the emergence of religious organizations such as the Sarekat Dagang Islam to the emergence of political and non-political affiliation forces with large Islamic mass bases, such as Masyumi, NU, and Muhammadiyah until when they have to deal with the simplification phase of political parties in the New Order era. Restraint of movements based on religious identity and the emergence of mass organizations in society during the New Order era became the dominant discourse which at the same time showed the degree of tension over the ups and downs of relations between the State and Islamic forces, including in this case the existence of space for Islamic intellectual powers. (ICMI) which simultaneously emphasizes the intimate relationship between Islam and the State.

The emergence of a strong state with the basis of integration of the nation-state, which was initially solid, becomes fragile when social and political movements respond to the change in authoritarian government power to a more liberal form of democratic structure (Hadiz, 2003: 592). This phenomenon simultaneously ensures the emergence of various movements and components of civil power born of new elites with the capacity to practice all of their economic, social, symbolic, and economic capital

(Beittinger-Lee, 2010). The constellation of socio-political power at the national and local levels is no longer the primary domain of authoritarian government (bureaucrats and the TNI) but shifts in various contestation spaces between these elites. The emergence of identity-based political parties, local strongmen, and oligarchic political dynasties is a reality that accommodates the variants of these contestations.

In the early post-Suharto era, the representation of religious identity was divided between the forces of moderate Islam and radical Islam, especially in interpreting the journey of democracy in Indonesia. FPI, Laskar Jihad, KISDI, Jamaah Islamiyah, and various similar organizations often openly oppose liberal democracy and consider it incompatible with Islam, which is counterproductive to the view of moderate Islam, which provides a space for negotiation for the broader operation of democracy. (Beittinger-Lee, 2010). In the later period, around 2010, the power of civil society began to mushroom, including those using the identity component. In this case, religion increasingly emphasized its existence with the various intertwined power relations built in various electoral political events. Elite politicians and elites who come from "claims" of the power of civil society organizations are an integral part of power bargaining efforts. Not only in collaboration in strengthening or strengthening the populist strategy of the political elite but also in the agenda of affirming identity to embrace the masses of voters, including, of course, a means of gathering economic capital for civil

society organizations, supporters of the political elite concerned.

The presence of FPI, HTI, and various civil society movements based on religious identity is a form of response to this collaboration. The response to their claim is a representation of the people's anxiety from the unclear platform of political institutions, including political parties, towards the enforcement of the basis of religious values that they carry as the central ideological identity of the party. In 2016-2017, the Action to Defend Islam (ABI) was led by the National Movement to Guard the Fatwa of the Indonesian UIama Council (GNPF-MUI). It is a phenomenon that strengthens the tendency to use religious identity in the Post-New Order era. It also serves as a strategy for populist figures and political elites to strengthen popular policies in the electoral process, especially the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada (Kusumo & Hurriyah, 2018).

Hadiz (2018) saw the formation of civil society organizations and the presence of various civil society mass action movements during that period as a new form of Islamic populism. The emergence of mass organizations marked by the use of Islamic symbols as a unifying and mobilizing basis is believed to lead to the formation of Islamic populism in Indonesia. The formation of organizations and movements based on religious identities such as the FPI shows the character or the growth of new elements of Islamic populism, such as the existence of multiclass alliances and narratives of one ummah. Other writers, such as Kusumo & Hurriyah (2018), mention the presence

of community organizations and identity-based civil society movements such as the Islamic Defense Action Movement as a form of pseudo-Islamic populism rather than Islamic populism as previously argued by Hadiz.

Kusumo & Hurriyah (2018) study finds only a few elements fulfilled as new Islamic populism. It is because the alliances of organizations and movements they collect and carry out tend not to last long and have various meanings for the ummah among other members or participants. As in the Action to Defend Islam, the purposes of the various lower classes form a coalition based on a shared spirit, namely as defenders of Islam or Islamic defenders (Kusumo & Hurriyah, 2018). Their struggle is based on the value of virtue, where there is a biblical text that has been desecrated. The use of a specific approach in building the concept of Islamic populism has made it incapable of capturing the phenomenon of populism in the context of the Muslim community itself, both in the formation of organizations and their movements, where the reality is intertwined with various very complex factors.

