Singing the Old Song: The Historical Politics of the Masyumi Party in the 1950s in East Java, Indonesia

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Abstract: Masyumi, Indonesia’s first modern Islamic party, introduced new methods of political campaigning in East Java because of its traditional Islamic base. However, this case has not been seriously studied by scholars. Using the historical method, this article aims to explain the historical politics of the Masyumi party, which temporarily saved the party from declining trust and support. In its analysis, this article uses the perspective of past politics. This article shows how the strategy of the Masyumi Party sustained the party’s dream of an ideal Indonesian state. The strategy of the Masyumi Party in East Java, Indonesia, often differed from other provinces because of its historical politics. The party was more interested in attacking the communist groups than other parties. This was because these groups used the issue of Masyumi’s radicalism in rebellions in other regions. As a result, Masyumi was not concerned with other political forces, such as traditional Muslims and their patron-client relationships, and illiterate society. Although the Masyumi Party did not survive, partly because the Communist Party influenced the Indonesian government, the historical politics of this first Islamic party is important for future research in cities or regencies in East Java with a large traditional Islamic base.

INTRODUCTION

The politicization of religion and ideology to promote integration has become commonplace. Politicians often use history to justify their actions (Bermejo et al., 2023; Couperus et al., 2023). They construct what should be remembered and how it should be remembered. This view has preoccupied politicians in many countries for centuries (Betz & Oswald, 2022; Islam et al., 2021). This has also been the case...
in Indonesia, especially since the introduction of the modern party system after independence. East Java, a unique region in Indonesia, has a traditional Islamic base (Sayono, 2006), which can be elaborated to understand the Masyumi Party as the first modern Islamic party, which many scholars have studied for decades. However, the previous writings have not yet elaborated on this place as part of Masyumi’s struggle, especially those related to past politics. Most of the writings on Masyumi only explain the dynamics of the party in general and its winning strategy at the national level (Ishaqro et al., 2017; Madinier, 2013; Ihza, 1993). Stream politics is touched upon in several articles and books (Fogg, 2020; Bruinessen, 2002; Noer, 1978), but they do not focus on East Java. Meanwhile, Latief (2022) addresses the role of Masyumi in stimulating da’wah activism in general, including on a traditional Islamic basis, and in stimulating the establishment of Islamic higher education institutions. In addition, Ayu’s (2020) study of Masyumi’s campaign methods in Jakarta inspired this article, which states that the party’s campaign strategies had significant differences. Therefore, this article explains how the past policies of the Masyumi framework sustained the party from the reflux of confidence and support throughout the 1950s.

The Masyumi party movement in the transitional power at the beginning of independence in East Java contributed to change, democracy, and wider social participation than in the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods. Although they embraced democracy, Masyumi leaders also reformulated its interpretation by enriching it with Islamic values (Madinier, 2015), reflected in contentious politics. In this way, Masyumi’s role was crucial in balancing track cooperation and radicalism within a grounded democracy. Several figures Masyumi massively initiated the novelty of the political campaign method in terms of contentious dynamics, responding to several other political parties such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the National Party (PNI), and the Communist Party (PKI), which actively played an essential role with different methods, viewpoints, and ideologies. The role of the Masyumi Party in the dynamics of democracy in East Java often differed from that of other provinces because it had its strategies and tactics, especially in dealing with its political rivals. However, this party, in turn, received less and less support towards 1960.

