

## Pancasila and the Long Shadow of Suharto's Authoritarianism, 1966-1998

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**Abstract:** This paper aims to analyze the history of the development of the political interpretation of Pancasila under Suharto's authoritarian rule between 1966 and 1998. The research questions are: 1) how did Pancasila become the ideological basis for authoritarian power? 2) How did Pancasila become the basis for pseudo-democracy during the Suharto government? This research was carried out using historical methods, relying on data from archives and newspapers from 1966 to 1998. Analysis of this research data used Historical Discourses Analysis (HDA). The findings show that Pancasila, at the beginning of the Suharto government, was trying to be cleansed of the influence of Sukarno and communism. In this period, Pancasila was reinterpreted. The success of the Suharto government in reinterpreting Pancasila was due to de-sukarnoization efforts and strict control over elements of society. In subsequent developments, Pancasila became the label and slogan in every government policy, the most famous of which was 'Pancasila Democracy', a system designed to show that the Suharto government was the savior and protector of Pancasila, which can be considered a pseudo-democracy. This democratic system does not prioritize freedom of expression and political autonomy of society. Research regarding the political interpretation of Pancasila will continue to be carried out to analyze the extent to which this idea can continue to be relevant in application in Indonesia.

**Abstrak:** Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis sejarah perkembangan politik penafsiran Pancasila pada masa pemerintahan otoriter Soeharto antara tahun 1966 sampai dengan tahun 1998. Pertanyaan penelitiannya adalah: 1) bagaimana Pancasila menjadi dasar ideologis kekuasaan otoriter? 2) Bagaimana Pancasila menjadi dasar demokrasi semu pada masa pemerintahan Soeharto? Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode historis, dengan mengandalkan data dari arsip dan surat kabar tahun 1966 sampai dengan tahun 1998. Analisis data penelitian ini menggunakan Historical Discourses Analysis (HDA). Hasil temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Pancasila pada awal pemerintahan Soeharto sedang berusaha dibersihkan dari pengaruh Sukarno dan komunisme. Pada periode ini, Pancasila diinterpretasikan ulang. Keberhasilan pemerintahan Soeharto dalam melakukan reinterpretasi Pancasila tidak lepas dari upaya de-sukarnoisasi dan kontrol yang ketat terhadap elemen masyarakat. Dalam perkembangan selanjutnya, Pancasila menjadi label dan slogan dalam setiap kebijakan pemerintah, yang paling terkenal adalah 'Demokrasi Pancasila', sebuah sistem yang dirancang untuk menunjukkan bahwa pemerintahan Soeharto adalah penyelamat dan pelindung Pancasila, yang dapat dianggap sebagai demokrasi semu. Sistem demokrasi ini tidak mengutamakan kebebasan berekspresi dan otonomi politik masyarakat. Penelitian mengenai interpretasi politik Pancasila akan terus dilakukan untuk menganalisis sejauh mana gagasan ini dapat terus relevan dalam penerapannya di Indonesia.

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## INTRODUCTION

Contemporary studies on the history of Pancasila often grapple with the ideology's position in the early days of independence and its interpretation following the democratic era (reformation). Debates about who was the founder, whether Pancasila is an ideology, and if it is the ideal foundation for the state are more readily found in the writings of previous researchers. More recently, as tensions between nationalists and religious groups rise, studies on the relationship between Pancasila and religion have gained traction. For example, Tsoraya and Asbari (2023) examined Yudi Latif's thoughts on Pancasila and religion. Putri et al. (2022) explored the discourse of Pancasila and religion. Husna et al. (2022) studied the intersections of Pancasila and religion. These three studies do not only prove that research on the history of Pancasila has not yet touched on essential aspects. However, there was a time when Pancasila grew as an ideology amidst an Authoritarian Government during Soeharto's New Order regime.

The ideology of an authoritarian system is a framework that supports and legitimizes authoritarian governance in a region (Grigoryev et al., 2022; Malka et al., 2022) where power is centralized in the hands of a leader or an unelected elite group (Abuzayyad, 2023; Bruce, 2023; Dunwoody et al., 2022; Elfert, 2023). Authoritarian ideology is often used to explain why such governments have robust control over various aspects of societal life. The New Order is a representation of an authoritarian system in Indonesian history. Pancasila served as a complement to the authoritarian system that developed at that time (Shimada, 2022). The power of the New Order led to a new interpretation of Pancasila, which, for specific purposes, created changes that drew Pancasila into an anti-democratic condition (Bourchier & Jusuf, 2023).

In a regime filled with control over societal elements, an authoritarian ideology can emphasize the importance of national unity and often use nationalist rhetoric to strengthen government authority (Avendaño et al., 2022). The New Order is known as a government that did not care much for civil rights (Jones, 2013), even tending to impose substantial limitations. The government's authority during the New Order spawned a new interpretation of Pancasila. In an authoritarian political system, the political authority has significant control over decision-making and often does not allow free political participation or healthy political competition (Crouch, 2022; Wiratraman, 2022).

