An Evaluation of Relevance of Criminal Intelligence Management and Implications for Security and Public Safety in Benue State, Nigeria

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Abstract: This empirical study utilized the qualitative method and key informant interview (KII) technique to examine the relevance and implications of criminal intelligence management to the fight against crime and insecurity that threaten public safety in Benue State, North Central Nigeria. The study focused only on five local Government Areas of the State where incidents of various kinds of crime, particularly cattle herders attacks, cattle rustling, armed robbery, banditry, kidnappings and farmers-herders conflicts do occur regularly. A sample size of 18 (n-18) was determined for the study. The interview participants were recruited using the referral approach that was based on the purposive sampling technique of selecting persons with enough stock of knowledge, experience, and expertise on the topic of this study. The participants were recruited from the Nigeria Police, DSS, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, and community vigilante groups in Makurdi, the State capital located in Makurdi L.G.A (Benue North-west Zone) and four other Local Government Areas , namely, Agatu (Benue South zone), Logo, Kwande, and Katsina-Ala (Benue North-east zone),where all manner of criminal activities, particularly armed robbery, banditry, kidnapping, herders attacks, farmers-herdsman clashes, and cattle rustling take place on regular basis. Data analysis was done using thematic analysis approach. Lincoln & Guba’s 3-step model was applied with the aid of NVivo 11. The finding of the study was that the management of the collection/collation phase of information meant for intelligence production, including the various agents and tools used for that process (informants, surveillance, technologies (ICT), community policing, and interrogation) predisposes criminal intelligence management to be very relevant to the fight against crime. The finding of the study also showed that how the intelligence analysis phase of the intelligence production process, parti-
cularly intelligence analysis is managed makes criminal intelligence management have much relevance and implications to the fight against crime and insecurity. Again, the study also showed that the way the consumption phase of the intelligence process including utilization, feedback and reviews is managed accounts for the relevance and implication of criminal intelligence management to the fight against crime and insecurity that threaten public safety.

**Keywords:** Intelligence; Crime; Security; Law Enforcement; Public Safety

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**A. Introduction**

Recent investigations reveal that since 1999 Nigeria returned to democratic rule till date, the country has come under the severe burden of so many different types of security threats, with six of them being deadliest extremist jihadist insurgency (typified by the Boko Haram terrorist conflicts), farmers-herdsmen clashes, armed banditry and kidnapping, separatist or secessionist insurgency (typified by Biafran agitators, oil-bunkering militancy, and cattle rustling. This is outside the burden of such routine common criminal acts like rape burglary, theft, assault, armed robbery, and fraud among other acts of petty criminal victimization that take place on daily basis in various nooks and cranny across the country. The consequences of the foregoing, include death, and injury to several thousands of innocent

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Nigerians, destruction of property valued into millions of naira, and displacement of millions of persons away from their home communities.  

Investigations also reveal that one of the State’s worst affected by the foregoing deadly security threats in Nigeria is Benue State, located in the centre of the country in the North central region, and reputed to be one of food-baskets of the country. Aside of those petty criminal victimizations, Benue State has since been under the siege of three fearsome security threats; famers-herdsmen clashes, cattle rustling, armed banditry and kidnapping, with the herders attacks being the deadliest of all. In the said clashes, an army of armed herders would attack an unsuspecting community, kill several thousands of the inhabitants, sack those who are lucky to have survived, and burn down their houses and property. For instance, in 2016 and 2018, such densely populated communities and ever busy markets like Agatu, Ugbo and Aga markets, among several others were attacked, with over 500 persons killed in each of the attacks. As the clashes escalated between 2017 and 2018, the Benue State Government was compelled to enact the Open-Grazing Prohibition Law, 2017, and as part of its enforcement efforts created Livestock Guards. The pastoralists, on the other hand, were alleged to have rejected the law on grounds of its being overbearing and draconian on their own side, and in response had continued to allow their cattle stray into peoples’ farmlands uncontrolled. This stalemate had continued to trigger larger-scale attacks by armed herders on the farming communities up till this day.

These challenges indicate that the law enforcement agencies and other security personnel are yet to meet the expectations for quality service

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delivery, particularly in preventing crime, attacks and the activities of extremists, as well as being more pragmatic and innovation in response to numerous challenges posed by this problem to public safety and security in Nigeria. Various factors have been implicated as being responsible for the ineffective law enforcement and efficient maintenance of law and order in Nigeria by the nation’s police force and other law enforcement agencies. These factors which shall be discussed later in this study could be categorized into structural and institutional in nature. Today, these factors appear to have grown into a gangrene monster that is seemingly difficult to tame, leaving to the present ever-increasing wave of insecurity across the country.

This rising and seemingly intractable wave of insecurity compounded as it is today, by very strange forms of criminality poses three urgent challenges. First, the situation requires proactive measures rather than the very reactive approach (scornfully and pejoratively dubbed "wee dem" by the lay public in Nigeria). This approach has been adopted by the law enforcement agencies in the country particularly the police as its traditional policing model since 1930 the force was established.