However, the narratives built by civil society organizations, including all of their contemporary movements, consistently bring out the character of sentiment based on racial and religious elements through the legitimacy of specific sacred texts. In this capacity, the narrative displayed always contests these elemental bases where their existence is not uncommon as a means or instrumentation in gaining power. The narrative is still considered a call for the sympathy of the voters. They continue to act in the name of the right to freedom of expression even though their existence often conflicts with or contradicts the rights of other minority groups or even the state's authority.

Another aspect influencing civil society's condition is the policy regulating community organizations. This legal framework determines the status of legal entities of community organizations. In its development, this policy also regulates the government's authority to give or revoke legal entities of community organizations. Regulations governing the existence of community organizations in Indonesia include 1). The legal basis for social organizations with foundation legal entities is Law Number 16 of 2001 concerning Foundations as amended by Law Number 28 of 2004 regarding Amendments to Law Number 16 of 2001 regarding Foundations; 2). The legal basis of social organization with legal entities having members is the Staatsblad 1870-64 on Incorporated Societies (Reschtpersoonlijkheid van Verenegingen); 3). The legal basis for community organizations is Law Number 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations; and lastly, 4). Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu) concerning Amendments to Law Number 17 of 2013 on Community Organizations.

The government seeks to provide a legal umbrella for community organizations. This regulatory effort is worthy of appreciation so that the existence of community organizations can be guaranteed by law. At the very least, the existence of this legal umbrella can be interpreted as an effort by the

government to provide legal protection for community organizations. However, in the context of the post-New Order state, regulatory efforts by the government cannot but be seen as an attempt at control over civil society.

There were mixed reactions when the government announced its plans to issue a policy on civil society organizations. The polemic is ongoing regarding the extent to which this regulation will not limit the activities of civil society. The Indonesian NGO Council, established in 2010 and currently oversees 120 non-governmental organizations in Indonesia, is critical of the regulation.

Since Perpu No. 2 of 2017 applies, at least two organizations have their legal entity status revoked by the government. Through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the government revoked the legal entity status of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) on July 19, 2017. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) had its legal entity status revoked on December 30, 2020.

In Bali, three community organisations, namely Laskar Bali, Baladika, and Pemuda Bali Bersatu, received a warning letter from Governor Koster (Gubernur Keluarkan Surat Peringatan untuk Laskar Bali, Baladika, PBB., 2019). The Bali Provincial Government issued a warning letter in 2019. The warning is a follow-up to the Bali Police Chief's recommendation letter sent in 2017. Bali Police Chief sent letters of recommendation to mass organizations that carried out organized crime crimes that disturbed the public to the then Governor of Bali, Pastika, who asked for three community

organizations' freezing (dissolution) because they considered disturbing the public (antaranews.com, 2019).

This regulation on civil society is a legal framework that protects community organizations. In practice, this legal framework is often an instrument of state control. Nationally, two community organizations disbanded, HTI and FPI. Laskar Bali, Baladika, and Pemuda Bali Bersatu received a warning letter from the Bali Provincial Government in Bali.

Although these organizations can be seen as (un)civil society, as expressed by Beittenger-Lee (2013), namely elements of civil society that threaten the democratization process, this indicates a more serious problem related to the condition of democracy in Indonesia. The political configuration, both nationally and regionally, has an insignificant influence on the sustainability of civil society. In this case, a handful of ruling elites determine the fate of civil society organizations.

The Socio-Political Landscape of Post-New Order Bali

This section describes the general context that underlies the development of civil society in Bali. The decade of the 90s witnessed the emergence of several civil society organizations, such as the Manikaya Kauci Foundation, Mitra Bali, The Wisnu Foundation, and the Legal Aid Foundation chapter Bali which was formed in Denpasar. This civil society organization can be said to have spearheaded efforts to organize a society that was generally critical of the state. This organization also witnessed the fall of the New Order regime. Around the

same time, The Bina Wisata Foundation was formed in Ubud, Gianyar, which focused on improving the management of the tourist industry in Ubud.

Organizations such as Idep Foundation were formed after the fall of New Order, which focused on implementing permaculture as an alternative solution to the financial crisis. Kopernik Foundation emerged in the decade following, focusing on achieving sustainable development goals using technology. Lastly, The Janahita Mandala Foundation was formed amid the pandemic of COVID-19 in Bali. One of their activities is helping the residents of Ubud during the earlier stage of the pandemic by partnering with government officials.