This research analyzes the New Order gov-

ernment's interpretation of Pancasila and how the regime maintained power with its version of Pancasila. The research questions are: 1) How did Pancasila become the ideological foundation for authoritarian power? and 2) How did Pancasila serve as the basis for a pseudo-democracy during Soeharto's Administration? This study focuses on discourse analysis of authoritarianism, which seeks to control every element within the state with a singularly interpreted ideology. It contributes to the study of Pancasila's history to enrich insights into interpretations, implementations, functions, and the relevance of Pancasila in the political life of the Indonesian nation. Research on Pancasila and authoritarianism yields reflective ideas beneficial for researchers and practitioners concerned with research, socialization, and the internalization of Pancasila.

## METHOD

This research was conducted using the historical method. This method application refers to the systematic approach historians use to excavate, understand, and analyze past events (Milligan, 2022). In this research, the historical method was employed to comprehend human history within the political dynamics of authoritarianism during the New Order era (1966-1998), as it paves the way for researchers to articulate Pancasila's position under the authoritarian New Order regime.

The steps carried out by researchers in the study are as follows: 1) source collection, namely gathering historical sources such as written documents in the form of archives and contemporary newspapers; Other supporting sources include photographs and notes about events during the New Order era; 2) source criticism, namely critically assessing source reliability, bias, and accuracy. This involves in-depth research to ensure the trustworthiness of the sources; 3) source interpretation, namely interpreting the information contained within the sources. Researchers attempt to understand the context, background, and messages within these sources; 4) the construction of the historical narrative, namely compiling a historical narrative focusing on a specific topic or period based on source analysis. This narrative explains the events, changes, and developments during that period, and 5) reflection and criticism, namely reflecting on the findings and welcoming criticism from fellow historians. This helps to enhance the quality of historical research and ensure the accuracy of historical interpretation.

Data analysis in this research utilizes the His-

torical Discourses Analysis (HDA) (Howarth & Griggs, 2016). HDA is an analytical method used in historical studies to uncover and understand the role of narratives, discourses, and language in the formation of historical representations. This method assists researchers in understanding how narratives and discourses about past events are created, disseminated, and utilized in society. Here is a description of the Historical Discourses Analysis model: The first step in HDA is identifying the relevant discourses within the research context. Discourses are words, ideas, and concepts used to shape a narrative or representation of a particular historical event. This can include official narratives, alternative narratives, myths, political rhetoric, and more. HDA involves analyzing texts and documents related to the identified discourses. Researchers examine historical documents, articles, and books containing relevant narrative or discursive elements. HDA also analyzes the underlying ideologies of discourses and their relationship to expressions of power. This aids in understanding how discourses are used to reinforce or undermine authority. The results of the HDA analysis are used to develop interpretations and conclusions about how discourses influence historical representation, thus providing deeper insights into how society perceives and manages history.

#### **FORMULATION OF PANCASILA AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE STATE AND IDEOLOGY**

On September 1, 1939, the outbreak of World War II (1939-1945) saw the Allied powers confront the Axis powers. The Netherlands was invaded by Nazi Germany on May 5, 1940, and succumbed on May 10, 1940, leading Queen Wilhemina and her government officials to flee to England. This allowed the Dutch government to maintain communication with the colonial administration in Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2005). The Dutch government's promises of eventual independence for Indonesia were merely a strategy to ensure the smooth operation of their administrative system in Indonesia at that time. The Dutch promises of future Indonesian independence were empty lies, as independence never materialized even by the time of the Dutch surrender to Nazi Germany on May 10, 1940.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, a vital United States naval base in the Pacific Ocean, triggering the Pacific War (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 1984). Within a short period, Japan had taken control of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Japan recognized the

challenge of controlling Indonesia, considering the long-established Dutch (Western) influence. To gain the support of the Indonesian people, Japan exerted extra effort, broadcasting the "Indonesia Raya" anthem daily on the radio and promoting the message of equality and unity against Western colonization (Dutch).

Japan allowed Indonesians to hoist the red-white flag and sing their national anthem, "Indonesia Raya". The Japanese deception was effective, with many Indonesians supporting Japan's efforts to expel the Dutch. The trust Japan built became their main asset in rallying support for their campaign in the Greater East Asia War (Benda, 1955; Katzenstein & Shiraishi, 1997). Capitalizing on this trust, Japan formed youth organizations (Seinendan), women's associations (Fujinkai), the PETA military force, and suicide squads to prepare for any allied countermeasures (Ricklefs, 2005). Furthermore, Japan convinced the predominantly Muslim Indonesian population that dying in battle for the homeland was the most honorable death ("suhada").

In reality, the Japanese occupation government in Indonesia turned out to be far more brutal than Dutch colonial rule. The cruelty of the Japanese led to the rebellion of the PETA troops in Blitar, East Java (Aziz, 2012). The Indonesian people were deeply disappointed by the deceitful nature of the Japanese. Consequently, "underground" resistance against Japan arose. On another front, Japan began to be overwhelmed by the onslaught of the Allied forces. The Indonesian people's disappointment quickly became evident. Japan was well aware that if this discontent were not promptly addressed, it would jeopardize their effort to win the Greater East Asia War. To address this disappointment, Japan promised to grant Indonesia independence as a future reward eventually (Arsyad, 1979). In response to this Japanese promise, there were two prevailing attitudes among the Indonesian freedom fighters. Some believed in Japan's promise, while others doubted its sincerity. Those who agreed continued to commit all efforts to assist Japan in the war against the Allies (Mahmud, 1975). Those who were skeptical viewed the promise of independence as nothing more than a Japanese tactic to maintain sympathy and support from the Indonesian people against the Allies.