Second, the prevention of these crimes requires knowledge, including intelligence, which is beyond local and national jurisdictions. Third, the acquisition of knowledge for the policing of these crimes requires dynamic engagement and partnership among security and intelligence agencies as well as between law enforcement agencies and critical non-law enforcement stakeholders within and across nations. It is in this context that it is often stated that contemporary major crimes require transnational network and intelligence-led law enforcement, rather than what Docobo and Angwe described as “police-led policing”.

In civilized climes, prevention and detection of crime is a prerequisite to effective law enforcement. Intelligence gathering is key to crime detection.

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The general perception today is that, compared to half a century ago, intelligence gathering is no longer the centerpiece of policing and law enforcement in Nigeria. Generally speaking, law-enforcement agent in civilized climes “investigate in order to arrest”, but in Nigeria the reverse is the case: law-enforcement officers “arrest in order to investigate”.\(^{10}\)

Put differently, the law enforcement agencies in Nigeria, particularly the police have all along betrayed sheer incapacity to adopt the proactive method of law enforcement known as criminal intelligence-led enforcement in their law enforcement challenge, ostensibly as a consequence of a number of factors that outside the purview of this study. Even where they make attempt to do so, they betray far greater incapacity to engage in quality intelligence analysis, which is the livewire or engine of the intelligence-led law enforcement. The foregoing constitutes the crux of the matter in this study.

Against the foregoing backdrop, this empirical study assessed the relevance of criminal intelligence management with its implications to public safety in Benue State, North Central Nigeria. Criminal intelligence management as an approach simply means the administrative control and supervision of the intelligence cycle or process that involves eight (8) sequential steps, which for convenience’s sake can be essentially collapsed into three major phases: collection/collation, analysis, and consumption phases. This study was, therefore, guided by three research questions. What is the relevance and implications of management of collection/collation of raw information for intelligence production to the fight against crime? What is the relevance and implications of management of intelligence analysis to the fight against crime? What is the relevance and implications of management of consumption of intelligence to the fight against crime?

\section*{B. Review of Relevant Literature}

The search for literature for this study revealed a yawning deficit of both meaningful scholarship and policy attention on the central anchor of this study, ‘criminal intelligence management’. The reasons for this are not farfetched, but too many and obviously not so compelling to be discussed here. However, the most prominent explanation for such paucity in scholarship on the vexed issue of ‘criminal intelligence management’ is the emerging and evolving nature of the subject. This is coupled with the apparent irrational

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fixation on the incident-based reactive approach to law enforcement described as ‘police-led policing’ in most parts of the world, particularly on the part of law enforcement practitioners, policymakers, as well as scholars in developing countries.\textsuperscript{11}

However, there has been in the recent time an increasing shift of attention and recognition both locally and internationally from the critical importance and role of criminal intelligence management in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting of criminal acts as part of the overall response of protecting public safety and security in society. The reasons for this shift of attention and recognition are obvious for enumeration but suffice to mention at least two of the seven factors highlighted by Racliffe, one of the highly respected scholars in the field. They are ineffectiveness of the standard model of policing; and the paucity of evidence that the reactive and incident-based approach to policing has had any significant impact on the level on the crime.\textsuperscript{12}

As a steppingstone to a better understanding of the dynamics and relevance of criminal intelligence management in providing public safety and security to society, significant efforts were made in much of previous literature to address its conceptual preambles. In this respect, for instance, some of the efforts among were directed at first clearing the confusion in the meanings among some of the key concepts that define the field of criminal intelligence management, particularly ‘intelligence’ versus ‘information’, ‘criminal intelligence management’ versus ‘intelligence analysis’, and ‘intelligence analysis’ and ‘intelligence-led policing’ (ILP).

In distinguishing between the term ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’, the scholars who finally cleared the air simply described the former (information) as the raw materials from which intelligence is produced, and the latter (intelligence) as refined information aimed at assessing the impact of specific acts or policies for the purpose of identification, evaluation, and mitigation of possible threats to public safety and security.\textsuperscript{13} Specifically, Ratcliffe &


Gudeth, conceptualized ‘intelligence’ as “the product resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information, supportive of the policy and decision-making processes pertaining to and directed at detecting and preventing specific threats to public safety and security, national stability, and development. Lowenthal summed all up when he observed that intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information, adding that “while all intelligence is information, not all information is intelligence”. In summary here, and as Hutton and Wirtz among many others rightly observed, criminal intelligence which are collected through information, technology, surveillance, and interrogations, permits law enforcement authorities to establish a proactive response to crime and also to identify and understand criminal groups operating in their areas of jurisdiction. Once criminal groups are identified and their habits known, law enforcement authorities may begin to assess current trends in crime to forecast, and to hamper the development of perceived future criminal activities. Intelligence “provides the knowledge on which to base decisions and select appropriate targets for investigation”.

