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# From *Ekstrem Kanan* to *Kadrun*: A Semantic History of Islamic Stigma in Political Dynamics in Indonesia

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**Abstract**: This article tries to analyze several terms that indicate a stigma againsts Islamic politics in Indonesia, such as right-wing extrimist, jihad commando, and *kadrun*. *Kadrun* is the newest form to stigmatize Islam in Indonesia, so it is interesting to review. Stigma against Islam can arise due to three main points, namely: the misunderstanding of Islam because of how it was represented according to the Orientalism point of view, the mainstream media framing, and the "terrorist" attack of the Western world. The research uses a historical approach that identifies various terms of stigma against Islam in the archives. Archives regarding the protest in Java in the 20th century were used to identify the stigma attached to Islam at the end of the colonial period. The archives at MUI (Indonesian Council of Ulama) were used to see the relationship between the terms right-hand extremist and jihad commando in the dynamics of relations between Islam during the New Order Era. Content analysis method and Twitter "crawling" data collection techniques were used to describe the kadrun concept. The results of research on the words right-hand extremist, jihad commando, and kadrun put Islam as a political doctrine, which was the opposition to the ruling government. Historical analysis shows that the stigma against political Islam has been a recurring phenomenon since the Dutch East Indies era, which continued to this era and might continue as a vicious cycle of conflict in Indonesia.

**Abstrak**: Artikel ini mencoba menganalisis beberapa istilah yang mengindikasikan adanya stigma terhadap politik Islam di Indonesia, seperti ekstrimis kanan, komando jihad, dan kadrun. Kadrun merupakan bentuk terbaru dari stigma terhadap Islam di Indonesia, sehingga menarik untuk diulas. Stigma terhadap Islam dapat muncul karena tiga hal utama, yaitu: kesalahpahaman terhadap Islam karena direpresentasikan menurut sudut pandang Orientalisme, framing media arus utama, dan serangan "teroris" dari dunia Barat. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan historis yang mengidentifikasi berbagai istilah stigma terhadap Islam dalam arsip. Arsip-arsip mengenai protes di Jawa pada abad ke-20 digunakan untuk mengidentifikasi stigma yang dilekatkan pada Islam pada akhir masa kolonial. Arsip-arsip di MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) digunakan untuk melihat hubungan antara istilah ekstremis kanan dan komando jihad dalam dinamika relasi Islam selama masa Orde Baru. Metode analisis isi dan teknik pengumpulan data "crawling" Twitter digunakan untuk mendeskripsikan konsep kadrun. Hasil penelitian terhadap kata ekstremis kanan, jihad komando, dan kadrun menempatkan Islam sebagai doktrin politik yang menjadi oposisi bagi pemerintah yang berkuasa. Analisis historis menunjukkan bahwa stigma terhadap Islam politik telah menjadi fenomena yang berulang sejak era Hindia Belanda, yang berlanjut hingga era sekarang dan mungkin akan terus berlanjut sebagai lingkaran setan konflik di Indonesia.

## INTRODUCTION

Stigma is something that is commonly found in society and is usually attributed to anyone who is considered deviant from society's norms. People tend to receive different treatment from the surrounding community when they have been given a certain stigma, such as rejection, denial, or exclusion from those around them. One form of stigma against Islamic politics in Indonesia is the use of the term "*Kadrun*", which is commonly found on social media. *Kadrun* is interesting to observe as a term in society and is used to describe certain groups. *Kadrun* was first used in the context of the 2014 presidential election, where two poles of supporters competed and gave each other the terms, namely *cebong* and *kampret*. The term cebong is addressed to supporters of the presidential candidate at the time, Joko Widodo and *kampret* to supporters of the presidential candidate, Prabowo (Sodikin & Utari, 2020). *Kadrun* is a nickname associated with the desert lizard (*Kadrun*) and violates the concept of language politeness (Adham, 2020). The concept of the desert lizard used on social media is synonymous with the desert and the Arab world. So, it indirectly means Muslims of Arab descent. This term is considered racist and contains accusations that Islam is the religion of the Arabs only. The term *kadrun* is a residual from a dispute in the 2017 Presidential Election in Indonesia and the governor of DKI Jakarta, which continues to make an impression today (Sodikin & Utari, 2020). *Kadrun* is the reality of cyber democracy in Indonesia, which is filled with negative propaganda, which makes conditions unconducive and unhealthy in cyber democracy (Faisyal, 2020). It can be interpreted that this term boils down to political contestation.

In a broader context, the stigma against Islam is part of global political discourse, where Islam is seen as a feared monster, not as a religious teaching. As a result, Islam is associated with terrorism, oppression of women and violations of human rights. Azeez (2019) assesses that the stigma against Islam in Europe was formed due to anachronistic cultural constructions that emerged from the old machine of the colonial apparatus, including economics, culturalism, and the Huntigtonian 'clash of civilizations' hypothesis and the events of 9/11.

