Governance of the Functions Representation and Recruitment of the Golkar Party in Actualize Good Governance in the Reform Era

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Abstract
Political parties have a strategic function in actualize of good governance through representation and recruitment functions. The function of representation is a form of accountability of political parties to the public by absorbing aspirations, articulating and aggregating society's interests into laws, regulations, and policies, as well as overseeing the implementation of public policies. The function representation of political parties also includes forming and running an accountable and effective government, controlling corruption, and strengthening political stability. This study aims to analyze the causes of the governance function of representation and recruitment of the Golkar Party as a political party institution that has not optimally actualize good governance in the reform era. This study also formulates a governance model for the representation and recruitment functions of the Golkar Party, which can promote good governance. The research method uses mixed methods or mixed methods research (MMR), combining quantitative and qualitative approaches with exploratory sequential mixed methods models. The theoretical approach used is the political party representation theory of Bartolini & Mair (2001), and Szymanek (2015), and the political party recruitment theory approach put forward by Pippa Norris (2006). The results showed that the governance of the function representation of the Golkar Party in the reform era did not function optimally because the function representation was still electoral, and the strong interests and presence of rent-seekers made the Golkar Party not autonomous, not free from oligarchy and corruption. This study recommends an excellent political party governance model with a functional aspirational house model and a model of educational institutions, regeneration, and recruitment.

Keywords:
Political party, Golkar Party, Function representation and recruitment, Good governance, Reform era

INTRODUCTION
The governance of the function representation and recruitment of political parties is an important and fundamental factor to produce good governance. The function of representation is a form of accountability of political parties to the public through the absorption of aspirations, articulation, and aggregation of community interests into laws and policies, as well as overseeing the implementation of public policies (Bartolini and Mair: 2001, Szymanek: 2015, Meyer: 2012, Katz and Mary: 2018). The function representation of political

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parties also includes the function of forming and running an accountable government, effectively controlling corruption, and promoting political stability (Ezrow: 2011, Ishiyama: 2015). Recruitment function or institutional function is the function of political parties in the aspect of selecting and candidating capable and eligible political actors. It is clear what society they represent, and their accountability and public electability are tested (Bartolini and Mair: 2001, Norris: 2006).

Several scholars have written the results of their studies on the problem of the function of representation and recruitment of political parties in several countries. Representation of the people through political parties in the democratization process in Myanmar does not produce good political party governance because party institutionalization has not been able to build an effective organizational structure. The parties that exist in Myanmar currently only have a limited capacity to ensure people's representation. Most political parties in Myanmar are weak in the sense that they have not been able to build an effective organizational structure based on party ideology, public support, and internal democracy (Stokke, Win, Aung: 2015). The legacy of authoritarian intervention in electoral politics in Korea causes political parties to be less institutionalized and unable to carry out representative functions in shaping public policy (Lee: 2009). On the other hand, good governance of the representation and recruitment functions can be seen from the governance of the function representation in South Korea and the political recruitment function in the United States. The South Korean parliament has implemented a representative inclusion model with an e-parliamentary system to articulate public aspirations. In addition, the parliament which places representatives of political parties in South Korea also provides counseling facilities and services to analyze and collect public information called the Legislative Counseling Office (LCO). Public policy formulation is carried out through studies in collaboration with research institutions and universities so that the aggregation of community interests into laws and regulations and policies has strong legitimacy (Brata., et. all: 2015). Recruitment governance in the United States has a system that allows the selection of political leadership to be carried out through a bottom-up process, namely placing the lowest party members as the main determinant. Candidates are carried out using a convention system so that real support comes from the will of the public, not what the elite wants. Through this process, the candidate's capacity, capability and integrity are more guaranteed because supporters have access to the candidate's track record. This political recruitment model then encourages broad public participation (Mubah: 2008).

