

The 1629 Acehnese Invasion of Malacca: A Eurasian Perspective

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Abstract: The rising tension in the Straits of Malacca in the first half of the 17th century forced the political entities to make an ally on one side and invade other states on the other side. Acehnese Sultanate succeeded in capturing all Malay states, except for Malacca. The desire to control the straits forced them to make an assault. Interestingly, the 1629 Acehnese siege of Malacca was perceived differently. The Acehnese chronicles seem to be quiet except for the Bustan Al-Salatin. However, the European sources are proud to explain the Portuguese victory over the greatest fleet in Asia. The available Eurasian sources should be exploited to cross-check the historical data and narrate more accurately. The siege started when the Acehnese were anchored and fortified. However, they succeeded in surrounding the fortress for a month, but the Luso-Malay joint forces could counter-attack and drive them out from Malacca. The Portuguese relief forces continued to patrol the straits after the Acehnese failure. Unfortunately, the death of Nuno Alvares Botelho in the tragedy of the Dutch ship's explosion forced the Portuguese to bury their dream of securing the mercantile route of India and China from the Dutch threat.

Abstrak: Meningkatnya tensi di Selat Melaka di pertengahan paruh pertama abad 17 telah mendorong entitas politik untuk membuat sekutu dalam satu sisi dan melakukan invasi pada negara lain pada sisi yang lain. Kesultanan Aceh berhasil mencaplok semua negara Melayu kecuali Melaka. Keinginan kuat untuk mengontrol selat memaksa mereka untuk melakukan serangan. Menariknya, penyerbuan Aceh di Melaka tahun 1629 dilihat secara berbeda. Hikayat-hikayat Aceh terlihat diam kecuali the Bustan Al-Salatin, tetapi sumber Eropa dengan bangga menjelaskan kemenangan Portugis atas armada terbesar yang pernah ada di Asia. Ketersediaan sumber-sumber Eropa dan Asia seharusnya dieksploitasi bukan hanya untuk proses verifikasi sumber data tetapi juga untuk menarasikan lebih akurat. Penyerbuan dimulai ketika Aceh mendarat dan membuat benteng. Walaupun mereka, berhasil mengepung benteng Melaka selama sebulan tetapi pasukan gabungan Luso-Melayu dapat memukul balik and menendang mereka keluar. Pasukan penyelamat Portugis terus melanjutkan tugasnya untuk melakukan patroli di selat setelah kegagalan Aceh. Sayangnya, kematian Nuno Alvares Botelho dalam tragedi meletusnya kapal Belanda memaksa orang-orang Portugis mengubur impiannya untuk mengamankan jalur perdagangan India dan China dari ancaman Belanda.

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INTRODUCTION

This paper attempted to narrate the most extensive Acehnese invasion of Malacca in 1629. During the 16th-17th Centuries, Portuguese-Malacca and Aceh competed to dominate the geopolitics of the Straits of Malacca. Passing through the straits could shorten the maritime route and decrease the risks of shipwreck and piracy at sea. Ships from the Indian Ocean or the China Sea could also transit in Malacca to buy all Indonesian products. They did not need to sail to the islands of the producers. Malacca was a central market for all Indonesian and Southeast Asian merchants to export commodities. The strategic position of Malacca was a subject to be contested.



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During the 15th century, the Malacca Sultanate succeeded in defending its town from some Siamese invasions. The sultanate established the Malay alliance to counterattack the Siamese. However, the exclusive policy issued by the late sultan forced the sultanate to its decrease. As a cosmopolitan port city, Malacca should accommodate transnational and trans-cultural inhabitants. The sultan should be aware of Malacca's plural society. Chinese and Indian merchants were disappointed concerning the exclusivism in Malacca. When Albuquerque and his armada came and invaded Malacca, they played as the go-between agents. On one side, they served the sultanate, but on the other, they also informed the Portuguese all about Malacca in detail.