It is interesting to study the stigma against Islam in Indonesian contexts. During the New Order era, various terms emerged, such as right-hand extremist, jihad commando, fundamentalism, terrorist, and finally, *kadrun*. These various terms are studied from a historical perspective so that the socio-political context that gives rise to these various terms will be understood. In Indonesia, the discourse of stigmatization of Islam is the aim of responding to and identifying two things. First, the emergence of political movements based on Islamic ideology is thought to be transnational in nature. Second, the emergence of right-wing terrorists, fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups who are trying to fight Western hegemony and political domination by spreading terror (Bazian, 2015; Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016). In the Indonesian political context, Islam stigmatization is an instrument of power is manifested in the behavior of elites who make it an issue based on identity sentiment to the public, as a political instrument to gain a seat of power (Syarif et al., 2020). In the early days of the Reformasi era, political intolerance in Indonesia did not show significant symptoms, but it was different two decades later when symptoms of political intolerance increased significantly.

Al-Hamdi, 2013 revealed that according to historical experience in Indonesia, the strategic role of religion in the political arena has been going on for a long time, even before Indonesia's independence. In line with this, Burhani & Simandjuntak (2018) explained that the politicization of religion in the political context became increasingly visible, especially during the regional elections. In the 2017 Jakarta regional elections, an issue emerged about one of the candidates for governor being accused of religious blasphemy. This case became big because there was religious sentiment towards one of the prospective partners who happened to be of a religion other than Islam. The culmination of this sentiment was the massive Defense of Islam 212 Action which mobilized masses from various regions in Indonesia to gather around the Monas Monument. This condition has further exacerbated the Cebong vs Kampret division that started in the 2014 presidential election, giving rise to a new stigma, namely *kadrun*.

The problem raised in this article is "What is the socio-political context for the emergence of stigmatization of Islam such as right-wing extremists, jihad commandos, and *Kadrun*? Mubarak (2015) stated that radicalism in the Reformasi era was the third phase, an evolution of the previous phases. The first phase was when the new DI/TII Kartosoewirjo movement emerged. Kahar Muzakar and Daud Beureuh followed the event. Meanwhile, the second phase emerged during the Jihad Commando movement in the 1970s to 1980s, with the main actors being several former DI/TII of the Kartosoewirjo era. In this phase, the names Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir emerged, and they

became known as the emirs of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). The third phase was marked by various terror and violent movements that occurred during and after reform from the late 1990s until now. The fourth phase is marked by the development of new radical Islamic groups, especially young groups who have ties to previous generation figures.

**METHOD**

This study employed a historical semantics approach that explored the vocabulary of right-wing extremists and jihad commandos in certain social and political contexts (Sakhiyya, 2022). Williams (Sakhiyya, 2022) recognizes the importance of studying registers in their socio-political context. However, the study does not emphasize the epistemology of the registers; rather, it emphasizes the socio-political conditions that became the background to the emergence of a term. Archives of reports about the protest movement in Java in the 20th century contained in ANRI (National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia) were used to identify several terms and stigmatization used by the Dutch colonial government towards Islam. Several other archives also help identify the relationship between religion and the state during the New Order, including Mimbar Ulama (1988), Mimbar Ulama (1995), 15 years of the Indonesian Ulama Council (1980), 20 years of the Indonesian Ulama Council (1996), MUI in Historical Dynamics (2005), Fatwa Association of the Indonesian Ulema Council (2003), MUI in 1976 (1976), The Decree of the First MUI National Conference (1975), The Decree of the Second MUI National Conference (1980), The Decree of the III MUI National Conference (1985 ), and MUI Ummah and Development (1982).

Qualitative content analysis was used to understand the ideas in the studied tweets. Data about *Kadrun* were collected using the Twitter Archiver application integrated with the Twitter and Google APIs. The method was simple because it did not require a complicated programming language. The data were collected from 2461 accounts with 2461 Tweets from 23 to 27 November 2020. This period was chosen because *Kadrun*'s discussion on Twitter was widely discussed. Of the 2461 accounts, 2370 accounts can be processed. For the record, data retrieval from the Twitter API is limited to three to five days by Twitter. The collected data were then compared with research results using social media conversation data from Drone Emprit using BuzzeRp (Arianto, 2020). Apart from that, the data were also compared with the research results of the Drone Emprit publication on the page https:// pers.droneemprit.id/memetakan-polar-pki-vs-kadrun/. The data source comes from Twitter, taken from 1 April 2016 – 21 April 2022 and 1 January 2022 – 21 April 2022. The keywords used in the drone emprit publication are: *Kadrun*, Kadal Gurun, and "dasar" *kadrun*.

**HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF STIGMATIZATION OF ISLAM IN INDONESIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE**

The stigmatization of Islam in the colonial era was marked by a Dutch figure named Cristiaan Snouck Hurgrounje. Laffan (2015) explained that the Dutch appointed Snouck as the Dutch advisor in 1889. Snouck researched the Acehnese people to find out the strategy they used in fighting against the colonial government. The Dutch colonial policy in dealing with Islamic issues is often referred to as "Islam Politiek", namely the policy of the Dutch East Indies government in managing Islamic issues in Indonesia. Christian Snouck Hurgronje was considered the pioneer in Islamic stigmatization (Suminto, 1985). In Snouck's view, Indonesian Muslims were essentially peaceful. He was aware of the political capabilities of Islamic fanaticism. For him, the enemy of colonialism was not Islam as a religion but Islam as a political doctrine.