In Indonesia, requirement for improvement and reform of political party governance were in line with requirement for change and improvement of the government at the beginning of the 1998 reform. The New Order regime was deemed not successful in implementing good governance

because it did not run the government in an accountable manner, laden with corruption, collusion and nepotism (Kholis: 2013). The 1998 Reformation Movement that succeeded in forcing Suharto to step down and ending the 32 years of the New Order government marked social, legal, economic and political changes, including requirement for change and reform of political parties. Political reform opened when recognition of the existence of political parties was introduced into the 1945 Constitution as a result of changes made by the People's Consultative Assembly in 1999-2002. Article 6A paragraph (2) and Article 22E paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution as a result of the amendments stipulate clearly the existence of political parties as the only institution that can nominate pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, as well as the only participants in the general election for members of the House of Representatives. Through Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional Administration, the authority of political parties is increasingly expanded as bearers of candidates for governor, regent, mayor and their representatives in direct regional head elections (Haris: 2020).

At the same time, the People's Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives together with the government of President BJ. Habibie responded to the requirement for reform by establishing a good governance foundation. The foundation is TAP MPR No. XI/MPR/1998 Concerning Clean and KKN Free State Administration, Law No.28/1999 concerning Clean and KKN Free State Administration, Law No.31/1999 concerning Eradication of Corruption Crimes. Responding to demands for political party governance reform, the House of Representatives and the Habibie Government established Law No. 2/1999 concerning Political Parties, Law No. 3/1999 concerning Elections, and Law No. 4/1999 concerning the Composition and Position of the House of Representatives and the People's Consultative Assembly. Through the foundation of this law, many political parties were born and the first democratic elections were held in 1999.

Political party reform opened a roadmap for the transformation of Golkar as a political party by carrying out a new paradigm for the Golkar Party. This new paradigm is oriented towards the development of Golkar with new values in line with the demands of reform, making Golkar an open (inclusive), independent, democratic, moderate, solid, rooted and responsive political party to the problems of society, nation, and the state by carrying out the functions of political parties consistently (Tandjung: 2007).

The change in the governance of the Golkar Party was able to run well at the beginning of the reform. However, the dynamics of changes in the political configuration from authoritarian to democratic, as indicated by responsive laws, are inconsistent. The Golkar party shifted again, no longer able to touch its ideal function and led to political crowding (political commotion). After Akbar Tandjung's leadership and

changes in political configuration in the reform era from 1999 to 2009, the Golkar Party experienced political disorientation and began to become oligarchic (Sudjito: 2013). This situation shows that the function of representation and recruitment of the Golkar Party did not function properly in the reform era.

The dysfunction of the representation of the Golkar Party has an impact on public trust in the performance of political party institutions and the House of Representatives which places party cadres in it, which in turn has an impact on improving governance. The survey results of several political research institutions in the last five years show that the performance of political parties is not optimal in carrying out their functions consistently which then causes public trust in political parties to decrease. An opinion poll conducted by Indo Barometer in 2017 showed that 51.3% of the public considered political parties to have performed poorly. The results of this survey have an impact on the public's distrust of the performance of the House of Representatives members. One of the reasons is that many political party cadres have been caught up in legal cases, especially corruption. The results of a survey conducted by the Political Research Center of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI) in 2018 also revealed the low level of public evaluation of the House of Representatives performance. The survey results show that most expert respondents from the fields of politics, economics, socio-culture, and defense-security assess the performance of the House of Representatives as poor (51.72%). The causative factor is that the regeneration system, recruitment process, and candidacy run by political parties are still poor (Amalia and Rahardjo: 2018). The results of research conducted by LSI in the 2019 election year show that the level of public trust in political parties and the House of Representatives still has the lowest level of trust compared to other institutions, namely 53 percent. In 2020, Saiful Mujani's research findings show that the lowest trust is aimed at the House of Representatives (50%) and political parties (45%). Based on the results of the Political Indicator poll in 2021, the public thinks that political parties or politicians are not good, as indicated by the significant decrease in the level of trust, up to 64.7 percent.

The trend of declining public trust in political parties is a logical consequence of how close society is to political parties. The results of a Kompas survey in January 2022 show that many voters feel they are not close to political parties, including the Golkar Party.

