

DEFINING ARABISM: THE CONTESTATION OF ARAB IDENTITY IN THE HADRAMI COMMUNITY IN BETAWI

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ABSTRACT

This study of defining Arabism aims to analyze Arab identity in the hadrami community in Betawi. Arab identity in the hadrami community in Betawi could be seen in the use of the marriage title, and their respect for the 'alawiyyin community. The hadrami community in Betawi made religion a distinctive feature of Arab identity, thus causing conflict between the hadrami community in defining Arabism. The problem in this study is events that occurred in the past, thus materials such as archives, books, journals, and newspapers related to the theme were used as sources in this study. The analysis of this study uses the hermeneutic phenomenology method in order to obtain a reconstruction of the history of Arabism that is close to the truth. This study provides the conclusion that identity is a source of conflict, resulting contestation in the hadrami community in Betawi.

Keywords: identity, hadrami, arab and betawi

ABSTRAK

Kajian tentang mendefinisikan arabisme ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis identitas Arab pada komunitas hadrami di Betawi. Identitas Arab pada komunitas hadrami di Betawi dapat dilihat pada pemakaian gelar pernikahan, dan penghormatan mereka terhadap kelompok 'alawiyyin. Komunitas hadrami di Betawi menjadikan agama sebagai bahan dari identitas Arab, sehingga menyebabkan konflik diantara komunitas hadrami untuk mendefinisikan arabisme pada identitas Arab tersebut. Masalah pada penelitian ini adalah segala peristiwa yang telah terjadi di masa lampau, maka bahan-bahan seperti arsip, buku, jurnal, dan surat kabar yang terkait dengan tema digunakan sebagai sumber dalam penelitian ini. Analisis penelitian ini menggunakan metode fenomenologi hermeneutik agar dapat diperoleh rekonstruksi sejarah arabisme yang mendekati dengan kebenaran. Penelitian ini memberikan kesimpulan bahwa identitas adalah sumber konflik sehingga menimbulkan kontestasi pada komunitas hadrami di Betawi.

Kata kunci: identitas, hadrami, arab dan betawi



INTRODUCTION

Watzlawik in his research stated that religion is used as part of an identity (Watzlawik: 2012). This is proven by Meuleman in his research that perseverance in carrying out religious lesson will become an identity inherent in someone (Meuleman: 2011). Likewise, as Kholiq said when constructing the Kalang community identity based on cultural values inherited from their ancestors that ancient Javanese religious values (Kapitayan) become the identity of the Kalang community (Kholiq: 2015).

However, Schiefer in his research refuted the above statement by revealing that identity was always associated with the environment (Schiefer: 2013). This was confirmed by Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor and Maksum Malim in their research that the public had an influence on their identity (Nor: 2015). For this reason, according to Hatina, it was necessary to carry out continuous restorative education for the community, so that they did not lose their identity (Hatina: 2016), as well as to strengthen the identity of the institution (Kim: 2010).

The identity of the hadrami community in Betawi is known as a group of religionists (Alatas, 2002: 39). The government then responds to this, recognizing that they are part of cultural diversity in Betawi. Government recognition is given in the form of providing space for them to socialize, just like what other ethnic groups do. In the socialization, the hadrami community was required to conduct a learning process on the values and views of the community in Betawi (Putra: 2013). This, according to Agustin Rebecca Lakawa and Rita Walaretina, is reflected in the routine activities, programs, and special monthly ceremonies (Lakawa: 2016).

This hadrami community has influenced the religious social values in Betawi, such as the principles of the virtue of the Prophet's descent and the textuality of the conservative prophetic religious traditions (Berg, 1989: 63; Ibrahim, 2001: 5). For this reason, identities formed in Betawi such as norms, systems and behavior

at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century were very identical to the identity of the hadrami community (Nottingham, 1981: 32-45). On this basic principle, many people from the hadrami community strive to maintain their prestige (Aziz, 2002: 39; Alatas, 2010: xxxiv; xxxiv; Berg, 1989: 122-123), so that it looks exclusive (Berg, 1989: 122). By safeguarding these aspects, they have tried to keep their identity as hadrami.

As a result of the social reality, the identity that occurs in Betawi is based on the identity of the hadrami community. This can be seen in the form of respect for them such as calling them *habib*, *sayyid*, *sharif*, and *sidi*; kiss their hands (*taqbil*); and respecting the *kafā'ah* marriage system by the way *sharifah* women are prohibited from marrying *non-habib* men. Likewise, with privileges such as placing a *habib* as a religious leader and welcoming him with a standing attitude if a *habib* is present at a religious meeting (Federspiel, 1996: 84-87).