In the book De Atjehers, Snouck comprehensively examines the ideas and values contained in Acehnese society. From 1891 to 1906, Snouck was chosen as the principal advisor to the Dutch East Indies government on issues relating to the native Indonesian population (Ricklefs, 2008). On Snouck's advice, the Dutch government divided Islam into two groups. First, Islam is a religious teaching. In this case, they adhere to it simply as a religion, they must be given freedom. Second, Islam as a political teaching. According to Snouck, the Dutch East Indies government should not hesitate about eradicating it.

Snouck's views greatly influenced the colonial government's control over indigenous people in Indonesia. In this case, Snouck advised against the ulama because they play an important role in mobilizing popular resistance (Ahmad, 2017). Thus, Islam as a political doctrine was something that the Dutch government paid attention to because of its potential to fight colonial power. With such assumptions, Islamic movements such as Sarekat Islam (SI) became part of the stigma of the colonial government. Around 1915-1930, many *tarekat* (a way or method to get closer to God, Allah) groups experienced a decline in influence due to the development of modern Islamic social and political or-

ganizations, especially Sarekat Islam. Although the SI was a modern organization with Western-educated leaders, some local branches resembled messianic sects or *tarekat*, especially in its early days. Cokroaminoto was sometimes hailed as *the Justice* Queen; There were also tarekat kyai who join SI with all their adherents and try to use SI as the formal face of their tarekat (Van Bruinessen, 1992). The term Sarekat Islam itself shows its stigma, which the colonial government often accused of being related to various social problems in the Dutch East Indies, such as robbery, anti-Chinese riots, and others (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1913).

At the time, all Islamic group was considered as endangering the position of the colonial government since they disturbed public order. They would be labelled as bad by the colonial government, including "Abangan Islam" and the *Justice Queen* (Imam Mahdi) movement (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1920b; Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1923). One example was the Abangan Islamic Movement led by Mangoenat-modjo in Klaten in 1919, which the Dutch closely monitored (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1920a). The stigma was given to Quran teachers and local clerics who used the legitimacy of Imam Mahdi to gather the masses and were considered to have the potential to endanger the position of the Netherlands. Anything Islam could potentially harm the colonial government and had to be monitored, including the Naqsabandiyah tarekat movement (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1928). The Dutch government closely monitored these movements, including the Abangan Islam, the Queen Justice movement (Imam Mahdi), and the Tareqat movement. If these teachers were deemed demeaning by the colonial government, they would be prohibited from teaching. And if it were deemed to lead to potential riots, they would be arrested.

## THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE TERMS JIHAD COMMANDO (*KOMANDO JIHAD*) AND RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST (*EKSTREM KANAN*)

In the post-independence era, stigmatization of Islam occurred due to the rebellion of some Islamic figures and acts of terrorism. Mubarak (2015) explained that the first act of terrorism or bombing took place in Cikini on November 30, 1957. Then, the Darul Islam (DI) movement led by Kartosoewiryo emerged in 1950-1960. During the New Order era, the jihadist Commando movement appeared, the hijacking of the Woyla plane by Imron bin Muhammad Zein's people in 1981 and the blowing up of the Borobudur temple by the Shia group led by Hussein al-Habsyi in 1985. Terrorist acts can still be found up to today.

This situation was made worse by the ideological conflict between modernist groups (Natsir, Hamka, and masyumi figures) and "traditional" (Wachid Hasyim and NU) and nationalist groups (Soekarno, Hatta and Soepomo). Soekarno thought it was necessary to separate religion and state affairs because Indonesian society has always been plural and complex, and it was difficult to establish democracy if religion was involved in state affairs (Saidi, 2004). In contrast to Soekarno, Natsir emphasized that Islam and the state were a unified religious-political entity. These debates arose at BPUKI sessions, thus, to reconcile nationalist and Islamic groups, a committee of nine was formed, known as the Jakarta Charter (Fauzi & Yulianti, 2021).

Deliar Noer (1987) assessed that the relationship between Islam and the Nation during the liberal and Guided democracy era was unstable. This situation was caused by ideological struggles, both in the Constituent Assembly and the rebellions against the government by DI/TII. Regarding the causes of the unstable relationship between Islam and the nation, Saidi (2004) suggests several causes. First, there are differences in paradigms regarding the interpretation of Islam in the context of the relationship between religion and state affairs. Second, there were national policies that seemed to deviate from Islamic rules. As a result of the prolonged debate, President Soekarno, on July 5, 1959, issued a presidential decree dissolving the constituent assembly and making Pancasila the definitive single ideology. This decree brought the struggle to restore the Jakarta charter to a halt, especially in 1960, when Soekarno disbanded Masyumi, which was accused of being involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion.