KOMPAS Survey Infographic

Kedekatan pemilih dengan partai politik

Party	Ada/kuat	Tidak ada/Lemah	Tidak tahu
PDI-P	28,9%	65,2%	5,9%
Gerindra	24,6%	63,5%	11,9%
Golkar	29,1%	65,0%	5,9%
PKB	30,3%	57,6%	12,1%
Demokrat	17,2%	76,6%	6,2%
PKS	35,4%	59,8%	4,8%
Nasdem	31,0%	66,7%	2,3%
PAN	26,7%	73,3%	0,0%
PPP	23,5%	70,6%	5,9%

Source: kompas.id, 2022

Translation:
Kedekatan pemilih = Voters engagement
Kuat = Strong; Lemah = Weak; Tidak Tahu = No Response

As seen in the Kompas survey infographic above, only 29.1% of voters feel close to the Golkar Party, the rest (65.0%) feel they are not close to the party. Likewise, the level of closeness with other political parties does not come close to half or penetrate 40 percent. The distance between the electorate and the Golkar Party is a reflection that the people do not feel represented by political parties. The data above shows that the representative function of the Golkar Party has not been optimal in the reform era.

The non-optimal functioning of the Golkar Party can also be seen in the pattern of recruitment and regeneration that has not fulfilled objective measures based on the merit system principle and the continued strengthening of nepotism in the party elite circle of the Golkar Party. The pattern of recruitment is carried out using a pragmatic approach through vote getters who generally have high popularity and financial ability, such as celebrities and business people or entrepreneurs, and elite relatives (political dynasties). The Golkar Party also does not close access to former corruption convicts which shows there is no mechanism for recruiting public support from civil society circles and clear measuring tools to test public accountability and electability of candidates. This recruitment pattern shows a pragmatic step in pursuing electoral aspects and fails to carry out the regeneration function.

The table below shows the elected Members of the House of

Representatives for the 2019-2024 period who are identified as having political   kinship:

Fraksi	Jumlah Anggota	Anggota Memiliki Kekerabatan Politik	Prosentase
PDIP	128 Orang	10 Orang	7,8 %
Golkar	85 Orang	9 Orang	10,6 %
Nasdem	59 Orang	8 Orang	10,2 %
Demokrat	54 Orang	6 Orang	11,1 %
PAN	44 Orang	5 Orang	11,4 %
Gerindra	78 Orang	4 Orang	5,1 %
PKS	50 Orang	3 Orang	6 %
PKB	58 Orang	2 Orang	3,4 %
Total Anggota	**575 Orang**	**48 Orang**	**8,3 %**

Source: Tempo, 2019

Translation

Fraksi = Faction; Anggota = Members; Anggota dengan Kekerabatan = Kinship; Prosentase = Percentage; Orang = People

Based on the percentage data in the table above, the Golkar Party is the third most party that recruits using a kinship approach in legislative elections. Dynastic politics has also strengthened in the 2020 regional head elections. Data released by the Nagara Institute shows that the Golkar Party is the party carrying the most political dynasties (12.9%) in the regional head elections (republika.co.id, 2020).

Political recruitment that is not democratic, is not based on eligibility, is not based on public support, and does not go through a public accountability test will give birth to leadership and political power that lacks integrity and tends to result in the emergence of a system of government power that has the potential for abuse of power (abuse of authority). Recruitment based on vote getters from rent-seeking groups which are dominated by businessmen, political

dynasties, popular circles (artists), and ex-corruption convicts has the potential to at the same time confirm the lack of good governance in the reform era.

The high level of corruption, the low democracy index, the holding of elections and political leadership that is not credible and with integrity are a number of indicators that show that good governance has not been optimal in the reform era.

First, indicators of corruption. The 2020 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows Indonesia's corruption ranking as the 5th most corrupt country in ASEAN. The findings of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) regarding Corruption Crimes (TPK) based on profession and position show that until 2020 the TPK in Indonesia is dominated by political actors (424 politicians consist of members of the House of Representatives and Regional

People's Representative Assembly at most, namely 274 people, followed by 122 Regional Heads and 28 Head of Institution/Ministry).

Second, indicators of democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in 2020 places Indonesia in 64th place out of 165 democratic countries in the world with a score of 6.30. The data shows that Indonesia's democracy has experienced a decline in quality, reaching the lowest democracy index in the last 14 years. The EIU refers to this deteriorating quality of democracy as flawed democracy or in the category of flawed democracy. One of the phenomena of the deteriorating quality of democracy today is shown by the strengthening of money politics in every political contest. Money politics clearly damages democracy, is synonymous with corruption, tarnishes fair and clean competition, hinders potential political candidates, and has the potential to worsen governance (Alfian: 2018). The decline in the quality of democracy shows that Indonesia is currently in a crisis of democracy which is quite dangerous for good and clean governance.