After the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, the Portuguese struggled to defend Malacca. In the Straits of Malacca, the Portuguese considered the aggressive Acehnese their most dangerous enemy. Aceh Sultanate overgrew after welcoming the Muslim merchant refugees from Malacca. The local chief embraced Islam and took the title of Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (1515-1530). Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah had a different policy toward the Portuguese. If Pidie and Pasai preferred to ally with the Portuguese, Aceh did not follow the Portuguese monopoly. When the Portuguese vessels accidentally anchored at Aceh in 1519, the sultan instructed them to attack them. The Acehnese brutality forced the Portuguese Captain in Malacca, Jorge de Brito, to invade Aceh in 1521. The Acehnese troops could defeat the Portuguese and murder Jorge de Brito (Iskandar, 1966, p.31; Hadi, 2006, pp.78-9; Said, 1981, p.149). Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah also dominated the northern coast of Sumatra after capturing the pivotal ports of Daya in 1520, Pidie in 1524, Pasai in 1524, dan Aru in 1524 (Barros, 1563, VIII, fl.309; Iskandar, 1966, p.31).

The Acehnese dreamed of inserting Malacca as their last piece into the puzzle to control the Straits of Malacca. During the 16th and 17th centuries, Aceh tried to expel the Portuguese from Malacca in 1537, 1539, 1547, 1568, 1573, 1575, 1615, and 1629. The latter invasion was the biggest invasion conducted by the Acehnese. It left European and Asian records for us to be reconstructed. Concerning its source availability, the Eurasian perspective can be used to reconstruct the 1629 Acehnese invasion. Unfortunately, previous historical studies merely refer to some of the Eurasian sources. Hussein Djajadiningrat (1983) describes the Acehnese invasion based on Acehnese and Dutch Sources. While Yahaya Abu Bakar (1988) & Denys Lombard (1991) exploit the Eurasian sources, they fail to

mention Manuel Vieira's *Vitorias do Governador da India* (1633). On the other hand, English historians William Marsden (1784), Frederick Danvers (2003), Richard Winstedt (1935), and Charles Boxer (1985) use European sources but do not consult the local ones. For instance, *Hikajat Aceh, Hikajat Malem Dagang, Hikajat Sultan Aceh Marhoem, and Bustan Al-Salatin*. This study attempts to re-compose the 1629 siege based on all available sources. Using European and Asian sources could help historians narrate the historical event comprehensively.

METHOD

All major sources on the 1629 Acehnese invasion of Malacca are available in online and offline libraries. Those sources are scattered, ranging from Lisbon (*Biblioteca Nacional Portuguesa*), Porto (*Biblioteca de Faculdade de Letras, Universidade do Porto*), Leiden (*De Universitaire Bibliotheken Leiden*), London (Royal Asiatic Society Library) and Depok (*Perpustakaan Universitas Indonesia*). Suppose historical sources could be defined as human representations and reflexes of a past reality. Depending on the variety of the sources, the images of the past to be rebuilt will differ. Therefore, I tend to describe the past based on its traces and have to question the Eurasian sources, as I exploited them, with adequate methodology. To the purpose of answering my research questions: (1) what were the causes of the 1629 Acehnese siege?; (2) how did the Acehnese employ their strategies to besiege Malacca?; and (3) how did the Portuguese counterattack and destroy the Acehnese? I selected some sources according to the following criteria of (1) chronological and contextual sources during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636); (2) multi-perspective sources; and (3) representativity and significance of the sources.

Using the Malay, Portuguese, Dutch, and English sources, I collected a data grid by identifying the date, homeports, transit ports, arrival destinations, fortifications, siege penetrations, wars, and capitulations. Thus, I systematized all my sources according to the data source typology, for instance, chronicles and deeds. To penetrate the meaning of a document, reconsidering the author's intention is not enough. It should also look at the outer form of the author's design in producing it. Nurrudin Arraniri, for instance, narrated the History of Aceh to satisfy the order of Sultan Iskandar Thani. He tends to compose the Bustan Al-Salatin based on the tradition of the universal Islamic history to provide the lesson learned for the corrupted officials during his patron hegemony. Therefore, cross-checking

sources between one another is necessary. For the data analysis, using historical hermeneutics could understand the text from the author's cultural mental. Although the authors of local chronicles remain unknown, we could still understand why the chronicles do not describe the failure of the Acehese siege in Malacca. By placing the chronicles into their primary function, which is to praise the great Sultan Iskandar Muda, the researcher could be able to interpret the messages as written in the chronicles.