Various terms indicating the existence of a stigma against Islam became more frequent during the New Order era. The accusation that was often levelled at Islamic circles during the New Order government was that they wanted to replace the National Principles of Pancasila with Islam, similar to the event during the 1957-1959 Constituent Assembly. The Snouck Hurgronje-style perspective and practices of the New Order government towards Islam resulted in many of its policies being detrimental to Muslims. Saidi (2004) concluded that the relationship between Islam and the Nation

during the New Order era fluctuated greatly. This was caused by several factors, such as, first, the failure of Political Islam to articulate Islamic values in a more substantial form. Second, the nation's excessive coercive power in constructing the desired social reality ignores the sensitivity of existing religious values.

Ricklefs (2008) explained that the New Order which favored Islam less, and the rapid growth of non-Islamic religions after 1965, had created a sense of frustration and loss of self-confidence among Muslims themselves. As a result, many Modernists shifted their attention from the world of politics to Da'wah and hoped that the Islamization process could be further perfected. The political path was abandoned, and the modernists shifted and devoted much of their energy to education and welfare (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1982). However, the traditionalists represented by NU do not seem to be too affected by major changes in the world of politics, apart from their large mass-based in rural areas, this is also due to their ability to easily adapt to situations and conditions (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1990; 1996; Ricklefs, 2008.

Politically, the New Order government wanted a conducive atmosphere, while several Muslim groups at that time were often considered right-wing extremists that might disrupt national stability. The stigmatization of "Right-Wing Extremist" was not only directed at the *Jihad Commando* group, but it was also more directed at Islamic organizations that oppose or do not support the policies of the New Order. Such conditions create suspicion between the government and the Muslims (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1976; Fauzi & Ali, 2017). At the time, ABRI (The Army of Indonesia Republic) became the main force of the New Order government, while the Islamic groups were mostly seen as groups that "endangered" the New Order government.

This stigma would be directed at groups who talked about Islamic politics and had ideas about an Islamic state. The term "right-wing extremist" is almost the same as the term "left-wing extremist" for the former PKI group members. Apart from the Right-Wing extremist, another term that emerged at that time was "Jihad Commando". The term "Right-Wing extremist" is not only directed at the Jihad Commando group but is also more directed at Islamic organizations that oppose or do not support the policies of the New Order. MUI, under the leadership of Buya Hamka, established relations with ABRI by forming Social Communication (KOMSOS), which along the way succeeded in

eliminating the stigmatization of " Jihad Commando ", which had a negative connotation for Islamic groups (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1979; Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), 1989; Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1976; 1985).

In 1976, the New Order government put forward the idea of implementing Pancasila in everyday life. In around 1978, Pancasila principles began to be applied by the government to the entire society and organizations in Indonesia. The National Philosophy, Pancasila, was the sole principle of Indonesia, making Islamic parties or organizations shift their Islamic principles to Pancasila. This policy triggered more conflict between Islam and the Nation. The policy of "Pancasila the only philosophy" indirectly resulted in the Tanjung Priok incident on September 12, 1984, with bombings and burning of local public facilities. Security forces followed up the incident by arresting dozens of Islamic figures. A series of incidents also occurred, such as the explosion of the BCA (Bank Central Asia) building, Borobudur Temple, the Wolya plane hijacking, and the Lampung case. These cases were a reaction from Muslims who felt that their roles in government politics were marginalized. The Indonesian Islamic Student Organization (PII) was considered a prohibited/illegal organization by the government because it refused to change its principles.

The New Order regime considered these cases to be a form of threat from the "Right-Wing extremists" who wanted to change the national philosophy with religious principles. Since then, the movements of Islamic figures have continued to be monitored closely. Many groups were banned, and several other group members were detained. Since then, the terms fundamentalist groups, the dangers of "Right-Wing extremist", and so on have become popular. Ricklefs (2008) believes that the single principal policy of Pancasila was caused by nothing other than the government's efforts to prevent the increasing religious groups from uniting into a dangerous political movement, which, of course, would threaten the ruling regime.

Indeed, excessive suspicion was the ailment of the New Order Government because of their war with DI/TII and PRRI/Permesta troops. Ricklefs (2008) argued that Suharto, with his New Order, adopted the view of Snouck Hurgronje, respecting Islam as a personal religious practice but not allowing it to become a political force. Many Muslims suspected that the government has negative prejudices against Muslims, this can be seen from the number of high-ranking military officers, the ma-

jority of whom are non-Muslims. They also consider the New Order behind the rapid growth of non-Islamic religions since 1965.

The clash between the New Order government and Islamic groups occurred again in the case of mystical beliefs and the state marriage law in 1973 (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1976; 1980). Since 1957, the spiritual groups have tried to gain recognition and be aligned with religion to gain funding from the Ministry of Religious Affairs and protection from governmental oppression. Islamic groups continue to take action to ensure that these spiritual groups do not gain recognition. Since this was a sensitive issue and might cause significant turmoil if they accommodated these spiritual groups. Ultimately, the government only recognized spirituality as a belief, not a religion, so they did not have a section in the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2005). Meanwhile, the marriage bill drafted by the government received extraordinary criticism because several articles conflicted with Muslim beliefs, such as regarding the permissibility of interfaith marriages (Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men) and recognizing civil marriages (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2003). In September, student demonstrations stormed the parliament building to protest the bill. The government finally agreed to the demonstrators' demands and revised the bill.

