

# Comparative Analysis of Clientelistic Democracy in India and Indonesia: Outcomes and Challenges

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## Abstract

This article aims at analysing the clientelistic democracy between India and Indonesia. Two countries are considerably the leading democratic countries in the world. However, recently it seems both countries face declining democracy. One main thing that drives democracy to decline is clientelism. This practice has various interpretations in many practical ways. This article uses qualitative method, particularly critical literature review. Some relevant literatures that derive from journal and books will be the main source. The findings of this study are while the clientelism practice in India is incorporated in party system, Indonesian version of clientelism does not follow in institutionalisation. Instead, the perpetrators behind the clientelistic practice are the informal actors, who famously known as *tim sukses* "success team". In a nutshell, democracy seems run well in procedural way, but it has declined gradually due to clientelistic practices.

## Keywords:

Democracy; Clientelism; India; Indonesia

## INTRODUCTION

Recent studies have emphasised the relationship between clientelism and declining democracy in flawed democratic countries. This means the democratisation wave has not been embedded in state and society at all. Instead, these results in the widening gap relationship between state and society. One striking point that helps us to understand the democratic breakdown is the parties and elite-driven factor. They have been a prominent factor in shaping voting preferences. When it comes to electoral campaign, the candidates offer some money to voters in exchange of their votes. At the same time, voters need

additional money to cover their living cost. These pragmatic relationship between candidates and voters results in the clientelistic practices.

The clientelistic practices of two actors arguably have two main consequences. First, unfair electoral competition between incumbents and challengers. This first condition causes the prisoner's dilemma for those electoral contestants. They felt worried if their rivals spending money higher than his/her. This eventually makes most of candidates keep spending money to ensure their electabilities. Second, an increase in voter turnout. This condition particularly happens in developing countries with flawed democratic condition. The lack of ideological commitment leads people to think pragmatically in elections. It has been

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widely believed that money is the main reason why public would like to submit their votes. Although, spending money politics is prohibited, it seems the increasing number of abstainees (golongan putih) can be solved with money. This view then becomes "common norms" in many developing democratic countries.

Following these debates, the question I want to ask is: does clientelism undermines democracy? This question specifically refers to the impact of money politics on democracy in both countries. To be more precisely, I would like to put democracy and clientelism at the same level. In previous studies, most of scholarly works blamed the clientelism has been deteriorating democracy. Since the democracy implementation in India and Indonesia is still underway, I partially agree with previous studies. Instead, throughout this essay, I argue clientelism can have good and bad effects, with Indonesia and India as my point of reference. While high voter turnout is the good thing for democracy, clientelism mostly causes social injustice, abuse of power, and unfair electoral competition within democracy. I elaborate deeply the latter effects in two given countries

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### *Clientelism at Glance*

Clientelism disrupts connections between the state, intermediaries, and citizens. In a normal situation, those three actors represent the flowchart of governance diagram. Politicians appeal to a society based on legitimacy through an election. Intermediaries such as media and non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) enable society to appeal easier to the state with programmatic appeals. Under normal democratic conditions, we can expect a sense of accountability and a sense of responsibility amongst politicians are important to ensure a functioning system of checks and balances (Almquist et al., 2013, p. 480). However, once clientelism undermines the democratic system, it affects the way government acts by unbalancing the relationship between intermediaries and society. Government is not for all the people but for the segmented group of people, which called by constituents. Public goods distribution by the government to particular groups of supporters is the first case. This political favouritism leads to dissatisfaction for those people were not the voters of incumbents. For the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), their role is in dilemmatic condition. In developing democratic countries, it is common phenomenon when elites are also the owner of media and donor for NGOs. This condition surely makes two organisations favouring of the elites. As a result, relationship between state and society in unbalanced condition.

The unbalanced relationship between the state and society causes intermediaries acting as middlemen in brokering vote. These is the second case as a result of that unbalanced relationship. The middlemen can be prominent actors such as preachers and leader of neighbourhood communities. Although media is also part of intermediaries, their role may less significant than those two actors. Preacher and leaders of neighbourhood communities often have a direct influence

over society through regular face-to-face meetings. By utilising their roles, that two actors cause their fellow people to vote certain candidate or parties. This might be suggestions, but in some cases, people will follow the advice because they believe in political preference their leaders made. The charisma may serve as the main trigger.

