

THE COLONIZATION TRIAL POLICY IN GEDONG TATAAN, LAMPUNG IN 1905-1917

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ABSTRACT

The problem of colonization policy in Gedong Tataan (South Sumatera) made the main theme in this research is to know one part of Dutch colonial politics in the Dutch East Indies in the modern imperative era in the first half of the 20th century. The policy is an implementation of one of the ethical political programs, namely: the emigration proclaimed by the Dutch in 1901, which would implicitly be used for the welfare of the Indies population. However, in practice, the colonization was then politicized by the Dutch who conspired with the private capitalists, to expand the exploitation of natural resources and labor to the Outer Islands region. Since the problem of this research has taken place in the past, the archives of the Dutch colonial archives, books, journals and newspapers related to the theme of this research are used as sources in this dissertation; and the analysis of this study uses a critical historical method in order to obtain a reconstruction of the history of colonization that is close to the truth. In conclusion, the policy of colonization in Gedong Tataan was the Dutch colonial ambition or politics to improve the welfare of the native population, and as a pioneer for the procurement of labor or private capital of the capitalist plantations outer Java.

Keywords: conspiracy, exploitation, colonization, and labor.

ABSTRAK

Kajian tentang kebijakan kolonisasi di Gedong Tataan (wilayah Sumatera Selatan) bertujuan untuk mengetahui salah satu bagian dari politik kolonial Belanda di Hindia Belanda di jaman imperialisme modern pada paruh pertama abad ke-20. Kebijakan itu merupakan suatu implementasi dari salah satu program politik etis, yaitu: emigrasi yang dicanangkan oleh Belanda pada tahun 1901, yang secara implisit akan digunakan untuk kesejahteraan penduduk bumiputera Hindia Belanda. Akan tetapi, di dalam praktiknya kolonisasi itu kemudian dipolitisasi oleh Belanda yang berkonspirasi dengan para pemilik modal swasta (kapitalis), untuk memperluas eksploitasi sumber daya alam dan tenaga kerja ke daerah kepulauan di Luar Jawa. Oleh karena, masalah penelitian ini telah terjadi di masa lampau, maka bahan-bahan arsip kolonial Belanda, buku, jurnal, dan surat kabar yang terkait dengan tema digunakan sebagai sumber dalam penelitian ini. Analisis penelitian ini menggunakan metode sejarah kritis agar dapat diperoleh rekonstruksi sejarah kolonisasi yang mendekati dengan kebenaran. Sebagai kesimpulan, bahwa kebijakan kolonisasi di Gedong Tataan itu merupakan ambisi atau politik kolonial Belanda untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraan penduduk bumiputera, dan sebagai pionir untuk pengadaan tenaga kerja atau kuli-kuli perkebunan swasta kaum kapitalis di Luar Jawa.

Kata kunci: konspirasi, eksploitasi, kolonisasi, dan tenaga kerja.

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INTRODUCTION

The colonization of population from Java to Lampung, especially in Gedong Tataan in early twentieth century was a project of the Dutch East Indies government. This project was backgrounded by population issues that the population in Java was considered by the colonial government as overcrowded and in less prosperous condition (*mindere welvaart*). In the second-half of twentieth century, several residency areas in Java such as Kedu, Cirebon, Rembang, Kebumen, Grobogan coincidentally occurred starvation issue (Pelzer, 1945).

Thus, this led to the emergence of critics from the humanists and radical liberal democracy adherents, in the society, parliament, and the governments either in the Netherlands and Indonesia. Those critics were that the conditions were inseparable from the policy which had been carried out in Java (Brooshooft, 1901: 134-135; Locher-Scholten, 1976: 306-340). Hence, the Dutch Queen (1901) – in her speech in front of the Dutch parliament (*Staten Generaal*) – stated that the Dutch government will pay attention and improve the welfare of native people, Indonesians.

Her speech was then followed up into a Dutch government policy known as the ethical politics (*ethische politiek*) (Hüsken, 1994: 213-217). The colonial government made serious effort in improving the native prosperity in its colonies, the Dutch East Indies, by means of the community development program in several sectors namely education (*educatie*), agriculture (*irrigatie*), and population (*emigratie*) (Schalkwijk, 1918: 418; Kartodirdjo, 1990: 32). Then, the last sector, population, was outlined as a colonization policy (*kolonisatie*) which became a theme for this article.

