

The Challenges and Prospects of Enforcement of Nigeria's Counter-Terrorism/Insurgency Laws and Policies: Implications for National Security

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Abstract

Interpretation of legal guidelines can vary widely-relying at the occasions dealing with a rustic and its political structure-in different words, whether or not it's miles an autocracy or democracy. Acts of terrorism were described as moves intentionally fascinated by malice and the purpose to destabilize or wreck the essential political, constitutional, financial and/or social structure. The paper finds out that the country's anti-terrorism legislation is critical. The key law under consideration is the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013. The paper

strongly suggests that in order for the Nigerian government to fulfil its counter-terrorism objectives, it must change its attention to tackling the underlying fundamental causes of terrorism. Furthermore, the work suggested that, for long-term sustainable solutions, the opportunity to engage-and address the concerns of the entire population, including marginalized segments of the population who offer passive resistance to terrorist and outlaw groups, is at the heart of a successful counter-terrorism campaign. Most individuals are inclined to approve such a strategy if they can see evidence of success and can envisage even modest but progressive changes. It is only by their active participation and collaboration will the political leadership be able to capture the hearts and minds of the people, particularly Nigeria's youth, and act on the enormous prospects for Nigeria's economic, social, and intellectual advancement.

Keywords

Counterterrorism, Policy, National Security

I. Introduction

Terrorists all over the world have the same strategies of intimidation and coercion. This is utilized by terrorist as a major tool to stay relevant in their operations and relevance. This is amongst the various strategies employed by non-state actors and terrorist organisations. Scholars believe that most terrorist activities contain diverse ranges of intimidation and violence. But a few do now no longer. History indicates that anarchist and terrorist companies be triumphant due to the fact they get hold of

the help of segments of the populace who experience disenfranchised or are the sufferers of systemic discrimination. The Nigerian situation is no less different, the ungoverned spaces created by the return to democracy in 1999 after years of militarism created the emergence of radically oriented groups across the country based on religion, ethnic and sectarian leanings. In reaction to the menacing threats of national insecurity, the country crafted some counter terrorism laws and policies to deal with the impregnable threats of insurgencies and terrorism in Nigeria.

The country's records of terrorist acts, and its current experience, make this crucial difficulty for dialogue and ability action. The ongoing hazard of terrorism in Nigeria has endured over the last decade. The threats Nigeria faces are distinctly various and tough to suppress. This study examines a myriad of ongoing countrywide safety demanding situations confronting Nigeria and evaluates whether or not the counter-terrorism legal guidelines presently in area are powerful sufficient to correctly fight them. To do that, it's vital now no longer simplest to investigate Nigeria's counter-terrorism legal guidelines themselves however to as it should be outline the character of the threats they purpose to eradicate.

The most visible threat to Nigeria is the presence of radical, Jihadist Islamic groups in the north, primarily Boko Haram. There are also ongoing conflicts in the Niger Delta, Africa's most important oil-producing region, where attacks on oil facilities and pipeline vandalism endanger Nigeria's oil sector, on which the Nigerian government is heavily reliant for revenue. Furthermore, pro-Biafra groups for the establishment of a Sovereign State of

Biafra continue to express concern about the nation's future security.¹

Nigeria enacted national legislation in response to terrorism threats. The Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 was enacted to provide measures for the prevention, prohibition, and combating of terrorist acts, as well as the financing of terrorism. The Act also facilitates assistance from foreign governments in the form of mutual assistance, information sharing, and extradition for terrorism-related offenses.²

Nonetheless, they have proven to be insufficient in a number of areas. Existing laws give law enforcement agencies vast powers to apprehend suspected terrorists with little judicial oversight. The police frequently employ a collective punishment strategy, which primarily harms the civilian population. This collective punishment approach can be seen through three different aspects of human rights abuses: unlawful detainment, murder, and torture,³ which does little to dispel widespread public distrust in police and security forces.

Furthermore, it falls short of tackling the underlying socioeconomic conditions that drive violent extremism and terrorism, which is critical in attempts to deter prospective terrorist recruitment and avoid increasing Nigeria's present national security challenges.

¹ Fatima Kyari Mohammed - The future of Nigeria: Security Challenges and Implications for Internal, Regional and Global Security Environment

² United Nations in Nigeria

³ Amnesty International Report 2009

II. The Global Context of Nigeria's Terrorism Problems

Terrorism is a worldwide issue that poses a direct danger to international peace and prosperity. The crippling impacts of terrorist actions, such as the breakdown of law and order, the instability of government institutions, and the detrimental impact on economic growth, have harmed development and stability in many nations.⁴ The reputational damage it can do to a country is also significant. For example, the Boko Haram insurgency has contributed to a bad view of Nigeria as a dangerous country in the eyes of the rest of the world.⁵ It has harmed Nigeria's reputation as a desirable foreign investment, travel, tourism, scholarship, and migration destination. Terrorism in Nigeria creates public insecurity, threatens livelihoods, exacerbates human rights violations, exacerbates population displacement and the refugee crisis, and increases human casualties/fatalities.⁶ According to Transparency International's 2020 CPI (Corruption Perception Index), Nigeria is one of the world's most corrupt countries, ranking 149th out of 180.