GEOPOLITICS OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

At the beginning of the 17th century, Malacca continued to defend itself against repeated invasions from the Malay states. However, the Portuguese used the political balance between Achin (Aceh) Sultanate and Johor Sultanate to secure their interest in the straits. Still, stability was interrupted when the Dutch arrived in Asian waters. The Acehese permission for the Dutch to hibernate at an Acehese port, banda Aceh, broke the Luso-Acehese truce, which had been established during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah, 1588-1604 (Boxer, 1969, p.426; Dasgupta, 1962, p.76; Pinto, 2012, p.76). In June 1606, the Portuguese invaded Achin's city port to punish the Acehese king and his subjects for having welcomed the Dutch. Surprisingly, the Acehese could counterattack when Prince Perkasa Alam (Iskandar Muda) persuaded Sultan Ali Riayat Shah, 1604-6, to let him lead troops against the Portuguese. The brave Iskandar Muda forced the Portuguese back to Malacca (Dasgupta, 1962, p.75; Beaulieu, 1619-22, p.254).

The powerful Acehese had attracted the Dutch to expel the Portuguese from Malacca jointly. The Dutch-Johore failure of 1606 (Borschberg, 2016, p.5; Boxer, 1929, p.26) made them aware that they could not rely on Johor, the weakest power in the straits. Although the Dutch agreed to a revised treaty with Johor on 23 September 1606 (Borschberg, 2016, p.14), they also had an additional agreement with the powerful Acehese in 1607. The detail of the Acehese-Dutch treaty is still unknown due to the written treaty disappearing. It might be that the Dutch-Acehese commercial connection was shaped (Dasgupta, 1962, p.78). However, the Dutch often came to Achin and brought some cannon and gunpowder in exchange for Acehese pepper.

After Iskandar Muda replaced Sultan Ali Riayat Shah, the Acehese Sultanate became more aggressive. According to Nuruddin Ar-Raniri, as

recorded in his *Bustan Al-Salatin* (Iskandar, 1966), Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) with financial support from the state income (Dasgupta, 1962, p.46, pp.88-9) and his inherited power from his ancestors (Boxer, 1969, p.415 & p.420; Tjandrasmita, 2009, p.42 & p.68) started to invade the Malay states, comprising Deli (1612); Aru (1613); Johor (1613, 1615, & 1623-4); Malacca (1615 & 1629); Pahang (1618 & 1635); Kedah (1619); Perak (1620); Tiku (1621); Nias (1624-5).

On the other side, the Dutch also expanded their political-trading connections along the Asian coastal areas by establishing some factories in Banten (1596); Aceh (1601); Patani (1601); Gresik (1602); St. Catarina (1603); Ambon (1605); Batu Sawar (1606); Ternate (1607); Banda (1609); and Hirado (1609) (Burnet, 2013, p.67-107; Borschberg, 2002, p.31; Lombard, 1991, pp.122-6; Matos, 1995, pp.45-8). Considering their failure to take Malacca in 1606 and the unstable situation in Johor after the Acehese invasion of 1613-4 (Burnet, 2013, pp.109), the Dutch decided to establish their central base in Batavia (Jakarta) in 1619. The creation of Dutch Batavia was believed to have started the decline of Portuguese Malacca (Pinto, 2012, p.xxvi). The Dutch continually shadowed and invaded the Portuguese forts, as they did in Macau in 1622 (Boxer, 1991, pp.57-66). They also started to block Portuguese commerce by capturing Portuguese ships in the straits of Malacca and Singapore (Borschberg, 2010, pp.1-45).

As the Javanese Mataram laid siege to Batavia from 1628 to 1629 (Burnet, 2013, p.120; Graaf, 1990, pp.149-238), the Dutch could not participate in the Acehese campaign against Malacca in 1629. Jan Oosterwicz, a Dutch trader in Jambi, believes that the Acehese could have captured Malacca if the Dutch had assisted them with at least 3 or 4 ships to block the Luso-Malay vessels (Letter from Jan Oosterwicz to Antonie Van Diemen, 15 March 1630, as published in Iskandar, 1978, p.54). It had been hoped Johor would assist the Acehese, but they resented Acehese expansionism and remained on the Portuguese side. Sultan Abdullah personally went to Malacca and shaped an alliance with the Portuguese against the Acehese armada (Pinto, 2012, p.165). In 1629, the Acehese sent the largest war fleet in Asia to invade Malacca and besieged it for a month, but the joint Luso-Malay forces were able to defeat them (Bakar, 1988, p.73). I will explain this invasion in the following sub-chapter.