This study discusses the definition of Arab identity using the hadrami community in the 18th and 19th century Betawi as a case study. This study aims to show the existence of contestation in the hadrami community in Betawi. To facilitate it, the writer presents a description of the social identity of the hadrami community, the identity politics of the hadrami community and the social interactions of the hadrami community as well as the internal and external challenges faced by the hadrami community in defining the Arab identity in Betawi. The study concludes by asserting that genealogy is an important aspect of the hadrami community because it aims to preserve their existence as Arabs.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study uses a historical approach to discuss various events by focusing on elements of place, time, object, background and figures of events (Nata, 2000: 46). Through this historical approach, it can be known the origin of certain thoughts or

opinions and attitudes of a figure, sect or community and the religious stereotype of a group and the attitude of a group to another (Prayogo, 2003: 66). In addition, through this historical approach, it can also be traced to the origin of a situation where an idea emerges from a figure, and it can be seen that an act and thought of a figure is actually forced by the desires and pressures that arise from himself (Prayogo, 2003: 67).

This research uses *hermeneutic phenomenology* method in interpreting and analyzing data (Lubis, 2004: 100-146). This refers to Martin Heidegger's theory which explains that phenomenological descriptions (Fromme, 2011: 263) are interpretations or hermeneutics (Heidegger, 1962: 61-62), hermeneutic phenomenology in this study is used to understand a person's social thinking by giving interpretations of meaning contained in it (Marriam, 2009: 205). Interpretation is conducted to find a new understanding that there is a contestation of Arab identity in the hadrami community in Betawi, as formulated by Gadamer (Lubis, 2004: 130), about existing values, for example, values that underlie one's views about individuals, community, social interaction, social problems and others.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Social Identity of Hadrami Community

Social identity in this section refers to the Ahimsha Putera research who stated that identity is a collection of symbols or signs both materially and behavior that make an individual or group of individuals look different from the others with various scales and forms (Ahimsa, 2013). Even Sinisa Malesevic explains that identity is a basic ingredient that cannot be negotiated by any human, so claiming not to have or do not want an identity can be considered a strange thing (Sinisa, 2008: 13-14).

In the material aspect, the hadrami community in Pekojan built many houses using high and closed fences, this was done to protect hadrami girls from boys who were not *mahram* (Berg, 1989: 72-73;

Amran, 2012: 54). In addition, the hadrami community in Pekojan also established places for praying such as establishing the "Langgar Tinggi Pekojan" which was used by them as a center of praying and their religious social interaction (Berg, 1989: 73; Team, 2006: 41).

As for the behavior aspect, many hadrami people who lived in Pekojan maintain their behavior in accordance with the 'alawiyyin tradition, for example they often held meetings at the home of an 'alawiyyin figure (Badjerei, 1996: 32). Not only meetings, they also did religious activities based on their traditions such as the recitation of *qaṣīdah* in the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, the zapin dance performance and the music of gambus during the wedding. Especially in art events, seniors from 'alawiyyin and also people from religious circles rarely attended the events (Berg, 1989: 124-125; Abu Bakar bin 'Ali: 25-26,57). The behavior of those who maintained the 'alawiyyin tradition was expressed by various things such as avoiding gambling, smoking drugs, buying and drinking wine, eating pork, living a luxurious life and also taking care of their daughters from prostitution and marrying their daughters to 'alawiyyin only (Nottigham, 1985).

The identity of the Arabs as the context of the "Arab nation" has a special virtue, namely in terms of *nasab*. The *nasab* of the Arabs is more noble than the others because the Arabs are the chosen ones from Prophethood and their devotion. Because of this basis, the giving of the title *habib* as an identity has occurred since the days of the previous *salaf* when the prophet companions also received the title *raḍīya allāhu 'anhu* (Bin Yaḥyā, n.d.: 27).

The virtues of the *nasab* of "ahlul bait" as well as hadrami as a descendant of the prophet have been recognized and agreed upon for centuries (Bin Yaḥyā, n.d.: 27; Bin Yaḥyā, 1317/1900: 5-7; Bin Yaḥyā, 1323/1905: 5; Bin Yaḥyā, 1329/1911: 14-16). The virtues of the hadrami are; first, the hadrami community is the successor of the struggle of the prophets. Second, the hadrami community is a

sunni group (ahl al-sunnah wa al-jam'ah) who survived. Third, the leading group in following the prophet, and the fourth, the group that is obliged to be respected and loved (Bin Yahyā, 1329/1911: 56). In terms of the level (*maqām*) of religious glory, they are the rulers of three *maqām* (levels) of religious knowledge, namely knowledge that is both physical and spiritual, *shari'a* and nature (Bin Yahyā, t.th: 3).

