The War on Terror: The Neo-American Manifest Destiny

The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq

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ABSTRACT: Significant literature has concluded that Islamic-terrorist activity in the Middle East and in Europe had increased drastically since the beginning of the implementation of the Bush Doctrine in 2001 after 9/11, with the rise of ISIS. However, little is known about the causal mechanism that links between the Post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy and the rise of new terrorist organizations, particularly the Islamic State in Iraq. Hence, the focus of this study is to process trace such mechanism. It will also explain why the War on Terror has produced totally opposite results from those it was originally intended for. Finally, this study is a within-case analysis that might be a microscopic observation of the imperial American behavior in the Middle East. This study relies on explaining outcome process-tracing methodology, and employing oral and historical accounts, archives and statistical data. I argue that the War on Terror, precisely the period of the Bush's presidency (2001-2009), to be the continuity of the historical imperial behavior that inspires the U.S. foreign policy. I will only focus on two main policies: the Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Invasion of

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Iraq in 2003 because invasion is the most concrete manifestation of imperialism. The result shows that the invasion of Iraq led to sectarianism that IS feeds on, and that the invasion of Afghanistan led to the geographical expansion of Jihadists. Together they fused to cause the mutation of Al-Qaeda into a more complex Islamic-inspired terrorist organization (IS).

KEYWORDS: Imperial Behavior, Sectarianism, War on Terror, Bush Doctrine, Islamic State

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of terrorism does not seem to end anytime soon. In August 2021, IS-K bombed Afghanistan airport, killing 170 people including 13 U.S. troops as reported by the BBC NEWS[1]. This makes the War on Terror still enacted. On February 3, 2022, Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi, commonly known as Hajji Abdullah, the commander of ISIS, was killed as a result of a raid carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces. Since becoming the head in 2019, Qurayshi has presided over "the growth of ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups around the world after savagely destroying villages and killing innocents."[2] Since 2001, the War on Terror has taken place, and it seems that it is

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[1] Gardner, Frank. "Afghanistan airport attack: Who are IS-K?" BBC NEWS, 2021

[2] Anonymous. "ISIS Leader Killed in U.S. Raid in Syria." Wilson Center (2022).

doing very little to solve the problem of terrorism; sometimes, it makes it even more complicated.

IEP reports that "Iraq has had the biggest increase in terrorism from 2002 till 2011, while Pakistan had the second largest increase in terrorism, seeing large increases in explosive attacks, especially from 2007 to 2009," (7) while "Western Europe suffered nineteen times more deaths from terrorist incidents than North America between 2002 and 2011. The Middle-East and North Africa region had the highest number of terrorist fatalities with the Asia-Pacific region," (8)[3] Observing the data, it seems that the terrorist activity rose drastically with the implementation of the post-9/11 foreign policies that were supposed to lead to the opposite consequences.

Studies on the phenomenon of terrorism have proliferated since 9/11. One is immediately overwhelmed by the quantity of books covering the war on terror, Islamic terrorism, or terrorism in general upon entering practically any bookshop. Conference papers on "terrorism" abound, and academics in allied fields are becoming increasingly interested in topics relating to "terrorism." Most of these traditionalist papers take a problem-solving direction that is usually biased to serve imperial powers' agendas. Despite all these attempts to analyze the issue of global terrorism, it continues to exist, to metamorphose from one form to another, and to present the same threats that it has always presented.

Hence, despite the consistency of the War on Terror and the widespread of traditional research on terrorism, the issue does not

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[3] Global Terrorism Index. "Capturing the Impact of Terrorism from 2002-2011." Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace (2012): 7.

seem to be solved or even close to reaching any kind of resolution. Thus, one should ask what triggered the rise of Islamic-inspired terrorism, and what contributed to its development into complex global organizations, despite the U.S. War on Terror and the implementation of the Bush doctrine to contain Al-Qaeda.

II. METHODS

Research in terrorism studies had been monopolized for a long time by the traditional school. Ged Shearer highlights Gunning's concern with the domination of traditional terrorism studies that limited academic research to Western state-centric problem-solving approach. [4] However, Stump and Dixit (2013) emphasized the emergence of critical terrorism studies which would fill the research gap created.[2]

In this study, I will combine visions from three different theories: critical theory, post-colonial theory and Copenhagen school. Unlike other IR Orthodox theories, critical theory considers terrorism not to be "a self-evident, exceptional category of political violence. Rather it is a social construction–a linguistic term or label that is applied to certain acts through a range of specific political, legal and academic processes,"[5]. However, that does not mean that terrorism is not real because there are real groups who cause terror to others. It actually means that there is a combination of social and political practices that contributed to the construction and the flow of events to be the

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[4] Shearer, Ged. "Terrorism as a Weapon of the Strong? A Postcolonial Analysis of Terrorism."

[5] Jackson, Richard, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning, and Marie Breen-Smyth. Terrorism: A critical introduction. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011. p. 3

way they are. This way of understanding terrorist activity is essential to this study theory-building as it perceives the rise of terrorism as an outcome of socio-political realities that came as a product of imperial competition in the Global South

This takes us to post-colonial understanding of terrorism. According to post-colonialism, Western counterterrorism "reproduces, and transforms, well-known Euro-centric and state-centered discourses which intersect with colonial and imperialistic ideas (and practices)".[6] P.K Malreddy explains that the post-colonial theory is interested in the "lived condition of unequal power sharing globally and the self-authorization of cultural , economic, and militaristic hegemony than with a particular historical phenomenon such as colonialism,"(xxvi)[7]. He adds that in the post-9/11 era, it is " becoming increasingly clear that the tragedy of that day has been hijacked into a casus belli for protracted wars and neocolonial geopolitics, and other clandestine operations led by the US and its allied forces around the globe".[8] Therefore, post-colonial theory will serve this study tremendously for its thick preoccupation with neocolonial geopolitics that I argue it sparkled global jihad and the transformation of simple religious groups into transnational terrorist organizations. More importantly, the "othering" process that post-colonialism has introduced to the world plays, according to this study, a significant role in the rise of terrorism and its persistence despite global efforts to end it. A. Velho and Oscar Thomas-Olalde elaborate that "Edward Said and Homi K.

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[6] Chukwuma, Kodili Henry. "Critical terrorism studies and postcolonialism: constructing ungoverned spaces in counter-terrorism discourse in Nigeria." Critical Studies on Terrorism 15, no. 2 (2022): 399-416.

[7] Malreddy, Pavan Kumar. Orientalism, terrorism, indigenism: South Asian readings in postcolonialism. SAGE Publications India, 2015.