THE 1629 ACEHNESE INVASION OF MALACCA

As opposed to the European perspective (Carreiro, 1630; Botelho, 1629; Hoare, 1630; Fonseca, 1630; Xavier, 1633; Oosterwijck, 1630) and the silent other Acehese chronicles (Cowan, 1980; Sabil, 1932; Iskandar, 1978), the *Bustan* seems to represent the native reason for the failed siege, as in:

...kemudian dari itu maka dititahkan Orang Kaya Maharaja Seri Maharaja dan Orang Kaya Laksamana menyerang Melaka, pada tatkala Hijrah saribu tiga puloh dualapan tahun, tetapi tiada alah karena berbantah antara dua orang panglima. Pada ketika itulah segala orang Islam banyak yang mati syahid... (Iskandar, 1966, p.35).

...then *Orang Kaya* (nobleman), Maharaja Seri Maharaja (Prime Minister), and *Laksamana* (admiral) were commanded to invade Malacca in 1038 H (1629 AD). However, they failed (to occupy Malacca) due to the dispute between those two military commanders. At that time, many Muslims came to rest in peace... (Iskandar, 1966, p.35).

This information is also confirmed by Sultan Iskandar Thani's letter to the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia (Dagh-register, 1640, p.8, as published in Djajadiningrat, 1983, p.50). The dispute among the two *orangkayas* (the noblemen) *started when Maharaja Seri Maharaja supported the sultan's project to invade Malacca. As Laksamana opposed the sultan's policies, he was replaced as commander of the naval forces by Maharaja Seri Maharaja.*

The designs upon Malacca became obvious when the sultan imprisoned the Portuguese ambassador to the Acehese court, Pero (Pedro) de Abreu (Marsden, 1784, p.360). The Acehese were ready to break the amicable agreement and prepared the great siege of Malacca. As described by Admiral Beaulieu (1619-22, pp.251-2), the Acehese had an established military organization on land and at sea. The sultan could mobilize 40,000 men and hundred elephants, trained to accompany the Acehese commanders in war. Interestingly, he could compel his subjects to take to the field with their provisions for three months but had to feed them if the war lasted longer. The Acehese would besiege their enemy and conduct trench warfare, as they had done in Kedah and Deli (Lombard, 1991, p.191). They also had a strong navy, consisting of a hundred galleys and the greatest warship, *Momok Dunia* or *Chakra Donya* (the Threat of the World), enough to arouse everyone's fear (Lombard, 1991, p.118). Those warships sailed from the three major Acehese ports of Banda Aceh, Daya, and Pedir.

Roque Carreiro (1630, fl.69) and Antonio Pinto da Fonseca (*Carta do Capitaõ-Geral de Malaca aos Governadores*, 19 Fevereiro de 1630. ACE. p.506), Sultan Iskandar Muda sent 236 sails including 38 galleys and carrying 19,300 armies and coolies. Among these warships, 47 of unusual size, nearly 100 feet, and strong galleys. He appointed Maharaja Seri Maharaja, accompanied by the captain-majors of squadrons, to lead the fleet to Malacca. From the three ports, the sultan, accompanied by the royal family, set sail and anchored for a while in Deli, eighty leagues from Achin, to complete preparations. During the journey to Deli (Carreiro, 1630, fl.69; Sousa, 1940, p.58), the sultan murdered his grandchild from his daughter and the Prince of Johor when he got angry seeing his grandson crying loudly. The nasty habit of the Acehese king was also recorded by Beaulieu (1619-1622, p.242) as:

...The cruelty of this prince is unparalleled. Notwithstanding that all his tortures could extent... yet he imprisoned his own mother and put her upon the rack; and *put* to death five of the principal lords of his court, whom he suspected of favouring his mother. He barbarously murdered his own nephew, the king of Jo(h)or's son, saying, his mother meant to prefer that young prince to the throne. He put to death the son of the king of Bantam, as well as the son of the king of Pao (Pahang), who were both his cousins. He has not left one of the royal family but his own son, who has been thrice banished the court...