Third, the general election indicator. Elections are an important instrument of democracy as an entry point for political actors to assume political power in both the executive and legislative branches. The political power generated through elections reflects the governance of the two powers. The practice of money politics in the holding of elections in Indonesia, especially through the practice of buying and selling votes, indicates that elections are not credible. Money politics

strengthened especially after the open electoral system in the 2009 legislative elections. One in three Indonesians who have the right to vote are personally exposed to money politics. This phenomenon makes Indonesia the country with the third largest frequency of money politics in the world (Muhtadi: 2020). Buying and selling votes in elections also does not cover the eyes of the practice of rent-seeking. The phenomena of money politics and rent seeking is due to the weak recruitment function of political parties, voters (subjects of money politics targets), and candidates who lack political education, as well as the conditions of poverty in society (Heryanto: 2019).

Fourth, indicators of political leadership integrity. Indicators of the integrity of political leadership are reflected in the practice of administering power and the political mechanisms that are implemented. Political leadership dominated by oligarchs and rent-seeking behavior is an indication that political leadership lacks integrity, and power politics has been controlled by investors, thereby undermining democratic values (Latif: 2020, Muhtadi: 2020).

This study aims to analyze the reasons why the representation and recruitment function of the Golkar Party has not optimally represented good governance in the reform era. As a political party that has extensive experience in government, the Golkar Party has the potential to promote good governance. The Golkar Party has considerable potential to be able to re-strengthen a fairer function representation, which is more expected

by society, and also has more potential to create good governance. There are a number of reasons. First, the Golkar Party is the oldest and most experienced party with a loyal constituent base from the past until now. Second, the Golkar Party is a party based on a merit system, not dynastic. And also very important, the Golkar Party is a technocratic party. Lastly, the capital for Golkar's potential is its long experience in integrating Pancasila, Islam and Indonesianness.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Bartolini and Mair (2001) explain that basically political parties have two main functions, namely a representative function and an institutional or procedural function. The representative functions of political parties include the function of interest articulation, the function of aggregating interests, and the function of forming public policy. Meanwhile, the institutional or procedural functions of political parties include the function of recruiting leaders and political power in the legislature and government. Based on these two functions, political parties function to recruit and place public policy holders, as well as function to account for and ensure that power holders and public policies are able to aggregate and articulate public interests in the form of policies that are pro-public.

Reinforcing Bartolini and Mair's theory, Szymanek (2015) explains that the function of representation is a place for aggregating and articulating interests. From a functional perspective, political representation indicates that the correct decision-making process must consist of the articulation and aggregation of various interests. The theory of representation from Bartolini & Mair and Szymanek both agree that the three functions of representation are identical.

Pippa Norris' theory of political recruitment (2006) describes the steps or stages of recruiting candidates for power. The first step talks about who is eligible, ie outlines an analytical model for candidate selection, identifies key steps, and considers certification at the recruitment stage. The second step talks about who is nominating, namely what institution, party or group is proposing. The third step is the testing step of who is nominated (who is nominated). The fourth step is the step to consider the consequences of recruitment on the impact of being elected in general elections.

Norris' four steps in the formulation of governance of the recruitment function are strategic steps for political parties to carry out an accountable political recruitment function. The four stages of political power recruitment are; First, the candidates recruited are eligible and eligible (who are eligible) or the certification and qualification stages. Second, the candidate must be clearly proposed by who or which group is nominating (who is nominated). Third, who is nominated (who is nominated) to represent the carrier group. At this stage there must be verification whether the candidate really represents the group. Fourth, ensuring accountability for the election of candidates by the public who will vote for them. At this stage the candidate must be tested that the public wants him to be elected.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research uses a mixed approach or mix method research (MMR). Mix methods combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. Both approaches were carried out to obtain more comprehensive, valid, reliable and objective data findings to answer the problem of why the governance of the representation and recruitment functions of the Golkar Party was not optimal in create good governance in the reform era.

The research design uses an exploratory sequential mixed methods model with an emphasis on qualitative weight (Creswell, 2014). With this design, the findings of quantitative data provide analysis justification in explaining or constructing qualitative research results.