With the various virtues mentioned above, the *habib* and *sharīfah* in the hadrami community are proud of their socio-religious identity. For that pride, the hadrami always safeguard these various glories while remaining consistent in upholding the lessons of the previous *salaf* from the ancestors of the Banī 'Alawī (Bin Yahyā, t.th: 26).

'Alawiyyin wear the title *habib* in front of their names. Thus, the 'alawiyyin community will always maintain their honor and avoid humiliation (Bin Yahyā, 1317/1900: 5-7). Ahmad Soorkatti strongly opposed the word *habib* used as a title. The original meaning of the word *habib* is the same as *mijnheer* in Dutch or *monsieur* in French (De Jonge, 2000: 161-162). He stated that Islam championed the equality of fellow Muslims and did not recognize the position that discriminated against various groups, caused by hereditary blood, wealth or rank (Noer, 1973: 72). Thus, that the origin of a person is not important except his or her intellectuality (Morin, 2005: 53), and also kindness is very important (Hadiwardoyo, 1994: 14). Because the strong brain and heart move a person to speak and act (Soeratman, 1989: 33).

Ahmad Soorkatti stated that no one has the right to get a special position (Affandi, 1976: 56; De Jonge, 2000: 161). Because humans (material) can experience a process to progressively in a better direction (Langgulung, 2003: 290). Humans have certain traits that are naturally different from animals. They have the potential (inner potential) that can be developed through life experience or through formal education such as schools and other edu-

cational institutions (Khasinah, 2013). Because education is not only to gain intellectual knowledge, but also to the formation of individual characters, so that humans can behave as *khalīfah fi al-ard* (Allah's caliph on earth) (Jani, 2010). Additionally, this is also as an effort to build human *adab* (Umar, 2013), and the view at the human reality (Sanusy, 2013).

Even 'Uthmān bin Yahyā also stated that the honor of the Arabs, especially the 'Alawiyyin community, was determined by their behavior in daily life by not deceiving in trade activities that would make their honor descend (Bin Yahyā, 1311/1894: 2).

At that time many Arabs committed fraud on the basis of their status, because; *first*, if they were 'alawiyyin then the purpose of committing fraud was to seek personal gain for themselves by claiming to be guardians or saints (Bin Yahyā, 1297/1880: 39). The fraud was carried out by claiming that they had a sacred duty as a guardian (*wilayah*), becoming a leader or elder (*mashāyikh*), reaching the highest level in worship (*wuṣūl*), gaining reliable knowledge (*sanad*) and making friends and meeting the Prophet Khidir (Bin Yahyā, 1297/1880: 39-40). They tried to make the fraud by adding religious texts about the sacred meanings obtained by the saints and guardians, which in the end they made amulets to sell to their followers. The case of Arabs who committed fraud was mentioned in the government archive report about an Arab named Kasyiem bin Ismail Mansoek who copied and sent the "Prophet's will" into Indonesia to his brother (an Arab too) named Hasan Soerati who worked as a local trader and distributed the letter to all corners of the country through a native named Haji Rais (Bin Yahyā, 1309/1891: 8, 16; Bin Yahyā, 1297/1880: 50; *Besluit Gouverneur Generaal* (BT), August, 30 1894, No. 294; *Missive Gouvernements Secretaris* (MGS), February 21, 1892, No. 1534; *Missive Gouvernements Secretaris* (MGS), December 12, 1891, No. 292; *Missive Gouvernements Secretaris* (MGS), February 19, 1892, No. 51).

Second, people who were not from the 'alawiyyin community that claimed to be an 'alawiyyin. For example, there was an Arab named Abu Bakar bin Sungkar who claimed to be a "habib" named Abd. al-Mu'in. The fake habib just returned from Mecca and visited Aji's house in Betawi. Abd. al-Mu'in asked Aji to respect him (Bin Yaḥyā, 1297/1880: 48-50).

From the basic principle of "Habib", many Arabs from the 'alawiyyin community strived to maintain their prestige. It was shown when they refused to do manual labor as slaves or laborers. Therefore, many of the 'alawiyyin individuals remained in their profession as traders, shipping entrepreneurs and other types of businesses in the late 18th and early 19th century in Betawi (Alatas, 2010: xxxiv; Berg, 1989: 122-123). As in Betawi, the habib became important religious symbols that cause them to unite to maintain their social identity.

The basic principle formed from the above elements succeeded in making the social identity of the 'alawiyyin community the highest and exclusive in religion (al-Gadri, 1984: 53). Because of the dominance of the religious identity of the 'alawiyyin community, the conservative and exclusive social religious values were then integrated with the order and system of society in Betawi. Hence, that the diverse socio-religious identity of the Betawi community from various communities and groups in general became lost because it merged into the religious identity of the 'alawiyyin community.