**METHOD**

This paper uses the historical method, which consists of heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography (Pranoto, 2010). In its analysis, this paper uses the politics of the past perspective to explain how Masyumi’s involvement attracted many voters. This perspective confirms what Herbert Baxter Adam said in the early 1880s: “History is the politics of the past, and politics is the history of the present.” Related to this argument, I argue that on a strategic level, Masyumi also used historical narratives to increase his influence in East Java. Some papers have used the politics of the past as a perspective (Lu & Yan, 2022; Purwanta & Novianto, 2022). This is because memories of the past often effectively bound groups of people together (Gong, 2001, p. 26) and became part of the party’s strategic material. Memories of the past, whose function was to bind a group of people (Mcbride, 2001; Roudometof, 2002), were reinforced by the role of political parties, whose function was to bind the collective memory of sympathizers and members to increase political support. The old “songs” were played, manipulated, mythologized, and the feeling of fear or happiness was deliberately dug up and imagined at another time. Politicians deliberately argued based on selectively collected material to shape society itself (Scott, 2023, pp. 37-51; Lowenthal, 1985), so that it was resistant to histories that represented different points of view (Cole & Barsalou, 2006, p. 10). The fact that this had happened in the past implicated Masyumi, who was seen by his political rivals, the Communist Party (PKI), as being able to corner the party into a logical game of historical interpretation. The “songs” sung by Masyumi in East Java differed from those of the PKI. The record of radical parties in the Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) rebellion and the Government of the Revolutionary Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in other regions was to be used by the PKI as material for a politics of history. Meanwhile, the Muslim traditionalist group took advantage of this rivalry. They captured most of the Muslim voters in the province.

**CONSOLIDATION**

Masyumi’s leaders wanted to win on the altar of democracy. They proved to be the modern Islamic party of the post-independence era, incorporating various ideas and strategies to reach the lowest levels of society. Masyumi, in the early days of its formation, consolidated down to the level area in 1942-1945. It continued with the Islamic party of the same name founded in November 1945. The Congress of Indonesian Muslims in Yogyakarta in early November 1945 was pivotal as it successfully brought together nearly 500 delegates from leading
Islamic associations (Madinier, 2013, pp. 65-66). They emphasized that any form of colonialism was an injustice and forbidden by Islam. Another theme widely developed in the congress documents was jihad to ensure the continuation of Indonesian independence.

The party’s central board supported the division of roles between the ulama leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU, besides politicians from the Sarekat Islam (SI) movement. They fought much for their position in the executive ranks (Madinier, 2013, p. 45). During the first two years of the revolution (1946-1947), they witnessed the development of Masyumi, which gradually became the ruling party. It kept politically growing. From 1949 to 1952, Masyumi branches were established in every district in Java. Nevertheless, in East Java, the consolidation of Masyumi was still based on the roots of previously established Islamic organizations (Ricklefs, 2012, p. 122).

In this early period, the party benefited more from the issue of the temporary union of Muhammadiyah and NU. The two organizations’ networks strengthened the size of Masyumi, allowing it to dominate many government structures. In the early days of consolidation and formation in East Java, especially in Surabaya, Masyumi wanted to maintain its identity as a unifying group of Muslims and accommodate differences in understanding (Misbach, 1994, pp. 37-38). In Surabaya, the development of Masyumi gained more space in 1950 and controlled the government (“Sekitar Dewan Rakjat Kota Surabaja,” 1958; Koesmen & Pangestu, 1957, p. 145). Instead, several figures at the top of the party leadership came from different groups. In several decisions, even though Masyumi had the most votes, compromises were often made with the inclusion of smaller parties to avoid the prejudice that Masyumi wanted to act at will (“Sekitar Dewan Rakjat Kota Surabaja,” 1958).

However, the 1955 elections showed that Masyumi’s strength in East Java was waning, even though Bondowoso had proved to be Masyumi’s most subversive base in 1954. In addition, one of the strongest mass bases in the relatively stable regency of Lamongan was not spared from dwindling strength. Masyumi could not reconcile the divisions that had existed since the early 1950s, which had led to the institutionalization of political interests separate from the traditionalists. The leaders could not integrate the practical needs of the people into a single set of interests (“Riwayat hidup singkat ketiga ketua DPRD Surabaja jang baru,” 1958). Masyumi’s decision to distance himself from political parties and other organizations was also one of the reasons (Pleno “Panitia Kongres Rakjat Djatim,” 1955; “Panitia Kongres Rakjat Djatim,” 1955; “Konp. Kerda Kongres Rakyat,” 1955).