Source and collection of research data obtained through primary data and secondary data. Primary data sources were obtained from questionnaires, focus group discussions (FGD), and interview results. Secondary data in this study were obtained from the mass media, both print and electronic (online), journals, books and other documents deemed relevant and related to the research.

The FGD was conducted in several group discussion sessions by presenting relevant and competent informants from various backgrounds, including academics, political and public policy observers, and Golkar politicians. In the interviews, the researcher determined several groups of key informants, including the general chairman of the Golkar Party and those who represented him who were believed to be able to provide complete data. the data from the questionnaire results are based on the consensus of quantitative research, namely by giving scores to the choices of 'agree' and 'disagree' and so on in the questionnaire data collection instrument.

The population of this study is all 222 members of the Golkar Party Central Leadership Council for the 2019-2024 management period. This population was selected to measure the governance aspects of the representation and recruitment functions of the Golkar Party in the highest central management structure of the Golkar Party. Based on the population, a sample of 69 people was determined using the Slovin technique.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The articulation function of the Golkar Party is an important part of the function representation because it is from the articulation that public policy should be based. Based on the answers of research respondents, most respondents (94.2%) answered that the function of articulation or absorbing public aspirations of the Golkar Party did not go well in the reform era. One reason is the absorption of aspirations which tend to be pragmatic and transactional with money politics strategies. The non-optimum function representation of the Golkar Party in the articulation aspect is inseparable from the weak governance of the aggregation function, namely the function that carries out research, assessment and formulation of various alternative policies in response to public

aspirations. Based on respondents' answers, 87% agreed that the governance of the Golkar Party's aggregation function had not gone well in the reform era. This weak aggregation function is since the Golkar Party does not yet have an accountable aggregation mechanism and a special institution for public policy research and review. Other findings were revealed in a focused discussion on the causes of the stagnant and non-functional governance of the Golkar Party aggregation function. This was made possible because of being shackled by political laws and shackled by power so that the voices, hopes, aspirations and demands of the people for party cadres in the House of Representatives, for example, only become an aggregate of numbers and personal interests, not an aggregate of public interests. The aggregation function in the legislative mechanism is also considered oligarchic and ignores the check and balances mechanism.

The formation of Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11 of 2020 concerning on Job Creation is evidence that shows that the aggregation function of the Golkar Party is not yet good, especially in the legislative mechanism. The Job Creation Law was passed at the House of Representatives Plenary Meeting on Monday, 5 October 2020. The majority of the factions in the House of Representatives, including the Golkar Party faction approved the policy which then responses until a formal and material review was carried out at the Constitutional Court. Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 confirms that Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11 of 2020

concerning on Job Creation is formally flawed. In its legal considerations, the Constitutional Court's decision stated that the procedures for forming the Job Creation Law were not based on definite, standard, and standard methods and methods, as well as the systematic formulation of laws. Regarding the principle of openness, legislators do not provide optimal space for public participation. The Constitutional Court stated that the Job Creation Law was conditionally unconstitutional.

The problem with the Job Creation Law product confirmed the answers of most respondents who agreed (94.2%) that the Golkar Party had not implemented an accountable decision-making mechanism. It is considered that decision making on a public policy has not been carried out based on joint deliberations but based on the will of a handful of party elites. These findings were reinforced by FGD sources who emphasized that during the governance reform era the decision-making and public policy-making functions tended to be oligarchic and pragmatic-transactional.

The Law on the State Capital, which was decided by the government and the House of Representatives in early 2022, is another indication of how public policies made and decided to do not represent public aspirations. Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 3 of 2022 concerning the State Capital was passed at the House of Representatives Plenary Meeting on Tuesday, January 18, 2022. This law, whose draft was proposed by the government, received approval from most factions in the House of Representatives, including the Golkar

Party faction. The Law on the State Capital was formulated and decided in a fast-track legislation, discussed in 42 days, with 11 deliberation meetings. The process of establishing the Law from the start did not involve public participation and was not transparent.

Based on these findings, the dysfunctional representation of the Golkar Party in making and making public policy decisions is due to the strong practice of pragmatic-transactional politics which is vulnerable to being influenced by groups of investors or rent-seeking that benefit the political elite.