Again, to distinguish it from ‘intelligence analysis’, much of the reviewed literature simply described ‘criminal intelligence management’ as the overall administrative control of the eight-step process known as the ‘intelligence cycle’, which include, direction and planning, collection, evaluation, sanitization, collation, analysis, dissemination, and consumption (utilization, feedback, review of the entire process). From the foregoing, it could be deduced that ‘intelligence analysis’ is simply a subset of the intelligence cycle as its sixth (6th) step, and to that extent, cannot be equated to the larger field of ‘criminal intelligence management’, which controls or

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oversees the very intelligence cycle or process the former is part of. Not surprisingly, the confusing of the meaning of ‘criminal intelligence management’ with that of ‘intelligence analysis’ in certain portion of previous literature must have arisen perhaps as a consequence of the latter’s (intelligence analysis) critical importance and role in the intelligence cycle as the sixth step (Ratcliffe, 2003). To further distinguish it from other sister terms, much of previous literature conceptualized ‘intelligence analysis’ in different ways, while at the same time saying the same thing. For instance, Robertson, in his own line of thought observed that intelligence analysis simply means:

the application of individual or collective cognitive methods to evaluate data (information) and test hypotheses within a secret socio-economic context with a view to producing an intelligence end-product to be used for law enforcement.20

Intelligence analysis can also be described as an in-depth examination of the meaning and essential features of available information. Analysis highlights information gaps, strengths, weaknesses and suggests ways forward. The analytical process is aimed at the development and use of intelligence to direct law enforcement actions. The scope of analysis and its overall credibility depend on the level and accuracy of acquired information, combined with the skills of the analyst. Analysis is a two-step cyclical process, which can be performed to assist all types of law enforcement objectives. The two-step process, of course, include, data integration (the combining of information from different sources in preparation for drawing of inferences), and data interpretation (involves logical reasoning, whereby the intelligent analyst’s cognitive attributes and intelligence quotient (IQ) are deployed to draw inferences from raw data (information) and package the results as end-products meant for dissemination and use by policy-makers, detectives, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers).21 It is, therefore, within the foregoing context that lies the overall importance of the intelligence analyst in the criminal intelligence cycle.

In summary, the intelligence analyst plays very vital role within the intelligence cycle or system. First and foremost, it is the intelligence analyst that does the critical thinking, critical analysis and production of assessment reports which are the very foundation upon which the intelligence cycle

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rests. He does this by diligently collecting relevant information from various sources, critically analyzes them, and then produces objective and timely assessments free from any bias. This intelligence product usually appears in the form of written reports or oral briefings for use by his employers or law enforcement agencies.

Finally, here, much of previous literature also utilized the same definitional technique to distinguish the concept ‘intelligence-led policing’ from sister concepts like ‘intelligence analysis’, ‘criminal intelligence management,’ ‘police-led intelligence’ and ‘police-led policing’. To this end, Smith conceptualized ‘intelligence-led policing’ to mean:

Intelligence-led policing involves the collection; and analysis of information to produce an end-product designed to inform police decision-making at both tactical and strategic levels. It is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse; and is predicated on the notion that the principal task of the police is to prevent and detect crimes, rather than react to it.

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the concept and practice of ‘intelligence-led policing’ shares very close affinity or similarities with ‘criminal, intelligence management’, and to that extent, both concepts will be used interchangeably in the remaining part of this paper. Intelligence has always been part of police work. However, in the traditional policing approach, intelligence is used to aid investigation after a crime incident must have occurred, a practice Alemika and Docobo pejoratively describe as “police-led policing”. In some cases, intelligence is used at tactical level to aid ongoing operations or short-term crime control planning. This approach is referred to as policing-led intelligence. In contrast, intelligence-led policing repositions intelligence from the backstage to the front-stage of policing. This is necessary as emphasis on guaranteeing, attaining and preserving public

safety and security and security have moved away from enforcement to risk prevention or minimization. As Cope observed, "intelligence-led policing exemplifies concerns with identifying, prioritizing, and intervening to minimize risk. Intelligence can be understood as information developed for the purpose of directing police action." 27

All said, intelligence-led policing as an approach has only begun to gain popularity and currency across the world in the last couple of years precisely since 1990s. In the literature, a number of factors have been highlighted as being responsible for the ongoing widespread enthusiastic embrace and rapidly growing popularity of the intelligence-led policing model across the world, particularly in developed societies. Prominent among these factors include the paucity of evidence that the present model of policing anchored, of course, on the incident-based, reactive and investigative approach to policing has little or no impact on the level of crime in society; and the desire and commitment to explore new approaches to crime control in society. Others are the on-going revolution in information and communications technologies (ICTs) that has unleashed a wide array of technologies with great capacity to obtain, store, retrieve, and analyse data (information) with amazing speed. Others are lack of convincing evidence that both the community-policing and problem-oriented policing models are yielding the desired results in terms of reducing crime; and the severe financial constraints imposed on police departments across the world in the present era of increase in recorded crime and emergence of new types of crime that started in 1980s till date.28 All said, the question then remain: what is the relevant or implications of criminal intelligence management in the fight against criminal threats to public safety and security in parts of Nigeria? Interestingly enough, investigations in much of the previous literature on the topic of this study reveal substantial evidence that criminal intelligence management or intelligence-led policing has profound relevance or implications to the fight against threats to public safety and security in Nigeria, particularly in the study area, Benue State, North central region.