The previous description showed that the relationship between Islam and the nation in the Indonesian context was quite intense. This relationship was characterized by competitive attitudes and suspicion between the two institutions. In terms of its political relations with the country, Islam had long been at a dead end. Both the governments of President Soekarno and President Soeharto viewed politics based on Islam as a potential competitor for power that could undermine the national philosophy of Pancasila (McVey, 1983). Both the New Order and the Old Order government had tried to limit and weaken Islamic parties. As a result, Islamic leaders and activists failed to make Islam a national ideology in 1945 (before independence) and in the late 1950s (in the debate in the Constituent Assembly about national philosophy). They were even referred to as "minority groups" or outsiders (McVey, 1983).

Nasikun (1987) tried to answer the recurring phenomenon of conflict in Indonesia with the term "vicious circle of conflict". Indonesian society has always been in a never-ending process of change and conflict, which is common for a society. Pluralism in Indonesia has the potential for disintegration and social changes simultaneously. Even if Indonesian society is integrated, this is due to coercion, control, or domination by the New Order government (Nasikun, 1987). Conflicts may happen due to differences among varying members of ethnic groups and religions. A conflict may strengthen group identity to protect it from being dissolved or become stronger. In this way, this division in society will strengthen the identity of the two groups and lead to open conflict.

## THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE TERM *KADRUN*

The current issue around Islam in Indonesia is that it may be experiencing a transition from a moderate to a conservative ideology (Arifianto, 2019). Hefner (2016) saw that after the collapse of the New Order, Muslim politicians called for the implementation of Sharia law even though this was rejected by the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) and was not supported by the two largest mass organizations in Indonesia, namely NU and Muhammadiyah. After the fall of Soeharto, Islamization in Indonesia shifted bottom-up and mainly developed and circulated in the socio-cultural realm, influencing the political realm (Mohamed Osman, 2010). This was the impact of the conquest of Islamic political forces during the Soeharto era, and democratization in the post-Soeharto era contributed to the rise of Islamic groups in this country (Abdullah & Mohamed Osman, 2018). In this context, it can be understood that the emergence of the term "*Kadrun*" is a continuation of the differences in interpretation of the relationship between Islam and the nation, triggering conflict and suspicion between groups with different views in Indonesia.

As the political situation in Indonesia progressed, various political groups emerged, bringing their values and ideology. Nimmo (1999) identified three categories of politicians, namely those who act as political communicators, professional communicators in politics, and activists or part-time communicators. Politicians are people whose entire time is spent on political activities. Regarding political communication, politicians seek influence through communication. Professional communicator in politics. A professional communicator is a person who translates the attitudes, knowledge, and interests of one language community into terms of another language community that are different but interesting and understandable—a part-time activist or communicator. Activists and part-time communicators are those in organizational and interpersonal settings tied to command media networks.

**Table 1.** Social Media Accounts

| Social Media Account | Number | % |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Clear Identity | 966 | 40.8 |
| Unclear Identity | 1404 | 59.2 |
| Total | 2370 | 100.0 |

Source: Research Data

This includes spokespersons in an organization or community.

Thus, *Kadrun*'s case seems to suit part-time communicators, whose origins are unclear; it cannot be proven that this term came from a politician or professional communicator. Considering that the term *kadrun* has a negative impression, it is almost impossible for a politician and professional communicator to express this to the public. This trend towards part-time communicators is reinforced by social media traffic. This means that the concept of *kadrun* was popularized by part-time communicators. Details are discussed in the Table 1.

The research data in Table 1 shows that most Twitter accounts about *Kadrun* had no clear identity (59.2%), and only 40.8% had a clear identity and name. Emprit Drone data shows the age of social media activists who actively talked about *kadrun*, namely less than 18 years (23.95%), 19-29 years (44.92%), 30-39 years (13.60%), and above 40 years (17.53%) (Rahman, 2022). This data showed that millennials are actively involved in social media conversations.

Table 1 data further strengthens the opinion that the *Kadrun* issue was built mainly by buzzers. Professional political buzzers in Indonesia consist of volunteer and professional political buzzers (certain rewards). Professional political buzzers on social media expand information through activities related to narratives and daily hashtags so that the public can see them in the form of trending topics and go viral. Professional political buzzers also carry out attacks through criticism of candidate pairs or other political actors. Meanwhile, political volunteer buzzers convey information on social media based on personal initiative based on shared ideology.

Most of the Twitter accounts used in this study (50.8%) had more than 1000 followers. In addition, 32.7% had more than 100 accounts. Thus, they were categorized as nano-influencers and Micro-influencers. Nano influencers have the smallest number of followers, ranging from 500 to 1000 people. Micro influencers have around 1000 to 10,000

followers with an engagement level of around 25% to 50%. Micro and Nano influencers have more significant influence than larger followers (over 10,000). Communication between influencers and their followers is usually done through posts the influencers share.