Terrorist acts have economic implications because they divert foreign direct investment (FDI), destroy infrastructure, redirect public investment money to security, and hinder commerce.⁷ Terrorism can deplete capital and reduce the country's economic capability. Internationally, the Boko Haram

⁴ AMB. USMAN SARKI : Sustainable development

⁵ Abuad Open Access Research Projects

⁶ Abuad Open Access Research Projects

⁷ Economic Consequence of Terrorism in Developed and Developing Countries .

issue has heightened the anxiety of international investors in Nigeria.⁸ Terrorism's economic effect in Nigeria reached around 142 billion US dollars between 2007 and 2019, by far the highest in Africa.⁹ The entire cost of terrorism in 2019 was \$26.4 billion US dollars.¹⁰ That amounted to 2.4 percent of the country's GDP, a 0.3 percentage point reduction from the previous year.¹¹

Nigeria relies significantly on external borrowing and foreign direct investment to achieve its ambitious development goals, hence it is critical that the investment climate in Nigeria stays appealing. Economic activity has suffered greatly in parts of Nigeria ravaged by terrorist assaults. For example, in Borno State, the epicentre of the Islamist organization Boko Haram since its insurgency began in 2009, a decade of persistent violence has wrecked economic operations and regular living.¹²

While the Northeast is the primary focus of Nigeria's counterterrorism operations, there is a continuous war in the Niger Delta that is as damaging to the Nigerian economy. What distinguishes the region is that it produces the majority of Nigeria's oil, which is the source of the majority of the Nigerian government's revenue and is critical to the stability of Nigeria's existing political system.¹³

⁸ Abud Open Access Research Projects

⁹ Global Terrorism Index 2020 Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace)

¹⁰ Global Terrorism Index 2020 Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace)

¹¹ Global Terrorism Index 2020 Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace)

¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borno_State

¹³ <https://www.cfr.org/blog/significant-rise-insecurity-niger-delta-through-2019>

According to the NNPC (state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corp.), as of August 2020, Nigeria is losing an average of 200,000 b/d of crude oil output due to pipeline sabotage and unlawful pilfering by criminals. Due to attacks on oil and gas installations by the Niger Delta Avengers, a terrorist organization in Nigeria's Niger Delta, the country lost around half of its oil output in 2016.¹⁴ Following involvement by regional leaders and government vows to address the region's development issues, the organization ceased assaults in 2017.¹⁵

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari voiced alarm in June 2021 over new threats by the insurgent organization Niger Delta Avengers to bomb major oil and gas facilities in the West African country.¹⁶ Buhari's remark came as local media reported that the group intends to relaunch operations in response to what the militants regard as an unfair distribution of petroleum earnings to the oil-producing area, as well as rising insecurity in the country.¹⁷

III. The Nature of Terrorism

According to a 2019 paper titled: Nature of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Laws in Nigeria by E. U Ejeh, A. I. Bappah, and Yusuf

¹⁴ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/nigeria-s-buhari-concerned-about-new-threats-to-bomb-oil-assets>

¹⁵ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/nigeria-s-buhari-concerned-about-new-threats-to-bomb-oil-assets>

¹⁶ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/nigeria-s-buhari-concerned-about-new-threats-to-bomb-oil-assets>

¹⁷ <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/nigeria-s-buhari-concerned-about-new-threats-to-bomb-oil-assets>

Dankofa, the Terrorism Prevention Act (as modified) scrupulously avoids the definition of terrorism as a concept.

It defines it as an 'act of terrorism' as an act committed with malice aforethought that has the potential to gravely injure or damage a country or an international organization. Terrorist acts are performed when they are carried out with the necessary purpose; they substantially undermine or destroy a country's or international organization's core political, constitutional, economic, or social structure by intimidation or force.¹⁸ Terrorism imposes significant economic costs on societies and leads not only to direct material damage, but also to long term effects on the local economy.¹⁹

Egypt's Ambassador Mona Omar stated in 2018 that "terrorist activities not only enhance the sense of fear and uncertainty for foreign businessmen, but they also increase transaction costs and might result in the damage of export commodities (oil pipes, for example)." According to Nitch and Schumacher (2004), nations targeted by terrorism would trade less with each other than countries not affected by terrorism, according to Omar's 2018 assessment. These implications are significant: doubling the frequency of terrorist incidents affects bilateral economic flows by 4%.²⁰

Terrorism has had a substantial impact on the Nigerian economy, as detailed in this paper. Terrorism's economic effect in Nigeria reached around 142 billion US dollars between 2007 and

¹⁸ EJEH, BAPPAH & DANKOFA: Nature of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Laws in Nigeria

¹⁹ Negative Effects of Terrorism on the Enjoyment of Human Rights

²⁰ Negative Effects of Terrorism on the Enjoyment of Human Rights

2019, by far the highest in Africa.²¹ Over that time, that amounted to around 2.5 percent of the country's GDP on an annual basis.²² Terrorism and terrorist activities have an impact on the informal economy in at least two ways: they move economic activity from the formal to the informal sectors and they disrupt informal economic activity.²³ The Nation Newspaper reported on Boko Haram's operations in 2013 that Borno and nearby Yobe State - the core of the sect's activities have been economically decimated.

IV. Background of Nigeria's National Terrorism Threats

In Nigeria, as in much of Africa, the majority of security threats are internal, involving irregular forces such as insurgents, criminal gangs, and violent religious extremists. Boko Haram has been responsible for thousands of deaths in West Africa's Lake Chad Basin region since its inception in 2009.