The foregoing conclusion is based on two factors that arise from evidence from much of the literature. The first factor includes the lack of ample evidence or the apparent failure of the traditional incident-based reactive  

27 Cope, p. 92.
approach to fighting crime to stem the rising wave of all manner of crime in Nigeria. ²⁹ One glaring evidence of the foregoing lies in the fact that in spite of the much noise and self-acclaimed efforts being made by the Nigerian Police and other law enforcement agencies to curb crime in the country, the menace is known to have continued to increase in intensity, added dimensions, and sophistication since the 1980s till this day. ³⁰

The foregoing could be compared to the ongoing Boko Haram terrorist conflicts in North-east Nigeria, whereby in spite of the efforts the Nigerian security agencies and the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) claim they have been making to contain or deal with the conflicts since 2015 it escalated, the terrorist conflicts have continued to increase with intensity. Quite like the case of the fight against crime by the Nigeria Police which is driven by the police-led policing approach, this paper also agrees with Nwankpa, and many others that the problem with the fight against the Boko Haram terrorist conflicts lies with choice of inappropriate strategy (massive punitive military combats) that is not also driven by intelligence gathering approach. The second factor is, of course, the presence or ready availability of those very basic tools or ingredients that enable effective application or deployment of the proactive pre-emptive, and preventative approach to crime fighting, particularly the criminal intelligence management. The said basic tools or what Astra Academy calls “intelligence enablers or drivers” include the following strategies: surveillance, research, informants, technology, detention and interrogation, and community-policing strategy. ³¹ Put differently, the ready availability of these basic sources or intelligence enablers easily predisposes criminal intelligence management or intelligence-led policing approach to be relevant in the fight against crime in Nigeria, particularly in Benue State.

There is no doubt that human beings as informants play key role in the efforts at collection of information for processing into intelligence end-products in the fight against crime. It is, therefore, expected that with Nigeria’s huge population of over 200 million, inclusive of Benue State’s 4 million, an average law enforcement investigator on crime has indeed a very comfortable pool from which he can draw enough informants for purpose of


generating raw information for criminal intelligence production. The foregoing is indeed a predisposing factor that makes criminal intelligence management to be of much relevance in the fight against crime in Nigeria, particularly in Benue State, the focus of this study. What is more, the foregoing finds ample support from the findings of Gadi-Vincent, who investigated the role of criminal intelligence in the fight against criminal threats to public safety and security in the Gujarat state of India with a population of over 60 million. The study found among others that the large population of the study area played key role in supplying the persons that served as informants to law enforcement agents who effectively deployed the intelligence-led policing approach in their efforts at reducing crime in the area to the barest minimum. However, the study also forewarned that the same law enforcement investigators should at the same time be wary enough not to allow himself to be carried away by such large pool of information source and to that extent fall victim to information overload, which usually presents huge problem to an average investigator, particularly at the stage of sanitation and analysis.

Again, another predisposing factor that makes criminal intelligence management be of much relevance to crime fighting in the Nigerian context is the practice of surveillance as a veritable source of raw information for use in the production of intelligence. In this regard, therefore, it is also expected that any law enforcement officer desirous of combating crime meaningfully, in the country enjoys the opportunity to effectively deploy this potent tool of criminal intelligence management. The foregoing finds ample support in the earlier findings of a study by Omotola, Olarewaju and Alabi, which investigated the effect of intelligence-led policing on the fight against urban criminality across the Lagos-Ibadan axis in South-West Nigeria. The study found that not only the law enforcement agencies in that jurisdiction were not only making effective use of the intelligence-led policing approach, but where they did that, they were not also exploiting the full benefits inherent in the surveillance as a potent tool for intelligence and evidence gathering. The study, therefore, recommended increased surveillance, including use of the undercover strategy that would involve very skillful and hard-skinned

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investigators and less suspicious but attractive spies such as intelligent children, beautiful girls and women to penetrate criminal gangs for information and evidence gathering reasons.\(^{35}\)

As earlier on hinted, another factor that also predisposed the relevance of the criminal intelligence management to crime fighting in the Nigerian situation is technology, particularly the ongoing revolution in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) being midwifed, of course, by the almighty globalization. Prior to this day, technology was known to have since been integrated into criminal investigation and the justice sector as a potent instrument. Against this backdrop, therefore, the greatest beneficiary of the ongoing ICT revolution (particularly the advent of modern computers, the Internet, and camera including CCTV, all with amazing speed, dexterity, and artificial intelligence) is the field of criminal investigation and the justice sector. Stelfox,\(^{36}\) Pepper,\(^{37}\) and Fraser\(^{38}\) have in their studies demonstrated the high value now attached to ICTs as a strong backbone of criminal investigation. For example, how cameras are now used to collect as much information as possible in stationary technical surveillance; how telephones, particularly smartphones are now used through wiretapping to collect much criminal intelligence and evidence; and how computers are now being increasingly deployed to assist intelligence analysts process information of any magnitude and all types including DNA profiles and other kinds of forensic evidence into usable criminal intelligence and store same in special database for use by stakeholders. It is, therefore, expected that law enforcement agencies in Nigeria should always embrace the latest fad known as criminal intelligence management or intelligence-led policing approach so as to fully tap the benefits of integration of the ongoing ICT revolution into criminal investigation, in particular, and crime fighting towards public safety and security, in general, in the Nigerian society.