These two cases are one of the basic problems of emerging democratic countries. Specifically, "clientelism seems to be flourishing, even though the political arena is now generally characterized by the formal rules of democracy" (Grindle, 2016, p. 241). Clientelism has become an informal way of doing politics (De Souse, 2008, p. 12), whereby instead of adhering to the formal rules, governmental processes inevitably lack transparency. Ideally, non-government actors such as civil society, media, and parties can serve as a watchdog. It is an ideal role, nonetheless, the intermediaries subsequently powerless in newly democratic countries.

The absence of strong intermediaries maybe become a relevant factor in understanding why governance is falling into clientelism in emerging democracies. Developed countries are arguably less vulnerable to clientelism than developing ones because their strong media and high economic development enable greater democratic control (Stokes et al., 2013, pp. 221 & 236–240). In contrast, patron-client networks and trust based on habitual face-to-face interaction have been favoured in developing countries because it builds an emotional relationship between candidates and voters (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008, pp. 372 & 380). This means the

practice of democracy is more personalistic than structural-based, giving the elites and parties have more opportunities to dominate intermediaries and society. In another word, patronage drives the democracy implementation.

## METHOD

The method I use in this research is qualitative method, especially critical literature review. This method means how to use and criticise the literatures in order to find out the novelty. The novelty itself can partially agree or disagreed with the previous findings. I need convincing arguments in making gap from previous ones.

It also enables me to analyses several relevant information from journals, books, and websites. These three sources I classify according to their findings. It means that I make a scale of priority whether the literatures are relevant or not. Next steps are I try to make the research gap that might be different with the previous studies. After that, I make the findings into several sections throughout this article.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### *India and Indonesia as Patronage Democratic Countries*

India and Indonesia are typical of countries who have this kind of elitist democracy. It has been widely believed that corrupted elites who frequently committed to the abuse of power is the major reason. Many recent publications refer to both countries as a patronage democracy states (Kenny 2017) (Berenschot, 2018) (Berenschot, 2019) (Berenschot & Aspinall, 2020). From these consensus of literatures above, patronage

democracy makes voters becoming subordinates to elites. Since the voters are subjects to the clientelistic practices, this makes unbalanced treatments in the grass-root level.

One example to talk about that treatment is favouritism. It simply means the way elites/candidates indulges their constituents rather than all the people. The general clientelism trend of the two countries is favouritism could come to appear (De Souse, 2008, p. 12). This still places incumbent elites and parties are higher than its challengers in electoral competition. They could win the heart and minds of citizens through favouring some policies to some degree. Another meaning of favouritism is the material aid distribution to those targeted recipients through state resources funding. In short, the politician in two given countries cases utilises public spending and public policy during the office term.

The incumbent elites from India and Indonesia heavily use the public budget for their personal political advantages. It can be budget refocusing for the specific policies, decreasing number of other policies for their benefits, and making pork-barrel policies for those constituents. These three modus operandi are commonly frequent among elites in both countries. However, the way the elites can able to access the budget and spending it is totally different. This makes different patronage democracy condition between India and Indonesia.

For the Indian case, it seems the clientelistic practices can be earlier from official electoral campaign period. This makes incumbent elites are in favour of clientelism rather than their challengers. Indian patronage democracy shows the

interaction between ruling politicians, state institutions, and also citizens (Kenny, 2017, p. 74). This interaction enables the chief minister of the state to exploit his/her authority to gain great personal power (Kenny, 2017, p. 75). From these two explanations, Indian patronage democracy is also characterised by inter-party competition for seats in the Congress. The use of clientelist networks is the way parties secure their vote in each electorate. Realising the position of the chief minister is significant, the parties attempt to place many party cadres in grass-root level (Manikandan & Wyatt, 2019). Berenschot himself calls the workers as "party fixers" who provide access to state resources (Berenschot, 2011, p. 385). They are responsible for ensuring certain groups vote for the party by prioritising the channelling of state resources to them.

By contrast, Indonesian patronage democracy still happens in the electoral campaign period. This makes the personal factor is stronger rather than institutionalisation like Indian does. More specifically, it is more likely distribution of material resources for a political benefit based on personal political loyalty (Aspinall, 2013, pp. 28 & 30). This fact surely surprising because the patronage practices only effective in short-term period. For example, the politicians often use their money to tie up the citizens for the re-election matter. The Indonesian models also build upon the pyramidal structure in which the politician at the apex. Also, Indonesian models employ great networking from politicians, NGOs activists, and also citizens. This makes different story with India, which relies on state actor only.