Political Identity of the Hadrami Community

Identity politics in this section refers to Dana D. Nelson's research which states that identity politics is an act of someone or a community to prioritize the interests of their members on the basis of similarity of identity or characteristics, based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion to obtain justice, equality, recognition with the aim of maintaining their cultural existence (Nelson, 2002). This is reinforced by Bary Berstein's research, that identity politics is

related to cultural identity as an expression of belief (Berstein, 2005).

This identity politics carries an identity fanaticism where identity politics comes from the ideological belief that I or we understand better, are more correct, know better what God means (Faiz, 2005: xix). Thus, they were consciously driven to direct other people and communities to follow their beliefs. The problem according to Musdah Mulia was the tendency to establish their identity by denying others. One community was seeded, relied upon, while the other communities were humbled, marginalized and dispensed (Mulia, 2010: 48), so the marriage between a *sharīfah* and a non-*habib* man was not legal (*fasakh*) and the two brides who were bound by marriage must be separated if necessary by means of violence (Azra, 1995).

'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā stated that marriage between *sharīfah* and non-*habib* was immoral act and despised their existence. He quoted what was described in *Bughyah al-Mustarshidīn*, what he meant was that there had been a marriage in Mecca between *sharīfah* and non-*habib*. Where at once the habib and ulama in Mecca canceled the marriage, because the habib group was of noble descent and should not be humiliated by non-habib groups who did not have blood related to the Prophet Muhammad (Bin Yaḥyā, 1312/1894: 97-98). According to him, this kind of marriage would make the Prophet Muhammad angry and Allah would curse them. Therefore, 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā made the rule that marriage between *sharīfah* and non-*habib* was *haram* (forbidden) (Bin Yaḥyā, 1312/1894: 97-101; Azra, 2002: 145).

According to 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā, the marriage between *sharīfah* and non-*habib* would greatly hurt the *habibs*, and humiliated their sacred descendants. Even though *sharīfah* and his guardian wanted the marriage, the *habibs* had the right to prevent it, on the grounds that they were both from noble descendants. Although according to "fuqahā" (religious jurist), the

marriage between *sharīfah* and non-*habib* is legitimate, but according to ‘Uthmān bin Yaḥyā, the ‘Ulama of *ahl al-bait* have *ijtihād* and *ikhtiyār* in *shar’i* cases (Bin Yaḥyā, 1312/1894 : 97-98). However, ‘Uthmān bin Yaḥyā also did not reject the exception of this problem that if it was not carried out the marriage would cause damage, then it would be permissible for emergency reasons (Bin Yaḥyā, 1331/1913: 2).

The fatwa of ‘Uthmān bin Yaḥyā caused debate among Muslims. Even the reforming ulama like Rashīd Riḍā also argued in this matter. As the fatwa issued by Rashīd Riḍā stated that marriage between Muslim non-*habib* and *sharīfah* was *jāiz* (permissible). This issue was based on marriage between a Muslim from India and *sharīfah* in Singapore. The fatwa of Rashīd Riḍā was rejected by ‘Umar bin Sālim al-Attas from Padang, who said that all Muslims were from servants and descendants of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib (Noer, 1973: 71-72). Therefore, it was clear that the descendants of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib were more noble and higher than those who did not have the blood of the descendants of ‘Alī ibn Abī Tālib, the fourth caliph.

The members of the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, especially his descendants, considered themselves to be religious nobles. Marriage between an Arab woman who had "blue blood" and a lay man was considered despicable. In this case, Ahmad Soorkatti who became a follower of Rashīd Riḍā (Egyptian modernist figures) who taught the equality of all Muslims and who carried progressive ideas about observing Islam according to general demands, stated that marriage between *sharīfah* and non-*habib* was permissible (Jonge, 2000: 161), so the fatwa from Rashīd Riḍā relating to the *kafā'ah* was supported by Ahmad Soorkatti's fatwa (Jonge, 2000: 160).

The problem about *kafā'ah* began when Ahmad Soorkatti in Solo in 1912 (Badjerei, 1996: 28-31). He stated that Islam championed the equality of fellow Muslims and did not recognize a position that discriminated against various groups,

caused by hereditary blood, wealth or levels. This fatwa related to the fate of *sharīfah* who lived with a Chinese in Solo. In a meeting attended by many Arabs, Ahmad Soorkatti advised those present to collect money, so that the *sharīfah* could leave the Chinese, but because no one gave the money for their benefit, Ahmad Soorkatti suggested again to find a Muslim who was willing to marry the *sharīfah*. All *habibs* objected to this for reasons of *kafā'ah*, a *sharīfah* could only marry *sharīf*. That same night the *habib* group in Solo reported to the *habib* in Betawi about Ahmad Soorkatti's fatwa, which resulted in the people giving Ahmad Soorkatti's job. When Ahmad Soorkatti returned to Betawi, they welcomed him coldly (Noer, 1973: 72).