As a follow-up to that promise, especially for those who doubted it, Japan reasserted that if the promise were to be realized, it questioned whether Indonesia was ready to become an independent nation, specifying the criteria to be met by a sover-

eign state. For instance, it asked whether Indonesia was prepared with a foundational national philosophy (Anderson, 1988; Reid, 1980). On March 1, 1945, Japan announced the formation of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (BPUPKI) to affirm and provide evidence of Japan's commitment to its promise. This body was officially established on April 29, 1945, inaugurated on May 28, 1945, and commenced work on May 29, 1945. It had 60 members, led by Dr. Radjiman Widiyodiningrat (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 1984).

The establishment of the BPUPKI legally allowed the Indonesian nation to prepare for independence and to formulate the requirements that a sovereign state must meet. The first issue discussed at the BPUPKI sessions was the "Foundation of the State." The BPUPKI sessions were divided into two parts: the first session took place from May 29 to June 1, 1945, and the outcomes of this session were to be further discussed in the second session scheduled for July 14 to 16, 1945 (BPUPKI, 1995). The first BPUPKI session lasted four days, during which three figures consecutively delivered speeches proposing ideas for the nation's foundational principles. On the first day, May 29, 1945, Mr. Mohammad Yamin was allowed to deliver his speech. On May 31, 1945, Mr. Soepomo presented his address; on the last day, June 1, 1945, it was Ir. Sukarno's turn to deliver a speech on the proposed foundational principles of the state (Indonesia, 1995).

In his speech, Mr. Mohammad Yamin proposed the following tenets for the foundation of the Indonesian state: 1) Nationality; 2) Humanity; 3) Divinity; 4) Democracy (deliberation and representation); and 5) Social Welfare (social justice). Although Mr. Mohammad Yamin's speech contained these five proposals, he did not assign a specific name to them. At the end of his speech, he also presented a draft constitution for Indonesia, starting with a preamble (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 1984).

Unlike Mr. Mohammad Yamin's proposal, Mr. Soepomo initiated his speech by outlining theories of the state as follows: 1) Individualist state theory. According to this perspective, the state is a legal society formed by a social contract among individuals; 2) Class theory of the state, often referred to as group theory. This theory suggests that the state is a tool of one class to oppress another. The capitalist state serves the bourgeoisie; thus, Marxists advocate seizing power so that the proletariat may, in turn, oppress the bourgeoisie (Ross, 2012). In his speech about the proposed basis of the state, Mr.

Soepomo presented five elements for consideration, which included: 1) Nationalism/internationalism; 2) Subservience to God; 3) Democracy; 4) Kinship; and 5) People's justice. On this occasion, although Mr. Soepomo proposed five elements, he had not yet named them.

Ir. Sukarno's proposal for the state's foundation during the first BPUPKI session was delivered orally without a written text. He suggested a state foundation consisting of five principles, formulated as follows: 1) Nationalism (Indonesian nationality); 2) Internationalism (humanitarianism); 3) Deliberation (democracy); 4) Social welfare; and 5) Belief in One Supreme God (cultured divinity). Ir. Sukarno proposed naming these five principles "Pancasila." Participants asked Ir. Sukarno about the origin of the name "Pancasila." He straightforwardly replied that a linguistically skilled friend suggested the name. According to Ir. Sukarno, the five principles could be further condensed into "Tri Sila" (three principles): 1) Socio-nationalism, a synthesis of nationalism and humanitarianism; 2) Socio-democracy, a synthesis of democracy and social welfare; and 3) The divinity concept. Furthermore, Ir. Sukarno proposed that "Tri Sila" could be further reduced to "Eka Sila" (one principle), fundamentally representing mutual cooperation (Weatherbee, 1985).

Ir. Sukarno suggested that Pancasila should be the philosophical foundation and worldview of the Indonesian nation (*philosophische grondslag*), equivalent to the major world philosophies as a *weltanschauung*, upon which the Indonesian state should be established. His speech was particularly compelling because it was delivered orally, creating the impression that what was presented in the session was thoroughly prepared by Ir. Sukarno based on his experience advocating for his nation's independence. Second, in his speech, Ir. Sukarno also compared the philosophical basis of "Pancasila" with other major world ideologies, such as Liberalism, Communism, Cosmopolitanism, San Min Chui, Chauvinism, and others.

Sukarno's speech at the first BPUPKI session is noteworthy because it closely resembled his speech on July 4, 1927, when Ir. Sukarno, Cipto Mangunkusumo, Sartono, and other leaders founded the Indonesian National Party. Marhaenism, the principle of the Indonesian National Party, included three foundations: 1) Divinity, 2) Socio-nationalism, and 3) Socio-democracy. This means three of the five principles proposed in the June 1, 1945, speech had been previously articulated during the founding of the PNI on July 4, 1927 (Valentina,

2022).