The role of parties itself is less significant because they are often dependent on their candidates in terms of electability.

From the above-mentioned characteristic of patronage democracy in India and Indonesia case, it seems there are similarities and differences. For the first analysis, the decentralised clientelist and strong networking have been highly salient in both countries. The clientelist practices are often focussed at the local rather than the national level because elections regularly held at provincial and regency level. For the second analysis, the clientelist practice seems to a short-lived model in Indonesia because this practice only appears during the election campaign period. It just an instant and pragmatic clientelist networking. Conversely, the Indian case seems to be long-term clientelist practices because it involves a perpetual social caste system in society. The parties also maintain close ties with the leader of communities through their cadres in the grass-root level. Following these latter two contrast clientelist experiences, I will explain it in the next section.

#### *The Clientelism Problems in India and Indonesia*

The Indonesian clientelism relies on the material power of each candidate in running their campaign machines. One problem is the candidate as the patron should ensure his/her money can afford electoral campaign cost, particularly payment offered to their team. This high-cost campaign, consequently, makes candidates spending huge money because they employ broad brokers networking within society.

Having said that, this clientelist networking is also prone to the betrayal of their patrons. This marks the second problem in the Indonesian case. The consensus of literature argue that the clientelism practice will fragile if there is a traitor within the system. It means that while clientelism practice goes under way but the agent will change their affiliation if they receive more incentives from other rivals. This makes Indonesian version of clientelism in ambiguity.

In line with above-mentioned statement, Aspinnall notices this unfaithful practice in his research. He says the underlying logic of clientelism is payment as a reward (Aspinnall, 2014, pp. 564–565). This transactional condition, therefore, encourages the candidates competing with other candidates to hire brokers. This bidding competition usually put the incumbents as the winner. In other cases, the challengers could beat the incumbents if they have more money than ruling elites. Likewise, the voters also show their pragmatic stance by offering their votes to those rich bidders. These uncommitted voters are also keen to receive money politics from diverse candidates. And then they have the autonomy, whether casting vote to preferred candidates or might be abstaining from the election. Their behaviours surely give uncertain condition for those candidates. They cannot ensure exactly the voter preference in the ballot boxes. As a punishment, the candidates may pull the aids back if they lose the election. In brief, the clientelism problem lies on the unfaithful commitment of brokers and voters and its connection with votes outcome.

Indian clientelism problems might be inter-coalition parties and broker autonomy at the subnational level. These two conditions put the parties at the risky condition. Indian parties have played significantly in operating clientelist networking. More specifically, Indian clientelist networking is well-structured in a top-down hierarchy because the parties play significant roles than candidates. As a result, if one of the state parties at subnational betrays the federal parties, this will reduce federal party's votes significantly. This attitude ensures the great winning position in each states level. However, I underline some problems relate with the Indian version of clientelism.

For the first problem, federal and state parties often dependent on each other in securing the vote. Sometimes, the state parties overlap their patron federal parties to access state resources (Manikandan & Wyatt, 2019). It is a dominant feature of clientelist practices. For example, federal and state budgets serve as the source of those practices. This affects not only citizens but also bureaucrats regarding work promotions (Berenschot, 2019). This political influence, thus, serves as a long-term investment for the parties to mobilise the voters. The state parties could betray their federal patrons securing votes for their re-election opportunities. This condition may trigger the second problem, namely broker autonomy. Kenny argues "an increase in broker autonomy in patronage democracies weakens the ties between parties and voters, making the latter available for direct mobilisation by the populists" (Kenny, 2017, p. 14). This means either

federal or state parties could control their brokers in society. While the party cadres work on ensuring definite votes for their parties, they cannot oppose populist power. Moreover, Kenny also argues, the federal and states coalition based on the distribution of pork-barrel policies was not work out because the states parties aligned themselves with the populist-led identities campaign (Kenny, 2017, p. 20). These results confirm with Berenschot's study who says "the anti-incumbency factors" in India, particularly at the sub-national level (Berenschot, 2019).