Masyumi’s influence in East Java continued to weaken towards 1960. Masyumi’s consolidation in many places in preparation for the 1955 elections failed. Judging by the legislature and executive composition, Masyumi could mobilize a larger mass, but the opposite was true on the ground. After the election, Masyumi’s declining support in the community affected the composition of the government. Masyumi was soundly defeated by the PKI, even at the level of the Legislative Assembly (“Sekitar Dewan Rakjat Kota Surabaja,” 1958). In the 1955 and 1957/1958 elections in two major East Java cities, Surabaya and Malang, Masyumi came fourth (Feith, 1957; “Surat Suara2 Djangan Dibuka,” 1957; “PKI Mutlak di Surabaja,” 1957; “17 Kursi DPRD Surabaja Diborong PKI,” 1958; “PKI leading di Malang,” 1955; “PKI menang di Kota Kediri,” 1955). In some areas, however, Masyumi maintained its position at the top, such as in the Lamongan district (“Masyumi leading di Kab. Lamongan,” 1955).

Nationally, Masyumi came second. NU unexpectedly won one million more votes in Java than Masyumi (“Di Djawa PNI djaub berdiri di atas partai2 lain,” 1955), mostly from East Java. Masyumi received the most votes in East Java after NU, PKI, and PNI (“Stand pada tgl. 12 Okt. dj. 13.15: 8.067.509 suara bagi PNI”, 1955). In the 1955 election, Masyumi received 11.2 percent of the vote in East Java (Feith, 1957, p. 85). In the 1957 election, his vote share rose to more than 15.0 percent (Kasdi, 2001, p. 71). These results show the dynamic relationship between Masyumi’s party leaders in East Java and the other parties participating in the election. Although Masyumi won the popular vote in the 1957/1958 elections, the party still had to win seats in the East Java legislature. However, Masyumi lost. The election results for the DPRD seats consisted of PKI, PNI, NU, and Murba (“Sidang pleno DPRDP Prop. Djatim: Dlm. pemilihan DPRD Masjumi tak dapat kursi NU 2 kursi, PKI 1, PNI 1 dan Murba 1,” 1958).

The consolidation of Masyumi at the regional level was important in maintaining Masyumi’s dream of an ideal Indonesian state. The three cities of Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta (Madinier, 2013, pp. 68-69), with the addition of Surabaya (Wirayuda, 2016, pp. 12-23), played an essential role in the historical course of the formation of the
political identity of Islamic parties, which was created through relentless efforts. However, dynamic politics, with many factors, makes many results unpredictable.

POLITICS OF THE PAST
At the strategic level, Masyumi in East Java used historical logic to expand its influence and defeat rival discourses. Memories of the past became part of the strategic material. On the national scene in general and the local scene in several regions in particular since the 1950s, Masyumi operated in the shadow of a series of rebellions arising from disagreements with the government. Several Masyumi figures were involved. Therefore, although 1949, Masyumi was one of the most important pillars of the coalition governments, between 1950 and 1956, Masyumi’s political space became increasingly narrow (Madinier, 2013, p. 145).

Since Indonesia’s independence, the PKI has been the party that has most aggressively cornered Masyumi through a series of rationalizations of historical discourse. In return, Masyumi seemed more interested in attacking the PKI than other parties. Masyumi saw the PKI’s teachings, platforms, and actions as the most dangerous. They continued to invite many Islamic social groups to share their views. However, the PKI masses were still unstoppable. Gradually, Masyumi’s attacks became ineffective. The PKI was growing. Masyumi’s power diminished as the NU became more interested in becoming a “big fish” in a new “pond.” In contrast, the social bases on which other Masyumi relied in the early independence days became more distant.

As 1960 approached, the challenges to Masyumi became more serious. Rebellions broke out in several regions, some of which involved Masyumi leaders, members, and sympathizers. This gave Masyumi’s enemies new ammunition to undermine its credibility. The government’s view of the ‘rebels’ was increasingly favored by Masyumi’s political opponents, especially the PKI. In many areas, including East Java, the issue had become a source of entertainment for Masyumi’s political opponents. The communists, in particular, had to work hard to ensure the term was used to the party’s advantage. As a result, the development of the PKI accelerated, causing great concern among Masyumi members.