[8] Malreddy, Pavan Kumar

Bhabha are both prominent writers whohave dealt with discursive and political practices that can be described as "Othering". "Othering" is defined as a process in which, through discursive practices, different subjects are formed, hegemonic subjects – that is, subjects in powerful social positions as well as those subjugated to these powerful conditions".[9]

Finally, I will adopt an important insight from the Copenhagen School to this study which is "securitization". According to Wæver, the primary argument of securitization is a" (illocutionary) speech act, that solely by uttering 'security' something is being done. In other words, it is the process of continuous labeling of something as a security threat, while it might not be that it becomes an actual threat. This study argues that the post-colonial geopolitics is partly formed as a result of a series of securitization processes, and the outbreak of global jihad especially after 9/11 is partly a result of securitization as this study will explain in detail.[10]

Chomsky on many occasions criticizes U.S. reliance on unjustified military aggression and violence in its response to terrorists' attacks. In his lecture on modern-day American imperialism, he takes us back in time to the infant American empire that terrorized all the surrounding races and nations, starting with Native Americans to make the point that the modern empire is just a more complicated form with the same violent principles of the Manifest Destiny, as it

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[9] Velho, Astride, and Oscar Thomas-Olalde. "Othering and its effects: exploring the concept." Writing postcolonial histories of intercultural education. Interkulturelle Pädagogik und postkoloniale Theorie, (Bd. 2, S. 27–51). Frankfurt: Peter Lang (2011). p. 27

[10] Taureck, Rita. "Securitization theory and securitization studies." Journal of International relations and Development 9, no. 1 (2006): 53-61.

repeats itself in American behavior in the Middle East and its invasion of Iraq and everywhere[11]. Moreover, Shearer criticizes traditional terrorism studies which are based on problem-solving dynamic central to conventional experts and scholar's approach. Instead, he adopts a Post-colonial perspective to approach the correlation between terrorism and powerful states.[12]

Furthermore, Robert G Patman studies the "the tensions between a new exclusive US exceptionalism after 9/11 and a globalised security environment," linking this new American exceptionalism with "effectively prosecuting the war on terror".[13] Patman suggests that this new American exceptionalism started reshaping itself with the election of President George W. Bush in January 2001.[14] The linkage between Bush's offensive foreign policy and American new imperialism has also been raised by Noam Chomsky, who thinks that American imperial behavior in the world has always been offensive, and the Bush Doctrine is only a part of it, "The United States is the one country that exists, as far as I know, and ever has, that been founded as an empire explicitly. According to the founding fathers, when the country was founded, it was an *infant empire*. Modern-day American imperialism is just a later phase of a process that has continued from the very first moment without a break, going in a very steady line"[15]. Hence, the imperial character of the United States has always been inspiring aggression, military

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[11] Chomsky, Noam. Modern-Day American Imperialism: Middle East and Beyond (2008)

[12] Shearer, Terrorism, Weapon of the Strong

[13] Patman, Robert G. "Globalisation, the new US exceptionalism and the war on terror." Third World Quarterly 27, no. 6 (2006): 963-986. p. 971

[14] Patman

[15] Chomsky, American Imperialism

policies in dealing with global affairs and the War on Terror is just a part of this historically embedded character that manifests in aggressive foreign policy.

Barkawi and Laffey relate the War on Terror to what they call "the imperial character of great powers", "in the age of the War on Terror, with its avowedly colonial projects and rhetoric in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, there needs to be greater attention to the histories and processes of imperial subjugation and the resistance it has so regularly generated". [16] Therefore, the War on Terror is only a manifestation of the imperial character of the United States, a war between a great power and the other, if I may use post-colonial lexicon.

Similarly, George Leaman argues that," the U.S. government is trying to secure continuing American military and economic supremacy on a global scale over the long term. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq is part of this imperial project, which is now being pursued under the mantle of the war on terror". [17]. Leaman seems to share Chomsky's view that "the Bush Doctrine is only a continuum of the imperial behavior that was born even before the foundation of the Republic, with the Founding Fathers. I also argue that this imperial project is an extension of established policies, and that there are significant continuities between the actions of the Bush administration and those of its predecessors".[18]

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[16] Barkawi, Tarak, and Mark Laffey. "The postcolonial moment in security studies." Review of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2006): 329-35. p. 348

[17] Leaman, George. "Iraq, American empire, and the war on terrorism." Metaphilosophy 35, no. 3 (2004): 234-248. p. 234

[18] Leaman, p. 235

Charlotte Morris argues that the increase in religious inspired terrorism is due to the U.S. foreign policy since 1945. She particularly describes the Bush Doctrine to be a "significant shift in policy after the attacks of 11 September 2001," which," allowed for the securitization of religious terrorism and a state of exception in which the United States has broken international law and violated human rights through extraordinary measures".[19] Morris explains that this Doctrine was a part of the imperial projects that followed WWII, in an attempt to cement the U.S. position as a global hegemon that was shaken with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The post-9/11 foreign policies were designed to stress the hegemony of the U.S. by fighting terrorism through invasion and military intervention; however, "American security strategy after 9/11 destabilized the Middle East and did little to protect the U.S. from terrorism" [20] . Here, I find it important to reinvestigate the relationship between these imperially inspired post-9/11 U.S. foreign policies and the mutation and the expansion of terrorism in the Middle East, as a contradictory outcome of what these policies were originally intended for.

IEP reports that "Iraq has had the biggest increase in terrorism from 2002 till 2011, while Pakistan had the second largest increase in terrorism, seeing large increases in explosive attacks, especially from 2007 to 2009,"[21] while "Western Europe suffered nineteen times more deaths from terrorist incidents than North America between

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[19] Morris, Charlotte. "To what extent has US foreign policy contributed to an increase in religious inspired terrorism since 1945?." Journal of Global Faultlines 6, no. 2 (2019): 186-203. p. 189

[20] Morris, p. 191

[21] Global Terrorism Index. "Capturing the Impact of Terrorism from 2002-2011." Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace (2012): 7. p. 7

2002 and 2011. The Middle East and North Africa region had the highest number of terrorist fatalities with the Asia-Pacific region".[22] Observing the data, it seems that the terrorist activity rose drastically with the implementation of the post-9/11 foreign policies that were supposed to lead to the opposite effect. This period also coincides with the emergence of a terrorist group in Northern Iraq that would later become the largest and the richest global terrorist organization. Hence, there is a clear correlation between these foreign policies and the rise of this terrorist group. Hence, to what extent has the Post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy reinforced the rise and the transformation of IS from a mutant quasi-state of Al-Qaeda into an independent terrorist organization?