Despite having diverse problems, the Indian and Indonesian politicians are fond of clientelist practice in the election. The thin ideologies and thick identities of the voters are the reason why they still spend huge money in the election. Another possible issue might there is no alternative way to convince the voters without spending money politics. These pragmatic conditions, therefore, undermines the democracy itself. More importantly, this is not democracy should be, whereas the vote market when public trade votes for money meanwhile candidates trade their integrity for office. I will explain the detailed practice of clientelism in India and Indonesia.

#### *The Roots of India and Indonesia Clientelism.*

Referring back to my main argument that clientelism undermines democracy principles such as social injustice, unfair electoral competition, and non-transparency of public money spending, India and Indonesia have went through declining democracy due to clientelist practices. One way to understand why clientelism ratchets democracy down in both countries is

corruption. It has been widely believed that corruption has been ingrained within democracy system in both countries. This is the first cause of clientelism roots in both two countries. India and Indonesia's clientelism stories come from corruption. This means corruption has been embedded as a political norm in state and society. To be more precisely, either public or citizen has accepted that money talk is day-to-day practice in attempting to gain political supports. This practice mainly as low transparency, consequently, breed corruption itself. Public would not be supreme holder of democracy, whereas elite take advantage on public by spreading money.

Apart from such negative impacts, corruption is the common way politicians to survive in public offices. In the Indonesian and Indian cases, the high-cost campaigns and vote mobilisation through social aid provision are the two things drive politicians to be corrupt (Jeffrey, 2002) (Barter, 2008) (Berenschot 2019). This means, committing corruption level while in the office makes the possibility of re-election opportunities will come true. The level of corruption at the local level arguably higher than the national level. Compared with national level, local elites should deal with numerous case in grass-root level through policy-making processes.. This makes local elites can find out the budget gap for their own benefit. One of the reasons is rent-seeking motivation trough local development projects (Aspinall, 2014) (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016). This puts the incumbents are in the favourable position when doing clientelist practices. More importantly, the politicians at the subnational level

have winning chances than politicians at the national level. Facing the locals more frequently than national elites enables local elites to persuade locals politically. They could combine the money politics power and personal charisma persuading the locals. According to Barter, "local election have empowered leaders rather than rural constituencies" (Barter, 2008, p. 11). As a result, the incumbents are higher than society and even their challengers in electoral matters. This marks the unbalanced relationship as the second cause of clientelism root.

The root of Indian clientelism cases often takes place in rural farming areas. The vast majority of poor farmers is promising votes. More importantly, they also rely on governmental purchases such as crops, rice, sugar, and barleys. This unequal relationship will increase the likelihood of patron-client relations in local elections (You, 2015, pp. 94–95). The incumbents know better that situation by offering helps to those farmers. This condition means the economic inequality has enforced the voters exchanging their ballot paper for the particularistic benefits. And the state authorisation is the one-way clientelist actors' work. This one-direct mechanism ensures the ruling elites can overpower their rivals when it comes to political campaign. Indian case shows public access to police and judiciary service through charges the money for the brokers (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 23). The role of brokers become matter in this situation. They are much likely representing certain social caste, especially strong and rich caste. This omnipresent attitude surely can reach out many potential voters. More importantly, each people from different caste can has

different brokers. Surely this makes brokers and public can be connected each other. The brokers also maintain a local connection with elected officials to hold a talk with the government in negotiating sugar price (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 30). The agrarian setting with brokers in the middle of brokering votes shows Indian clientelism is well-structure.

However, the poor farmers could not vote and then delegate their vote to the brokers. In this situation, the ruling elites count on their electability to the brokers. This leads to the political transactions between politicians and the brokers ensuring votes to them in election day. Likewise, the lower castes also rely on their public service access. This structural caste hierarchy is highly salient in India due to religious norms. The upper caste has a strong bargaining position than lower caste. The presence of Indian brokers certainly hurt the sense of transparency in the local political arena. And they also cause social injustice because poor farmers become the subject of clientelist politics.

Meanwhile, the root of Indonesia clientelism is partially similar to the Indian case. It also takes extractive industries with a pyramidal structure as India does. However, the ruling elites sometimes take care of their clientelist politics. This makes different story with Indian counterpart when elite rely on brokers in reaching out people in grass root level. It can relate to their influence over public policies at a certain degree. This is one of the abuses of power practices. Another common method is the extractive industries. The ruling incumbents would expect payback from their client companies to afford their

electoral campaigns. This is the common root of Indonesian clientelism practices. Clientelism sometimes becomes into the racketeering activities, particularly high-profit extractive industries.