Ahmad Soorkatti's fatwa about *kafā'ah* delivered in Solo then spread to Betawi and caused him to leave Jamiet Kheir in 1914 (Bruinessen, 2011: 9). He stated that he did not agree if the religious culture of the Arab community, such as the implementation of the *kafā'ah* law in marriage, was used in the midst of diverse communities in Betawi (Snouck Hurgronje Letter to E. Gobece, July 5, 1931; Bin Yaḥyā, 1330/1912: 2, 11, 13). The reason for the resignation of Ahmad Soorkatti was caused by his fatwa which allowed a *sharīfah* for *kafā'ah* in Solo in 1912. The news then spread to the ‘alawiyyin in Betawi (Badjerei, 1996: 28-31).

It could be estimated that inter-community marriages were most prevalent among indigenous people. Inter-community marriage was not recommended by the colonial government, but it was also not prohibited. Thus, the community living in Betawi had the freedom to choose their own spouse. For example, according to the document *College van Heemraden* Lieutenant Tsitra married a Makassar woman named Simba (*Resoluti College van Heemraden* (RCH), September 1, 1703, No. 8). Another Makassar woman married Captain Buton Abdul Jalaly (*Resoluti College van Heemraden* (RCH), July 9, 1706, No. 9). Lieutenant Buton

Mohammad Sakkie had a wife of a Javanese named Alima (Raben, 1996: 99). Whereas Intje Cadier a Javanese woman married Norsay ban Batavia (*Minut Akten van Transport Notary Carel Schoute*, April 6, 1728, No. 3950).

Based on the identity politics of the hadrami community, it does not just stop at the aspect ratio (intellectual) but also other aspects to see human potential as a whole, namely personality, moral, and spiritual (Susari, 2012: 23-27). This confirms that the system must reflect human perfection (Husen, 2009: 43-46), which aims to maintain the physical and mental development of humans (Badhshah, 2011), and also to maintain and to develop human nature (Kurniawan, 2016).

Political identity is an important part of the hadrami community. *Kafā'ah* is a legitimacy for some of the hadrami community to express themselves between one community and another community. Even if this happens to followers of religion, then it can also happen to other communities (Vaezi, 2004: 183).

This identity politics is used as a "black campaign" tool which is one strategy in defeating other communities. This is dangerous for the continuity of religion itself, especially Islam (Syarif, 2017). Markus V. Höhne said that when conflict in a community increases at a certain level of violence, political identity exacerbates it on a larger scale and becomes a real threat (Höhne, 2006). How can religion seem to be the cause of discordance, even though the Qur'an highlights diversity as a *sunnatullah* (QS. al-Māidah [5]: 48; QS. Hūd [11]: 118; QS. al-Nahl [16]: 93; QS. al-Shūrā [42]: 8).

Social Interaction of the Hadrami Community

While Social Interaction refers to the research of Yaghoob Foroutan which stated that social interactions in society are not out of control from the noble values of religious lessons, thus the role of religion in responding to and facing social change in society is very important (Foroutan, 2014). This is because social interaction

aims to create an orderly, harmonious and united life (al-Aqqād, 1947: 79-80). Keddie Nehli stated that to create social stability, the relationship (interaction) of humans must be placed within the framework of religion (Nehli, 1983: 153).

Social interaction is a dynamic relationship between people, groups, or between people and groups. The absolute requirement for social interaction is the existence of contact and communication between humans that result social networks (Yusuf, 2016). Social interaction is a relationship between two or more humans, where in these behaviors influence each other, change the behavior of other individuals or vice versa (Purwanti, 2012). The hadrami community questioned the kiss of the hand (taqbīl) when there was a social interaction between them and even remained a problem which was always a discussion in the government especially in the parliament until the 1930s (Bin Yaḥyā, 1330/1912: 2, 11, 13).

The problem about kissing hands (taqbīl) is opposed by Ahmad Soorkatti (Jonge, 2000: 160). His fatwa caused him to leave Jamiet Kheir in 1914 (Bruinessen, 2011: 9). He expressed his attitude that disagreed if the religious culture of Arab society such as kissing hands (taqbīl) was used in the midst of the Betawi community (Snouck Hurgronje to E. Gobe, July 5, 1931; Bin Yaḥyā, 1330/1912: 2, 11, 13). 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā has highlighted this since 1906. The efforts of this opposition could be seen in the leaflets containing hadith which question the accuracy of the habib's nasab which were attached to the walls of mosques in Betawi (Bin Yaḥyā, 1324/1906: 23, 34). In his opinion, 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā said that their goal was to demean and to eliminate the culture of Arab society in Betawi (Bin Yaḥyā, 1331/1913: 6, 9). Ahmad Soorkatti urged to leave the habit of kissing the hands of the habibs. One of the first to follow his advice was 'Umar Mangusy (Affandi, 1976: 56; Jonge, 2000: 161).