The statistics show that Islamic-terrorist activity in the Middle East and in Europe had increased drastically since the beginning of the implementation of Bush Doctrine in 2001 and had reached its peak in 2007. The Annual GTI raw score (global total) indicate that, "the impact of terrorism has increased globally since 2003, peaking 2007"[23], correlating with the rise of IS. Further, SHEARER states that "The terrorism industry which had already begun to increase, exploded after the 9/11 attacks and many of the experts within the industry developed close links to state and corporate power".[24] Hence, my study will prove that this is not just a correlation, but rather a causal relationship, by explaining the causal mechanism that links American foreign policy and the rise of new terrorist mutants. I will also explain why the War on Terror has produced

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[22] Global Terrorism Index, p. 8

[23] Global Terrorism Index, p. 7

[24] Shearer, 4

totally opposite results from those it was originally intended for. Finally, my within-case analysis might be a microscopic observation of how American imperialism operates.

The U.S. post- 9/11 foreign policies, precisely the War on Terror, which were either a manifestation of the American new exceptionalism or a continuum of the historically embedded imperial behavior, are the fundamental factor that led to the mutation of Al-Qaeda into new terrorist groups, in this case, the Islamic State, and its rise in Northern Iraq. In other words, The U.S. War on Terror policies are the main factor that led to the Rise of the Islamic State in Iraq.

In this paper, I will consider that the War on Terror, precisely the period of the Bush's presidency (2001-2009), to be the continuity of the historical imperial behavior that inspires the U.S. foreign policy. I borrow this concept from Chomsky who brought it about in his famous lecture, *Modern-Day American Imperialism*. This behavior characterizes the United States' foreign policy since the Declaration of Independence, or even when "Benjamin Franklin, 25 years before the Revolution, complained that the British were imposing limits on the expansion of the colonies, and Jefferson who declares the USA to be the nest from which America, north and south, is to be peopled," displacing not only the red men here but the Latin-speaking population to the south and anyone else who happened to be around"[25]. This historical concept continues to dominate American Foreign decisions as Morris illustrates its manifestation chronologically since 1945 under Harry S. Truman until 2001 with

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[25] Chomsky, American, Imperialism

Bill Clinton. Morris defines it as "this show of force" that" allowed them to be established as a hegemon" [26] . Similarly, Chomsky describes it as" showing muscle", the choice of aggression instead of diplomacy in order to expand everywhere in the world.

I will only focus on two main policies: the Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Invasion of Iraq in 2003. On one hand, invasion is the most concrete manifestation of imperialism; on the other hand, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq occurred between 2001 and 2003, and it continued to expand.

My main hypothesis is divided into parts to make testing possible, and it explains the causal mechanism between the main variables. The order of these parts is chronological. First, USA war (2001) on Taliban caused Al- Qaeda to move to Southern Pakistan while Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, the founder of IS, moved to Northern Iraq where he would establish the nest of his terrorist organization, after being a simple correspondent in Afghanistan. This American imperial action in Afghanistan agitated the movement of Jihadis throughout the Middle East.

Fawaz A. Gerges states that, "when the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda dispersed its lieutenants and fighters into neighboring states, including Iran, to prevent the destruction of the bin Laden network and to carry on the struggle. Adl notes that Zarqawi became Al Qaeda's point man in Iraq, a well-studied choice." Second, the U.S. Invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the fundamental factor that fueled bloody sectarianism in the region

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that the new terrorist quasi-state feeds on.[27] Al- Zarqawi's new terrorist base in Northern Iraq which is fed by sectarianism, turning an insurgency against US troops[28] in Iraq "into a Shia–Sunni civil war[29].Harith Hasan Al- Qarawee states that" rivalry between the Shia majority and the Sunni minority in Iraq had been at the center of political conflict in the state since then president Saddam Hussein fell in 2003".[30]

I hypothesize that sectarianism was created through two U.S. implementations. First, de- ba'athification, imposed and supervised by the U.S, led to the rebuilding of the Iraqi system, alienating in the process many people that Al-Zarqawi would be recruiting to expand his quasi-state. The American government would also impose Nouri al-Maliki's government, stealing Sunni election, leading to the reinforcement of sectarianism that the Islamic State in Iraq feeds on. Micheal Weiss states that "ISIS is not just a terrorist organization; it is also a mafia; it is, fundamentally, a form of Sunni power political projection", and what the Bush Doctrine does is promoting sectarianism through its fierce, unjustifiable foreign decisions. Second, disbandment of the Iraqi military, which was primarily made of Baathists by the USA left many Sunni generals, soldiers, etc jobless; these important people, with perfect knowledge of sources of weaponry, oil resources etc would be recruited by the Islamic

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[27] Gerges, Fawaz A. ISIS: a history. Princeton University Press, 2021.

[28] Not only U.S. troops but also the Shiites who took over power.

[29] Gerges, ISIS

[30] Al-Qarawee, Harith Hasan. Iraq's Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion. Vol. 24. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014. p.3

State[31][32], contributing to the formation of the economic and military structure of this quasi-state that would turn into a fully-structured terrorist organization, more wealthy than Al- Qaeda itself.

I have chosen to focus on IS as a case study for two main reasons. First, the first roots of IS coincide with U.S. invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq, and its reappearance today in Kabul coincides with U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is the best case I can study to link the past with the present, and this link seems to be American foreign policy. Further, invasion is the most concrete form of imperialism, USA foreign policies and rise of terrorism. Second, the Islamic State as a case study is the best choice to illustrate how the U.S. foreign policy consistently continues to cause the mutations of terrorists groups, as ISL was born out of Al-Qaeda, and they " belong to the same family— Salafi-jihadism—and share a similar worldview"[33] ; and their metamorphosis from unorganized jihadi groups into structured global organizations, as "ISIS has made a break from traditional approaches to the Salafi-jihadist movement, turning into the most powerful and wealthiest nonstate actor with potent and active affiliates in the greater Middle East and beyond,"[34]. Hence, the study of the Islamic State relates all the global jihadi organizations, as they are born from each other; thanks to American patterned imperial behavior.

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[31] Weiss, Micheal, interview by International Peace Institute. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (n.d.)

[32] Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan (2015). ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts.

[33] Gerges, ISIS

[34] Gerges, ISIS

In terms of data collection, I will solely use secondary data as I am dealing with pure history. In terms of sequence evidence, I will use historical accounts and reports and newspapers archives, TV Channels news, recorded political speeches and a variety of scholarly articles and books. I will also employ oral accounts as account evidence. These accounts are in form of previously conducted elites' interviews and focus groups. For instance, Iraq's former national security adviser, Mowaffak al Rubaie; Ali Khedery, special adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq; and Australian journalist and Middle East correspondent, Martin Chulov, interviewed by Al Jazeera's former Middle East correspondent, Sue Turton. Finally, I will use statistical data and patterns when it is applicable.