Indonesian clientelism case shows the local leaders take a role as patron of illegal forestry industries (Barter, 2008, p. 11). The ruling politicians use their influence making money from unlawful practices. This role helps them in making money election campaigns. This surely can be electoral fraud. But Indonesian ruling elites seem always have tricks avoiding convictions. In reality, there are many underreporting cases related to local elites. Despite extractive industries protection, they also could use discretionary power over bureaucracy mobilising votes. bureaucracy power sometimes has a great role in promoting its leaders in society. The governor or regents can appoint or removes the bureaucracy accordingly. This condition subsequently encourages bureaucracy showing his/her loyalty to local leaders., even if they should be neutral during the election. Similarly, with India, this condition raises the transactional cost, particularly money distribution from businessman to the politicians.

It seems that the root of clientelism in both countries comes from the agrarian setting. Surely the group of poor people is the main targeted segments because they need more money to afford the living cost. This make the presence of brokers are very welcome among the voters itself because brokers can provide money to them. It seems the voters will pragmatically submit their vote for those elite who gave them money. At the same time, the elites exacerbate the local



democracy contexts by breaking government rules and bypassing formal procedure to make money. Corruption expels democracy itself through clientelism. But we need to know deeply understanding clientelist practice in the real campaign period. Next section, I will show the common ways clientelism is worked out to convince the voters.

#### *How Clientelism Works in Election Campaign*

I will focus on vote-buying and the pork barrel politics are the real example in India and Indonesia. These two terms have been popular in order to build clientelist networking. This latter term means “the process that allows a legislator to attain central government projects for his/her geographic constituency by directly influencing appropriations” (Lancaster, 1986, p. 69). This means the incumbent politician has higher bargaining politics than their rivals in approaching potential voters. More importantly, the incumbent politician itself seeks for a political opportunity of re-election through pork-barrel policies. Surely this makes unfair electoral competition between incumbents and challengers. In this regard, identities and geography base often affect the pork-barrel policies in India and Indonesia. The more politicians attached with their electorates; the more pork-barrel policies will be greater. This practice certainly hurt the sense of social justice of the governance system because it will neglect some certain group of people. I will kick off with Indian pork barrel case and then followed by Indonesian pork barrel case.

Indian case showed the changing trend of pork-barrel politics: 1) from local caste identity-driven factor to single religious identity factor and 2) from infrastructure to social welfare grant scheme (Manikandan & Wyatt, 2019) (Sharma, 2017). For the first factor, the state based-local parties appeal to caste identity while seeking votes and then they join to the federal coalition to have access state resources (Manikandan & Wyatt, 2019, pp. 91, 95–97). This means the local parties should offer the real solution for their home – not only cultivating identity for own political desire. The second factor, discretionary grants are more favourable than spending grants because it is most easily identifiable by rivals (Sharma, 2017, p. 20). This shifting pattern takes places after the Congress ruling era. Discretionary grants on social welfare scheme arguably have a large effect to reach out to potential voters (Sharma, 2017, p. 38). This by no means to seek more favourable support in a cross-cutting caste society. Indian cases also show the farmer groups and caste groups often receive club goods from politicians or ruling parties (Anderson et al., 2015). The club good means aid assistance for those particular group of people (Allen Hicken, 2011, p. 291) The particular pork-barrel distribution is mainly related to farming activities or public services.

In contrast, pork-barrel spending in the form of public works is more favoured in Indonesia (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 79). The infrastructures often become “monument of politics” because people will remember the initiator. Moreover, before the local election, the incumbents often

make a promise to improve the current infrastructure qualities (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, pp. 109 & 137). For example, road and place of worship become the subject of pork-barrel politics because these two affect many people directly. The incumbents have advantages to access state revenue before engaging in electoral competition.

Similar to India, club goods are highly important in Indonesia. The club good distribution practice often targets the member of club/association such as sports club, religious organisation, and youth club (Aspinall & As'ad, 2015, p. 70). This method enables the candidates to more concentrate pork barrel to collective than individual ones. By targeting individuals, particularly brokers, the candidates expect more votes from the broker's followers. For example, The ulama is tempting to be approachable by politicians, especially during the election campaign period. They run several Islamic boarding schools (*pasantren*) with numerous students. They would be an important target for those candidates by donating money as a charity to ulama. By approaching ulama, the candidate, which is specifically incumbents, will increase their charisma over the voters.