Neighbours gave the group the name Boko Haram, which means "Westernization is sacrilege," based on how they perceived its lifestyle and teachings. This was widely misconstrued as "Western education is a sin" or "Western education is forbidden." Boko Haram is ideologically opposed to Westernization, which it sees as undermining Islamic values.²⁴ Following a spike in Boko Haram-related violence in 2014 and 2015, the number of casualties attributable to the group has dropped dramatically. The Nigerian military, with assistance from Benin, Cameroon, Chad,

²¹ Statista 2021

²² Statista 2021

²³ UNDP Africa

²⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram>

and Niger, has driven Boko Haram out of several provinces in north-eastern Nigeria, but the group still controls some villages and pockets of territory and continues to carry out deadly suicide attacks and kidnap civilians, primarily women and children.²⁵ Internal tensions resulted in the formation of multiple Boko Haram splinter groups in 2016. The Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF), which works alongside the Nigerian military, is the primary counter-terrorism response to Boko Haram.²⁶ According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), by the end of 2020, Islamist insurgencies in Northeast Nigeria had killed 35000 people. The conflict does not appear to be ending anytime soon.

The current Niger Delta conflict arose in the early 1990s as a result of tensions between foreign oil corporations and several of the Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups, particularly the Ogoni and the Ijaw, who believe they are being exploited.²⁷ They complained that Shell, Mobil, and other oil companies were prospering at their expense, as ethnic groups saw little of the wealth generated by oil production while suffering the consequences of widespread environmental degradation caused by exploration and production efforts.²⁸

The Ogonis' response to these perceived wrongs was limited, at least initially, to protests, low-level acts of civil disobedience, and minor, occasional acts of sabotage, as well as the formation in 1990 of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People

²⁵ <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria>

²⁶ Global Terrorism Index 2020 Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace)

²⁷ Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_in_the_Niger_Delta

²⁸ Forbes: Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta

(MOSOP), led by author and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The conflict deteriorated over the next few years, and Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists were hanged by the Nigerian government in November 1995.²⁹ The hangings radicalized Niger Delta opposition groups, prompting them to organize and engage in acts of violence and terrorism against oil interests.³⁰

Nigeria, after nearly four decades of oil production, had become almost completely economically dependent on petroleum extraction by the early 1980s, accounting for 25% of its GDP at the time. As of 2008, this proportion had risen to 60%.³¹ Nigeria's oil and gas sector accounts for approximately 10% of the country's GDP, and petroleum export revenue accounts for approximately 86% of total export revenue.³²

In the southeast of Nigeria, various factions are attempting secession, with the two largest parties currently being the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPB) (IPOB).³³ The pro-Biafran movement, led by Nigeria's minority ethnic Igbo population, has significant historical origins.³⁴

Following two failed military coups and targeted ethnic violence and persecution, the Igbo people banded together in 1967 to form the secessionist state of Biafra, triggering a brutal two-year civil war during which the Nigerian military imposed a blockade of the state, causing between 500,000 and 2 million civilians to

²⁹ Forbes: Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta

³⁰ Forbes: Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta

³¹ Wikipedia : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_in_the_Niger_Delta

³² OPEC: https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm

³³ European Asylum Support Office : Separatist Movement

³⁴ FP Insider Access

perish from starvation.³⁵ Ultimately, Biafra surrendered to the federal government, but pro-Biafran and anti-government sentiment remained and has hardened in recent years.³⁶

V. The Nature of the Problem

The Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 has, in our opinion, fallen short of its intended goals of preventing, prohibiting, and combating terrorist crimes and financing.

Though Nigeria has made progress at times, groups such as Boko Haram remain active and pose a significant danger to national security today. In fact, based on the data, it is difficult to conclude that the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013 was a success. Low public trust in Nigerian police limits vital public assistance in combating internal security challenges posed by irregular forces such as insurgents, criminal gangs, and extremists.³⁷ For years, the Nigeria Police Force has been beset by allegations of corruption, heavy-handedness, and politicization.³⁸ And socioeconomic concerns continue to be a significant hindrance to the efficacy of the Nigerian government's efforts.

A successful counterterrorism strategy must prioritize addressing underlying conditions that promote the spread of terrorism, such as poverty, protracted unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of terrorism victims, ethnic, national, and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socioeconomic

³⁵ FP Insider Access

³⁶ FP Insider Access

³⁷ African Center for Strategic Studies : Africa Security Brief No. 31

³⁸ African Center for Strategic Studies : Africa Security Brief No. 31

marginalization, and a lack of good governance.³⁹ According to the IEP's (Institute for Economics and Peace) 2020 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria is the third most affected country in the world by the economic cost of terrorism.

To effect that shift, Nigeria will need to improve governance and oversight of the security sector, as well as address the underlying factors that contribute to the development of terrorism.