I will adopt explaining outcome process-tracing methodology. As I previously explained, I aim to prove that the relationship between post-9/11 foreign policies and the rise of IS in Iraq, is a causal relationship, through illustrating the causal mechanism that links them. I will start by tracing back my outcome: the rise of IS. In other words, the genesis of its 1) complex economic structure and 2) recruitment. Then, I will show that both are linked to sectarianism. Next, I will trace the origins of sectarianism back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, this is not enough to explain why the founding father of IS ended up in Iraq. For this reason, I will, finally, trace bibliographical facts about Abu Musab al- Zarqawi back to his desertion of Afghanistan with the Invasion in 2011. Therefore, I will conclude that the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan caused the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq.

III. RECRUITMENT *&* ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IS

It is important to note that "[m]oney, not ideology, was the primary motivation for joining AQI [Al-Qaeda in Iraq]"[35]. That's why the economy of IS in Iraq is strongly tied with recruitment. According to Gerges, Daesh is different from Al- Qaeda ideologically, a mutation from a concentration on the "far enemy" to the "near enemy".[36]This ideological transformation is reflected in its eco-political transition. IS's political economy mainly relies on local resources to establish the aspired caliphate instead of foreign financial assistance.[37]

This new model of the caliphate's economy relies mainly on local recruitment. Solomon et al. argue that "given the origins of much of its fighter population, ISIS's state-building project has unsurprisingly been heavily reliant on the economic networks that local Sunni tribes had constructed. A – Perhaps optimistic – estimate puts ISIS's 2015 revenues at $900 million"[38]. Hence, the success of this new economic structure relies on the success of the local recruitment of Sunni tribes. This takes us back to Gerges's idea of the near enemy−the Shiite. The sectarian dimension in IS's ideology makes the procedure of recruitment successful and this latter is the pillar of IS's economic fabric.

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[35] Gerges, ISIS, p. 84

[36] Gerges, ISIS, pp. 4-7

[37] Lypp, Jakob. "Understanding ISIS: The political economy of war-making in Iraq." (2016). p.5

[38] Solomon, Erika, Robin Kwong, and Steven Bernard. "Inside Isis Inc: The journey of a barrel of oil." Financial times 29 (2016).

IS's major economic concern is the hydrocarbon sector. It attacks, holds, operates infrastructure in Libya, Iraq, Egypt and Syria. In 2015 alone, its revenues from oil operated at $40 per month[39]. IS sells oil at significantly reduced prices to a variety of traders or intermediaries in domestic markets in Iraq and Syria, including adversaries such as the Kurds in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, and Turkish agents, who then transport the oil to legitimate markets.[40] Based on the ranges given for the number of barrels of oil produced per day (34,000-40,000) and price per barrel (US$ 20-45), one report (2015) estimates daily revenue from oil of US$ 1.5 million. Other reports, however, indicate that these production rates and prices are inflated, with oil selling for far less than $20 per barrel.[41] These data show how existential is the hydrocarbon trafficking for the Islamic State, but how could ISIS construct such a successful economic revenue source, starting from nothing at all in Iraq?

The strength of the organization stems from the fact that its fighters are Iraqis, locals who are familiar with the terrain and its familial, clan-based, communitarian, or sectarian networks. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, differs in that its members were banished from their homelands in Afghanistan. Finally, unlike Abu Nidal, Ahmed Jibril, and Fatah al-Islam in the Middle East, IS does not rely on outside funding.[42] ISI's choice of recruited jihadis plays an important role in

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[39] Porter, Geoff. "Terrorist targeting of the Libyan oil and gas sector." Combating Terrorism Centre (2015).

[40] Crane, K. "The Role of Oil in ISIL Finances: Testimony Presented Before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on December 10, 2015." RAND Office of External Affairs, USA (2015).

[41] Blannin, Patrick. "Islamic State's financing: Sources, methods and utilisation." Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9, no. 5 (2017): 13-22.

[42] Levallois, Agnes, Jean-Claude COUSSERAN, and Lionel KERRELLO. "The financing of the'Islamic State'in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)." (2017). p. 10

the success of oil economy. ISI exploited former officials from the Baathist regime who were excluded from the new Shiite-dominated government. These people are the most knowledgeable about the Iraqi oil infrastructure, smuggling roots, weaponry, etc.

Simon Mabon states that," Little did the CPA realise the impact that such a move would have, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people being made redundant and struggling to provide for their families".[43].On the other hand, Maliki government, appointed and supported by the occupation, would promote the most extreme forms of Shiie-Sunni sectarianism. Naturally, under such circumstances, these alienated former Baathist unemployed high officials would ally with the first substitute that fills the resulting vacuum.

Isabel Coles and Ned Parker have reported that, according to Sunni tribal leaders, Baathists, and an Iraqi security general, the Naqshbandi and smaller groups of Saddam-era officials made up the majority of combatants in the early phases of military offensive. According to Iraqi officials and Abdul al-Samad al-Ghrairy, a prominent figure in what's left of the Baath Party, it was the Naqshbandi who urged civilians in Mosul to rise up against Baghdad, and who organized and directed much of last year's military operations. They add," the overall head of Amniya in Iraq and Syria is a former Saddam-era intelligence officer from Fallujah called Ayad Hamid al-Jumaili, who joined the Sunni insurgency after the U.S.-led invasion and now answers directly to Baghdadi,

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[43] Mabon, Simon. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.

according to Hashimi, the analyst".[44]Moreover, the *Washington Post* recounts the testimony of Abu Hamza, a former Syrian rebel, who later joined ISIS to be surprised to find an Iraqi emir and other Iraqis who moved to Syria. Abu Hamza explained that "they have brought to the organization the military expertise and some of the agendas of the former Baathists, as well as the smuggling networks developed to avoid sanctions in the 1990s and which now facilitate the Islamic State's illicit oil trading".[45]

European Asylum Support Office reported that The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in April 2018 that some high-ranking former Baath party members are on the list of most wanted ISIL members published by Iraqi authorities in February 2018[46]. The same office interviewed an Iraqi analyst, Hisham al-Hashimi , who has worked with the Iraqi government, reported that ,"of ISIL's 23 portfolios – equivalent to ministries- former Saddam Regime officers ran three of the most crucial: security, military and finance" [47] .Further, Alessandro Bruno states that," some 100-160 Saddam-era veterans occupy key posts in the Caliphate and the CIA says that all officials of the Islamic State come from Sunni-dominated areas".[48] Given such facts about IS recruitment, it is clear that the essential driving force of joining ISI at the first place is the resulted sectarian division that isolated the Sunni minority generally and

[44] Coles, Isabel, and Ned Parker. "How Saddam's men help Islamic State rule." Reuters, December 11 (2015).