#### *Vote Buying as Another Clientelist Practice*

Indian and Indonesian politicians often use vote buying to target voters during the electoral campaign (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019) (Muhtadi, 2019). Vote-buying itself remains effective in their political electorates, but it also more likely affect the other voters. The swing voters are a group of people who do not have definite vote preference and political engagement either. More

importantly, they sit on the vast majority of registered voters in an election. This condition then encourages the candidate to approach them.

Despite its popularity, vote-buying certainly hurts the democracy value, especially the independent vote stance. Also, it damages the sense of accountability in the governance system because the politicians purchase our vote already. As a result, once they get elected in office, the public could not voice the concerns. Moreover, according to Hasen (2000), "vote-buying declines social welfare issues because those who buy votes will do so to capture government subsidies" (Hasen, 2000, pp. 1332–1333). Following his argument, vote-buying hurts the public wellbeing because people could not articulate their real needs.

#### *Vote-buying in India*

The Indian case shows the party workers are the major actor in vote-buying (Still & Dusi, 2020). This means they responsible for persuading the vote preference, especially for those undecided voters. There are two major ways related to the Indian case. First, "parties distribute money to all the voters" and second, "vote-buying happens on the eve of election day with the targeted recipient is the caste leader" (Still & Dusi, 2020, p. 106). These two ways allow the parties to catch possibly the undecided voters in society. Moreover, the party workers also organise door-to-door campaign distributing money and even "biryani parties" for those male villagers (Still & Dusi, 2020, p. 108). The lower case like Dalits often gets spoils from the party

workers because they occupy the largest demographic proportion. Such high cost organised vote-buying campaign that Indian have.

Another Indian case reveals that the performance of public good delivery also affects the way people respond to the vote-buying appeal. Heath and Tillin argue the unemployment and low rates of literacy have a strong correlation with the increasing number of vote-buying (Heath & Tillin, 2018, p. 103). This means the public services performance is one of the pulling factors. Furthermore, "poverty and education influence whether or not people will respond to clientelist appeals (Heath & Tillin, 2018, p. 105). One interesting point from their research is the voters are also rational people. They would not respond to the vote-buying if the public service they get is still poor. However, if the quality is improved, the cost of vote-buying also goes up. This means the voters expect the elites would like to do more regarding public service once they get elected (Heath & Tillin, 2018, p. 107).

#### *Vote-buying in Indonesia*

Indonesian case shows the different election level determining the vote buying's effectiveness (Muhtadi, 2019, pp. 55–56). the cost of vote-buying in national legislative and presidential election is higher than the local election itself. This means the candidate should afford much money capturing voters across the archipelago. The level of money value also highly salient in inducing someone in the grass-root level. For example, 20.000-50.000 rupiahs effectively affect the poor people's preference, but the money does not affect

the middle-class groups that presumably rational voters (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 232). Instead of the amount of distributed money, the candidate holds an important role than the party itself as India does.

The vote-buying mechanism in Indonesia also shows a direct personal relationship with the voters and emotional relationship with electoral campaign team are the most important thing (Rohman, 2016, p. 247). The latter relationship arguably determines the success story of why candidates win an election. The *tim sukses* (success team) maintains the huge structure of brokers within society (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 96). Each of them also has own personalistic networking that might be useful for campaigning their candidate (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 102). And even if accepting the money politic is a sin, the ulama who considerably as part of *tim sukses* will say God forgiving the "small sin" (Hamdi, 2016, p. 292). This condition causes a highly politicised condition in society. More importantly, it also describes the vote-buying is the usual business in Indonesian election.

Although vote buying is still persistently effective, some candidates consider committing vote-buying is similarly with the gamble. One case shows the villagers are the pragmatic voters (Rohman, 2016, pp. 241–242). They still accept the money from the *tim sukses*, but at the same time, they also get money from other candidates. In this regard, they will evaluate whether or not they will cast vote certain candidate in line with the given money. This condition reveals the voters itself understand the

meaning of money and the value of their vote.

## CONCLUSION

The two countries' case shows clientelism undermining the democracy system. One striking point is the abuse of power in using state resources. This surely causes social injustice because it triggers discriminatory public services. And then state also suffers huge money loss due to their incumbents' ambition. This sombre, nonetheless, still place vote-buying and pork-barrel as the effective vote-getter in Indian and Indonesian contexts.

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