In a study, Okon, Agorye & Aov\(^{39}\) investigated the role of mapping in crime management in Makurdi metropolis in Benue State, North Central Nigeria, using the GIS or GPS technologies. The study found that law

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enforcement agents can deploy the GIS technologies that not only use broad range of functions but are also capable of manipulating both spatial and attribute data of particular locations to produce hotspot maps and crime databases of areas within their jurisdiction for use in such criminal investigation activities like surveillance patrols and stationary technical surveillance for intelligence and evidence gathering.

Another significant factor that predisposes criminal intelligence management to have profound implications and relevance to the efforts at fighting criminal threats to public safety and security in Nigeria is, of course, the community policing approach. Ever since it originated across the country in 1980s and early 1990s, the community policing approach has up till this day come to occupy a pride of place in both the nation’s security architecture and the informal security system. Though the community-policing approach in this country, otherwise known as police-community relations, is denoted by various structures and nomenclatures, such as vigilante groups, neighbourhood watch groups, civilian taskforce, forest guards, livestock guards, Amotekun, hisbah, etc, their mandate, philosophy, vision composition and modus operandi remain the same across their various jurisdictions. A typical community policing outfit is composed of volunteer’s resident in the community which such outfit serves. As an outfit that operates at the grassroots level, the mandate of a typical community-policing outfit is essentially to gather available information about crime, individual criminal suspects, their modus operandi, everything about their gang, and target victims, of each operation and pass such information over to the formal law enforcement agents as raw materials to be processed into criminal intelligences end-products. These end-products are, of course, used by the latter for criminal investigation and prosecution of the suspects in law courts. The fact that the various community policing outfits are still in very sound existence, with many more coming on board on daily basis after over two decades of its advent is enough evidence that the concept or idea of community policing is not only successful, but also an effective strategy for fighting crime in Nigeria, both at the grassroots and in the urban neighbourhoods. Evidently, the forgoing puts a serious lie to the contention in some quarters, that because community policing lacked ample evidence of its contributions to the efforts at reducing crime that gave rise to the adoption of the intelligence-led policing approach. Against the foregoing backdrop, therefore, it is also expected that law enforcement agents in Nigeria should enthusiastically

40 Docobo, 2005; Alemika, 1999; Chukwuma, 2015.
41 Docobo, 2005; Amaechina, 2015.
42 Ratdiffe & Guideths, 2008
embrace criminal intelligence management or intelligence-led policing so as to reap the huge benefits coming from the community policing approach.

Furthermore, another major factor that paves way for the relevance of criminal intelligence management to fighting crime anywhere is that of availability of intelligence analysts. In fact, the critical importance of intelligence analysis was, of course, well alluded to or pointed out while discussing the intelligence cycle, in which it was highlighted as one of the important steps (step 6) of the process. As noted by IALEIA\textsuperscript{43} among many others, an intelligence analyst is, of course, one who uses his or her knowledge, skill, traits, competencies, sense of judgment, creativity, and expertise in critical thinking, logical or analytical reasoning, intuitive judgment, and systematic approach to collect raw information and observation from multiple sources and convert same into intelligence-end-products for use in criminal investigations and prosecution by law enforcement officers and prosecutors. To this extent, therefore, the intelligence analyst is not just an ordinary, run-of-the-mill law enforcement officer, but also the one with much professional expertise, and competence, capabilities, and comportment acquired either through years of work experience or training. In fact, the criminal intelligence analyst is obviously the driver and lifewire of the entire intelligence cycle, and to that extent, highly indispensable to the process.\textsuperscript{44} The foregoing conclusion is, of course, in conformity with the earlier findings by Johnson, Johnson & Ifedayo,\textsuperscript{45} who investigated the impact of intelligence-led policing on the fight against flow of small and light weapons (SALWs) in rural and urban South Africa as part of the efforts to curb the rising wave of criminality in the area. The finding of the study was that while much raw information was collected and processed accordingly, the entire process had little or no meaningful impact on the rate of flow of small arms and the rising wave of criminality associated with it. On further probing, the study also found that the problems squarely lay with the level of competence of the criminal investigators/intelligence analysts that populate the various police formations and other law enforcement agencies in the jurisdictions investigated. Again, in one ‘grey’ literature sponsored by the BBC Research Unit, Imeh, Amadi, Durodola & Audu (2018) also investigated