[45] Sly, Liz. "The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein's." Washington Post 4 (2015).

[46] Ghenea, Bogdan. "European Asylum Support Office Syria Targeting of individuals-Country of Origin Information Report." (2020). p. 62

[47] Ghenea, p. 64

[48] Bruno, Alessandro. Geopolitical Monitor: The Ba'athist Roots of Islamic State. 31 July 2015. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-baathist-roots-of-islamic-state/.

former Ba'athists specifically. The success of the IS oil economy is strongly linked to the special and the sensitive positions and skills of former Baathists held as previous officials of Saddam's regime.

III. SECTARIANISM *&* THE U.S. INVASION

Sectarian conflict in Iraq is closely related to the De-ba'athification program imposed by the American occupation. Ryan Pavel states that on May 16th, 2003, Paul Bremer of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US entity in charge of post-invasion Iraq transitional governance, issued an order calling for Iraq's de-Ba'athification[49]. Paval explains the de-ba'athification program in simple terms:

> "De-Baathification meant that anyone who had become a member of Saddam's oppressive political party, regardless of intent in joining or actions after joining, was henceforth banned from participating in Iraqi politics or public office. If one believed that Saddam should be removed from office, it stood to reason that his associates also should be removed from power. Following this train of logic, de-Baathification was the obvious and correct course of action". [50]

 However, the theory is simplistic compared to what actually happened in reality. Stover states that many former politicians, administrators, and academics that could scarcely be considered close allies of Saddam were removed from their jobs as a result of

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[49] Pavel, Ryan. "The De-Baathification of Iraq: the development and implementation of an ostensibly necessary vetting policy that turned into a tool of sectarianism." PhD Diss., 2012.

[50] Pavel, 1

the program. Most of these people had to present as Ba'athists because it was unlikely to advance in life without being loyal to Saddam.[51] CPA relied basically on exiled Shiites by Saddam to decide if someone is Ba'athist or not: this would eventually lead to sectarianism. Mowaffak al Rubaie, FRM Iraq national security advisor, in an interview with Al-Jazeera's former Middle East correspondent, Sue Turton, stated that" the central concept of de-ba'athification was right", he adds," but to de-ba'athefise the ideology not individuals". Ali Khedery, FRM Senior Advisor of U.S. CENTCOM, adds that" the Iraqis would come to regret (..) and setting up the de-ba'athification commission which became a tool of political vengeance (..). We never recovered from those things because hundreds of thousands of people became unemployed, disillusioned, disenfranchised and took to insurgency."[52]

During Ba'athist Party's rule; sectarianism was a minor issue. The party was ideologically secular and non-sectarian. It was indeed dominated by Sunnis, yet that was not a sectarian plot, but a natural result of the patronage system, implemented by Ba'athists to secure their survival. Ibrahim Marashi explains that sectarianism is only a strategy of patronage in states with sects. For him, the Ba'athist regimes in both Iraq and Syria allowed anyone from both communities to rise to power on the condition of loyalty to the leadership. Only later with the invasion of Iraq and the outburst of Syrian Civil War that sectarianism was used to make one community defend the state while the other mobilizes, fearing the

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[51] Stover, Eric, Miranda Sissons, Phuong Pham, and Patrick Vinck. "Justice on hold: accountability and social reconstruction in Iraq." International review of the Red Cross 90, no. 869 (2008): 5-28.

[52] Ali Khedery, Mowaffak al Rubaie, Martin Chulov, interview by Sue Turton. Enemy of the Enemies: The Rise of ISIL (1) (October 19, 2015).

threat of the state. In both cases, the patronage system happened to create elite in-groups from the same sect for the purpose of loyalty: Alawites in Syria and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. Other groups employed the victimized sect to fill security vacuum.[53] Therefore, Ba'athism itself isn't about sectarianism, but it was about loyalty to the regime; it was by coincidence that the Iraqi Ba'athist party was mainly Sunni; and even with that, the Party had no interest at all in religion, as it was fundamentally secular. As a result, later, with de-ba'athification, "a massive number of Sunni politicians were instantaneously removed from public employment, with some even arguing that de-Baathification was in fact de-Sunnification".[54] This created in the marginalized Sunnis a feeling of alienation, and with the rise of the Shiite dominated Maliki government, this alienation would develop into sectarianism.

In 2006, John Gershman and Stephen Zunes polished a very strong claim about the relationship between the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the rise of sectarianism," The sectarian violence which has swept across Iraq following last month's terrorist bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara is yet another example of the tragic consequences of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Until the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation, Iraq had maintained a longstanding history of secularism and a strong national identity among its Arab population despite its sectarian differences".[55]Top CIA and State Department officials, as well as a huge number of Middle East experts, have warned that an American invasion of Iraq might result

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[53] Marashi, Ibrahim. "Reconceptualizing sectarianism in the Middle East and Asia." Middle East Institute (2014).

[54] Marashi, p. 7

[55] John Gershman, Stephen Zunes. Foreign Policy in Focus. 6 March 2006 https://fpif.org/the_us_role_in_iraqs_sectarian_violence/.

in ethnic and sectarian violence. Much of Iraq's current divides may be traced back to US occupation authorities' decision to destroy the Iraqi army and purge the government bureaucracy—both bastions of secularism—immediately after the conquest, resulting in a vacuum that was quickly filled by sectarian parties and militias.[56] Following the invasion, the Canal Hotel Bombing took place in Baghdad in August 19, 2003. Later, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of ISI claimed responsibility for the bombing. It is not a coincidence that the terrorist activity had started right after the invasion and the de-ba'athification program and not in the midst of the rule of secular nationalism under Saddam.

Sarhang Hamasaeed and Garrett Nada summarized the impact of the invasion and the de-ba'athification program in their article, published in the *United States Institute of Peace:* Two key events occurred. First, the United States' decision to sanction the long-ruling Baath Party—and the manner in which it was carried out—created a political vacuum. Second, disbanding the military left a security vacuum, alienating hundreds of thousands of trained men who had no other option. Iraq has been torn apart by civil conflict, political unrest, massive corruption, sectarian strife, and an extremist insurgency that has taken control of a third of the country.[57]

This claim is confirmed, given the following period of insurgency bombing of Baghdad during 2003 and beyond. The first blast was

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[56] John Gershman, Stephen Zunes. Foreign Policy in Focus. 6 March 2006. https://fpif.org/the_us_role_in_iraqs_sectarian_violence/.