The colonization policy was first initiated in 1905. Colonization was a new model directly handled and financed by the Dutch East Indies government in order to establish new farmers (*landbouwers*) outside Java, and then well-known as the agricultural colonization (*landbouw koloni-*

satie) (*Besluit Pemerintah*, 7 March 1906, no. 5.). In contrast to the old colonization model, this was aimed at the labor fulfillment (*arbeiders*) of the private plantations which had been occurred before 1905 and handled by the private plantation entrepreneurs known as the labor or coolie colonization (*arbeid kolonisatie*) (Breman, 1963; Prior, 1979);

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methods used in this article referred to the critical history method (Garraghan, 1965; Gottschalk, 1963). The sources of this research were gathered from the archives in Indonesian National Archives (ANRI) Jakarta and *Nationale Archief* (NA) in Den Haag, and books, articles, and newspapers from the Indonesian National Library and KITLV Leiden Library. This research did not use the verbal sources because those studied historical events were too far from present, so this was impossible to find contemporary witnesses.

The historical sources, then were examined and tested through the external critics in order to obtain the historical data which had high validity values. Next, the data were interpreted together with the historical concepts to build facts. Then, the facts were strung or correlated based on the rule of causality in history, so they became a historical story which approached the truth in the historiography (Renier, 1950: 179-180).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Population Issues in Java in 1900-1920

The population of Java in 1900 was 23.746.683 people, while the population outside Java at the similar year was 6.575.373 people. From the data, it could be seen that Java which had smaller areas than other islands outside Java (Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Papua Barat) had greater population. In addition, the level of population density in the Dutch East Indies at the similar year was not overly high, namely in Java approximately 216 people per square kilometer, and outside Java

only 4 people per square kilometer. Therefore, this meant that the level of population growth in Dutch East Indies was not high and uneven. The low level of population growth was indicated by the emergence of influenza plague and starvation issue; and the mandatory workload which burdened the rural populations, so they left their village (Boomgaard, 1991; Nitisastro, 1970: 67). See Table 1.

As could be seen in the table 1, there were *out-migration* areas, namely the areas which their people pleased to migrate to other areas: Kedu, Cirebon, Madiun, Kediri, and Madura; and *in-migration* areas, which were often entered by the migrants outside the: Pasuruhan and Besuki (in Java), and East Sumatra, Lampung, Riau, Jambi (outside Java) (Nitisastro, 1970: 55-87). During the first colonization, the area of Kedu Residence became *out-migration* area, which some of its inhabitants were departed as colonists to Gedong Tataan, Lampung (*Besluit Pemerintah*, 7 March, no.

5: Craandijk, 1918: 27). The percentage of population growth in Java in 1900-1920 was also still lower than 2% per year, except in the *in-migration* areas. See Table 2.

As could be seen in table 2, the number of population growth per year, per 1000 people in Java was extremely low. For instance, in Cirebon, Banten, Pekalongan, Semarang, Rembang, Kedu, Madiun, Kediri, Surabaya, Madura, Yogyakarta, Surakarta; even there were areas which had the decrease number of population in 1905-1920, such as Banten, Cirebon, Semarang, Kedu, Madiun, Kediri, Surabaya, Madura, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta (Nitisastro, 1970).

The economic condition of Javanese people during years before the implementation of colonization was in penniless condition (Booth, 1988: 389; Manggistan, 1986: 99-141). During the last years after 1883, the crop prices (rice) in Java decreased due to the crop failure, so the employment termination in the private

Table 1. Total Population in Java in 1900-1920

Region	1900	1905	1917	1920
Banten	812,170	878,009	878,009	897,301
Jakarta	1,938,000	2,309,352	2,444,642	2,787,343
Priangan	2,435,582	2,696,767	3,358,022	3,810,652
Cirebon	1,660,670	1,709,005	1,671,111	1,711,778
Pekalongan	1,803,176	1,900,286	2,164,007	2,268,571
Rembang	1,470,525	1,406,708	1,640,702	1,663,814
Banyumas	1,368,298	1,486,129	1,627,090	1,767,520
Kedu	2,358,545	2,338,683	2,713,517	2,456,591
Madiun	1,233,334	1,349,472	1,602,242	1,602,242
Kediri	1,521,921	1,774,545	2,151,660	1,011,903
Surabaya	2,360,909	1,436,963	2,529,844	2,460,180
Madura	1,758,511	1,493,280	1,778,243	1,743,818
Pasuruhan	1,824,467	2,022,170	2,054,345	2,241,223
The total of areas directly under the Dutch East Indies:	26,140,338	27,386,247	30,772,345	31,651,909
Yogyakarta	1,084,327	1,118,705	1,374,168	1,282,815
Surakarta	1,512,773	1,593,056	2,060,1,049	2,040,547
The total of all Vorstenlanden areas:				
Total Jawa	2,597,100	2,711,761	3,435,038	3,352,362
	28,746,638	30,098,00	34,157,383	34,984,171