Between 1950 and 1960, five regions in Indonesia were the scene of various Islamist-inspired insurgencies. From 1957, Masyumi was involved in the 1950-1956 Islamist insurgency on two fronts. On the one hand, some of its branches in regions that still had a revolutionary identity joined the rebellion. This made the party a target for criticism. On the other hand, as the main governing institution, the Masyumi tried to use negotiation and sometimes emphasized returning to the straight path with fellow brothers who had strayed from the ‘shortcut’ that favored anti-compromise and cooperation (Madinier, 2013, p. 146).

Masyumi continued to be monitored by its political opponents. The Darul Islam insurgency became a liability for Masyumi, tarnishing its reputation as a modernist party. Suddenly, the party appeared to be radicalized. As part of the PKI’s propaganda, the issue of Masyumi’s association with the revolutionary Islamic movement was popularised through the slogan ‘Masyumi = DI,’ which adorned every political meeting. However, this association continued to resonate in the consciousness of non-communist society (Madinier, 2013, p. 151), so it was not surprising that it delivered an unexpected spectrum of voters in the 1955 election, which strengthened towards the end of the 1950s.

In East Java, the theme of rebellion may be more effective. This was because it was widely reported in the mass media. However, with a low readership due to illiteracy, NU leaders saw Masyumi as a Muslim group that should not be exploited. The DI/TII issue was raised lightly by Muslim groups in the discourse battle in East Java. However, during several election campaigns leading up to the 1957 general election, the PKI continued to play up the issue of the PRRI rebellion as part of its efforts to appeal to Muslims. The PKI was highly critical of Masyumi. Masyumi was strongly criticized for being ‘politically wild’ and not taking responsibility for what had happened (“PKI Surabaja Mengecam Pedas Lawan2 Politiknja, Menolak Drs. Hatta Kuasa Kembali,” 1956).

Traditionally, Muslim circles reacted with mutual understanding. NU figures preferred to concentrate on building support without questioning the decisions of some Masyumi members and sympathizers involved in the rebellion (“Nahdlatul Ulama Tjabang Surabaja,” 1952). Like Masyumi, the NU hated the communists and, therefore, focused more on PKI attacks. For example, in Blitar, Sidoarjo, and Banyuwangi, there is the landlord issue (Kasdi, 2001, p. 7). Meanwhile, the growth of the PKI in the 1950s in major cities in East Java, such as Surabaya and Malang, as well as in Kediri, shows that the propaganda factor of the PKI was more effective than that of the NU and Masyumi. In the 1955 and 1957 elections, Masyumi controlled only a few seats, mostly in fourth place (”PKI lead-

In another competitive context, the PNI, one of the largest parties in East Java, took a different political stance towards Masyumi. The PKI-Masyumi and NU-PKI feuds often favored the PNI. As the party with Sukarno’s strongest mass appeal, the PNI was little challenged by its rivals, especially in the 1955 and 1957/1958 campaigns. The PNI was less interested in a discourse confrontation strategy with other parties. The party was also more established because it had more control over bureaucratic circles. Despite attacks from the PKI, the PNI was not its main opponent because of the PKI’s interest in remaining close to Sukarno.

The Communists, who often demanded more attention from Masyumi in order to be able to respond, presented a horizon that Masyumi could not imagine about the results of the 1955 and 1957/1958 elections. The PKI, which had the confidence to surpass Masyumi, found proof. The early 1950s saw a further escalation in the interaction between the PKI and Masyumi. As early as 1954, there were repeated incidents of physical confrontation in East Java. For example, the PKI acted aggressively against Masyumi in Surabaya and Malang. The issue was that Masyumi was built on a social base of merchants, which provided powerful ammunition for the PKI. However, it was difficult to prove the accusation that Masyumi had anything to do with loan sharks or capitalist bureaucrats (“Rapat Umum Gerwani,” 1955). This PKI method was successful in two cities, Surabaya and Malang. The dynamic population gave the PKI an advantage.