The Prince of Johor could not accept the king's atrocity and stole a small vessel going to Malacca the next night. The sultan, in turn, ordered 50 vessels to catch the prince alive, yet the latter made his escape after being saved by two Portuguese galleys, which took him to Malacca. The prince vessel might be expected as a foreign vessel passing the Portuguese city port of Malacca. At that time, the Portuguese adopted the Indian toll system to seek other revenue sources. According to Winius (1996, p.116), the pass and toll system was introduced by selling the passport (*cartazes*) to Asian merchants. The *cartazes* then required their bearers to call in Portuguese-controlled ports and pay customs duties to ensure the merchants did so and to prevent piratical attacks, and the Portuguese fleet headed them into convoys delivering them to the royal *alfandega* or customs houses. In this context, the Portuguese probably directed the prince's vessel to anchor at Malacca to be checked his *cartazes* or to pay the due.

The subdued sultan sailed back to Achin while on 24 March 1629, the prince informed the



Figure 1. the Portuguese fortifications during the Acehese Siege (Bocarro & Resende. 1594-1642. *Livro das Plantas de Todas...* fl.348)

Portuguese Captain-General, Antonio Pinto da Fonseca, of all the Acehese designs. The same day, Pinto sent a message to bishop-governor Dom Fr. Luis de Brito, who was in a vessel leaving for Negapattam, to request help from the Viceroy of the *Estado da India* (Carreiro, 1630, fl.69). Meanwhile, the Portuguese in India began to prepare the powerful relief force (Marsden, 1784, p.229), the captain-general and the commander of the fortress of Malacca spent three months reinforcing the sub-urbs of Malacca before the Acehese eventually arrived. The Portuguese had only 260 soldiers in the garrison and 450 local soldiers, and 120 citizen volunteers to defend the city. The massive buttressed walls of the fortress were considered impregnable, but the Captain-General of Malacca took the offensive and, with 200 of his men, fortified the hill of *Bukit China* to the east of the city (the fortress of Malacca) and prepared to engage the Acehese (Burnett, 2012, p.63), as seen in figure 1.

The Acehese fleet sailed in front of the fortress on 3 July and anchored at the mouth of the Duyong river south of it on 6 July. They might avoid landing at Upeh, where the wealthy merchants from Java, Keling, and Gujarat take place. Thomaz (2000, p.47) explains that Upeh was defended on the land-

ward side by a palisade extending from the river, 400 fathoms (880 meters) upstream from the mouth to the beach at the end of the settlement. As widely known, the powerful merchants controlled the city of Malacca from the traffic Upeh. They owned a thousand enslaved people and provided financial support to rent the troops. Therefore, it might be feasible for them to winter in the south of Malacca and invade the fortress from the south.

Laksamana and his army of 4000-5000 men moved into fortified camps at *Sao João* (St. John) hill, southeast of Malacca (Carreiro, 1630, fl.69v; *Carta do Capitao-Geral de Malaca aos Governadores. ACE, p.506; Viera, 1633, fl.8*). During the first battle at São Francisco Hill (*Bukit China*), the Portuguese cannon killed 300 Acehese, with only a few Portuguese wounded. After that, the Acehese surrounded the Portuguese fortress for three months. The besieged could hold on for a while due to their erecting military defenses. The captain ordered 200 men to fortify palisades and bulwarks from *São Francisco Hill* (*Bukit China*) to Hilir.

During the battle, the Portuguese with six galleys, 40 small ships, and 830 armies equipped with lances, swords, artilleries, and muskets (*Carta*

do *Capitao-Geral de Malaca* aos Governadores. ACE. pp.506-510) sallied and attacked the Acehese bulwarks. In the first battle, the captain commanded 260 men and succeeded in killing 200 Acehese, including the King of Deli (Sousa, 1940, p.58). On 4 August 1629, the Acehese assaulted and captured the Portuguese bulwark of *Madre de Deus* in *Bukit China*. They also fortified other bulwarks with the artilleries close to *Nossa Senhora da Piedade* (our piety lady church). It took them closer to the fortress' bulwarks of *Santiago* and *São Domingo*. The Acehese also placed their two navies in the (Aerlele) river, south of the fortress. João Soares Vivas, the Portuguese admiral, led 120 men to attack the Acehese and killed 200 (Viera, 1633, fls.9-10; Sousa, 1940, p.59). However, while the Portuguese could kill some Acehese, their limited strength was unable to handle the sheer numbers of Acehese troops.