In terms of recruitment governance, the Golkar Party has now transformed into a modern party and carries a new paradigm of the Golkar Party which is open (inclusive), democratic, objective, and measurable based on aspects of achievement worthiness, dedication, loyalty and not reproach. This recruitment system experienced dynamics along with the changing of the electoral system in the reform era to become an open system. The change in the electoral system affected the recruitment governance of the Golkar Party. This recruitment system is no longer a major consideration. This changing recruitment pattern was revealed in a focused discussion session which presented expert sources from academics, political observers, policy observers, and senior Golkar politicians.

In the aspect of openness (inclusiveness) and democratization of recruitment, the trend is that the recruitment mechanism is based on like and dislike, dynastic, and acclamation. Kinship politics or dynastic politics is one of the prominent practices in the political recruitment pattern of the Golkar Party. Pragmatism and transactionalism in recruitment are also demonstrated by the recruitment of non-cadres from popular figures and owners of a strong financial base such as business people or entrepreneurs and celebrities.

Based on the findings of the questionnaire, most respondents (91.3%) agreed that democratic values and openness in the recruitment governance of the Golkar Party had not been fully implemented. Recruitment patterns are still considered elitist. On the other hand, the expert sources in the focused discussion session saw that this recruitment problem was inseparable from the influence of changes in the open electoral system and the existence of oligarchic power within the party. The merit system approach and technocratic culture that exist in the Golkar Party is a strong bargaining power to overcome the recruitment problem.

In the aspect of fit and proper certification which includes the integrity, capacity and competence of candidates, the questionnaire findings show that the majority of respondents agree (95.7%) that the recruitment mechanism for the Golkar Party during the reform era was not optimal and accountable for implementing a certification mechanism that guarantees the eligibility and appropriateness of candidates. The presence of vote getters (vote panners) in the political recruitment process is a pragmatic choice for the Golkar Party to

gain the support of a majority vote. This pragmatic step tends to ignore aspects of the candidate's integrity, capacity and competence. The vote getter phenomenon is one of the important findings in the governance of the Golkar Party's recruitment function. The majority of respondents (92.8%) agreed that the vote getter phenomenon also

occurred in the Golkar Party during the reform era.

Open access to capital owners (entrepreneurs/businessmen) in political recruitment can be seen from the data on House of Representative of Indonesia Republic members from the 2019 election results, as shown in the following table:

Table: Entrepreneurs Elected to Become Members of the Republic of Indonesia House of Representative 2019 Election Results

Fraksi	Jumlah Anggota	Anggota Pengusaha	Prosentase
PDIP	128 Orang	57 Orang	44,5 %
Golkar	85 Orang	48 Orang	56,6 %
Gerindra	78 Orang	41 Orang	52.5 %
Nasdem	59 Orang	21 Orang	35,6 %
PKB	58 Orang	26 Orang	44,8 %
Demokrat	54 Orang	23 Orang	42,6 %
PKS	50 Orang	22 Orang	44 %
PAN	44 Orang	18 Orang	40,6 %
PPP	19 Orang	6 Orang	31,6 %
Total Anggota	**575 Orang**	**262 Orang**	**44, 5 %**

Source: Tempo, 2019

Translation
Fraksi = Faction; Anggota = Members; Anggota dengan Kekerabatan = Kinship;
Prosentase = Percentage; Orang = People

Based on the table above, of the 85 members of the House of Representatives from the Golkar Party faction, more than half (48 members) have business backgrounds. Based on the overall percentage, the Golkar Party is the most numerous political party that recruits the owners of capital (entrepreneurs/businessmen) to sit as people's representatives in the House of Representatives.

The data findings reinforce the ideas that have developed in focused discussions regarding the increasingly accessible power of capital within the

Golkar Party since the election of Jusuf Kalla, who has a business background, in 2004 to replace Akbar Tandjung as General Chair of the Golkar Party. In the FGD it was revealed that the current political power elite is full of practices of money politics and political transactions. This phenomenon shows that the Golkar Party still chooses pragmatic steps in recruitment during elections and shows that the power of capital (money) is a determining force in the recruitment of the Golkar Party.

The absence of an accountable fit and proper test mechanism in the

candidate selection process is also a problem in the recruitment governance of the Golkar Party. Based on a survey conducted among internal members of the Golkar Party, 91.3% thought that the fit and proper test mechanism carried out internally by the party was unaccountable and unprofessional, making it difficult to generate political power with integrity.