Source: Widjojo Nitisastro, 1970: 6.

Table 2. The Population Growth per year, per 1000 in Java in 1900 – 1920

Region	1900-1905	1905-1920	1905-1917	1917-19220
Banten	19.5	0.1	-1.6	7.3
Jakarta	16.9	15.2	12.3	+3.7
Priangan	20.4	23.0	18.3	+2.1
Cirebon	5.7	0.1	-1.9	8.0
Pekalongan	10.0	8.7	10.7	0.7
Semarang	-5.3	3.0	5.5	-6.6
Rembang	2.5	7.0	7.6	+0.7
Banyumas	16.5	12.2	7.6	27.5
Kedu	-1.7	3.3	12.+	-33.2
Madiun	17.9	11.1	14.1	-1.6
Kediri	31.9	8.+	16.1	-22.+
Surabaya	26.5	0.6	14.5	14.5
Madura	32.7	10.3	14.5	29.0
Pasuruhan	20.6	6.9	1.3	29.0
Besuki	30.0	62.2	18.6	-1.8
The average growth of areas under districts:				
	8.6	13.7	19.7	10.1
Yogyakarta	6.2	9.1	17.1	-22
Surakarta	10.3	6.8	21.5	-1.8
The average growth of areas under the Netherlands:				
	8.6	13.7	19.7	10.1
The average growth in Java:				
	9.2	10.0	10.5	8.0

Source: Widjojo Nitisastro, 1970:54-69.

companies continued. Consequently, the plantation economic crisis occurred, so the demand of labors decreased and the labor wages declined (Manggistan, 1986: 123; Elst, 1986: 143-157).

In fact, between 1888 and 1915, the expansion of agricultural land areas had occurred. From 1888-1900, the rice field increased at 8%, while the moor rose at 24%; then in 1900-1915, the rice field increased at 16%, the moors rose at 150%. Together with the increase of moor fields above, the Javanese farmers did not move from poverty yet. According to Geertz, the rice crops were still constant, namely 1:1. This was caused by uneven crop growth occurred in Kedu, Cirebon, Madiun, Kediri, Semarang, Rembang (Geertz, 1983: 98-100; Kano, 1984: 51-52). Based on data in 1900-1905, every farmer only had the agricultural fields approximately 0,35 Ha. The case in Kedu Residency, per family only had the agricultural fields ap-

proximately 0,17 hectar or 0,25 *bau* (1 *bau* = 7096 m²) (*Het Metrieke Stelsel van Maten, Gewichten en Munten*, 1925:8), and they were still subsistence farmers. This means that they did not try to behave efficiently and intensively. Thus, their annual incomes were only approximately f. 1. 80,- (*Advies Raad van Indie*, 25 March 1904, no. 30; Eindresume, Volume I, Appendix A; Booth, 1988).

The Government Colonization Policy

After the liberal politics developed in Europe in mid-nineteenth century, the fate of the native people in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) became a highlight from the humanists and liberalists, especially after the emergence of an issue called *Batig Slot* (net profit). This issue had sounded since 1860s, and developed after The State Treasury Laws (*Comptabiliteitswet*) by the Dutch issued in 1864 (Van Hoeverell, 1863: 315; Van Gennep, 1878: 10-11). Based on

the laws, the Dutch East Indies budgets were determined by the Dutch Laws. After that, the relationship between the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands related to *Batig Slot* always became a target of criticism. The liberal parties in the Netherlands became extremely sensitive toward this case. They condemned the explorative old colonial politics, and accused the Dutch government had plundered millions of guilders from the Dutch East Indies wealth (Deventer, 1899). This radical criticism was proposed by van Dedem. He sued the abolition of profit taking (*batig slot*) from the colonies to the Netherlands (Kartodirdjo, 1990: 27).