In Drone Emprit's study (Rahman, 2022), "*Kadrun*" only appeared in October 2019. Without the "G 30S PKI" event, the daily conversation volume of "*Kadrun*" was 70%, much more significant than "PKI", which was only 30%. The map of netizens who mentioned "*Kadrun*" seemed unbalanced. One cluster is very active with top influencers @ChusnulCh__, @Dennysiregar7, @Hayuningrat7. The counter cluster was much smaller, with influencers @abu_waras, @maspiyuaja, @bachrum_achmadi. The total number of accounts active in conversations about "*Kadrun*" is 66.6 thousand accounts. "*Kadrun*" is widely used for group calling and labelling (Rahman, 2022). Conversations about "*Kadrun*" predominantly contain the expression of "anger", triggered by the incident of violence against Ade Armando by "*kadrun*". The call volume of "*Kadrun* basic" reached 94%, while "PKI basic" was only 6%. The meaning "*Kadrun*" is much more widely used to label the above phrase (Rahman, 2022).

This data indicated that the buzzer drove the issue. The research results from CIPG or the Center for Innovation Policy and Governance in 2017 outline four general characteristics of buzzers. 1) Buzzer had a wide network that made it easy to collect



**Figure 1**. Figure 1. Top Influencer kadrun (2022) (Source: Rahman, 2022)

**Table 2.** Social Media Accounts

| Attitudes towards *Kadrun* | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Anti Kadrun | 1870 | 78.9 |
| Pro Kadrun | 306 | 12.9 |
| Neutral | 48 | 2.0 |
| Indecisive | 145 | 6.1 |
| Total | 2369 | 100.0 |

Source: Research Data

**Table 3.** Who is *Kadrun*?

| Kadrun Identity | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Only mention Kadrun | 1634 | 68.9 |
| Tengku Zulkarnaen | 28 | 1.2 |
| Anies Baswedan | 102 | 4.3 |
| HTI (HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA) | 72 | 3.0 |
| FPI (ISLAMIC DEFENDER FRONT) | 45 | 1.9 |
| Habib Rizieq | 20 | 0.8 |
| Tarbiyah | 19 | 0.8 |
| Felix Siauw | 41 | 1.7 |
| Robe, turban, cingkrang (ankle short pants), of Arabic atmosphere | 20 | 0.8 |
| Islam | 6 | 0.3 |
| Haikal Hasan | 15 | 0.6 |
| Muhammad Said DIdu | 6 | 0.3 |
| Ustadz Abdul Somad | 2 | 0.1 |
| Ustadz Hilmi | 5 | 0.2 |
| Ratna Sarumpaet | 2 | 0.1 |
| 212 | 33 | 1.4 |
| Novel Bamukmin | 16 | 0.7 |
| KPAI (Indonesian Child Protection Commission) | 12 | 0.5 |
| Cendana | 16 | 0.7 |
| Musni Umar | 13 | 0.5 |
| GNPF Ulama | 3 | 0.1 |
| PKS (Social Welfare Party) | 6 | 0.3 |
| Beard | 2 | 0.1 |
| Fadli Zon | 7 | 0.3 |
| Denny Zulfikar Siregar | 199 | 8.4 |
| Andre Rosiade | 13 | 0.5 |
| Hassan Gamal Ahmad | 9 | 0.4 |
| Refly Harun | 12 | 0.5 |
| Yohanes Ignatius | 12 | 0.5 |

Source: Research Data

crucial information. Many followers were also part of the character of a broad network that one must have. 2). Buzzer could converse with audiences on social media timelines to make the message persuasive and personified 3). Content production abilities such as journalistic knowledge and information framing/selection were the third characteristics of buzzers. And 4). Motive, a buzzer could be paid or based on a voluntary decision driven by ideological reasons or satisfaction. PDI Perjuangan politician Budiman Sudjatmiko said that buzzers were effective for political purposes if they had a massive follower base. He gave an example: it only took 2-3 thousand political buzzers via Twitter to influence one million voters in Indonesia. The involvement of buzzers and influencers in the *Kadrun* issue could also be seen from the age of the account. Most accounts (around 50%) were over one year old. Only 33% of these accounts are under one year old.

Table 2 shows that most tweets about *Kadrun* were "anti-*Kadrun*" (78.9%), and only 12.9% support *Kadrun*, while only 2% are neutral. So, who exactly was *Kadrun* according to the perception of these Twitter users?