'Umar Mangusy was not from the habib group who was appointed by the Dutch Government to be an Arab captain

in Betawi. Even though 'Umar Mangusy was not a habib, but the non-habib group was aware of their position and power. Similar to Ahmad Soorkatti who was also not a habib, but he was respected by Arabs and non-Arabs, and was considered a person who had a lot of knowledge. Thus, when there was a tension between the habib and the non-habib, 'Umar Mangusy did not kiss the hand of a habib named 'Umar bin Sālim al-Attas, when they met on one occasion. Kissing hand (taqbīl) was something that must be done when a non-habib meets a habib, but 'Umar Mangusy did not do that, as the advice delivered by Ahmad Soorkatti (Noer, 1973: 72-73).

Because of the differences of religious opinion between 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā and Ahmad Soorkatti, Ahmad Soorkatti resigned from Jamiat Kheir. The news then spread to the 'alawiyyin community in Betawi (Badjerei, 1996: 28-31). Ahmad Soorkatti's ideas raised the debate in the Hadrami community and resulted powerful opinions. Ahmad Soorkatti's ideas which made the habib angry were not ideas that dealt with pure religious issues such as the rejection of mysticism and *bid'ah*, but the ideas related to social issues. The controversial ideas were related to the noble position that Bā'alwī claimed as their right. The most important issues were the habit of kissing hands (taqbīl), equality of position between married couples (kafā'ah), and the use of habib titles (Badjerei, 1996: 28-31).

Thus, Ahmad Soorkatti became the main character who seemed to oppose the dominant role of 'alawiyyin. His departure from Jamiat Kheir then invited sympathy from the non-'alawiyyin group, especially Yūsuf bin 'Umar Mangusy who held back Ahmad Soorkatti's return after he left Jamiat Kheir and gave a house on Jalan Jatibaru no. 12 Jakarta, besides that, financial support was also given to Ahmad Soorkatti by Abdullah bin 'Alwi Alatas in the amount of f 60,000. This group that supported Ahmad Soorkatti from the non-'alawiyyin was finally referred to as "The Shaikh or Non-Habib

group". The Shaikh group under the leadership of Ahmad Soorkatti later established an educational institution called *Madrasah al-Irsyad al-Islamiyyah* in September 1914. The *madrasa* then became an official organization of the non-'alawiyyin hadrami community named *Jam'iyyah al-Ishlah wa al-Irsyad al-' Arabiyyah*. The al-Irsyad association was inaugurated on 11 August 1915 where the chair was Sālim bin Awad Balweel, a former deputy chairman of Jamiat Kheir, then Saleh bin 'Ubaid bin Abdat (deputy chairman), Muhammad Ubaid bin Abud (secretary), Said bin Salim Masy'abi (treasurer) and 19 commissioners, all of them from non-habib groups. After the madrasa was established, Ahmad Soorkatti continued to try to ask the government to help his efforts in making a new scheme about religion by promising not to cause riots. (Badjerei, 1996: 32, 74, 76; Letter of 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā, June 11, 1931; Letter of Ahmad Soorkatti to Dr. Rinkes, February 22, 1918).

With the emergence of the shaikh group, the hadrami community was divided into two groups, namely the 'alawiyyin habib group and the non-'Alawiyyin shaikh group. The shaikh group wanted the hadrami culture not to be used again. From the problems mentioned above, the position of 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā occupied the main part that "held" hadrami culture (Letter of 'Uthmān bin Yaḥyā to Snouck Hurgronje, March 22, 1901).

Based on this, the social interaction in society is inseparable from the noble values of religious lessons, so the role of religion in responding to and facing social reality in society is very important (Foroutan, 2014). Social interactions are formed genetically and geographically so that there is a shared awareness of the importance of a social relationship to regulate various problems that arise in the midst of such interactions. Thus, the meanings of community, organizational system, civilization and social interaction in sociology are the core of a community (Safe'i, 2001: 5). All forms of human interaction aim to create a tidy, harmonious

and united life. This is contained in QS. al-Hujurât [49]:13 which is aimed at all humanity, not only to the Muslims. Therefore, there is no reason to obstruct international unity for believers who believe in the truth of all the Prophets and who view all humans can be united as one (al-Aqqād, 1947: 79-80). Keddie Nehli said that to create social stability, the relationship (interaction) of humans must be placed within the framework of religion (Nehli, 1983: 153).