Prior to the criticisms, in 1867, the Dutch Colonial government precisely had established a research team assigned to investigate the lack of prosperity (*mindere welvaart*) in Java and Madura. The aim of this research was that the government desired to be cognizant of whether the lack of prosperity among the native people occurred in Java, so the new economic-politic policy was required to overcome this condition. However, this research was started to conduct in 1901-1903, after the Dutch Queen delivered her speech in 1901, and she emphasized the necessity of the prosperity for the native Indonesians. (Fokkens, 1901-1903).

In 1889, the brochure from a controller in the Government of Home Affairs (*Binnenlandsch Bestuur*) circle appeared, namely H.E.B. Based on Schmalhausen's book titled *De Overbevolking op Java en Hare Gevolgen* (The Population Density in Java and Its Consequences), the population growth in Java was adequate significant, and he also proposed that this was a time for some Javanese people to be moved outside Java (*Kolonisatie Bulletin*, 1937: 4).

The proposal to move people from Java to outside Java got attention from the director of the Government of Home Affairs. Thus, he reported this case to the government, so this idea would be followed up (*Besluit Pemerintah*, 1902, no. 17; and Letter of the Director of Government of Home Affairs to the Government [the

General Governor], 3 December 1903). This report was received by the government, so the preparation to compile the colonization programs. During preparing and determining the colonization location, the government (the General Governor) requested the assistant of Sukabumi Resident, namely Heyting, in order to conduct research for preparing the colonization proposal from the densely populated areas in Java to other sparsely populated areas (outside Java).

The director of the Government of Home Affairs advised Heyting to conduct research only restricted to five particular areas in Java, and seven areas outside Java (Schalkwijk, 1918: 117). In addition, he was also demanded to investigate the labor issues (the contract coolies) required by the private plantations outside Java. Hence, since 1863 the labor issues in the plantations became a problem for the plantation entrepreneurs in those areas. To carry out the duty, he received government allowances of 600 guilders per month (Stoler, 1985).

In his plan, Heyting had created 10 years program. His research areas were directed around the private plantation areas, namely the areas which required labors and close to the prospective colonization participants. This was important because the colonial government did not have sufficient funds to defray the proposed program (Pelzer, 1945). See Table 3.

The government should provide expenses to the prospective colonists (*kolonisten* – the colonization program participants) of f. 10,- per family for transportation cost, purchasing kitchen utensils, agricultural tools; the procurement of houses for a Javanese doctor and two headmen, building maintenance, consumption allowances for 8 months, purchasing materials to plant, salaries and allowances for two controllers, two *Wedana* assistants, three clerks, two cavalries, and four policemen, an irrigation orderly, wages for 20 porters, salary for a Javanese doctor for 8 months, to purchase medicines, salaries for 2 headmen and 28 civil servants, travel allowances for two

controllers, two *Wedana* assistants, three clerks, an irrigation orderly, and a Javanese doctor with his family to a designated place. The total cost was approximately f. 150.271,- (Benoit, *et al*, 1989: Heyting, 1938: 1106-1117)

The proposed project was not approved because it was considered too expensive by the government, so Heyting was still given time to arrange a new proposal. Although his second proposal had been concretized the number of colonized people, it was not approved yet by the government, especially by *Raad Van Indie*. The reason was it was necessary to look for the most densely populated areas in Java and outer areas as colonization destinations. In addition, this was suggested that colonization supposed to implement in Java areas first (to Banyuwangi), then continued outside Java, namely Lampung in order to save the costs (Letter of Director of the Government of Home Affairs to

the General Governor, 3 December 1903, no. 469 dan 16 January 1904, no. 254; Schalkwijk, 1918: 117).

After considering both proposals and suggestions from the colonial officials and evading the colonial project to be abandoned, so the government decided to conduct the colonization trial first named *Kolonisatieproef*. *Kolonisatieproef* was established by the government in 1905. As an initial stage, Kedu Residency was selected as an area which most of the population would be moved from the colonization project destination. Those area was Lampung district (*Lampung Districten*), precisely in Gedong Tataan (*Besluit Pemerintah*, 19 Oktober 1904; *Kolonisatie Bulletin*, 1937: 4; Sayogyo, 1986: 32; Swasono, 1986: 70).