Some feuds between the two parties sometimes show a more provocative attitude. For example, the incident in Malang in April 1954 occurred when the PKI held a meeting attended by the partisan Masyumi. Hasan Aidid, the chairman of Masyumi’s Surabaya branch, also attended the event (Medenier, 2013, p. 140). In front of the podium, where PKI secretary I DN Aidit stood in the middle of his speech, a banner was unfurled with the words ‘Kutuk teror perampok Masyumi-BKOI (Curse the terror of the Masyumi-BKOI robbers)’. The PKI, adept at discourse, said it was not anti-religious; even the Islamic faith of its members was much better than Masyumi’s. For him, voting for Masyumi was tantamount to praying that the whole world would go to hell. More provocatively, DN Aidit insisted that membership in Masyumi was illegal while joining the PKI was halal. This tense event culminated in the removal of the portraits of Marx, Engels, and Aidit hanging above the podium, replacing them with pictures of Soekarno and Hatta and removing the hammer and sickle symbol (Madinier, 2013, pp. 141-142).

Some of the actions of PKI figures were seen as threatening to Muslim leaders. The most serious was the abuse of Islamic religious symbols. For example, on 22 April 1955, an Islamic scout group in Tuban met a boy selling ice cream who handed them a torn piece of the Koran with a PKI stamp and the words ‘Masyumi anjing (Masyumi is like the dog)’. Several Masyumi members and branch leaders in some villages in East Java have not escaped arrest and repression for continuing to be associated with extremists. Masyumi confidently claimed that between 1951 and 1953, not a single member of Masyumi was spared. In June 1951, for example, 600 Masyumi members were arrested in Bondowoso.

Faced with the threat to the party posed by its organ’s links to the Darul Islam rebellion, Masyumi was forced to clarify its position. This step was taken in stages following the escalation of the rebellion and the concerns it raised (Madinier, 2013, p. 155). To further castrate the echoes of Masyumi’s greatness, Masyumi’s political opponents, especially the communists, were very happy to associate Masyumi’s party with the Darul Islam movement. Masyumi became increasingly exhausted as he responded to nearly four years of government repression with what the party called an “army-centric” approach that did not respect places of worship.

Masyumi’s miscalculated campaigns in Java sometimes ended in communist attacks. There is a widespread superstition that the moon and stars are associated with bad luck (Feith, 1957, p. 17). The party’s failure in the 1955 election and its subsequent attachment to its identity as an ‘outside Java’ party (Madinier, 2013, p. 201) gave Masyumi the enthusiasm to improve its campaign strategy in East Java. Although its share of the vote increased in the 1957/1958 elections, it still had to outperform the votes of the NU, PKI, and PNI. The pattern of communist campaigning and attacks continued. At the same time, the NU preferred to concentrate on keeping its voters while using the communist attacks to strengthen its bonds of solidarity, some of which were tangible with its patronage clients. The PNI was interested in showing less than those of the three parties. Others relied more on Sukarno and his bureaucratic power.
The PKI’s motto, “PNI is a priyayi party, Masyumi and NU are santri parties, but the PKI is a people’s party,” gave it imagination. The PKI identified the hammer and sickle as an “electoral tool” to vote for agrarian land and to anesthetize the peasants. The PKI emphasized the importance of the pro-peasant hammer and sickle rather than the “moon and star,” which was associated as a symbol of evil. The NU also used several arguments to gain greater sympathy, including among Muslims, whom Masyumi also targeted. In this context, the NU cited a myth from an ancient book, according to which twin queens would later fight to become queens. The legend said that the one who could be queen was the one who had no shadow. NU also noted that the buffalo symbolized PNI, the hammer and sickle (PKI), and the moon and stars (Masyumi) had shadows. Only one had no shadow, and that is the earth, the symbol of NU (Isnaeni, 2014).

The atmosphere in the run-up to the parliamentary elections continues to heat up, marked by attacks between political parties. Important moments have sometimes been used as campaign events. In addition to Surabaya and Malang, political party signs were removed in Gresik shortly before the May Day celebrations. Several witnesses reported that on 1 May 1955, some party posters were missing, or cow dung was found in almost all parts of Gresik. Some residents were angry because the posters cost much money to make, apart from being a symbol of group superiority. The image consisted of four Masyumi signs and three NU signs, which are quite large; in fact, the Masyumi images are about 3 meters high. Meanwhile, several posters from the PSII drawing paper have been lost and probably torn up. On the other hand, the NU and Masyumi posters, being made of wood, were thrown only with cow dung, which infuriated most of the Muslims in Gresik (“Gedjalal2 tak sehat,” 1955).