In the aspect of nomination or nomination governance which includes parties who nominate (who are nominated) and candidates who are nominated (who are nominated), it shows that there is no formal public support mechanism in the Golkar Party in the nomination stages. Most respondents (87%) agreed that the Golkar Party does not yet have a candidacy or nomination governance system that can guarantee or ensure the accountability of candidates and the level of electability of these candidates. The mechanism that applies is limited to support from party structures in the form of recommendation letters. The majority of Golkar Party internal respondents (87%) also considered public support mechanisms to be important and agreed that in order to ensure the election of candidates, a clear and official public support mechanism was needed, namely that candidates to be endorsed by the Golkar Party must have clear supporters and have high loyalty to party.

The public accountability and electability test mechanism is a significant aspect in the governance of the recruitment function to test whether the candidate who nominates or is nominated has public accountability and electability, so that it can be ensured that the public has popularity, liking, trust and electability in the candidate nominated. Based on the findings of a survey conducted, 94.2% of respondents stated that during the reform era, the Golkar Party did not yet have a mechanism for testing public accountability and candidate electability in the selection process. The general chairman of the Golkar Party, Airlangga Hartarto, who was interviewed, stated that to guarantee the public accountability of candidates, a public testing mechanism is needed so that the candidate being promoted wins and has good public accountability.

Based on research results, the function representation of the Golkar Party is still electoral representation, not yet substantive through ideas and policies that represent the public interest. This electoral representation causes the Golkar Party not be optimal in its function representation. The capital factor causes the Golkar party not autonomous. This capital factor also causes the presence of rent-seekers, corruption, and parties that tend to be pragmatic.

Actualization of the substantive function representation of the Golkar Party through ideas and policies can be initiated with the Functional Aspiration House. The idea of the functional aspiration house is the finding that the authors obtained from the results of this research study. This idea was then reinforced by several key informants with a constructive response in the form or format and system that must exist in

the functional aspiration house.

The Functional Aspiration House is an institutional model of governance of the function representation of political parties that is functional in managing the functions of articulation, aggregation, and public policy recommendations. This functional aspiration house is designed as a forum for community activities in influencing the political process, and as a forum for community participation in actualizing their aspirations.

The institutionalization of Aspiration Houses must also be operational. The operationalization of the Aspiration House does not require administrative matters such as office buildings or other administrative requirements. Its operates at the level of practice and ideas, programs that bring people closer, becomes a house of ideas that responds to public issues, focuses on absorbing aspirations and actualizing people's aspirations, as well as conducting research on ideas and policies. Through the Functional Aspiration House program, the governance of the Golkar Party's function representation is directed to consistently represent Indonesianness, Pancasila, and Islam as the philosophical and ideological characteristics inherent in Golkar.

In the recruitment function, the Golkar Party must not only prioritize financial capabilities and highlight a pragmatist approach. The Golkar Party is an ideological party that applies the principle of meritocracy in its recruitment management. The problem with the pattern of cadre recruitment, especially with the strengthening of nepotism and pragmatism practices within the elite Golkar Party, has caused the recruitment mechanism to fail to meet objective standards based on the merit system principle.

An effort to refresh the recruitment pattern with the presence of the Golkar Institute, which was founded by the Golkar Party as an educational institution, center for political studies and research that is inclusive, is a pilot project to improve party governance. Through the Golkar Institute, the Golkar Party is able to develop a tiered, sustainable and integrated design of education, regeneration and recruitment governance to produce a cadre of prospective leaders who are competent, capable and with integrity.

CONCLUSION

The Golkar Party as a political party with experience and wealth of resources, can actualized good governance by reforming and strengthening good political party governance.

The idea of a Functional Aspiration House and the presence of the Golkar Institute as an educational and research institution hosted by the Golkar Party is an alternative solution and a proactive measure to improve and strengthen the governance of the function of representation and recruitment of political parties.

This research is expected to contribute to how to manage political parties, especially in the aspects of representation and recruitment governance that can encourage good governance. This research is also intended to be able to open up a wider space for discussion by carrying out

studies by further researchers so that existing research can be further refined.

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