The second BPUPKI session continued with an agenda to discuss the proposed foundations of the state presented by three figures from May 29 to June 1, 1945. The discussion of the three proposals was no longer undertaken by all BPUPKI members, but rather by nine trusted individuals, later known as the "Committee of Nine", comprising: 1) Ir. Sukarno; 2) Drs. Moh. Hatta; 3) Mr. A.A. Maramis; 4) Abikoeno Tjokrosoejoso; 5) Abdoel Kahar Muzakir; 6) Haji Agus Salim; 7) Mr. Ahmad Soebardjo; 8) K.H. Wachid Hasym; and 9) Mr. Mohammad Yamin (BPUPKI, 1995). Through intensive meetings (July 14–16, 1945), the Committee of Nine eventually reached a significant result, a formulation of Pancasila, known as the "Jakarta Charter", composed as follows: 1) Belief in God with the obligation to follow the Islamic sharia for its adherents; 2) Just and civilized humanity; 3) The unity of Indonesia; 4) Democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation; and 5) Social justice for the entire Indonesian people.

The formulation and systemization of Pancasila, as captured in the Jakarta Charter, was accepted by the BPUPKI in the session of July 14–16, 1945. However, Pancasila, as the foundation of the state, was not yet finalized since BPUPKI was not seen as a fully representative body. As an entity created by the Japanese, it was considered yet to be reflective of Indonesian representation. To address this, it was imperative to establish a committee to prepare for Indonesia's independence promptly (Anderson, 2006).

On August 7, the PPKI was announced to be formed, and by August 9, 1945, the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) began its work, with Ir. Sukarno as chairman and Drs. Moh. Hatta as vice-chairman. PPKI's membership consisted entirely of Indonesians tasked with reviewing BPUPKI's work to prepare for the nation's independence. Post-independence, the membership of PPKI was perfected to become a National Body. Initially, PPKI's role was to examine BPUPKI's work; subsequently, it held critical positions and functions: 1) Representing all Indonesians; 2) Acting as the state-forming body (organizing the Republic of Indonesia post-Independence Proclamation on August 17, 1945); and 3) According to legal theory, such a body has the authority to establish the foundation of the state (Indonesia, 1995).

On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies. Despite efforts to keep Japan's defeat secret, the intelligence and agility of the youth, espe-

cially those working in the News Office, ensured that the news reached the leaders of the Indonesian movement. Meanwhile, the Allies assigned Britain the task of disarming Japan. The delay in this mandate led to a power vacuum in Indonesia. It was this defeat of Japan and the subsequent power vacuum that national youth leaders used as a basis to urge Ir. Sukarno and Drs. Moh. Hatta to declare Indonesia's independence as soon as possible. Ultimately, at 10:00 AM Jakarta time, on the 56th Pegangsaan Timur Street in Jakarta, the "Proclamation of Indonesian Independence" was announced by the duo (Sukarno-Hatta) on August 17, 1945, on behalf of the Indonesian people.

Internal recognition (de facto) of Indonesia as an independent state was insufficient. It was essential to achieve international recognition (de jure). To this end, immediate actions were needed to organize independent Indonesia, such as establishing the State Foundation, Constitution, President and Vice-President, and other state apparatus. On the morning of August 18, 1945, before the session that would adopt the 1945 Constitution as the State Constitution, there was a proposal from Maluku, North Sulawesi, and Bali (Lesser Sunda Islands) to change the wording of the first principle from "Belief in God with the obligation for its adherents to practice Islamic law" to "Belief in the Almighty God."

The PPKI session on August 18, 1945, ultimately established the Constitution, later known as the 1945 Constitution, and Pancasila as the State Foundation, as stated in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. At that time, Ir. Sukarno was elected President and Drs. Moh. Hatta as Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, making Indonesia de facto and de jure an independent state. Pancasila was agreed upon as the complete foundation of the state, embodying the nation's identity, a common home for all citizens because diversity is a gift, and Pancasila serves as the foundation, ideology, and philosophy of an open nation.

#### **PANCASILA AND AUTHORITARIAN POWER**

Pancasila is the foundational philosophy of Indonesia, comprising five principles that guide the nation's development and governance. These principles are Belief in the One and Only God, Just and Civilized Humanity, the Unity of Indonesia, Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom in the Unanimity Amongst Representatives, and Social Justice for the Whole of the People of Indonesia. Pancasila underscores unity, democracy, and justice as core

values in the nation's governance.

The authoritarian power of the New Order refers to the regime under President Soeharto from 1967 to 1998. It was characterized by strong authoritarianism, with centralized power in the hands of Soeharto and his military elite. This period is noted for human rights abuses, suppression of free speech, and the silencing of political opposition. Corruption, collusion, and nepotism were rampant despite economic progress in certain areas.

Under its rule, the New Order utilized Pancasila as the sole ideology to maintain political stability, sometimes shielding flawed governmental policies. Pancasila is a crystallization of noble values predating Indonesia's independence, formulated by the nation's founders to lay the foundation for a free state, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. On August 18, 1945, the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was established (Razman, 1980), officially adopting Pancasila in its Preamble as the state's foundation. Therefore, Pancasila's inherent values must fundamentally guide Indonesia's governance.