The PKI’s image was often used as a platform to attack Masyumi. Although it was not known who was responsible, the PKI concluded that Masyumi was behind the disappearances. This conflict arose because Masyumi had removed the PKI’s image from the city of Surabaya on several occasions before the 1955 election campaign (“Masjumi tak menginginkan pentjabutan2 Tanda Gambar”, 1955).

The correlation between the strengthening of national identity, nationalism, and the logic of internationalism is also essential for political parties to attack each other. Masyumi was a party that both the PNI and the PKI presented as associated with Arab culture. At the local level, the PKI was also keen to compare the development of Indonesian democracy with that of other countries. Democracy was seen as necessary for the PKI by placing women’s emancipation within the framework of national identity. Again, Masyumi became a target because Saudi Arabia’s culture did not know democracy, so it was impossible to support the emancipation of women, who were given equal voting rights in general elections. The PKI saw Saudi Arabia as a ‘semi-colonial’ country associated with Masyumi’s backwardness—one of the PKI leaders, Nj. Mudigdo said sternly: “Now you probably understand that Indonesian women must carefully guard women’s democratic rights. The women of our nation had always to be vigilant. They always had to ask and investigate thoroughly whether among the individual candidates and parties in the next general election, some intended to abolish women’s right to vote and be elected in the new constitution (‘Djangapilih orang jang antic hak demokrasi untuk Wanita,” 1953).

**VINDICATION**

On the national scene in general and the local scene in several areas in particular, since the 1950s, Masyumi had found it difficult to free itself from the shadow of a series of rebellions resulting from a disagreement with the policy government. The characters of political Masyumi tried to divert strong power attacks, parries, and materials hit back through political game history. In the framework, they remove the stigma that Masyumi was a supplier of rebels, bearer of unifier people, and the only party that could deliver Indonesia to be better. However, some themes are unsuitable for implementation in East Java, where people are traditionally Muslim.

In some cases, it was revealed that the NU had been confronted by the PKI, which eventually led to the realization that the development of the NU masses in East Java was a serious problem for Masyumi. Of course, this fact hurt Masyumi because it reduced the number of sympathizers and voters. Meanwhile, Masyumi did not need a strong PKI attack. This is because most of the material about Masyumi as a rebel was only relevant in West Java and Jakarta. The PKI’s attack linking PRRI to Masyumi in East Java was not considered effective enough because Masyumi’s votes - which eventually shifted more to NU than to the PKI - were not strong enough.

In the 1950s, Masyumi tried to restore his
Credibility in East Java. This became one of the most important parts of his agenda. Masyumi located the problems of a social nature and touched directly on the interests and everyday life of society. For example, the image of the abolition of party signs, or a sign of worship thrown with animal dung and some worship distractions, supplied Masyumi’s argument. Not to mention the housing and budget shopping problems plaguing the cities could also help rehabilitate Masyumi locally (“Ambil suara supaja DPRDS dibubarkan sadja”, 1952). However, this strategy of diverting Masyumi’s attention from the insurgency to the needs of society proved ineffective. It failed to stem the tide of communist discourse. Instead, it was exploited by the PKI.