The hadrami community makes religion a part of the hadrami identity to strengthen the pre-existing identity. The meeting of various cultures produces a model of adaptation that is different or even completely new to that which already exists. In the early stages it will certainly cause conflict as mentioned earlier, but in the process that occurs next is restructuring (Watzlawik, 2012). This is reinforced by Nicola in his research that the differences in perspectives in religion often become the root of conflict (Colbran, 2010). In the context of the hadrami community case, the involvement of religious factors in a series of conflicts not only increases conflict escalation but also causes conflicts that are not easy to solve (Grim, 2012), and will also increase the understanding of conflict relief solutions (Chuang, 2017).

Arab identity in the Betawi Community

Schiefer in his study said that immigrants cause problems of inequality and conflict over identity (Schiefer, 2013). This opinion is supported by Kholiq in his research that there are consequences of the encounter of different identity, first; previous identity wins; second, the new identity wins; third, there is a compromise (Kholiq, 2015). In the initial stage according to Meike, of course it will cause conflict, but in the process there is a restructuring process (Watzlawik, 2012).

Nicola in his research explained that the differences in perspectives in religion are often the root of conflict (Colbran, 2010). This is reinforced by Brian in his research that the involvement of religious

elements in a series of conflicts not only increases the escalation of conflict but also causes conflicts that are not easy to solve (Brian, 2012).

Jean Gelman Taylor explained that the people in Betawi during the colonial period consisted of various groups, one of which was European society. However, in this society the wives of Asia and Mestizo were a majority partner for men and they gave a great influence to the elite in terms of habits and lifestyles (Taylor, 1983: 61). It was only at the beginning of the 18th century that Europeans occupying the highest positions in colonial society began to live permanently in Betawi. So at that time, the government determined the types of clothing based on their respective identities. Clothes with suits, hats, caps and clothes belonging to Europeans; robes were owned by Arabs; kebaya and stagen were clothes of the Betawi people (Bin Yahyā, 1316/1904: 5-7) although there were Betawi people who dressed in robes or turban after returning from the pilgrimage (Noupal, 2008: 201).

However, it turned out that there were many hadrami communities who changed their clothes with European identity clothing. Their aim to use European clothing was to make them more free and not ashamed of their social interactions. It was rare for Arabs in Betawi in the early 20th century to wear skullcaps, robes, turban and replaced them with Turkish or European clothes. With their new clothes, they could be free when walking in various places such as public roads and alleys of towns and villages in Betawi. In addition, with their new clothes, they were no longer ashamed and more flexible in interacting socially because their Arabic characteristics were gone. Thus, they could do things that were initially considered taboo if done by Arabs in Betawi, for example singing, playing tanji and gambus, hanging out (tongkrong) on the roadside with chess, playing *top*, drinking wine, sitting on the sidewalk streets and bridges, urinating on street corners and sheltering on crowded streets where people pass by and eat at markets or roadside stalls (Bin

Yaḥyā, Plano 53, F1. No. 31). Changes in Arabian clothing which were replaced with European and Turkish clothing began in 1901, so they would be quickly favored by the dignitaries and get honor (Bin Yaḥyā, 1316/1904: 4; Kaoem Moeda, 20 January 1914).

The use of European and Turkish clothes by the hadrami community has also made various conflicts and social problems in Betawi such as debate, slander and crime, although many have been overcome. Such an example happened in 1904, where a young Arab who was a graduate of a Turkish school wearing his Turkish outfit pretended to be a new master (*bey*) and beat a landlord in Menteng. For this act, he and his father were put in prison for half a month ('Uthmān bin Yaḥyā's letter to Snouck Hurgronje, 22 March 1901).

Snouck Hurgronje also reported the incident in a letter sent to the governor on June 12, 1905. According to Snouck Hurgronje, the young man was named Ahmad Ba Junaid and Said Ba Junaid and also the son of Bin Sunkar who had just returned from Constantinople (Istanbul). The three of them then showed off their Turkish clothes to the people in Betawi and behaved disrespectfully to the rebuke of the assistant resident of the Betawi police. The assistant was named J. Eithoven who rebuked the three of them with a government circular letter dated June 2, 1903 no. 1844 about not getting clothes that did not fit their identity. Finally, the three Arab youths and their parents were sentenced to fines by the police due to their actions. In another case, Snouck Hurgronje also reported the incident that happened to a young 'alawiyyin named Abd. al-Raḥmān bin Abd. al-Qādir Alaidrus who also wore Turkish clothes. Abd. al-Qādir Alaidrus faced his son's behavior trying not to force his son to take off his clothes. Therefore, he would ask the assistance of the Turkish consul general if there were problems regarding the clothes worn by his son (Andrianse, 1994: 1706).