Since independence, the role of Pancasila has continually evolved. It went along in 1949 with the RIS Constitution, in 1950 with the Provisional Constitution, and returning to the 1945 Constitution in 1959 with a democratic conception until the New Order regime in 1966--claiming to implement Pancasila purely and consistently. From the beginning of independence until 1966, Pancasila was considered not to have been implemented purely and consistently, especially in 1959 with Guided Democracy (Ricklefs, 2005). Moreover, in the period 1959-1965, there were attempts to combine Pancasila with an ideology that was clearly opposed to it, which led to the G30S incident.

Based on the view of the impurity and inconsistency in implementing Pancasila before 1966, the New Order regime led by General Soeharto, which replaced the Old Order regime led by Ir. Sukarno, proceeded with the spirit of implementing Pancasila purely and consistently (Azhar, 1984). This can be seen from the numerous policies issued by the New Order regime related to the implementation of Pancasila. Pancasila, as the foundation of the state, as an ideology, as a worldview, and as a guideline in society, was vigorously pursued by the New Order regime. The *Ekaprasetya Panca Karsa* (Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila or P4) and the Sole Principle of Pancasila are examples of the New Order's policies related to the pure and consistent implementation of Pancasila.

The *Ekaprasetya Panca Karsa* policy is out-

lined in Tap MPR No.II/MPR/1978. Article one states, "This Guideline for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila is not an interpretation of Pancasila as the State Foundation, nor is it intended to interpret the State Foundation of Pancasila as stipulated in the Preamble, the Body, and the Explanatory of the 1945 Constitution" (MPR, 1978). Article two further explains that these guidelines serve as a directive and a foundation for social and state life for every Indonesian citizen, state administrator, and all state and societal institutions at both central and regional levels, to be implemented wholly and integrally. This indicates that the New Order regime sought to provide a framework for the community to implement Pancasila, yet further circumstances must be addressed.

As a state foundation with its logical consequences, the New Order regime reinforced Pancasila's position in relation to political parties and social organizations. The government issued Law No. 8/1985 and Law No. 3/1985, mandating that Political Parties and the *Golongan Karya*, as well as Social Organizations, must be based on Pancasila as their sole principle. This principle pertains to societal life, nationality, and state governance (Pranoto, 2020). These facts demonstrate that the New Order regime positioned Pancasila as the fundamental principle and ideology that the Indonesian nation must implement purely and consistently. This follows logically from adopting the 1945 Constitution as the state foundation on August 18, 1945.

However, the New Order's proclaimed pure and consistent implementation of Pancasila eventually led to the term "hegemony." Hegemony refers to the influence of leadership, domination, or power. In relation to Pancasila, during the New Order, leadership exerted influence or domination using the ideology of Pancasila to maintain power. This hegemony spanned all aspects of life; state control over societal elements was strong, leaving almost no room to oppose or reject government policies.

#### **NEW ORDER'S POLITICAL HEGEMONY: 'SINGLE PRINCIPLE OF PANCASILA'**

The emergence of the term or policy of the Single Principle of Pancasila was indeed a result of the political climate during the New Order era. In the early days of the New Order, a regime led by Soeharto, there was an assertion that his leadership was the legitimate and constitutional successor to the first president. Drawing from Sukarno's ideological legacy, this new government adopted Pancasila as the sole foundation of the state, which was seen as the most appropriate means to legitimize its power. The

term "New Order" was communicated as a desire to introduce a new, improved condition over the old one to society. Reorienting the economy, politics, and international relations and ensuring national stability were initial steps enforced by the New Order (Dulmanan, 2015).

The New Order regime was able to indoctrinate the public with the belief that any coup against a legitimate government or attempt to replace the Pancasila ideology was wrong and had to be eradicated completely. This 'propaganda' appeared to be successful, particularly in light of the extreme mass violence between October 1965 and early 1966, a 'massacre' of individuals suspected of communist affiliations (Rahman, 1982). The national instability under Guided Democracy and the attempted coup convinced many, not just the military, of the necessity to 'depoliticize' society. The New Order coalition, consisting of the military (as the dominant force), youth-student groups, Muslims, intellectuals, democrats, etc., was able to garner the necessary support to overthrow Sukarno in March 1966. From that point on, the New Order cemented its influence by focusing on Pancasila and establishing it as the ideological pillar of the regime (Emmerson, 1983). Pancasila thus became an ideological justification for the ruling elite, no longer just a common platform for all ideologies to meet. It became increasingly formalized as the state ideology, with no other ideology recognized as legitimate for the state. This initial intent seems to have strengthened the New Order's power and provided a more solid national stability than the Old Order.

For the New Order, debates over the state ideology, particularly between Islamic and nationalist groups, did not enhance national stability but rather highlighted a fragile political structure. Learning from the history of the Old Order, which was somewhat permissive in allowing the growth of other ideologies, proved fatal for maintaining stability.

This is why Soeharto and key New Order figures such as Adam Malik emphasized the importance of Pancasila for the New Order. Pancasila became the most effective tool for minimizing the emergence of any power outside the state. Early in its rule, the New Order appeared to have resolved its ideological legitimacy issues. By 1966 and 1967, the foundations of a government legitimized by the ideology of Pancasila began to be laid. By mid-1966, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) had purged itself of all Sukarno supporters, legitimizing the transfer of power to Lieutenant General Soeharto on July 5, 1966, and addressing

the 'deviations' in implementing Pancasila and the Constitution that had occurred during Sukarno's Old Order.