Looking back, the fall of Suharto in 1998 ushered in a period of transition for Indonesia. The transition to democracy that is taking place in Indonesia opens up new democratic spaces (Lay, 2017). The logical consequence of this open political system has had a significant impact, including the emergence of many political parties as participants in the 1999 General Election.

After holding its first congress in Bali, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) won the 1999 general election. Public support appears to have strengthened against the presidential nomination of PDI-P chairman Megawati Soekarno Putri. Although ultimately failed to become president, Abdurachman Wahid was elected president, and Megawati became vice president. It triggered a strong reaction in Bali, which became the basis for the victory of the PDI-P.

Gus Dur's tenure was relatively short. The period of government post-transition of power in 1998 can be said to be unstable. Nationally, broad support from the Nahdiyin community and residents during his leadership did not get him to complete his term of office until 2004. Megawati, vice president of the PDI-P, was sworn in after Gus Dur's resignation.

The national political situation that changes to a certain degree affects the political conditions in the regions—one of them with the emergence of local regulations governing traditional villages in Bali in 2001. The role of traditional villages strengthened along with the recognition of the existence of adat in Bali. One implication is the emergence of the pecalang, a unit of security guards for traditional villages in Bali (Pramana, 2012).

The revival of adat is getting stronger after Bali became the target of the bombing terror. The bomb attacks that destroyed Bali in 2002 and 2005 strengthened the sentiments of the Balinese people. The revival of adat, community sentiment, and economic devastation after the Bali bombings culminated in Ajeg Bali's speech (Pramana, 2013).

These years have witnessed the rise of civil society. The democratization wave in Indonesia has hit various aspects of people's lives. In 2004, Indonesia implemented direct presidential elections. The same thing happened in the election of members of the legislature. This change in the electoral system changed Indonesia's political landscape.

The Demokrat Party led by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono challenged the dominance of The PDI-Perjuangan in Bali. The Demokrat Party became his vehicle for victory as president for two terms from 2004 to 2014. The Demokrat Party became a challenger to the dominance of the PDI-P in Bali.

The seat of Governor of Bali, which the PDI-P successfully held in 2003 and 2008, was taken by the Demokrat party. In the 2008 gubernatorial election, I Made Mangku Pastika was supported by the PDI-P. In the 2013 gubernatorial election, the PDI-P no longer supported Pastika. The Demokrat party supported Pastika, which led Pastika to win back the seat of the governor of Bali. In 2018, the PDI-P won the gubernatorial election by supporting Wayan Koster.

The number of PDI-P candidates who sit as legislative council members shows how dominant the party is. The election results show that the PDI-P has the most members in the Bali Provincial People's Representative Council. In the 2009-2019 period, the PDI-P won 24 seats in the 2009 elections (VIVA, 2009), an achievement also maintained in 2014 ("55 Anggota DPRD Bali dilantik," 2014). In the 2019 Election, PDI-P managed to increase the number of seats it won to 33 (Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Bali, n.d.).

The changing socio-political landscape during the transition marked the last years of Soeharto's New Order and had severe implications in Bali. First, this period saw the development of various forms of civil society organizations in the form of foundations that engaged in social issues. Although these organizations work on diverse issues, they become a network of civil societies by working together. It signaled the many faces of civil society movements in Bali. Second, the collapse of the New Order had severe implications in Bali, where Golkar's party dominance was replaced by the PDI-Perjuangan during the first general in after Soeharto's fall back in 1999. Third, there was a change in the configuration of power in the regions after the increasing authority of local governments as an implication of changes in laws and regulations, namely the enactment of the Regional Autonomy Law. This increased authority then also strengthens regional identity. In a way, as many politicians use this kind of identity politics, it gives rise to a conservative element in society. Even with the nationalistic tendencies of the dominant political party, PDI-P, this does not hide how the Balinese treat other people with various backgrounds around the archipelagic state.

In addition, direct elections also have implications for regional head elections, where regions have considerations in determining the candidates who run for regional head elections. The dominance of the PDI-P in Bali was not enough to win the governor's seat. It can be said that the interference of the central government, to some degree, still affected the configuration of the elections in the local sphere, as indicated by the victory of the Democratic-backed candidate, who was then the nationally dominant party.