Hadrami people who constantly

exchanged their clothing identities would never even attain a commendable moral (Bin Yaḥyā, 1329/1911: 11-12). At that time, the 'alawiyyin community should have continued to obey the rules made by the government instead of participating in changing the clothes of Arab identity with others (Bin Yaḥyā, 1327/1909: 10). According to him, the hadrami community who exchanged their clothes would only cause shame and expel them from the lucky and safe groups of people (Bin Yaḥyā, 1316/1904: 2-4).

Hadrami people who did not have commendable morals and special skills or intelligence, there was no way they would get a place in the eyes of Europeans. Even though the Arabs were already wearing European clothes, if they did not have the intelligence and expertise, it would only make them pay cheap *sado*, tram and train costs and be respected by coolies and laborers. They should not have needed to change their Arab clothes, unless they wanted to be more free and not ashamed to go to places of immorality such as gambling, wine shops and prostitution because they no longer wore robes and turban (Bin Yaḥyā, 1316/1904: 5 -7). This was reinforced by Deliar Noer that people who wore European-style clothing were considered to imitate Europeans, namely Christians and were sometimes considered to have been infidels. Even people who tried to wear European ties, trousers and hats, are more despised by the people who give illegitimate laws in the use of ties, panties and caps (Noer, 1973: 9).

In the 19th century, hadrami men still retained their original culture by never using headbands as a substitute for turban. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in its development many distinguished Arabs often wore pantalons with shoes and socks like Europeans rather than wearing *futah*. National clothing was rarely used by the hadrami community because it was often a mockery of children. Habib clothing and middle class also experienced adjustments at the end of the 19th century, such as the replacement of robes with long white (*qamis*) shirts to ankles.

Under their robes, they wear *sirwal* instead of *futah*, but the use of vests was still commonly worn. The robe and *sudairiah* were only worn among the elderly, *radi* was rarely used and switches to the handkerchief (rumal) worn on the shoulder to tie the key. Serban was used in the context of official events while skullcap was used when in a relaxed condition with hair that was always shaved short (Berg, 1989: 122-124).

Based on these data it can be said that Arab identity with 'alawiyyin culture makes Arabs look exclusive because they try to maintain material aspects such as clothing (Berg, 1989: 121). In matters of clothing, they must wear robes and turban for men, while Arab women must continue to wear a veil (Berg, 1989: 122-124), even though they have also worn kebaya like a Betawi woman. By safeguarding this aspect, they have tried to maintain their identity as individuals and communities who always uphold the culture of the hadrami community based on the values of the 'alawiyyin lessons.

Thus, combining two different things will lead to conflict or can also increase the understanding of solutions to eliminate conflict (Sarah Rasmi et al., 2017). Thus, social skills are needed, namely oral and written skills. Besides that, also skills in working with others, willing to correct mistakes, skill at lobbying others to solve problems. This includes being skilled in managing conflicts, disagreements, discussions, etc., and also skilled in influencing others to be able to support their ideas (Howard, 2015).

CONCLUSION

This research confirms that identity is a source of conflict, causing contestation in the hadrami community. This can be seen in the social identity of the hadrami community, the identity politics of the hadrami community and the social interaction of the hadrami community. The identity of the hadrami community aims to maintain and to preserve their cultural existence as Arabs.

The differences in views in the so-

cial identity, identity politics and social interaction of the hadrami community have always been the root of the conflict. Even the involvement of religious elements in a series of conflicts not only increases the escalation of conflict but also causes conflicts that are not easy to solve. Then combining two different cultures will lead to conflict but can also increase understanding in the search for solutions to eliminate conflict.

For the hadrami community, Islam is a part of an Arab identity to strengthen a pre-existing identity. The meeting of various cultures results a model of adaptation that can be different, or even completely new to that which already existed. In the early stages, this cause conflict, but in the process, there is a restructuring process. Therefore, social skills are needed, namely oral and written skills. Communication that can be understood by various kinds of communities from the lower, middle and upper strata. Besides that, they are also skilled at working with other people, and are willing to correct mistakes, as well as skilled in lobbying others to resolve conflicts.

The process of defining Arab identity in Betawi led to a contestation in the hadrami community, namely the habib 'alawiyyin group and the Shaikh non-'alawiyyin group. The Shaikh group wanted the Arab identity of the hadrami community to be discontinued while the habib 'alawiyyin group wanted to hold back and preserve the Arab identity of the hadrami community as it was at their origin, Hadramaut.

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