\textsuperscript{43} International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Inc (2012). Law enforcement analytic standards. New Jersey: IALEIA.


problems, challenges and prospects of intelligence-led policing in combating criminality in Oyo State, South-West Nigeria. The study found that intelligence-led policing approach made significant positive impact on the efforts at reducing the level of criminality in Oyo State owing to what it described as “availability of competent criminal investigators/intelligence analysts” (p.121). We concur here as did a number of scholars\(^\text{46}\) that the foregoing Oyo State situation might be the same with some few other sister States across the country as a result of the level of self-development that is taking place among a number of law enforcement officers across many formations most of who opted to go back to school for further studies to improve themselves towards higher positions and pay increases. In conclusion here, it is the said availability of a handful of competent and experienced criminal investigators/intelligence analysts in few police formations and other law enforcement agencies, represented, of course, by the Oyo phenomenon, that predisposes and enhances the relevance of criminal intelligence management to the fight against crime in Nigeria.

In conclusion here, the foregoing review of literature on the topic of this study shows that criminal intelligence management or intelligence-led policing has much relevance and profound implications in the ongoing fight against the various criminal acts that threaten public safety and security in parts of Nigeria. The problem, however, lies with the lack of commitment of the various law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders in the provisioning of public peace, order, safety and security in the Nigerian society. It is, therefore, left for the preceding empirical investigations to prove or disprove whether the approach has relevance to the Benue State situation or not.

C. Method

As earlier hinted, this study is qualitative research. Its methodology, therefore, comprised the qualitative research method and semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KII) to capture elaborate and in-depth responses from participants, but flexible enough for in-depth probing and clarification of issues as they emerged. The series of interview were conducted by this researcher and two Research Assistants, using semi-structured interview protocol, digital tape recorder and field journals.

Participant recruitment for the study was guided by earlier established recruitment Nigeria police -5, Department of state services (DSS) – 3,\(^\text{46}\) Ojukwu, 2015; Alemika, 2012; Amaechina, 2015
Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps – 3, Police-Public Relation Committee (PPRC) – 3, (n = 18). Participants were recruited through referrals and purposive sampling technique based on the stock of knowledge and experience in relation to the topic of the research. 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted across parts of Benue State including Makurdi metropolis, Agatu, Logo, Katsina-Ala, and Kwande. The interviews which lasted between 37 and 65 mins each were conducted by this researcher in company of two (2) well trained research assistants, using digital tape recorder, interview protocol, and field journals. Simultaneous transcription of the recorded interviews also took place with the aid of member of computer software (NVivo II Theme Reader, Mind Manager, rilab’s knowledge map, and Hart’s Diction 5.0), where permissible throughout the interviews, confidentiality and anonymity of each interviewee as part of the requirements for granting approval for the interviews in the first place were ensured. A number of ethical challenges coming mostly from some overzealous participants, which if allowed would have adversely affected the credibility of the interview processes, were successfully overcome. Immediately after the data analysis exercise, both the recorded and transcribed copies of the interviews were put away into this researcher’s private locker and secured against any possible intruder, waiting to be physically shredded or deleted in the computer two years after this research.

Trustworthiness and authenticity of data inquiry was established based on Lincoln & Guba’s (1985) four criteria: credibility, transferability, conformability, and dependability. In particular, credibility of this research was also established using four key techniques: prolonged engagement with the participants in the field and in reading and re-reading the transcripts of the data, peer-debriefing, triangulation, and member-checking. Data analysis for the study was carried out using Thematic Analysis approach, which utilizes a particular technique for identifying, analyzing, organizing, describing and reporting ‘themes’ found within a data set. The technique used in the thematic analysis using Lincoln & Guba steo model.

D. Results and Discussion

In this section, the results of the analysis of the fifteen (15) interviews carried out at five (5) different locations in Benue State, North central region of Nigeria which featured 12 interviewees, which included formal law enforcement officers, security agents, government officials, civilian security task force members, and community leaders are presented and discussed.
1. What is the relevance or implication of management of collection/collation of information meant for production of intelligence to the fight against crime?

Efficient or effective control and a supervision of the following tools/agents used for collection/collation of information meant for production of intelligence was identified by majority of the participants to be of much relevance and to have profound implication to the fight against crime in Benue State Nigeria: informants, surveillance, technology, community policing, interrogation, and open-source research.

a. Informants

Many of the participants were of the opinion that effective management of available information is a predisposing factor that makes criminal intelligence management relevant in the fight against crime. They also observed that once there are large numbers of informant with some good knowledge about the criminal suspect(s) and are willing to volunteer information, the criminal investigator has the opportunity to obtain as much information as possible about the identity and other details about the criminal suspect(s) within a given location. Many of the interviewees also stressed, however, that the willingness or readiness of the individual informants to volunteer information is not always guaranteed, but dependent on their being assured of protection from any backlash harm by the criminal suspects(s) in question or his/her cohorts. That is to say, once the informant is given adequate assurances with regard to confidentiality and protection against possible attack from the suspect, he or she can give as much information about the criminal’s identity, criminal history, gang members, criminal networks, modus operandi, hideouts possible funders, among others. For instance, one participant (KI-04) was captured as saying:

> In intelligence-led policing or what you call criminal intelligence management, if at all I understand what you mean, is a good strategy and relevant to fighting crime. Its use is easier and more effective when you have many good and willing informants around your beat. The problem is that in most of the crime beats, the expected informant is never willing to talk to you about the criminal suspects for fear of attack by the suspect or his friends or gang members should the secret of who informed the police is revealed (KI-04).