Twilight of Civil Society in Bali

A further implication of the policy on civil society organizations is the

government's attention to the development of civil society in Indonesia. In terms of quantity, the number of civil society organizations spread across Indonesia in 2014 was 139,957. In 2016, this number increased to 254,633. Based on the data that the author can collect, there is a change where civil society organizations are seen based on legal entities registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs and registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This number increased in 2017 to 371,794. In 2018, this number rose to 394,250. By 2020, this number has increased to 431,465.

As a democratic country, the significant increase in civil society organizations indicates that Indonesia's democracy is good. Over five years, the organization's civil society organizations number has increased, from 139,957 in 2014 to 431,465 in 2019.

Many civil society organizations also affect the issues that become the focus of their activities. This condition also occurs in Bali. Data from the SMERU Research Institute in 2021 shows that 18 sectors have become the focus of civil society activities. The civil organization activities in Bali consist of several sectors: 1) Education; 2) Health; 3). Democracy, Law, and Human Rights; 4) Women and Gender; 5) Children; 6). Public policy; 7). Environment; 8). agrarian; 9). Disaster management; 10). Agriculture; 11). Electricity; 12). Technology; 13). Housing area; 14). Tourism, Arts, and Culture; 15). Economy; 16). Food; 17). Disability; and 18). Politics (accessed from the SMERU Research Institute Database in July 2021). The diversity of these issues shows the complexity of the problems of

concern to Bali's people. It also shows how the public pays attention to state development's direction.

In terms of quantity, the number of civil society organizations in Bali can be said to be minimal. Of the 18 sectors of activity, there are only 43 civil society organizations in Bali. There were also 19 religious-based community organizations in Bali in 2016.

Since 2013, the Bali People's Forum Against Reclamation (Forum Rakyat Bali Tolak Reklamasi, or ForBALI), an alliance of civil society, has consistently been against the Benoa Bay reclamation plan by PT. Tirta Wahana Bali International until now. The critics of development plans that harm the environment are a rallying cry driving civil society in Bali. The alliances behind ForBALI include youths, activists, artists, and many members of traditional villages group. They coordinated the responses of dozens of civil society organizations, mobilized grassroots resistance, and mounted legal challenges against the project (Tans, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on people's lives. Bali, an international tourism destination, is feeling the effects of the pandemic, which has drastically reduced tourist arrivals so that the economy is under tremendous pressure. This development does not dampen the efforts of civil society to criticize government policies.

In 2019, the Job Creation Law and KPK Law were ratified and received strong reactions nationally. The mass protest under the banner of Reformasi Dikorupsi, or Corrupted Reform (referring to the Reformasi Movement that overthrew Suharto in 1998), with

university students, many in their college jackets, were joined by activists of all kinds, workers, trade unionists, peasants, farmers, fishermen, and high-school students—especially from vocational high schools (SMK), generally from a lower-working-class background, stereotyped as rough troublemakers involved in gang fighting and given a hard time by the police (Kuddus, 2019). The emergence of Bali Tidak Diam, a student-based protest initiated in Bali, responds to this situation that is taking place at the national level.

The ongoing case of the coordinator of Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (Kontras), Fatia Maulidiyanti, and the executive director of Lokataru, Haris Azhar, who reported for alleged defamation by the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan (Tempo.co, 2021) signaled the regression on the current state of democracy in Indonesia. In Bali, the Director of Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Bali, Ni Kadek Vany Primaliraning, was reported with a case of alleged treason by the Garuda Nusantara Patriot Organization while accompanying the Papuan Student Alliance to take action at the Bali Police (M Rosseno Aji, 2021). This report adds to the long list of activist reporting cases in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

The increase in civil societies in Indonesia shows an optimistic picture. This tendency gives a favorable impression to observers. There are worrying developments, including the increasing tension between civil society

actors and the state—the efforts to limit the expression of civilian dissatisfaction with state policies. Second, the state's role is more intervening in the life of civil society in Bali. In the context of Bali, Perda No. 4 of 2019 on Desa Adat shows recognition for indigenous peoples in Bali. On the one hand, this is an exciting thing because of the attachment of customs to the Balinese people. However, on the other hand, this also shows the inequality of power relations between the state and society.

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