VI. Nigeria's Global Strategy to Combat Terrorism

Terrorist threats have continued throughout the last decade, and Nigeria has joined up with various foreign and regional allies to combat them. Nigeria is a member of the United Nations and has collaborated with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) (UNODC). The UNODC's Global Counter-Terrorism Assistance Programme is the primary United Nations entity with the mandate and expertise to provide counter-terrorism legal technical assistance to Member States in order to strengthen capacity for rule-of-law-based investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of terrorism offenses, as well as the ratification, legislative incorporation, and implementation of international legal instruments against terrorism.⁴⁰

The EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Counter-Terrorism Programme is a collaboration between Nigeria, the UN, and the European Union. It is intended to assist Nigeria in preventing and

³⁹ Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations (October 2009). UN Sixth Committee

⁴⁰ EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project II

combating terrorism using human rights-compliant criminal justice methods. The initiative aims to significantly develop Nigeria's capacity to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism offenses in accordance with the rule of law and human rights, as well as to combat violent extremism.⁴¹

At the regional level, the countries of the West African sub-region have domesticated the majority of international counter-terrorism laws under the auspices of ECOWAS, the sub-regional organization.⁴² Nigeria's cooperation with her close neighbours, Niger, Benin, Chad, and Cameroon, resulted in the formation of the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU), with headquarters in Abuja.⁴³ Through this arrangement, 80 intelligence services from these five nations communicated timely intelligence relevant to tactical operations demands.

Nigeria became a founding member of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), a counter-terrorism forum co-chaired by the United States and Turkey that brings together a diverse range of governments to discuss and share counter-terrorism measures. Nigeria is currently working with international organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), and the United Nations (UN) to examine the global dimensions of the country's terrorist challenges.⁴⁴

⁴¹ EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project II

⁴² Dasuki, M 2013 : The fight against terrorism and Piracy

⁴³ Aderonke M 2015 : Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Contemporary Nigeria

⁴⁴ Owete, F 2018 : Nigeria, France, Cameroon and three other Countries sign deal on massive joint offensive against Boko Haram

Furthermore, Nigeria has agreements with countries that provide finance and military support, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Nigeria participates in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a multifaceted, multi-year US strategy aimed at establishing resilient institutions capable of preventing and responding to terrorism in a holistic, long-term manner.⁴⁵ Britain pays £240 million in aid to Nigeria, with £100 million going to the north-east, making it the second-largest donor behind the US and giving the UK a significant stake in what happens in the region.⁴⁶

VII. The Nigerian Government's Slow Response to Boko Haram

The Nigerian government's response to terrorism concerns has been delayed. In reality, it wasn't until the United States decided to blacklist Nigeria and Nigerians for terrorism in January 2010 that the Nigerian government implemented anti-terrorist laws.⁴⁷ In June 2011, President Obama signed the Terrorism Prevention Act into law. In addition, in 2011, the Money Laundering Prohibition Act was enacted, with the goal of cutting off financial support for terrorism.⁴⁸ In 2011, the Federal Government set up

⁴⁵ Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

⁴⁶ The Guardian : UK could boost military support to help Nigeria defeat Boko Haram

⁴⁷ The Conversation : Nigeria's poor response to Boko Haram has left border communities feeling abandoned

⁴⁸ The Conversation : Nigeria's poor response to Boko Haram has left border communities feeling abandoned

a special Joint Task Force in Maiduguri.⁴⁹ It was made up of the military (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the Department of State Security, and the Nigeria Police Force. It enabled the security formations to collect and share intelligence in a coordinated manner.

However, security experts have questioned the type of intelligence obtained by the Joint Task Force. It took a military strategy to combating an organization whose identity and structure were flux and yet to be formed. This is a significant flaw in the government's reaction, and it is one of the reasons why the Boko Haram insurgency continues to thrive.⁵⁰

Understanding a terrorist organization's identification and structure is critical in developing a response to the risks they represent. According to Byman's theory of distinction, it is critical to distinguish between an ethnic and an ideological terrorist in order to respond effectively to the various groups.⁵¹ Byman believes that there is a critical distinction between ethnic and ideological terrorist groups, namely that ethnic groups have a much greater connection to the local people than ideological organizations.⁵²

As a result, any military action against the ethnic terrorist group will elicit a backlash and increase resentment toward the government among the local community. Furthermore, this will

⁴⁹ The Conversation : Nigeria's poor response to Boko Haram has left border communities feeling abandoned

⁵⁰ The Conversation : Nigeria's poor response to Boko Haram has left border communities feeling abandoned

⁵¹ Daniel Byman : The logic of ethnic terrorism , studies in conflict and terrorism.

⁵² Daniel Byman : The logic of ethnic terrorism , studies in conflict and terrorism.

strengthen support for the radical terrorist organization, as well as recruitment to the group.⁵³ Boko Haram represents the economic, political, and religious frustrations of marginalized young Muslims in northeast Nigeria.⁵⁴

Nigeria has a Christian population of 49.3 percent and a Muslim population of 48.8 percent.⁵⁵ Given the country's substantial Muslim population and the fact that there are currently twelve states regulated by Sharia Law, the objective of establishing an Islamic State in Nigeria might easily be viewed as an ethnic claim rather than an ideological one.⁵⁶ Ethnic striving is not only confined to achieving statehood or independence; it can also refer to a group's desire to establish a new ethnic authority in the country in question.⁵⁷

When comparing Byman's thesis to the nature of Boko Haram, it is evident that Boko Haram has ethnic ties to Nigeria's Muslim population. It aspires to construct a state that will benefit the purified Muslim population of Nigeria rather than simply itself, in accordance with its concept of purifying the Muslim people. As a result, it is acceptable to argue that Boko Haram is ideologically and racially motivated.⁵⁸

To combat Boko Haram, the Nigerian government has frequently used collective punishment. However, indiscriminate violence does little to prevent a community from remaining neutral or pro-government. In fact, the use of indiscriminate

⁵³ Daniel Byman : The logic of ethnic terrorism , studies in conflict and terrorism.