The reason why Kedu Residency was selected as the first colonization place of origin was because the economic condition of people in the Kedu Residency ini-

Table 3. The Proposed Program of 10 Years Colonization by Heyting

Year	The Destination Area of Colonization	Number (KK)	Cost (Gulden)
I	Banyuwangi	530	f. 150.271,-
II	Banyuwangi, Krawang	530	f. 337.675,-
III	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung	350	f. 544.100,-
IV	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung	--*	f. 314.725,-
V	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung, Jember	--*	f. 767.150,-
VI	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung, Jember	--*	f. 341.500,-
VII	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung, Jember, Bengkulu	--*	f. 396.750,-
VIII	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung, Jember, Bengkulu	--*	f. 437.325,-
IX	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung, Jember, Bengkulu, Palembang	--*	f. 262.175,-
X	Banyuwangi, Krawang, Distrik Lampung, Jember, Bengkulu, Palembang, Sumatra Barat	--*	f. 499.150
Total			f. 5.028.900,-

Note: *) no data available

Source: Heyting, 1938; Hardjono, 1977: 16

tially had worrisome. The famine season often occurred in this area, and the agricultural areas (rice field and moor) had less good quality. This was because the irrigation was not proper, so during the dry season, the fields were difficult to plant rice. The average area belonging to the farmers was 0, 17 hectares in 1904, so his life was poor (*Advis Raad van Indie*, 25 March 1904; Elst, 1986: 155)

Additionally, based on Heyting, another reason why Gedong Tataan was selected as an area for the trial colonization was his location which was closer to Java, supported by the highway and railway— so the costs to take the potential migrants (*kolonis*) could be smooth and affordable; the wide of flat areas reached 17.000 hectares. Furthermore, the water sources were numerous, so it was suitable to build rice fields (Heyting, 1938; Zwaal: 1936; Schalkwijk: 117).

Colonization in Gedong Tataan (Lampung) in 1905-1917

The recruitment of the prospective migrants who would be sent to Gedong Tataan initially was entrusted to the regents in Kedu Residency, such as: Karanganyar, Kebumen, Purworejo (Bagelen). A person who coordinated them was an assistant of Sukabumi Residency, H.G. Heyting, assisted by Wedono Ronodimejo assistant from Kutoarjo, and two measurers (Schalkwijk: 119; Swasono: 70). In 1905, 155 families had succeeded to be moved to Gedong Tataan. The first colonization site was named the Begalen village, because the migrants came from the Bagelen District (Purworejo) in Kedu Regency. Generally, the village in the colonization areas used the name of the area of origin (Swasono: 70; Soeratman: 162; *Kolonisatie Bulletin*, 1937:4).

Finding the prospective migrants at the villages in Kedu Regency was rather difficult because according to Schalkwijk, the village population in Kedu in particular and in Java in general was reluctant to leave their homeland. The village traditions were difficult to remove or to release. Thus, this caused that the popula-

tion colonization program from Java to outside Java was less successful.

Based on Ginkel, this failure was caused due to the fact that the delivery target of the migrants to Lampung at 22.940 people in ten years was unsuccessful although the number of migrant migration every year continued to increase since 1905-1917 (Ginkel, 1917: 1545; Craandijk, 1918: 27-29; and see also Schalkwijk, 1917-1918: 420-421). See Table 4.

The colonization trial in Gedong Tataan District occurred five times. The first trial was the establishment of Begalen Village then followed by Karanganyar and Kutoarjo villages in 1905. Next, the second trial held in 1907 by establishing Gadingrejo village coordinated by Van Dissel (The Leader of Trial Colonization). The third village establishment was in Purworejo village, and then the additional hamlets, namely Tegalsari, Purwosari, and Karangrejo which took place in 1909. After that, the fourth establishment was Wonodadi village, together with the additional hamlets such as Wonosari and Wonokriyo, which took place in 1910; while the fifth one was Tambahrejo village established in 1911 (Darsiti Soeratman, 1978: 1961-1963).

The travel costs for the prospective migrants to the colozation areas were borne by the government. They were defrayed their domicile costs (*verblijfkosten*) of f. 22,50,- including to purchase the agricultural tools. The age limit of the perspective colonization participants was restricted, namely less than 41 years or already married. During the initial colonization program, the perspective migrants who newly arrived were stationed in *los* (barracks) before their housings were built (Schalkwijk, 1913: 419).