MPRS Decree No. XX/MPRS/1966 stated that the New Order led by Lieutenant General Soeharto was based on the Constitution and Pancasila and would implement the objectives of the Revolution. This decree recognized the validity, legality, and revolutionary spirit of the Constitution and Pancasila (Sajid, 2018). More importantly, the MPRS stated that the highest source of national law was the 'spirit' of Pancasila, which it recognized as a reflection of national character and above the main body of the 1945 Constitution.

Under the New Order, Pancasila truly became the most effective ideological force in its efforts to entrench its power. The New Order clearly defended Pancasila as an ideology, so any major threat to the nation (or power) was seen as a threat to Pancasila, as evidenced by the destruction of all forms of rebellion. Adam Malik cited MPRS Decree No. XX/MPRS/1966 as proof that Pancasila was indeed a legal and 'moral' source of authority and legitimacy in Indonesia. Thus, Pancasila could not be implemented if elements within the nation did not align with the 'national character,' such as 'foreign ideologies' that advocated for opposition political parties, as in the West (Malik, 1973).

This condition proved how difficult it was to find any external force daring to criticize the state during the New Order. Opposition movements would not only be eradicated but also contribute to societal chaos. In certain circumstances, the emergence of opposition was not in accordance with Pancasila. This is evidence of how the New Order seemed inextricably linked to Pancasila, as it was the starting point for the regime.

Thus began the era in which the New Order successfully convinced the public of its consistency in maintaining Pancasila as the state ideology. It even used Pancasila as a tool to legitimize and strengthen its power, immune to challenges from other forces. The New Order became synonymous with Pancasila, such that any criticism was 'suspected' of being an attempt to change the state ideology, which had to be completely eradicated, not only by repressive state apparatus borrowing Althusser's term, like the president, ministers, the Armed Forces, and the judiciary, but also by ideological state apparatus, such as religious institutions, education, mass media, and so on.

The 'forced' merger of parties in 1973 is a clear example of the government's dependence on the national ideology to create Pancasila democracy

and legitimize its actions. However, it was not until 1978 that the New Order government launched an ideological offensive intended to further establish parameters and controls over political discourse in Indonesia. The culmination was on March 22, 1978, when the MPR ratified a decree on the 'Guidelines for the Understanding and Implementation of Pancasila (P4)', known as MPR Decree No.II/MPR/1978. This decree became crucial as it was linked to the MPR's five-year development plan guidelines. With P4, a national Pancasila indoctrination program began, strictly implemented through ideological education programs (Morfit, 1981).

During the 1978 MPR discussions on the P4 decree, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) faction within the PPP (United Development Party) protested by walking out of the Assembly. Sidney Jones stated that at that time, NU was the last mass (Islamic) organization in Indonesia that still harbored political aspirations and was thus 'suspected' by the regime because, in 1971, it refused to comply with the New Order's guidelines on political behavior and later in 1981, NU declined to support Soeharto for a third term or bestow upon him the title of 'Father of Development.' In other words, NU acted as if it were an independent party (Asmar, 2020). This behavior led to accusations from the regime of being 'anti-Pancasila,' as in a 1980 speech by President Soeharto where he attacked NU's walkout with such charges.

The circumstances depicted above show the New Order President beginning to deal firmly and harshly with any 'force' that would not accept Pancasila as the ideology. This culminated in the proclamation of the single principle of Pancasila, meaning no other foundation but Pancasila in political parties or social organizations. This was enshrined in Law No. 3 of 1985, establishing Pancasila as the sole principle for Political Parties. Shortly after Law No. 3 of 1985 was enacted, the New Order issued a policy on Pancasila as the single principle for social organizations through Law No. 8 of 1985 (Dulmanan, 2015). Social organizations were given two years to adopt Pancasila as their sole principle.

On March 27 and April 16, 1980, President Soeharto issued this warning through his speeches at the ABRI elders meeting in Pekanbaru. He stated that before the New Order, Pancasila had been threatened by other ideologies, such as Marxism, Leninism, communism, socialism, nationalism, and religion. Every organization in the country had to accept Pancasila as its ideology. Hence, the armed forces must support groups that defend and follow

Pancasila. Soeharto even implied that ABRI should back Golkar (the Party of Functional Groups) because it supports a government that upholds Pancasila, thereby standing above politics. According to David Jenkins, Soeharto and his allies in ABRI believed that if the military were 'neutral' in the General Election, the Islamic party (PPP) would defeat Golkar. From Soeharto's speeches, Islam was clearly portrayed as a threat to Pancasila; hence, ABRI's neutrality was tantamount to endangering Pancasila.

In his annual speech to the DPR on August 16, 1982, President Soeharto reiterated that "all social and political forces must declare that their ideological foundation is solely Pancasila." This statement further emphasized the hegemony of ideology, something unprecedented in Indonesian history, where the state effectively used ideological hegemony as the New Order did (Indrayani & Purnomo, 2023).

Thus, the New Order's journey was essentially based on the desire to 'strengthen' and 'embed' the ideology of Pancasila as the sole legitimate state ideology. 'Sheltering' behind Pancasila, the New Order, supported by its allies (ABRI, Golkar, and the bureaucracy), became an extraordinary force in Indonesia, untouchable by any power. Any force outside the 'state' mainstream at that time was seen as undermining the Pancasila ideology. After communism was vanquished, Soeharto still perceived another 'dangerous' force: Islam. The subsequent establishment of Pancasila as the sole principle further clarified the state's political interests using the Pancasila ideology. Regardless of their form and nature, all organisations had to include Pancasila as the principle in their charter.