⁵⁴ Warner Z : The sad rise of Boko Haram

⁵⁵ U.S Department of State: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/nigeria/>

⁵⁶ Ms. Maike Knoechelmann : 2014

⁵⁷ Ms. Maike Knoechelmann : 2014

⁵⁸ Ms. Maike Knoechelmann : 2014

violence against the Nigerian Muslim populace has created even more enmity within the people, and this vicious cycle has benefited and strengthened Boko Haram over the years.⁵⁹ To put an end to the bloodshed, a new counter-terrorism strategy that focuses on Boko Haram as an ethnic and ideological terror organization is required.⁶⁰

VIII. The Niger Delta and Biafran Separatist Movement

Nigeria's Niger Delta Region is the continent's most major oil-producing region. Nigeria's oil and gas business accounts for approximately 10% of the country's GDP, while petroleum export earnings accounts for approximately 86% of overall export revenue.⁶¹ However, the Nigerian oil economy has remained largely underdeveloped, and its citizens, particularly those living in oil-producing areas, are impoverished.

This has resulted in a wide range of disputes. The initial confrontation between oil communities, oil companies, and the Nigerian government has developed into fighting within and between oil communities. People are set against each other in their pursuit of oil-related benefits or means of subsistence.⁶² Another factor is the complicity of local elites and elders. Their desire for monetary gain from oil benefits, like as contracts to clean up oil spills and monitor pipelines, has exacerbated environmental

⁵⁹ Ms. Maike Knoechelmann : 2014

⁶⁰ Ms. Maike Knoechelmann : 2014

⁶¹ OPEC: https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm

⁶² Abosede O Babatunde <http://Journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

issues.⁶³ Oil spills, gas flaring, and other oil company activities have had a significant environmental impact on fisheries and subsistence farming.⁶⁴

When looking for methods to address the crisis in the Niger Delta region, a thorough examination of this network of global, national, and local interactions and their effects is crucial.⁶⁵ The problem necessitates a collaborative strategy to solving it: broad consultation, collaboration, and effective discussion. Local fishers, farmers, traders, youth, and women are among the stakeholders, in addition to oil firms, the Nigerian government, and local elites.⁶⁶

In Nigeria, neo-Biafran secessionism has grown in prominence, posing a significant challenge to the federal government.⁶⁷ The separatist movement was irregular in the early 2000s, but it gathered traction in 2015-2016. Tens of thousands of people flocked to the streets in response to IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu's arrest. In response to the threat and in an aggressive reassertion of national sovereignty, the Nigerian military went on a killing spree, killing up to 150 peaceful protestors in just two years.⁶⁸

⁶³ The Conversation : How Oil and Water create a complex conflict in Niger Delta

⁶⁴ The Conversation : How Oil and Water create a complex conflict in Niger Delta

⁶⁵ The Conversation : How Oil and Water create a complex conflict in Niger Delta

⁶⁶ The Conversation : How Oil and Water create a complex conflict in Niger Delta

⁶⁷ Brown Political Review : The sun still rises-Neo Biafran secessionism, Zionism, and the question of Nigeria

⁶⁸ Brown Political Review : The sun still rises-Neo Biafran secessionism, Zionism, and the question of Nigeria

Many people hope (or fear) that this movement will continue to expand, but it is unclear what it will become.⁶⁹ What is certain is that Biafra has officially returned to Nigerian politics and will most likely remain there.⁷⁰ Biafra has become the lens through which many Igbos—both in the diaspora and in Nigeria—view their political situation. It is a stand-in for a wide range of dissatisfaction. These include unemployment, alienation, underdevelopment, crime, and terrorism, all of which have plagued Nigerians in recent years.⁷¹

IX. Addressing Nigeria's Underlying Socio-Economic Issues

Nigeria has the greatest GDP of any African country and is endowed with a wealth of resources. However, the country's growth is still impeded by consumptive cultures, poor institutions, and brittle political structures.⁷² These socioeconomic issues have not only hampered Nigeria's ability to build its economy, but have also resulted in diminished stability in a number of locations around the country.

In north-eastern Nigeria, structural factors such as inefficient and corrupt administration that feed individual and group grievances are worsened by acute poverty, unemployment, and restricted political and socioeconomic options in the neighbourhood from which Boko Haram operates.⁷³ The

⁶⁹ Georgetown Journal of Internal Affairs – Biafran activism in Nigeria today

⁷⁰ Georgetown Journal of Internal Affairs – Biafran activism in Nigeria today

⁷¹ Georgetown Journal of Internal Affairs - Biafran activism in Nigeria today

⁷² Colonel Charles : <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA561627.pdf>

⁷³ Forrest J.J 2012

government's responses have not resulted in the expected consequence of defeating Boko Haram.