The takers of Masyumi voters were NU. Identifying that as the first Islamic party no makes Masyumi successful ties voters in deep East Java definite imagination. The patron-client attachment exhibited by traditional Muslims is precisely the main factor in the castration influencing Masyumi. Competitors’ main level scramble constituents root grass. NU had used religious forums in mosques, langgar (small mosques), and houses to strengthen consolidation. Masyumi did not carefully calculate this. The leaders of Masyumi seemed to be drifting more into a tense competition with communism after the conflicts that occurred in the 1950s in some large areas of East Java, such as Surabaya, Malang, Gresik, Jember, and Tuban, especially when some events offered podium speeches for communists or debate forums. In addition to this escalation, opposition was expressed through abolitionist images, confrontational speeches, and various forms of agitation. It was logical that the leaders of Masyumi succeeded in formulating Islam, which was not only the state administration of the time of the Prophet Muhammad, the Caliphate, and the Islamic countries that emerged in the middle of the 20th century. However, the down-to-earth contact with the traditional Muslim grassroots was not done well and systematically. While Masyumi excelled in intellectual debate, the Muslim community in East Java always preferred the approach of religious practice.

Masyumi excelled in the internal scramble for constituents who “still have party bond blood,” i.e., Party Indonesian Islamic Sarekat (PSII). Knots of prominent masses in the circle of Masyumi were an exciting thing for some big Muslims. However, Masyumi was unaware that the boarding school (Pesantren) circles were strategic masses, where habits were usually tackled on a broad scale, influencing the formation of society and culture in East Java. During tactics Masyumi prioritized in several increasing discourse and intense dissemination approach to access power and reinforcing ideology through interpretation of history and doctrine party, NU simplified that campaign policy must be correlated to tangible things in need, the economy is society East Java a lot hang his life on the farm. Masyumi still voted to try to become a container “unity people”; they split because NU could make or strengthen the social base circle. Masyumi, the more alone, survived at a time ambitious to become an influential party in the government in East Java.

Moreover, Masyumi’s mass spaces, concentrated in urban areas, failed to compete with the PKI; only a few cities, such as Lamongan, won, showing the closeness of coastal society to Masyumi’s ideas. Masyumi’s communist propaganda aimed to show what they considered true communism. Without knowing it, the party leaders were even invited to study the source of the enemy of the original doctrine. Natsir deciphers Lenin’s deliberate teaching to eliminate enemies. Several figures Masyumi stressed the impossibility of compromise between religion and communism; Indonesia would become a “dictatorial state” because of the accusation of silencing the opposition and the absence of freedom of the press, and behind the “old songs” that the PKI fought for practical purposes with hidden state interests figure extreme totalitarianism terrible (Madinier, 2013, pp. 139-142), a common argument used to explain matter that shows portrait characters world communism at every PKI meeting. Nevertheless, the PKI was still superior in agitation, propaganda, and lobbying to the powers and members of the militant parties; nonetheless, no counter from the NU inside tie faith voters in the 1957 election.

Photographs displayed at official events could also be used as material for interpretation. For example, in December 1954, Muchtar Chazaly, chairman and administrator of Masyumi’s Sukubumi branch, asked during a comparison that no member of Masyumi had a photograph of Eisenhowe. He concluded that Masyumi was not an agent of the United States “as they are often accused of being”. At the same time, the PKI often displayed “pictures of Communist foreign leaders such as Malenkov, Mao Tse Tung and others” who were obviously “agents abroad.”

Masyumi’s defense also focused on the position of enlightenment. Beyond condemnation, the principles of the fast, in a way, expressed the always defensive discourse that emphasized the role of earlier Islamic movements in the struggle against the
colonialists. Understanding the disaffected rebel groups and partly believing in their desire for independence does not mean the party agrees. Over-shadowing the danger of a religious war in Indonesia, the party tried to become the initiator of a ‘psychological solution’ and smoothly supported the ‘military solution’ demanded by some broad layers of Indonesian politics (Fakih, 2020, p. 81; Madinier, 2013, pp. 155-156).

Faced with an increasing number of arrests of its members, the then head of the Centre, Masyumi, agreed to draw more firm dividing lines with the rebels. In January 1951, the party issued a statement, the content of which repeatedly forced it to clear up confusion as to whether it was inside or outside Masyumi. Masyumi reaffirmed its commitment to the democratic and parliamentary path by the rules in force. The Republic of Indonesia resulted from Masyumi’s jihad and for the sake of its “implementation of deep Islamic teachings of state administration” through official channels (Madinier, 2013, pp. 157-158). Several leaders, Masyumi, continued and attempted to defuse the rebellion by extending power to the central region. They also strengthened the argument that the Republic of Indonesia was a ‘home’ for Indonesian Muslims that needed to be preserved (“Republik Rakyat Indonesia dari Tjirebon,” 1952).