Table 3 shows that 68.9% of Twitter users only mentioned *Kadrun* without mentioning certain figures, organizations, or characteristics. Table 3 data also shows three types of *Kadrun* categories: individual, organizational and certain characters. The individuals called *kadrun* are Tengku Zulkarnaen, Refly Harun, Hassan Gamal Ahmad, Yohanes Ignatius, Hassan Gamal Ahmad, Denny Zulfikar Siregar, Fadli Zon, Musni Umar, Novel Bamukmin, Ratna Sarumpaet, Ustadz Hilmi, Ustadz Abdul Somad, Muhammad Said Didu, Haikal Hasan, Felix Siauw, Habib Rizieq, Anies Baswedan, and Tengku Zulkarnaen. These names further strengthen the thesis at the beginning that *kadrun* was a term to refer to those in opposition to President Joko Widodo's government. There was an interesting name in the *Kadrun* group, namely Denny Zulfikar Siregar, who was known as a social media activist who supported the government and was known to be anti-*Kadrun*. His name was added to Twitter as a form of satire because his name has "zulfikar" with an Arabian nuance.

The organizations called *kadrun* were HTI, FPI, Tarbiyah, Group 212, KPAI, Cendana, GNPF Ulama, and PKS. Apart from the Islamic groups that were in opposition to the government, such as HTI, FPI, Tarbiyah, the 212 Group and GNFF ulama, it was interesting that there are also the Cendana and KPAI groups that are included in *Kadrun*. The Cendana group is understood to be opposed to the government, while KPAI was called *kadrun* because of a statement that was considered

controversial regarding swimming pools and the possibility of women getting pregnant because sperm can survive in swimming pools.

Several words dominate the conversation in Drone Emprit Analysis (Rahman, 2022). These words were no different from the data in Table 3. The following words appeared.



**Figure 2**. Words cloud of Kadrun (Source: Rahman, 2022)

Characteristics categorized as *kadrun*: beard, black forehead, Islam, robe, turban, short-ankle pants, Arabic nuances. This is not something new because the image of radical Islamic groups has always been identified with these characteristics.

**Table 4.** Positive Attitude

| Perception toward Kadrun | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Anti Communist Party | 4 | 0.2 |
| Kadrun is not corruptor | 6 | 0.3 |
| Kadrun is a label for anti-Jokowi government | 56 | 2.4 |
| Kadrun term is not appropriate | 11 | 0.5 |
| Kadrun term was founded by the communist party | 36 | 1.5 |
| Do not be triggered by the term Kadrun | 6 | 0.3 |
| Kadrun by buzzer | 35 | 1.5 |
| Kadrun criticized Kadrun | 204 | 8.6 |
| Kadrun is for the opposing party | 5 | 0.2 |
| Desiring Islamic values | 68 | 2.9 |

Source: Research Data

Table 4 shows several opinions that support *Kadrun*. Netizens who were pro-*kadrun* thought that *kadrun* was only a label for critics of Jokowi's government or those who did not submit to the

**Table 5.** Who is *Kadrun*?

| Perceptions on Kadrun | Number | % |
|---|---|---|
| Indecisive | 183 | 7.7 |
| Opposing party from the presidential election (Pro Prabowo) | 33 | 1.4 |
| Prevets | 51 | 2.2 |
| Minority in Islamic groups | 3 | .1 |
| Religion for politics | 169 | 7.0 |
| Stupid | 296 | 12.5 |
| Dividers of National Unity | 26 | 1.1 |
| Radicals, anti-Pancasila | 39 | 1.6 |
| Agitated | 25 | 1.1 |
| Hoax spreader | 167 | 7.0 |
| Non NU Islam | 6 | .3 |
| Dangerous | 233 | 9.6 |
| Trouble makers | 54 | 2.3 |
| Anti China | 51 | 2.2 |
| Traitor | 10 | .4 |
| Corona virus spreader | 36 | 1.5 |
| Fake religious leaders | 116 | 4.9 |
| Right-wing extremist | 81 | 3.4 |
| Blaming others | 25 | 1.1 |
| Children exploiters | 23 | 1.0 |
| Intoleran | 5 | .2 |
| Damaging the nation's assets | 144 | 6.1 |
| envious | 100 | 4.2 |
| Against "Ahok" | 9 | .4 |
| Henchmen of KKN groups | 17 | .7 |

Source: Research Data

government, a label for groups with different political views and was a term promoted by buzzers and uttered by the PKI group. *Kadrun* was an anti-communist party, not a perpetrator of corruption and wanted the implementation of Islamic law. They asked the public not to be provoked by the term *kadrun*.

So, who is *Kadrun*, according to netizens? From Table 7, the following are the main characteristics of *Kadrun* perceived by netizens, namely: (1) "Goblog" and stupid; (2) Religion for political interests; (3) Right-wing extremists; (4) Hoax spreaders; (5) Damaging the nations' assets; (6) Fake religious leaders; (7) Envious; (8) Provocateur; and (9) Group who lost the presidential election (Pro Prabowo Group)

The term *kadrun* was initially represented by groups outside Jokowi and Prabowo supporters who rejected the Republic of Indonesia. The groups here are often compared to HTI, FPI, and Defense

Action 212. However, based on previous data, *kadrun* is not only aimed at pro-Prabowo groups and Islamic groups but also all government opposition. Data shows that *Kadrun* targets figures and organizations both based on Islam and the Islamic era who are critical of Joko Widodo's government. So, the term *kadrun* does not only apply to extreme Islamic groups.