The Dutch Colonial government was dissatisfied with the results of the trial colonization in Gedong Tataan because this was not followed by the spontaneous migration while the costs were high. Hence, the colonization to Lampung had been terminated in 1911. The government demanded the local government in Lam-

pung to take part in handling this program, so the immigration from Java to Sumatra did not terminate. Consequently, the government aimed to establish colonies (villages) and the labors (coolies) in Sufmatera was successful because since 1900, the government had expanded the plantations for their export purpose outside Java (Prajudi, 1970: 14-17; Hardjono, 1977; 17).

Since the government developed the rural Bank (*Bank Penkreditan Rakyat*), the colonization trial was continued once more, after the Lampung Bank (*Lampongsche Bank*) had established in Lampung in 1912. Thenceforth, the leader of the colonization trial (*Dissel*) cooperated with *Lampongsche Bank* continued the colonization program to Lampung. Through *Besluit Pemerintah* on 16 August 1913, no 19, the bank could fund f. 60.000,- to assist the migrants' necessity with 4% interest per year (Schalkwijk, 430-431). Due to the change, in 1913, the newly arrived migrants only received living costs of f. 22.50,- per family, while for building house, purchasing agricultural tools and others, so they were welcomed to borrow money to the bank for maximum amount f. 200,- and paid in install-

ment for 10 years. However, most migrants only borrowed money no more than f. 10,-.

This colonization policy program was designed by costumizing Javanese customs and traditions. This method was used to anticipate people who had participated this program not to return to their homeland. They were expected to stay comfortable in the colonization areas because they had already felt in their own socio-cultural environment, as in Java (*Bijlagen: Inheemsche Kolonisatie* from the Letter addressed to the Java-Madura Governor by the *Gubernemen* Secretary dated 25 Maret 1931, in *Rondschrifven* No. 646/13).

The relationship between the migrants and the native population in Gedong Tataan was relatively good, even though conflicts had been occurred between those two groups. According to Schalkwijk – an employee of the colonization trial in Gedong Tataan (1910) – several disputes had been occurred there due to the regional border issues, but they could be reconciled because both communities (the native and the migrants) were required a mutual cooperation (symbiotic mutualism). The na-

Table 4. The number of colonization migrants in Gedong Tataan (1905-1917)

Date		Number (person)	increase* (person)	new** (person)
First trial	1905	155		
Second trial	1905	555	577	--
March	1905	3132	2941	--
31 December	1911	6073	2142	--
31 December	1912	6215	486	--
31 December	1913	6701	486	317
31 December	1914	6930	229	249
31 December	1915	7327	419	397
31 December	1916	7677	350	107
31 December	1917	7883	211	170

*) The data were the population growth of migrants born and newly arrived in Gedong Tataan.

***) Until December 1912, the data of new migrants were not available, and started from December 1913, this number could be seen.

Source: the numbers in this table were gathered from Schalkwijk, 1918: 420-421; Swaal: 1936; Darsiti Soeratman, 1973: 162-163; Kolonisatie Bulletin, 1937: 4; and *Besluit Pemerintah*, 7 March 1906, no. 5.

tives still required the presence of the migrants because they were considered as people who were skilled and hard workers to assist planting their rice fields or moors. On the other hand, the migrants were still required additional living costs, especially for whom did not want to work their fields (rice fields or moors) because the government only provided raw lands. The migrant group tended to prefer to become hired workers for the natives, such as hoeing rice fields, pounding rice, and picking pepper (Schaalwijk, *op. cit.*).

The Infrastructure and Barriers of Colonization in Gedong Tataan

Supporting the implementation of the agricultural colonization trial in Gedong Tataan, the physical facilities had been provided. The first one was the housing. The migrants had been provided long houses (*los*) on their arrival by the colonial government. One long house was for two or several families before they could build their own house. This condition surprised some migrants because their expectation was to achieve better life in the colonization are. This group generally – which were categorized as lazy people by the colonization program management – returned to their homeland or chose to assist the natives as laborers. Additionally, the houses were located in environmentally unsound places around swamps, especially Karanganyar, Tambahrejo, Purworejo, dan Baledono villages (Fock, 1904: 168-169; *Kolonisatie Bulletin*, 1937).