Malacca was in danger, but fortunately, Johor King sent 1000 men by land and about 50-60 ships carrying 1500 warriors to assist the Portuguese. Five armadas from São Thome of Melyapur also came on 30 September before the 28 galleys led by Nuno Alvares Botelho arrived on 21 October (Carreiro, 1630, fl.69v; *Carta do Capitao-Geral de Malaca* aos Governadores. ACE, p.508; Viera, 1633, fls.10v-11). With this sizeable joint force, the Portuguese operated a two-fold strategy of counterattacking the Acehese on land and blocking the Acehese ships at the mouth of the Duyong river they had anchored. Eventually, the Acehese scattered when the Portuguese fired upon them and re-captured the *Madre de Deus*. The Maharaja armies abandoned the siege and returned to their ships. They tried to fortify the river mouth, but the joint navy of 32 vessels blocked them in its mouth (Viera, 1633, fls.11v; Sousa, 1940, pp.60-1). An attempt by Maharaja Seri Maharaja to break the blockade failed with losses of between 500 and 700 Acehese. Maharaja Seri Maharaja tried to escape during the night, was detected, and deserted to the land where he was killed (Marsden, 1784, p.231).

At the time of Maharaja's death on 30 November, 160 Johor-Patane vessels arrived and assisted the Portuguese in blocking the river on 1 December. Laksamana and the rest of his force (still about 5000-6000 men) had no choice but to seek refuge in the jungle for 13 days. While the battle raged, on 3 December, Laksamana sent his ambassadors to communicate with Nuno Alvares Botelho (Sousa, 1940, p.64), begging permission to sail back to Achin. However, Nuno Alvares Botelho refused this capitulation, as the Acehese still held

the Portuguese ambassador, Pedro de Abreu, prisoner. As the Acehese did not respond, the Luso-Malay forces continued to attack the Acehese (Marsden, 1784, p.231; *Carta do Capitao-Geral de Malaca* aos Governadores, ACE, p.509)

On 4 December 1629, the Acehese sent Pedro de Abreu back to Malacca, hoping the Portuguese would grant the safe conduct for the three galleys with 4000 men to sail back to Achin. However, Botelho again refused the proposal, scattering the rest of the Acehese armies, so they fled in different directions. Laksamana was imprisoned and sent to Goa, but he died during the voyage. The Portuguese took 30 Acehese galleys, 130 pieces of artillery, and 73 small-arm ammunitions (Marsden, 1784, p.232; *Carta do Capitao-Geral de Malaca* aos Governadores. ACE, p.509; Sousa, 1940, pp.64-6).

AFTER THE 1629 INVASION OF MALACCA

After this failure, Acehese power and hegemony decreased dramatically. The Portuguese admiral, Nuno Alvares Botelho, was so proud of his victory over the Acehese troops that he continued to execute the next project to secure the Portuguese vessels from Dutch threat (*Conselho sobre Alguas Cousas que o Capitao Geral Nuno Alvares Botelho escreveo de Malaca*. 18 Abril 1630. ACE, p.272). He left Malacca with 27 vessels for the Straits of Singapore, where the Dutch often privateered the Portuguese vessels laden with precious commodities from China and Manila (*Carta de Nuno Alvares Botelho aos Governadores*. ACE. p.501; *Carta do Capitao-Geral de Malaca* aos Governadores, ACE, p.509). However, as Botelho did not encounter any Dutch ships there, he decided to sail south into Indonesian waters, where he found and captured three Dutch ships at the mouth of the Jambi river in South Sumatra.

He went further up the river and captured two more ships laden with pepper. When he returned downstream, his ship encountered the Dutch *Walcheren* in the estuary. Botelho decided to attack and bombard the Dutch vessel. His men boarded the *Walcheren* and set it on fire so that it eventually exploded, destroying Botelho's vessel and throwing him to the sea. He was rescued but died soon after. Without any capable leader, the rest of Botelho's fleet sailed back to Malacca. The loss of Botelho ended any further Portuguese efforts to cut the Dutch expansion into intra-Asiatic waters (Burnet, 2013, pp.64-5; Danvers, 2003, pp.233-4).