Several participants also observed that information coming from informants are usually considered relatively more accurate and more reliable
when compared with those from other sources as a result of the fact that these informants live very close with the suspects either within the same vicinity, neighbourhood or community. As some of these interviewees contended, it is must be the strength of the foregoing that makes availability of informants a strong “indicator and pointer” to the relevance of criminal intelligence management to the fight against crime” (KI-013).

\textbf{b. Surveillance}

In like manner, majority of the interviewees also identified effective management or handling of surveillance activities with diligence, tact, that and efficiency as another critical factor that predisposes criminal intelligence management to be relevant in the fight against crime in Benue State. They observed that so long as surveillance remains a practice whereby the criminal investigator has no one but himself to rely on in the task of gathering information and evidence for accomplishing his assignment, he always has all the freedom to choose criminal intelligence management or intelligence-led policing as an approach in the fight against criminality in his jurisdiction. For instance, one participant (KI-015) narrated a particular situation in which a task team he once worked with lacked enough quality information, and to continue, the leader of the team was forced to divide the members into small groups with the instruction for each group to undertake surveillance by itself instead of waiting for informants. That enabled the team to accomplish the task at hand much more easily and creditably. The participants also added that it was on the strength of that huge success achieved by that task team that the authority that was in charge of the jurisdiction began to rely more on the practice of regular patrol of the area and use of intelligence-led policing instead of waiting for complaints to come before taking action. In his own words, one participant said:

\begin{quote}
Because of the success we made in that operation, our ogas on top directed for regular release of patrol vehicles to us and with more men to patrol the area regularly. And since then, we began to rely more on the use of intelligence-led policing, instead of the old ‘go-we-go-come-later’ style of waiting for complaints before action. (KI-01).
\end{quote}

Many other participants also observed that the availability of such complements like spies, patrol vehicles and motorcycles, and helicopters, dogs, stationary cameras, observatories, and undercover tactics lends big weight to surveillance as a strong, predisposing factor to the relevance of
criminal intelligence management in the fight against crime. As one participant (P7) observed:

Last year, many of our men were killed or wounded. Due to the increasing risk and dangers involved in foot-patrol, canine (dog) patrol, or mounted patrol, availability of good vehicles, motorcycles and fuel has become ‘cannot-do-without’ in the modern and new method known as intelligence policing. Just give our men quality vehicles, no longer stories or complaints from informants and see us puncture all those devilish plans by criminals (KI-07).

c. Technologies

An overwhelming majority of the interviewees also indentified timely provision of modern technologies as another factor that predisposed criminal intelligence management to be of great relevance to the fight against crime in the study area, Benue State, Nigeria. They singled out such modern technologies like telephone, particularly smart phones, stationary cameras like CCTV, high-speed computers, the Internet, and ongoing revolution in ICTs as the most outstanding intelligence enablers that act as predisposing factors to the intelligence-led policing approach. While stressing her point in this regard, one participant (KI-020), observed in her words that:

The greatest thing that has happened to the criminal investigation subsector is the boom in ICT. The most important is the introduction of all kinds of telephone that usually come with many devices and functions, speed rates, and capabilities. With a smart/phone, an investigator can easily and freely communicate with his informants and colleagues in the field, take pictures of crime scenes, or record same with in-built camera, browse the net for open-source info and listen to telephone discussions involving criminal gang members within his duty beat. The opportunities are indeed uncountable and limitless. (KI-020).

d. Community policing approach

In similar vein, a good majority of interviewees in the study also identified the use of community policing approach to fighting crime at the grassroots or urban neighbourhoods as a strong predisposing factor that makes criminal intelligence management to be of much relevance to the general fight against criminal threats to public safety, order, and security in Benue State. As earlier mentioned, a typical community policing outfit such as vigilante group, neighbourhood security group, civilian taskforce on
security, forest guard, or livestock guards, civilian taskforce as it may be called is usually composed of residents of the very neighbourhood in question who are adjudged to be very conversant with the happenings in and around the said neighbourhood. In addition, the mandate of community policing outfits as symbols of police-public relations strategy includes collecting raw information about criminal activities and details about those suspected to be behind such nefarious activities, prepare such as threat reports, and pass the reports over to regular police and other law enforcement agencies for further investigations and preventative actions. In this regard, many of the participants stated that government, particularly Benue State Government, the police and other law enforcement agencies, CBOs, CSOs, and development partners in the state had been making efforts and contributions in the form of occasional funding, logistics support, including provision of patrol vehicles and motorcycles, and other security gadgets, payment of monthly allowance or stipends, training of personnel, and disciplining of officials, among others, to ensure the success and sustenance of the community policing project. In the words of one of the participants (K1-07):

“...government and others have been supporting us. They give us few patrol motors, motorcycles, fuel, torch, catapult, and raincoats etc occasionally. They also pay us money as salary, but it is always too poor and also not on time. Police also give us training, and cooperate with us whenever we catch criminals or give them good information. Without government support, I don't think we can function. They should give us more support, particularly pay us good money like police” (KI-07).