Instead, these government measures reveal the governance vacuum and problem of paying insufficient attention to the contextual realities and underlying political, social, and economic causes of the Boko Haram conflict's emergence and perpetuation.⁷⁴ The persistence of systemic flaws in Nigeria's political structure, which creates realities such as corruption, poverty, and underdevelopment, only supports the type of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram.⁷⁵

Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk's 2003 paper demonstrated how three countries (Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom) implemented social and economic development programs to prevent a revival of terrorism within their borders. These countries' initiatives revealed the potential benefits and drawbacks of using social and economic development as a counter-terrorism tactic.⁷⁶ According to Cragin and Chalk, social and economic reforms can erode local support for terrorist actions and deter terrorist recruits. Many terrorist organizations recruit new members from places where terrorism is widely regarded as a legitimate answer to perceived grievances.⁷⁷ Some terrorist organizations also provide cash incentives and enhanced family assistance to recruits.⁷⁸ Social and economic development measures can help to diminish the pool of prospective recruits by

⁷⁴ Asfura-Heim, P & McQuaid 2015 – Diagnosing Boko Haram Conflict

⁷⁵ African Journal on Conflict Resolution

⁷⁶ Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk (2003). *Terrorism & Development : Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*

⁷⁷ Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk (2003). *Terrorism & Development : Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*

⁷⁸ Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk (2003). *Terrorism & Development : Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*

addressing their perceived grievances and giving viable alternatives to terrorism.⁷⁹

X. Public Distrust of the Police in Nigeria

Extortion and abuse allegations have long accompanied the Nigeria Police Force's reputation, which was called the country's most corrupt public institution by a 2019 study and the lowest-ranked police force of the 127 countries assessed in a 2016 index assessment.⁸⁰ In fact, 72% of Nigerians polled by Transparency International judged police to be corrupt.⁸¹ Furthermore, humanitarian organizations have consistently chastised the Nigerian military for conducting harsh campaigns that make little effort to win hearts and minds.⁸²

Countless ordinary Nigerians trying to make ends meet as taxi drivers, market sellers, and shopkeepers are harassed on a daily basis by armed police officers who demand bribes and conduct human rights violations against them in order to extract money. Failure to pay is frequently met with threats of arrest and physical damage.⁸³ However, the government has generally failed to hold

⁷⁹ Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk (2003). *Terrorism & Development : Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*

⁸⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/13/sars-is-no-more-but-nigerians-say-police-abuse-still-here>

⁸¹ Transparency International : *People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 – Global Corruption Barometer*

⁸² *The Guardian* : UK could boost military support to help Nigeria defeat Boko Haram

⁸³ Human Rights Watch: *Corruption and human rights abuse by the Nigerian Police force*

accountable police officers who waste and steal police funding, let alone rank-and-file cops who conduct abuses.⁸⁴

Human rights violations committed by Nigerian police and security personnel on a regular basis weaken their ability to properly mobilize public support when dealing with national security challenges. Improving the Nigeria Police Force's performance necessitates building trust with local communities and effectively responding to citizens' security requirements.⁸⁵ This necessitates systemic changes in the governance and accountability of Nigeria's police force.⁸⁶ Oluwakemi Okenyodo in a 2016 report talked about how the Nigerian Police Force should be decentralized.

This would allow the police to be more involved in the community and provide them greater flexibility in carrying out their duties without routine matters being bottlenecked at the highest levels of decision-making. It would also improve community-based accountability incentives for police, making them less reliant on distant supervisors.

XI. Improving Socio-economic Conditions and the Importance of Community Resilience

Given the complexities of Nigeria's security situation, as well as the country's economic, political, and social strife, counter-terrorism projects and programs should focus on building

⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch: Corruption and human rights abuse by the Nigerian Police force

⁸⁵ African Center for Strategic Studies : Africa Security Brief No. 31

⁸⁶ African Center for Strategic Studies : Africa Security Brief No. 31

community resilience against terrorism, improving cooperation among law enforcement agencies, and strengthening judicial institutions.⁸⁷ In a more interdependent and interconnected Nigeria, collective measures to combat terrorism have become critical.⁸⁸

The macroeconomic position is more difficult now than it was in 2015-2016, when oil prices plummeted precipitously and Nigeria entered its first recession in 25 years. Nigeria currently has fewer buffers and policy mechanisms to cushion unfavourable consequences. The Excess Crude Account is exhausted, foreign reserves are heavily reliant on short-term flows, and investor confidence is harmed by policy uncertainty. Prior to the 2016 recession, Nigeria's economy was expanding rapidly at a rate of 6.3 percent.

Prior to COVID-19, the economy was increasing at a rate of 2.2 percent. In 2014, inflation was in the single digits, but it is already about 12% in 2019. In 2019, the general government budget deficit was 4.4 percent of GDP, up from 1.8 percent in 2014.⁸⁹ Levels of unemployment are likely to rise, impacting poor households and increasing the proportion of the population at risk of sliding into poverty.⁹⁰

According to the most recent economic study, Nigeria might enable millions of residents to transcend poverty over the next

⁸⁷ Omale. D.J.O - Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy

⁸⁸ Omale. D.J.O - Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy

⁸⁹ The World Bank :
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview>

⁹⁰ The World Bank :
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview>

decade by enacting ambitious changes aimed at increasing economic productivity.⁹¹ According to the Nigeria Economic Update, *Jumpstarting Inclusive Growth: Unlocking the Productive Potential of Nigeria's People and Resource Endowments*, the country's productivity-how well the economy transforms land, labour, capital, and other inputs into goods and services-is low in comparison to peer countries, stifling economic growth, job creation, and living standards. The analysis warns that if productivity growth is not substantial, living standards would continue to worsen and the number of people living in poverty will increase by more than 30 million by 2030.⁹²