[57] Hamasaeed, Sarhang, et Garrett Nada. United States Institute of Peace: Iraq Timeline: Since the 2003 War. 29 May 2020. https://www.usip.org/iraq-timeline-2003-war.

followed by another vehicle bomb outside the Canal Hotel on September 22, 2003. The bomber and an Iraqi police officer were murdered, while 19 people were injured, including UN officials. Al-Zarqawi would also assume responsibility for the bombing. This man did not come out of the blue; he had always been there, but now he had a suitable environment to start his terror: an environment fraught with sectarianism and a dissolved army of alienated Sunni Baathists, perfect for his ideological foundation: the near enemy: the Shiites.

Bremer's first directive resulted in the dismissal of around 30,000 former Baathists from various ministries. All military officers above the rank of colonel, as well as 100,000 personnel of Iraq's various intelligence services, were forbidden from returning to work.[58]This is only the first order de-ba'athification, similar numbers will be just unemployed former Sunni officials who would join the insurgency as the only option for the resulted situation. The second order "disbanded the Iraqi military. Both orders worked to eliminate the institutional memory of all Iraqi institutions, requiring Bremer to establish the nation's new government from its foundations up. This resulted in a poor security situation that ultimately allowed a strong insurgency, recruited from unemployed disaffected youth, to develop, which paved the way for the beginnings of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham".[59] Mowaffak Al-Bubaie was asked who is killing Americans, he replied," the Ba'athists have started to rebel and took arms and also some of the Jihadists. So that amalgamation

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[58]   Otterman, Sharon. Council on Foreign Relations: IRAQ: Debaathification. 22 February 2005. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-debaathification.

[59]   Zinn, Cherish M. "Consequences of Iraqi Debaathification." Cornell International Affairs Review 9, no. 2 (2016). p. 80

Ba'athists-Salafists as a new strange creature if you like".[60]Indeed, this American program did create a phenomenal fusion of radical Islam and secular nationalism, which would result in the deadliest terrorist organization of all times. Sue Turton asked Ali Khedery if the occupation was aware that what had been done was in the name of the Americans, he answered, "yes, absolutely, many of us were aware of what was happening, warned against it the White House and others to stop this because we did not want it to become a sectarian witch-hunt", he adds, "by the spring of 2004, there were two insurgencies. There was the Sunni insurgency in the central part of the country, but then there was a sudden insurgency led by Moqtada al-Sadr, a literally radical Shiite cleric".[61] Hence, soon after the invasion, Iraq had been driven into unfinished sectarian conflict.

Fallujah: A Case Study of Insurgency

The initial heights of the insurgency within the country were highlighted by the first battle of Fallujah in spring 2004. Fallujah, often known as the "City of Mosques," was the site of two of the Iraq War's most fierce engagements. Fallujah, a big suburb 43 miles west of Baghdad in Iraq's Al-Anbar governorate, served as a safe haven for former Baathists during the war. Because its population is 95 percent Sunni Muslims, Fallujah serves as an excellent case study for Iraqi insurgency. According to Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, a CPA Military Strategist," "Now you have a couple hundred thousand people who are armed, cause they took their weapons home with them, who know how to use the weapons, who have no future and

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[60] Enemy of the Enemies, Rise of ISIL
[61] Enemy of the Enemies, Rise of ISIL

have a reason to be angry at you".[62]It is natural that this former Ba'athists dominated region witnessed the beginning and the fervor of insurgency; people full of sectarian sentiment, unemployed, armed, and knowledgeable: perfect evidence of the impact of de-ba'athification on terrorist activity. Martin Chulov Australian journalist and Middle East correspondent reported something very important about how deep de-beatification deconstructed the core pillar of Arab psychology; Ba'athists were not only stripped "of personal status" but of "personal dignity and personal dignity is a key driver of human behavior in the Arab World'.[63]

IV. THE WAR ON TERROR *&* THE INVASION OF IRAQ

President George Bush, in the *President's Radio Address,* states clearly the reason behind the invasion:

> Good morning. American and coalition forces have begun a concerted campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In this war, our coalition is broad, more than 40 countries from across the globe. Our cause is just the security of the nation's we serve and the peace of the world. And our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.[64]

Apart from possessing mass destruction weaponry, the pretext behind the invasion is the claim that Saddam's regime supports the

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[62] Zinn, De-ba'athification, 92

[63] Enemy of the Enemines

[64] Bush, George W. The White House: Operation Iraqi Freedom. 2003.

terrorists. However, a series of secret intelligence reports proved that there was never any ties with Hussein and Al-Qaeda; actually, he is not the kind of person who would collaborate with the radicals, given his Ba'athist secular ideology. I have collected a number of reports from different time periods, confirming this. Yet, The Bush Administration gave no value to the evidence, and invaded Iraq, continued its de-ba'athification program, and supported Al-Maliki Government. This process of *securitization* is not new to the U.S. government since the foundation of the federal republic or even before as I will discuss in the following sections.

In 2002, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) drew the conclusion that there was no reliable information about al-Qaeda training in Iraq, either at Salman Pak or elsewhere.[65] Similarly, the 2002 British intelligence report concluded that Al Qaeda has expressed an interest in obtaining chemical and biological knowledge from Iraq, but no such training has been offered. They had no information about cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda, and they have no reason to suspect that al Qaeda is planning terrorist strikes under Iraqi command.[66] The 9/11 Commission's formal report from July 2004 explored the possibility of a conspiracy between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks. The report looked into specific allegations of contacts between al-Qaeda and members of Saddam Hussein's government, concluding that there was no evidence that such contacts turned into a collaborative operational relationship, and that they did not

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[65] Senate, U. S. "Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments." US Senate, Washington DC. September 8, no. 2006 (2006): 573-84.

[66] News, NBC. «British report: Al-Zarqawi set up 'sleeper cells'.» 2004.

collaborate to carry out terrorist attacks against the United States. The following data are included in the report.[67]

In 2004, The CIA completed a new evaluation of Saddam Hussein's ties to al-Qaeda in August. This evaluation was requested by the Vice President's office, which particularly requested that the CIA check into the likelihood that Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda, as Colin Powell suggested in his UN Security Council speech. There was no evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime housed Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, according to the report. According to a US official familiar with the latest CIA assessment, intelligence analysts were unable to determine the nature of the relationship of AL Zarqawi with Saddam Hussein decisively.[68]

From Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi traveled to a terrorist camp in northern Iraq. The CIA was alarmed by the move and quickly sent a plan to the White House to attack the camp. He was not a big deal, and even Al-Qaeda did not take him seriously, yet the eddo made by the U.S. about him; and the conditions they created for him, turned him from "Thug" To ISIS Founder.[69] When he was detected in a terrorist camp in Northern Iraq, the CIA had the chance to hunt him down: "This seemed like the perfect moment," Bakos told FRONTLINE "We know where they are … We know what they're

[67] Thomas H. Kean, Bob Kerrey,Lee H. Hamilton,Richard Ben-Veniste,Fred F. Fielding ,John F. Lehman,Jamie S. Gorelick,Timothy J. Roemer,Slade Gorton,James R.Thompson. "THE 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States." Governemnt Report, 2004.