In the transportation sector, the highway to Tanjung Karang along 25 km had been built. The transportation facility was also available between Teluk Betung and Gedong Tataan. In those routes, trucks were not only used to transport the private plantation crops, but also were used for public transportation. The transportation cost from Gedong Tataan to Tanjung Karang was *f.* 1,-. However, based on Kingston, most migrants did not made use of the transportation facility because their life was still marginal and conservative (Kingston: 1990; Pelzer: 1945; and Benoit, *et al.*: 1989).

In health sector, before 1914, there was only a small primitive hospital to serve the migrants' health, but after that year, the Health Department was established for counselling concerning sanitation and for caring for the sick. By means of this way, it was expected that the high mortality rate in Gedong Tataan could be decreased (Benoit, *ibid.*).

In education sector, several schools had been established, namely Begalen, Gading, Purworejo, Wonodadi, and Tambahrejo. Those schools were under the inspector of Indigenous Education (*Inspecteur van het Inlandsch Onderwijs*) supervision, but this education was directed to result the low-level employees or laborers in the plantations (Zwaal: 1936).

The rural bank was also established, namely *Lampongsche Bank*. This bank was for the migrants. The bank in Gedong Tataan provided credits to the people. However, some people did not make use of it properly, so they were into debts because their money was only used for consumption, not for the agricultural costs (Pelzer, *op. cit.*).

The development of rice fields continued to rise. In 1910, the number of the damp rice fields was 460 bau, the half-damp rice fields 270 bau, moors 235 bau, then in 1916, the damp rice fields became 700 bau, the half-damp 400 bau, and the moors 465 bau, (Schalkwijk, 1916: 422-440). Reported on *Kolonisatie Bulletin* (1937), there were some people who did not make use of the agricultural lands because when handing over, the lands were not as rice fields or moors, but many fallen trees scattered in the fields. The "lazy" migrants worked and did not stand the test, then decided to return to their homeland (*Koloniale Verslag* 1917; and read also *Kolonisatie Bulletin*: 1937, *op. cit.*).

In Gedong Tataan area, conflict between the natives and the migrants occurred. In 1905-1917, the social conflict often occurred in this area. This conflict was triggered by the emergence of jealousy. The natives (the local people) considered the migrants had urged the agricultural lands and felt envious to the success-

ful migrants. However, this conflict was easily reconciled by the local government. As a result of this, the colonial government tried to mitigate this conflict through the improvement of village administration with the clan system developed in Gedong Tataan (Sutardjo: 1967)

Having said that, it could be said that the colonization trial in Gedong Tataan was not successful. This was caused: first, the agricultural fields (rice fields and moores) belonging to the migrants were not prepared to be planted rice or the secondary crops for their livelihood (*Koloniale Bulletin* (1937); secondly, the government was extremely protective and weak in their managerial administration and economy due to the economic crisis, so the costs for the agricultural colonization program started to reduce from time to time. This phenomenon occurred in 1912. The migrants were no longer provided money to purchase the agricultural tools and their necessities before the harvest. However, they were directed to borrow money to the bank in Gedong Tataan with 9% interest per year. Hence, this certainly incriminated the migrants although the loans could be paid in installment for three years (Ginkel: 1917 dan Zwaal: 1936).

CONCLUSION

According to the explanation above, it could be concluded that the colonization policy by the Dutch Colonial government in Gedong Tataan (Lamong) in 1905-1917 was a political product of the Dutch Colonial which had double standards and biased. In one side, the colonial government still wanted to legitimize his sovereignty not only in Java, but also expanded to outside Java – initiated to Lampung, and *batig slot* continued to flow to the Netherlands. On another side, the population of the Dutch East Indies would be conditioned by the Dutch Colonial government as *Inlander*, namely the lowest level of people (powerless) in the Dutch East Indies, so the security and peace conditions (*rust en orde*) in the Dutch East Indies areas were still maintained.

This colonization policy was also focused by the Dutch Colonial government as a pioneer to create labors (coolies) for developing the plantation and mines belonging to the Dutch East Indies government, the Dutch and other foreigners outside Java. Thus, colonization in Gedong Tataan was precisely not an economic development policy for the native population, but it was only an action to transfer poverty from Java to outside Java.

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