Similar to numerous authoritarian regimes, the New Order in Indonesia needed an ideology to justify and reinforce the state's authoritarianism. Therefore, the New Order regime interpreted Pancasila in such a way as to legitimize and strengthen state authoritarianism. It became essential to indoctrinate Pancasila into Indonesian society as a comprehensive doctrine to legitimize all actions of the ruling government. This indoctrination was carried out through various means, from the cultification of Pancasila to the P4 Training.

The New Order government's cultification of Pancasila aimed to gain complete control over it and the 1945 Constitution. They placed Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as sacred, unquestionable entities. The interpretation and implementation of Pancasila as an open ideology and the 1945 Constitution as the state controlled the constitutional

foundation (Ricklefs, 2005). The cultification of Pancasila is also reflected in the establishment of the Sacred Pancasila Day every October 1, commemorating the failure of the G30S movement's attempt to replace Pancasila with communist ideology.

The rhetoric of unity and uniformity led to the homogenization of thought in Indonesia's highly plural society. Uniformity was the concrete result of unilateral political development policies. The concept of pluralism was not given space for intensive discussion. By 1985, all socio-political organizations were legally corralled to accept Pancasila as the sole philosophical foundation; any citizen ignoring Pancasila or any social organization rejecting it as the sole foundation was labeled a traitor or instigator. Thus, it is clear that the New Order not only monopolized power but also monopolized truth. Citizens with critical political views or those who disagreed with the state were treated as criminals or subversives in practice.

#### **DOCTRINE, STABILITY, AND POLITICAL UNIFORMITY**

During the New Order era, in addition to the veneration of Pancasila, the government formally disseminated the values of Pancasila through Presidential Instruction No. II/MPR/1978 regarding the Guidelines for the Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila (P4) in schools and the community. Students, university students, social organizations, and state institutions were required to undergo P4 training. The goals of P4 training included establishing a uniform understanding of Pancasila democracy to foster and preserve national unity. This affirmation aimed to direct public opinion towards strong support for the New Order government. In addition to the socialization of Pancasila values and their application in national life, the training sessions also communicated an understanding of the 1945 Constitution and the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN). The implementation of P4 was the responsibility of the Agency for Implementing the Guidelines for the Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila (BP7).

However, such educational methods proved detrimental, particularly for the younger generation. The noble values contained within Pancasila were stifled by the P4 indoctrination, which, due to its lack of proper role models, deadened the young generation's conscience towards the true meaning of those values. Leaders would routinely espouse Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in their speeches, yet their actions belied their words. This

discrepancy bred a negative perception of leaders and diminished the relevance of Pancasila as a foundational principle of state governance, as it appeared that rules and norms applied to the populace but not to the leaders. In other words, Pancasila was reduced to a mere slogan denoting feigned loyalty to the ruling government.

It must be clarified that P4, as an indoctrination program, originated from the New Order's perspective, particularly under Soeharto, on state-building's importance in maximizing economic growth. In this context, Indonesians were encouraged to support and voluntarily comply with development regulations and their consequences. Through P4, the idea of forming "Pancasila human beings" was utilized as a facade for market-oriented development under the guise of Pancasila ideology. The architect behind the P4 program was Roeslan Abdulgani, a prominent figure from the Sukarno era (Abdulgani, 1964, 1998). As mentioned earlier, Soeharto's interest in adopting and emulating Sukarno's policy style became apparent when he enlisted Roeslan Abdulgani to design P4. For Soeharto, controlling the masses was a policy doctrine executed subtly, creating subjects in a state of pseudo-conscious ambiguity.

Abdulgani continued the fundamental notion that Pancasila, as a major force, should be a call of conscience to be implemented in national life through work and creativity. Abdulgani, a key figure in formulating and articulating Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy, held steadfast to what he called the "inspiration of the revolution." Furthermore, as a successor to Yamin, Abdulgani believed that the noble values of Pancasila were in harmony with Islamic values, reflecting situations where governance must realize the nation's lofty ideals on the foundations of religion. Just as Sukarno and Yamin negotiated Islamic values within Pancasila during its formulation, Abdulgani continued the hope that Islam could integrate into Indonesia's state foundation. Abdulgani expressed that Islam's spirit also supported Pancasila's birth. In his writings, Abdulgani showed how a more Islam-oriented perspective of Indonesia's past could be cultivated within the New Order's "development" framework and respect for Pancasila. In Abdulgani's analysis, Islam helped foster Indonesian patriotism and nationalism and develop modern socio-political consciousness, such as understanding democracy and socialism. Islam, respecting the Proclamation of Independence, contributed to the ideology and state foundation: Pancasila. However, the negotiated strength of Islam became ambiguous

when faced with state repression, in this case, the political constellation built by Soeharto that homogenized Islamic parties into a single party, with two others supporting the state and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The death of religious plurality began with this homogenization, which the elite perceived as either coercive or advantageous. In essence, the homogenization, intended as a political tool, affected the conceptualization of Pancasila Democracy that was "incorrect" or in line with the interests of the New Order.