[68] Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott. CIA Review Finds No Evidence Saddam Had Ties to Islamic Terrorists. 2004.

[69] Breslow, J. "Nada Bakos: How Zarqawi Went From Thug To ISIS Founder,[online], 17.05. 2016."

up to. This seemed like the right time to target them."[70] Yet, the Bush Administration used him as a pretext to invade Iraq and de-ba'athifize the country. Zarqawi had spent years in Iraq fomenting sectarian violence in order to prepare the framework for a strategy that would allow his followers to grab territory in Iraq and Syria and form a self-declared caliphate in 2014. Colin Powell, U.S. secretary of state from 2001 to 20020, despite the CIA reports, declared to the public," Iraq today harbors deadly terrorist network, headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate collaborator of Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda lieutenants". Martin Chulov states that he was, "talking about al-Zarqawi as being this potent force, and he , in fact, wasn't the force that he turned to be a couple of years later".[71]

When Zarqawi went to Afghanistan in 1999, according to Adl's testimony, Al Qaeda Central's top commanders did not meet with him and kept their distance from the young upstart. He did not have weight in their eyes; he was a minor character. He was a man who wanted things to be done very quickly with a colossal ego that requires unconditional fealty from subordinates, a man who attracts illiterate people who are unqualified for numerous missions and whose defects frequently surprise other mujahidins.[9] He himself was an uneducated man with limited knowledge of classical Arabic; he always needed help to understand the scripture. All of such attributes put him in an inferior position amongst Al-Qaeda main figures. Yet, the White House kept inflating his capabilities, "Al-

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[70] Breslow
[71] Enemy of the Enemies

Zarqawi is then an obsession of the occupation forces".[72] He is a threat constructed by the invasion, in a process of securitization.

All the speeches and the allegations of the U.S. contradicted the evidence, presented by their own secret intelligence and other testimonies; they carried out with the invasion and de-ba'athification; they fed sectarianism and turned this minor jihadi network into a complex organization.

V. AL-ZARQAWI *&* THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

In this section I will discuss how the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan had contributed unintentionally to exporting Al-Qaeda Jihad to Iraq through examining key events in the bibliography of the leader of AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq) that would turn later into ISI (the Islamic State in Iraq), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Al-Zarqawi grew up in poverty, dropped out of school, and turned to excessive drinking, tattoos, and fighting as an outlet for his frustrations. He was allegedly imprisoned for sexual assault before converting to fundamentalist Islam and traveling to Afghanistan in 1989. He was left to edit a magazine for demobilized mujaheddin after the Soviets were defeated. Zarqawi was reportedly imprisoned for having weapons in 1993 and became a reclusive loner, with some detainees recalling him scaring inmates with a single gaze. [73] Thousands of political prisoners, including Zarqawi and Maqdisi,

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[72] Original text in French, translated into English by the author; Bonnefoy, Laurent. "Le mythe al-Zarkaoui ou la légitimation de la guerre en Iraq." Au nom du 11 septembre... Les démocraties à l'épreuve de l'antiterrorisme (2008): 320.p. 8

[73] Joffe, Lawrence. "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." The Guardian online 9 (2006).

were granted general amnesty by Jordan's newly crowned monarch, Abdallah II, in May 1999. Zarqawi departed Jordan for Afghanistan, a war-torn country that had become the epicenter of the global jihadist movement, particularly Al Qaeda Central, after his release, carrying his resentment with him.[74]

Al-Zarqawi then founded a training camp in Herat that was essentially for living a modest lifestyle; designed to follow the lifestyle of Prophet Muhammed, according to some witnesses.[75] However, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and the US bombing assault on Herat in October 2001, Zarqawi and his men chose to flee to Kandahar, a four-day journey. Later, Zarqawi and his troops subsequently traveled to Tora Bora, a bastion of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, where they allegedly took part in the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. After that, Adl explains in his evidence on Zarqawi that when the U.S. attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda scattered its lieutenants and fighters into neighboring countries, notably Iran, in order to avoid the destruction of the bin Laden network and continue the fight. Zarqawi became Al Qaeda's lead man in Iraq, according to Adl, and was "a well-studied option."[76] Nevertheless, the U.S. pressure on the Iranian authorities made them beginning many arrests to break down these groups. Al-Zarqawi's group was split into two sub- groups, one headed to Turkey and the other one, which includes Al-Zarqawi, to Northern Iraq, of course, Saddam Hussein did not know about their presence:

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[74] Gerges, ISIS

[75] Joffe, Al-Zarkawi

[76] Patrice Barrat, Najat Rizk, Rania Stephen. «Zarqaoui: La question terroriste.» Ardèche Images. 2005. http://www.lussasdoc.org/film-zarqaoui_la_question_terroriste-1,14587.html.

But the links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda are not just a matter of the past, the official discourse continues, Baghdad would support the al-Qaeda troops who would have found refuge in Iraq after the Western operation of Afghanistan. Based in Kurdistan (therefore evolving beyond any control of Baghdad due to the establishment of a de facto independence of these northern provinces), a group baptized Ansar al-Islam focuses the attention of the American services which insist in particular on the determination of these terrorists to attack Europe. A certain abou moussab al-zarqawi, of Jordanian nationality and until then unknown to specialists and most of the intelligence services, is on TV in the al-Qaeda nebula installed in Iraq, assures Colin Powell to the UN in February 2003.[77]

Therefore, the invasion of Afghanistan put the country in turmoil especially the terrorist networks, forcing them to spread in different parts the Middle East. The case study of Al-Zarqawi is important: first, it analyses the causes that led the founder of ISI to reach Iraq , and second it shows that the group of Al-Zarqawi was divided into two parts; the first part went to Turkey and it did not develop into any worrying jihadi network given the unsuitable conditions of security in Turkey, while the second part reached Iraq to find a hospitable environment especially after the 2003 occupation as previously explained, and it flourished there to produce ISI, and then ISIS.

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[77]   Bonnefoy, le mythe d' al-Zarkawi, p. 3

VI. THE WAR ON TERROR *&* THE MANIFEST DESTINY

In an interview with Vice News, Obama said that the emergence of the Islamic State is directly associated with the US-led invasion of Iraq: "ISIL is a direct outgrowth of Al-Qaeda in Iraq that grew out of our invasion, which is an example of unintended consequences".[78] This statement might summarize a part of what actually happened; in fact, both the war on Iraq and the war on Afghanistan combined directly contributed to the rise of ISI. In this section, I will discuss the nature of these two wars and how they constitute a continuum of American imperialism that hasn't only always characterized the U.S. foreign policy, but also the very foundation of the federal republic. I argue that understanding American behavior at the international level is linked to its early history.