Although social and economic growth, when properly supported and implemented, can reduce terrorism, it cannot eliminate it entirely. Development is most effective when it is integrated into a multifaceted strategy that incorporates broader political, military, and community-relations components. Aside from these qualities, there is a significant possibility for development strategies to lessen the threat of terrorism. Poverty generates insecurity, and a lack of economic possibilities for young people fosters the development of terrorism. More funding is urgently required to improve young people's access to education possibilities in northern Nigeria.⁹³

⁹¹ The World Bank :
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/publication/nigeria-economic-update-accelerating-economic-expansion-creating-new-job-opportunities>

⁹² The World Bank :
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/publication/nigeria-economic-update-accelerating-economic-expansion-creating-new-job-opportunities>

⁹³ Uche Igwe : <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/01/15/buhari-little-to-address-nigeria-terrorism-insecurity-boko-haram/>

XII. Research Methodology

This study employs qualitative method of data analysis, notably from documentary analysis. We read through a large number of original research materials from various sources, as well as secondary sources such as news articles. The goal of this study was to discover why, despite apparent ongoing attempts by the Nigerian government to combat terrorism, Nigeria remains one of the world's most severely hit countries.

We strived to learn what the core causes of terrorism are in order to comprehend why Nigeria's present counter-terrorism legislation have been mostly ineffective in putting an end to the continuous security threats. Our investigation began with an examination of the present security concerns confronting Nigeria. We read up on Boko Haram and the crises in northern Nigeria. The present Boko Haram battle took me back just over a decade, to 2009, when the terrorist group rose to prominence after a series of attacks on police stations and other government buildings in Maiduguri, Borno state's capital.⁹⁴ We were particularly interested in the Nigerian government's reaction to Boko Haram's terrorist strikes. The Nigerian government established a national legislation - The Terrorism Prevention Act – in 2011, which was later revised in 2013.

The Terrorism Prevention Act established the groundwork for how the Nigerian government would respond to terrorist attacks in the future. As a result, we examined some of Nigeria's

⁹⁴ Kate Meaghar : Addressing Boko Haram Challenge in Nigeria

other noteworthy security concerns today. In Nigeria, the Biafran separatist movement has a long and illustrious history.

Although today's separatist movement takes place mostly on the internet rather than on the streets⁹⁵, it nonetheless poses a significant threat to national security. As we indicated in the Abstract, an effective and well-functioning security apparatus—along with suitable laws—is thus a critical component of successful law enforcement.

We investigated the continuous conflicts in the Nigeria Delta, a region of significant importance not only in Nigeria, but also globally. The Niger Delta generates around 2 million barrels of oil per day.⁹⁶ Revenues from Niger Delta oil exports have benefited Shell and other global oil corporations operating in Nigeria, including Mobil, Texaco, Agip, Elf, and Chevron.⁹⁷ They have been the principal source of money for the Nigerian government, have contributed to the construction of a new national capital, and have benefited some high-ranking government figures.⁹⁸

Our studies on the Niger Delta led us to investigate the global repercussions of Nigeria's persistent terrorism problem. We analysed research documents on the economic losses Nigeria has suffered as a result of these conflicts, both in terms of lost revenues from theft, vandalism, and a stalling economy in high-risk areas experiencing widespread violence, as well as through the impact Nigeria's reputation and security problems have on foreign investment.

⁹⁵ Georgetown Journal of Internal Affairs – Biafran activism in Nigeria today

⁹⁶ G. Nwagbo : Oil pollution in Niger Delta

⁹⁷ Bird F : Wealth and poverty in the Niger Delta

⁹⁸ Bird F : Wealth and poverty in the Niger Delta

Finally, in order to better understand why these conflicts have not been resolved, we studied research documents relating to the country's underlying socioeconomic concerns, which I believe establish preconditions for the formation of terrorism.

XIII. Results and Findings

The authors feel that the Nigerian administration, led by President Muhammadu Buhari, has not done enough to combat the country's ongoing national security concerns. According to Uche Igwe's London School of Economics paper, insecurity was a crucial factor in former President Goodluck Jonathan's loss in 2015 by Muhammadu Buhari, a retired army general. Following his election victory in 2015, Buhari vowed to eliminate the insurgency. To this day, attacks persist, and individuals who profess Christian faith are disproportionately targeted.⁹⁹ Many people have been kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam or face execution.¹⁰⁰ Buhari remarked in a 2021 address that "insecurity as a challenge has direct ramifications on our national economic stability, growth, and development, putting us back at vital times through the destruction of public and private investments."

In areas of the country where chronic poverty, social exclusion, and disillusionment among sections of the youth were already a problem, the cycles of violence unleashed by mindless groups like Boko Haram and others have thwarted government efforts to implement social policies and associated investments that

⁹⁹ Uche Igwe : <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/01/15/buhari-little-to-address-nigeria-terrorism-insecurity-boko-haram/>

¹⁰⁰ Uche Igwe : <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/01/15/buhari-little-to-address-nigeria-terrorism-insecurity-boko-haram/>

could make a significant difference in the quality of life of our citizens." However, six years later, and around two years before the conclusion of his final second term, insecurity has deteriorated beyond the Boko Haram insurgency.

Almost every section of Nigeria is currently dealing with some type of violent crime, demonstrating that the president has failed to uphold his promise on security. Nigeria is on the verge of collapse due to insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, and secessionist violence, with many asking for the president's resignation for "failure" to secure the country.