The movement was often more focused on counterbalancing the maneuvers of the PKI, from the section committee at the metropolitan level to the sub-section committee at the sub-district level, to the branch committee at the environment (wijk) or factory level (Dick, 2003, pp. 492-493). As the 1955 elections approached, Masyumi, now more concerned with clearing up the allegations, occasionally used them to regain momentum. For example, when several of Masyumi’s rival posters went missing, the Masyumi leader responded to the PKI; the Surabaya Masyumi leadership said it was not true that members or their sympathizers had caused the disappearance of PKI posters in several places. Even Masyumi wants to keep each other’s logos. Masyumi used the event to reinforce the ideology that Masyumi belongs to Indonesia and should have a proper place to support and be supported by all groups. Masyumi’s argument for broadening the image of support was to show that the ‘Bulan Bintang’ (moon and star symbol) image was defended not only by Masyumi members but by the majority of the Indonesian people who understood and felt the results of Masyumi’s struggle (“Masjumi tak menginginkan pentjabutan2 Tanda Gambar,” 1955).

Based on the 1955 general election, the Muslim vote in East Java was split between Masyumi, NU, PSII, and Perti, with a total of 45.75 percent. Non-religious parties such as PNI, PKI, PSI, and IPKI took 46.6 percent. The remaining 0.51 percent attended Christian parties (Feith, 1957, p. 51). The details of the vote battle can be seen in the results for the first four places in table 1.

Table 1 shows that the NU won the most votes in East Java. This proved that it had succeeded in consolidating traditional Muslim power and had taken great advantage of the intellectual clash between Masyumi and the PKI. Before the NU party was formed, Masyumi could accommodate traditional Muslims. Meanwhile, the PKI, which wanted to capture the NU vote, could not do much because of the strength of the traditional Islamic network, both through the pesantren and patron-client relationships. Thus, this case shows that Masyumi had neglected his strategy of reconsolidating traditional Islamic bases because of its aggressive attitude towards the communists.

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<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes (National)</th>
<th>Number of Votes in Java</th>
<th>Number of Votes in East Java</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>6,964,595</td>
<td>2,251,069</td>
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<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>1,109,742</td>
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<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>5,945,993</td>
<td>3,370,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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<td>Other 24 Parties</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>9,891,530</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of Party</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Votes</th>
<th>Constituent Assembly Vote</th>
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<td>PNI</td>
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<td>2,329,991</td>
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<td>Masyumi</td>
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<td>1,119,595</td>
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<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>34.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
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<td>855,399</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9,832,178</td>
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CONCLUSION
Since Indonesia’s independence, the Masyumi Party has been more interested in attacking the PKI than other parties. The party saw the PKI’s doctrines, platforms, and actions as more dangerous than other parties. Therefore, agitation and propaganda focused on arguments that communism was the most powerful enemy. The East Java phenomenon was unique because Masyumi worried too much about communism and neglected systematic campaign strategies. The party leaders were not concerned with other political forces, such as traditional Muslims and their patron-client relationships, the lack of people who understood the complex discourse Masyumi was presenting, and the fact that there were still many illiterate people in society. The large Muslim bases in the most rural areas went unnoticed. Meanwhile, in the big cities, Masyumi also failed to defend himself against accusations of total radicalism from the communists. The historical politics of the Masyumi failed to engage the public and connect them with an understanding of Masyumi’s contribution to Indonesian democracy and independence. This article is necessary to understand that history can be played out through competition and negotiation in political contestation. By examining Masyumi’s use of historical politics to harness modernism, democracy, and anti-communism during Indonesia’s self-discovery as a new nation, this article contributes to further research on Islamic modernism and radicalism in postcolonial Indonesia. However, the historical politics of the Masyumi Party in East Java cannot be represented by just a few regions. Therefore, further and in-depth research on historical politics in all regions of East Java is crucial.

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