Noam Chomsky states that "The principle is that America is an "historical vanguard." "History has a discernible direction and destination. Uniquely among all the nations of the world, the United States comprehends and manifests history's purpose." It follows that US "hegemony" is the realization of history's purpose and its application is therefore for the common good, a truism that renders empirical evaluation irrelevant".[79] In other words, everything is related to John Winthrop's ambition to build a "city upon a hill"[80],

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[78] Saul, Heather. "President Obama claims rise of Isis is 'unintended consequence' of George W. Bush's invasion in Iraq." The Independent. March 18, 2015. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/president-obama-claims-rise-of-isis-is-unintended-consequence-of-george-w-bush-s-invasion-in-iraq-10115243.html.

[79] Chomsky, Noam. "Wars of terror." In The Iraq War and its consequences: thoughts of Nobel Peace laureates and eminent scholars, pp. 147-170. 2003. p. 3

[80] "It is no doubt the case, as Sacvan Bercovitch has argued (see 3-11), that Winthrop's description of the Puritans' covenant and of America as a city upon a hill - or, more broadly, that the genre his sermon exemplifies - is in fact one of the generative sources

using any kind of means because it is the New Man's "Manifest Destiny"[81] to expand everywhere: in the past it was at the expense of Native Americans, today it is at the expense of everything that is not American or the "other".[82]

Chomsky comments on the U.S. foreign policy, explaining that the course of events revealed how some of the biggest crimes of the late twentieth century could have been easily avoided by just withdrawing key participants.[83] The rise of ISI is no exception; if the War on Terror had never taken place, ISI could have never existed. Chomsky explains that on 9/11, the war on terror was re-declared, with much of the same rhetoric and many of the same people in high-ranking positions as it had been 20 years before. According to the Reagan administration's moderate George Shultz, a primary concern of U.S. foreign policy would be a war on terror, particularly state-sponsored international terrorism, which was the most virulent form of the plague spread by depraved opponents of civilization itself in a return to barbarism in the modern age.[84] In fact

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of exceptionalism as quasi-religious vision," (92). From Byers, Thomas B. "A city upon a hill: American literature and the ideology of exceptionalism." American Studies in Scandinavia 29, no. 2 (1997): 85-105.

[81] "Edward Said and Homi K. Bhabha are both prominent writers who have dealt with discursive and political practices that can be described as Othering. Othering is defined as a process in which, through discursive practices, different subjects are formed, hegemonic subjects – that is, subjects in powerful social positions as well as those subjugated to these powerful conditions," (27), from Velho, Astride, and Oscar Thomas-Olalde. "Othering and its effects: exploring the concept." Writing postcolonial histories of intercultural education. Interkulturelle Pädagogik und postkoloniale Theorie, (Bd. 2, S. 27–51). Frankfurt: Peter Lang (2011).

[82] The American continent was assigned by God to the United States, p. 3, from Madsen, Deborah L. "The West and Manifest Destiny." A Concise Companion to American Studies (2010): 369-386.

[83] Chomsky, Wars of terror.

[84] Chomsky

the nature of this war on terror is more about hegemony rather than survival.

Chomsky explained that the war on Iraq was conducted with the "basic principle is that hegemony is more important than survival". Youssef Ibrahim, senior Middle East correspondent and analyst, explains that the war was to turn," a"friendly' Iraq into a private American oil pumping station.[85]George Bush claimed that he was driven by a mission from God to invade Afghanistan and to fight those terrorists," Bush's speech on the invasion of Iraq is more colored by divine and moral authority than imperial interests, a language that convinces a broader audience of the necessity of military action in that violent part of the Middle East". [86] This discourse is not new, a mission from God; it is actually the same discourse used to justify the extermination of Native Americans by early colonists to expand west. Quentin Youngber argues that, "the strategies of justification deployed today and narrated in the United States National Security Strategy of 2002, otherwise known as the Bush Doctrine, as the inheritance of a tradition of Manifest Destiny that is also narrated in Twain's novel, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court".[87]

The invasion of Iraq and of Afghanistan was based on the securitization process that is built on using false claims of the U.S. government despite the hard evidence provided by the CIA itself

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[85] Bass, Jeff D., and Richard Cherwitz. "Imperial mission and manifest destiny: A case study of political myth in rhetorical discourse." (1978): 213-232.

[86] Youngberg, Quentin. "Morphology of Manifest Destiny: The Justified Violence of John O'Sullivan, Hank Morgan, and George W. Bush." Canadian Review of American Studies 35, no. 3 (2005): 315-334. p. 320

[87] Youngberg, p. 316

and others. The use of historical allusions by George Bush and others proves how much the American foreign policy is strongly related to the very foundation of the republic: the Manifest Destiny, God's justification of American imperialism: divine will that Americans are destined to expand everywhere.

VII. CONCLUSION

ISI's economic structure is mostly based on the control of gas and oil resources; something that could be possible because of ISI's successful recruitment strategy. The strength of this strategy lies in the fact that ISI basically attracted local Iraqis, Sunni tribes that were alienated after the implementation of de-ba'athification program, imposed by the U.S. occupation. Former Ba'athists are key in the success of the control of oil and gas spots because of their previous knowledge and talent that they acquired from their sensitive positions in Saddam's government. De-ba'athification was also fundamental in producing Sunni-Shiite sectarianism. Sectarianism in itself was what the foundation ideology of ISI feeds on: fighting the near enemy or the Shiites.

Despite all the evidence resulted from secret investigations that the Ba'athists had nothing to with hosting Al-Qaeda terrorists or the presence of Al-Zarqawi in Northern Iraq; the U.S. government continued its propaganda and used the myth of Al-Zarqawi to justify the urge to invade Iraq. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan pushed many jihadis to disperse in different parts of the Middle East. Among them was Al-Zarqawi's group that headed to Iraq where they formed their network. The group was inactive until the invasion of Iraq with its consequences took place. The discourse

used by Bush to justify the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was mainly religious. Such kind of discourse is not new; it can be traced back to the idea of the Manifest Destiny that was invented even long before the foundation of the federal republic. The Manifest Destiny gives American divine right to expand everywhere because it is God's destiny. The U.S. imperial behavior is embedded in its early history, and the War on Terror is just a continuum of this history.

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The author declared that they have no competing interests.

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The number of people killed by the sanctions in Iraq is greater than the total number of people killed by all weapons of mass destruction in all of history.

Noam Chomsky