In their 2018 study, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University advised that the Nigerian government execute long-term economic and peace accords in the Niger Delta and the country's north-east. To that aim, infrastructure, economic, and human capital development should be prioritized so that the local community feels less excluded and hence less motivated to engage in violent conflict or easy recruitment into insurgency organizations.¹⁰¹ Concerning religious-based attacks in the country, they suggested that the Nigerian government encourage more creative forms of interfaith discussion and mediation between Christian and Muslim leaders in the country. This will contribute to greater religious tolerance and respect at all levels of government and society.¹⁰²

The Financial Times published an article in December 2020 concluding that the Nigerian state is failing.¹⁰³ Citizens rarely sleep with their eyes closed because to terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, and ethno-religious conflict expanding from Borno, Yobe, and

¹⁰¹ IPSS Peace & Security Report Nigeria Conflict Insight | Feb 2018 | Vol. 1

¹⁰² IPSS Peace & Security Report Nigeria Conflict Insight | Feb 2018 | Vol. 1

¹⁰³ Financial Times: Nigeria at risk of becoming a failed state.

Adamawa to Zamfara, Katsina, and Kaduna. According to the author, Mr. Buhari's government must endeavour to draw a line in the sand in its three remaining years. It must redouble its efforts to gain control of security. It must also rebuild trust in critical institutions like as the judiciary, security services, and the electoral commission, which will preside over the elections in 2023.¹⁰⁴

The militarization of every security concern has proven ineffective in combating the challenges that the country faces. The focus of the discussion must move from Nigeria's response to security concerns to how to avoid them in the future. To do so, the Nigerian government must focus on improving economic opportunities and social conditions – particularly in conflict-ravaged regions such as North Eastern Nigeria - as well as improving accountability within the police and security services and trust between the government and the Nigerian people.

XIV. Conclusion

Terrorism has had a massive and all-encompassing impact on Nigerian society. They can be quantified in terms of slower economic growth, less prospects for foreign investment, and financial instability. Less clearly quantifiable, but possibly more important to the nation's destiny, are the social and political repercussions. It is not difficult to forecast some of the external macroeconomic drivers that the country faces if we advance the clock only a generation. These include global climate change, a global shift away from the use of fossil fuels, and the resulting dangers to Nigeria's oil-dependent national economy.

¹⁰⁴ Financial Times: Nigeria at risk of becoming a failed state.

Internally, long-term structural challenges are the primary demographic and socioeconomic drivers at work. They are unchangeable in the short term. Nigeria has a population of 210 million people, which is expanding at a rate of about 2.6 percent each year. It boasts some of the world's highest female fertility rates (5.2 births per woman). It has a fast rising youth population that is confronting a labour shortage. Despite progress, the country maintains an education service gap and a chronically lopsided income distribution.

There are numerous advantages. Nigeria is endowed with significant geographical and non-fossil fuel natural resources. Solar power and the potential of a huge domestic market can help lay the groundwork for a future-oriented economy-and society. Literacy rates in the country are greater than in other countries in Africa.

Nigeria's religious diversity can be considered as both a difficulty (particularly now and in the near future) and an opportunity and strength in the long run, if tolerance and concord can be fostered. This could provide a long-term political and social vision for future generations in the context of this assessment on the efficiency of the country's counter-terrorism policies. The country's youth population will surely have an impact on the outcome. It has the potential to be a good change agent. In the meanwhile, Nigeria's present and future anti-terrorism laws and political governance will shape the immediate future.

Although terrorism-related murders at the hands of Boko Haram have decreased in recent years, North Eastern Nigeria remains destabilized, and many Nigerians live in constant danger. A growing number of kidnappings of students, as well as persistent threats against Nigerian military and citizens, have done little to

relieve ordinary Nigerians' anxieties. Because of the worldwide importance of locations such as the Niger Delta, worrisome rumblings of the risks Nigeria faces elsewhere in the country have continued to arise internationally.

Finally, after more than a decade of horror from Boko Haram and a slew of other difficulties, fear of further terrorist threats continues in many parts of the country. Despite certain victories, it is evident that the Nigerian government and present counter-terrorism laws are not doing enough to eliminate the risks that the country faces. Unemployment, corruption, and a lack of education make the option to join terrorist groups nearly unavoidable for many young Nigerians in high-risk locations. Furthermore, the Nigerian public's lack of trust in the country's police and security forces continues to impede the government's efforts to combat terrorism.

As a result, we believe that in order for the Nigerian government to achieve the counter-terrorism aims outlined in The Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013, the act must be kept, but the emphasis must shift in the future to tackling the underlying fundamental causes of terrorism. In terms of enforcement, which is critical, there is a chance to examine and reform the domestic functions of Nigeria's two principal law enforcement forces—the military and its civilian police force. Both play a role, although they do so in distinct ways. Reforming the police department, which is riddled with corruption, represents a big opportunity to gain local support.

This, in our opinion, must be a national and continuing debate in which everyone in the country is equally active and engaged. The work cannot be left to government bureaucracy, well-meaning but self-interested non-governmental organizations,

or professional reformers. The ability to capture the hearts and minds of the people, particularly Nigeria's youth, lies at the heart of a successful and durable counter-terrorism operation.

Enlightened counter-terrorism legislation, as well as law enforcement that is widely seen by the public to be based on a foundation of justice, can assist offer an acceptable framework for constructive transformation. The challenge is severe and pressing for Nigeria. Working together peacefully as a nation, on the other hand, will be well worth the effort. It is, after all, our future. What we make of it is entirely up to us.

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