In January 1973, parties were coerced into merging into two new entities: Islamic-based parties were compelled to form the United Development Party (PPP), and the others, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). This forced merger stripped the parties of their identities and condemned them to perpetual internal conflicts. These issues likely further weakened their already limited prospects in elections. The system, known as "Pancasila Democracy," operated efficiently. PDI and PPP acted as outlets for opposition pressures, and their involvement in regular elections provided the New Order with a veneer of democratic credibility. National elections took place in 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997, never posing a threat to Soeharto's power.

According to Niam et al. (2023), since the 1980s, the discourse on democracy and pluralism shifted from secular nationalists to Indonesian Muslim intellectuals leaning towards reformist ideas. Niam et al. (2023) assert, "...however, when it comes to the principles of planning governance, many Islamic leaders tend to tarnish their own experiences and fall back into an idealized portrait of Islam often based on the unification of religious and political power that undermines civility". The power relations during the New Order led to a confrontation between Islam and secularism or nationalism. This was exacerbated by the cunning use of P4, which manipulated religion to justify the indoctrination.

P4 represented the New Order's "single principle" indoctrination style, which confined the spirit of tolerance in an erroneous manner. This was done to build a developmentalist project championed by the New Order as a tool for high economic growth, leaning towards liberal capitalism. Morfit (1981) emphasized that the primary reason for P4 was to elucidate the third Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita III), officially commencing in 1978 and lasting until 1983. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) decree establishing this law emphasized that all civil servants must undergo P4 train-

ing to understand better and be motivated to implement the programs with greater commitment. Consequently, the first two volumes of the P4 material produced by the government discussed Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, while the third and most extensive volume focused on the Broad Outlines of State Policy.

Within this context, P4 was envisioned as a tool for indoctrinating citizens in the key concepts of the Third Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita III), represented by the development trilogy and eight paths to equal distribution. Hence, P4's primary aim was to rally support for maximizing economic development. Soeharto reported with satisfaction that by March 1983, approximately 1.8 million civil servants and 150,000 military personnel had participated in P4 courses. It's likely that most leaders of the Indonesian National Committee of Youth (KNPI) who met at Soeharto's residence on July 19, 1982, had attended these courses. Abdulgani (1998) emphasized that part of P4's justification lay in the assertion that a correct understanding of Pancasila was necessary for the nation's future development. This provided a benchmark for evaluating policy values by presenting a traditional vision of the desired society. Thus, the New Order state viewed religion and its pluralism as a perilous domain. It was concerned that values within religion could incite radicalism and that certain religious values (possibly within Islam) might obstruct state policies extending into private life. In this light, Islamic groups saw P4 as an attempt to indoctrinate society with an ideology contrary to their true beliefs. The government specifically refuted this in P4 materials, stating that Pancasila was in line with all religions.

The implementation of P4 and authoritarianism during Indonesia's New Order period are two significant facets of the country's political and social history. P4 was a program introduced by President Soeharto in 1978 to promote the state ideology Pancasila and instill it as a moral principle in citizens' daily lives. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, refers to the strong and authoritative form of governance characteristic of the New Order under Soeharto's leadership. P4 was designed to reinforce Pancasila ideology as a guideline in communal, national, and state life. Its implementation involved education, training, and social campaigns to integrate Pancasila values across society. Meanwhile, New Order authoritarianism was marked by a strong, controlling government. The media, political parties, and civil society organizations were tightly controlled. Freedom of speech and assembly

restrictions were rigorously enforced, and political opposition was systematically suppressed. This period saw serious human rights violations and widespread corruption. The adoption of P4 and the New Order's authoritarianism represent complex facets: while P4 was adopted to promote Pancasila as the national ideology, authoritarianism reflected the government's way of controlling and limiting civil liberties. Despite P4's noble intentions of building morality and integrity within society, critics labeled it a means to co-opt and control societal thoughts and values. Overall, the New Order was a controversial period that encompassed various aspects, including P4 and authoritarianism, playing a crucial role in the evolution of modern Indonesian history.

## CONCLUSION

This research finding indicates that under authoritarian rule, Pancasila underwent interpretations inconsistent with its original definition at the dawn of independence. The New Order regime imposed a rigid interpretation of Pancasila, treating it as a foundation incapable of dynamic definition. Any differing interpretations were considered errors or misunderstandings of Pancasila's values, leading the New Order to create a complex indoctrination system to establish a singular understanding of Pancasila among all Indonesians. The process tended to coerce citizens into compliance with government rules. The New Order's successful reinterpretation of Pancasila was facilitated by de-Sukarnoization and control over all societal elements. The regime was intolerant of divergent views or opinions that could confuse the populace and was unprepared for academic debate and dialogue. Authoritarian methods were chosen to affirm the regime's strengthening position, with Pancasila, in this context, becoming unfriendly to those attempting to define it from alternative perspectives. The authoritarian government's success in redefining Pancasila within an authoritarian system is a valuable historical experience for Indonesia. Therefore, political research on the interpretation of Pancasila should continue in various dimensions to enrich insights on Pancasila, with the goal of actualizing values and knowledge that are relevant to the spirit of the times.

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