The Aceh's failure in 1629 had paralyzed its power and role in the Malacca Straits. The deaths of royal officials consisting of Sultan Iskandar Muda,

Maharaja Seri Maharaja, and Admiral Malem Da-gang had decreased the Acehnese power. The Portuguese could breathe for a moment and devised a ploy to ally with the new Sultan, Sultan Iskandar Thani. The Portuguese came to the Aceh palace and hoped for cooperation between Aceh and Malacca. However, Sultan Iskandar Thani did not trust the Portuguese, who always reneged on the agreements they had agreed on (Iskandar, 1966, pp.46-7). Sultan Iskandar Muda decided to make an ally with the Dutch. In October 1638, Sultan Iskandar Thani sent his envoys to Batavia. The Acehnese informed the Dutch that The Portuguese had come to Aceh and asked for peace and a treaty. The Portuguese also asked the Acehnese to invade the Dutch (Leupe & Hacobian, 1936, p.6; Borschberg, 2010, p.12; Iskandar, 1966, pp.53-4).

Seeing that the Dutch had blocked the straits since 1633 (Borschberg, 2010, pp.12-33), Aceh assisted the Dutch in attacking Malacca. They sent two hundred warships to Batavia. The Acehnese armies joined the Dutch troops in Batavia in the mid of August 1639. However, the joint attack on Malacca planned to be launched in November or December had to be postponed. They were assigned to capture Ceylon. They attempted to attack Malacca on their way back from Ceylon. When they arrived in Malacca, they took a Portuguese ship sailing from Nagapattinam and several Portuguese captives. One of the prisoners, Luis Pacheco, was forced to speak about the state of Malacca. He admitted that the Portuguese had known that thirty Dutch-Malay joint forces would carry out this attack (Leupe & Hacobian, 1936, pp.6-9). The Portuguese were able to repel the attack with the presence of reinforcements from Manila. Aceh suffered many losses, including soldiers who died while four Dutch ships were sunk, and the rest fled back to Batavia (Bakar, 1988, p.74). When the Dutch continued their blockade and attacked again in the mid-1640s, Aceh did not participate. Aceh was disappointed when the Dutch let Johor invade Pahang (Iskandar, 1966, pp.57-8). The Dutch abandoned Aceh and allied with Johor to invade Malacca. Malacca fell when the Portuguese surrendered in 1641 (Iskandar, 1996, pp.53-4; Lombard, 1991, pp.168-9; Dasgupta, 1962, pp.183-6).

CONCLUSION

The Acehnese military attack culminated in economic competition and political rivalry in the Straits of Malacca. The desire to control the Straits of Malacca forced Sultan Iskandar Muda to invade the Malay States, including Johor, in 1613 & 1615.

However, the Johor Sultanate preferred to ignore the call to jihad and eject the Portuguese from Malacca. On the contrary, Johor led the Malay States to resist the Acehnese and joined the Portuguese to counterattack them. The Dutch, who had previously invaded Malacca in 1606, were too busy to handle the Javanese Mataram Siege of Batavia and could not support the Acehnese siege of Malacca. The Luso-Malay joint forces, therefore, were able to destroy and bury the Acehnese dream to raise their hegemony in the Straits of Malacca.

According to Bustan Al-Salatin, the Acehnese could not take Malacca from a small Portuguese force due to internal disputes among their two commanders. Both had their own but uncoordinated strategies to capture Malacca. While Laksmamana conducted trench warfare, Maharaja Seri Maharaja planned to invade the fortress directly by crossing the river.

The local sources, mainly *Bustan Al-Salatin*, can be compared with European sources. Not only does it describe the chief factor behind the Acehnese failure, but it is also a reference for the contradictory data. The Acehnese chronicle can explain who assisted the Portuguese during the Acehnese siege. Where the confusing Portuguese sources are uncertain about either Pahang or Johor, the *Bustan* can explain that Pahang was a vassal of Johor. Therefore, Johor was the Portuguese ally during the Acehnese siege.

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