*Kadrun*, as a form of stigma in social media, makes us more aware of the role of social media today. Media is a social and cultural force that shapes the construction of reality. Media has become a dominant source for individuals to obtain images of social reality and society and groups (Novianti, 2014). The media chooses which events are worthy of exposure as news material and which they think are inappropriate. The media also chooses people or figures as news sources based on their criteria, so the reporting results tend to be one-sided. Thus, the media also defines events and news sources. Through reporting, the media can frame an event in a certain frame. The events that have been framed are what the public hears and reads. The audience cannot see it from their frame (Muslich, 2008).

The war of hashtags and opinions on social media is caused by the belief that social media can change beliefs, values and attitudes, world views, social organizations, human nature, and perceptions about oneself and others. Brittain & Clack (2007) states that the internet is changing the way political communication is done. Changes in political communication are marked through social media, where power is not opposed to violence but with relaxed discourse. Power is ridiculed, teased, and even played with (Ibrahim, 2011).

In fact, the social media war can impact the real world and disrupt social harmony. *Kadrun* and "cebong" (toad pole) wars on social media can trigger open conflict. Moreover, this conflict continues to be fostered by buzzers. Buzzers in Indonesia use disinformation and manipulate the media to mislead the targeted parties. Apart from that, buzzers in Indonesia are deployed to strengthen content on social media. Buzzers actively create content such as memes, videos, fake news sites or manipulated media to mislead users. This situation will cause fear that will easily give rise to feelings of suspicion, prejudice, jealousy, and hatred based on ethnicity, race, and religion. The buzzer account causes chaos and conflict.

The pro-government buzzers are very reactionary, especially when responding to criticism from the people towards the Government and the DPR (House of Representatives). The impact is that

society is confused; people must re-check facts and opinions before sharing them on social media platforms.

Buzzer strengthens the existence of Post-truth in society. Post-truth is characterized by blurring the boundaries between lies and truth stories (Kalpokas, 2019). Post-truth emerged due to many factors, including a decline in trust in science, social and economic inequality, and a decline in social capital.

In Nasikun's (1987) view, the most important factor that can avoid open conflict and have the power to integrate a social system is consensus among members of society regarding certain societal values. This consensus needs to be built, and the state has a role. Brown (1997) has warned that at the systemic level, the first cause of conflict is the weakness of state authority, both national and international, to prevent existing groups from conflicting with each other and at the domestic level this is related to the government's ability to fulfill the will of its people. It must also be understood that the conflict between *Kadrun* and Cebong is not only due to political and power conflicts but is caused by basic human needs - physical, mental and social which are not met or identity which is threatened, which is often rooted in the loss of something or unresolved suffering in the past. The question is whether Indonesia will continue to allow the *Kadrun* and Cebong conflict and the stigmatization accompanying it or end it as soon as possible? Finally, Brown (1997) warns that the most appropriate way to deal with conflict between social groups is to handle it as early as possible, before the problem becomes more complicated and greater violence occurs, which we do not want.

**CONCLUSION**
Historical studies show that the stigmatization of Islam is a recurring phenomenon. The stigma against Islam in Indonesia is closer to political and power struggles. The facts show that Islamic stigmatization occurs mainly during political events such as presidential elections, which were initiated during the colonized era to today. During the Dutch era, the term "extremist" and "rebel" began to appear among Muslims who resisted the colonial government. The stigma against Islam in the colonial government initiated by Snouck Hunronje then continued during the Old Order and New Order. The stigmatization of Islam that emerged after independence was due to the DI/TII Movement and acts of terrorism. This situation was made worse by the ideological conflict during the liberal and guided democracy era. During the New Order era the

terms "Right-Wing extremist" and " Jihad Commando " appeared. The stigmatization of "Right-Wing extremist" was not only directed at the Jihad Commando group but was also more directed at Islamic organizations that opposed or did not support the policies of the New Order.

In the Reformasi era, terrorists such as Jamaaan Islamiyyah, Al Qaida, and ISIS gave rise to other forms of stigmatization since the 2014 presidential election battle with the terms Kampret, Cebong, and *Kadrun*. Thus, "*Kadrun*" is a result of Indonesian historical differing views on Islam and the country. *Kadrun* is not only aimed at hardcore Islamic groups but also all government opposition.

This research is limited to studying only three terms, namely Right-Wing extremist, jihad commando, and *kadrun*, even though many other terms show the same connotation, one of which is fundamentalist, terrorist, and so on. Apart from that, this research needs to be followed up with an in-depth study of various other stigmas against Islam, especially those unrelated to politics. Stigma in Islam is not only related to social politics or the dynamics of relations between religion and the state but is also related to the socio-economic conditions of Indonesian Muslims. For example, the stigma on traditional santri groups is considered outdated, and "old-fashioned santri" or "teklekan santri" is used. Stigma can also arise in interactions between fellow adherents of Islam from different sects, such as the terms Salafi, Wahhabi, and Nahdhiyin. The semantic historical approach can be further developed to explore these terms.

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