Another participant in support of the foregoing also observed thus:

“Since I joined the Livestock Guards in my area in Logo LGA soon after the herdsmen attack of the Ugbo you market, I have known Benue State Government as our major backbone. They give us what we want, but the police is not cooperating with us so much or at all at all. When you report to them that Fulanis enter a farmland with their cattle or give information that they are planning an attack, police refuse to take action or come when everything don dabaru. Fulani people don’t obey Governor’s law on movement with their cattle at all” (K1-07).
2. What is the relevance and implications of management of intelligence analysis to the fight against crime?

a. Intelligence analysis and intelligence analysis

Majority of the government, law enforcement, and community participants also identified effective management of intelligence analysis as a major factor that predisposes criminal intelligence management to be of much relevance to the fight against crime in Benue state. These participants also attribute the foregoing to the critical role intelligence analysis and intelligence analysts play in the intelligence cycle or process, which role it plays as the major last step in the production of intelligence from raw information collected from the field.

As earlier mentioned in the literature section, the critical role the intelligence analyst plays both in the intelligence process in general and intelligence analysis in particular lies with the fact that he/she is either the leader or overall coordinator of the entire process or the investigator that is usually called in as one of the intelligence production personnel to handle the sixth and the all-important step of finally converting the information already collected and collated into intelligence end-products for use later in either of the two scenarios. It is the intelligence analysts that mans each of the two phases involved in the intelligence analysis process: data integration and data interpretation. In the first phase, it is the intelligence analysts that has his ability to sift facts or data from information collected in the form of entities, materials, and events and establishes relationships among such facts or data (data correlation). In the second and final phase, it is also the intelligence analyst that uses his critical thinking, logical reasoning, and inference-drawing abilities to convert or interpret the sets of correlated data from the first phase into intelligence end-products (data interpretation) for use latter in the first and last step in the intelligence process (dissemination/consumption). From the foregoing, it is clear that the overall importance of both intelligence analysis and the intelligence analyst in the intelligence process can never be over-emphasized. One participant (KI-04) captured the foregoing in this way:

“The overall importance and indispensable role of both intelligence analysis and the intelligence analyst in the intelligence production process lie with the fact that all information collected for the purpose remain like ordinary street talk. They remain there like raw materials in the factory junkyard until the intelligence analyst moves in to convert such into a kind of finished goods for sale in the market to
consumers. Then, if at the end the intelligence product is successfully used to burst the target planned crime, it is the analyst that receives the greater percentage of the credit, and if, on the other hand, the opposite happens, it is also the same analyst, that receives the greater part of the whole blame” (KI-04).

It must be against the backdrop of the overall importance of both intelligence analysis and the intelligence analyst in the intelligence process that government, the law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system are oftentimes called upon to make concerted effort towards ensuring effective management of the intelligence analysis process. The said call includes call for adequate funding of the intelligence production process, the recruitment of highly educated persons such as lawyers, and graduates of various social science disciplines, personnel development through training, education, and mentorship, good remuneration and competitive conditions of service, among others. Whether this call is being hearkened to in Nigeria, particularly in Benue State is highly debatable. For instance, one of the participants (KI-05) observed thus:

“It appears the call for more educated personnel from the relevant areas like law, sociology, psychology, and others in the Intelligent Unit of the police or sister organisations is not yielding the desired results. The response has been “no money’, ‘try to make do with those available and bla, bla, bla’ all the way. Even the training programmes, remuneration packages, and conditions of service do not help matters, as the morale of the very few intelligence analysts available is always very low. Because of this, both intelligence and evidence gathering and criminal investigations in Nigeria continue to suffer. Oh No!, there is no way you can talk about the modern fad known as intelligence-led policing without adequate number of good and highly motivated intelligence analysts. That’s the reason the practice of the archaic policing called ‘wee-dem, wee-dem’ is still in vogue in this country” (KI-04).

3. What is the relevance and implications of management of consumption of criminal intelligence products to the fight against crime that threaten public safety?

a. Consumption of intelligence products

Very many participants also identified effective management of consumption of intelligence end-products as another critical factor that
makes criminal intelligence management to have relevance and implications to the fight against crime and insecurity. The interviewees specifically highlighted effective management of such key aspects of consumption of intelligence products like actual utilization of the products, feedback from the end-users themselves, and review of the intelligence production process itself from time to time and as and when need be as being very crucial in the use of criminal intelligence management in the intelligence-led policing approach against crime.

Intelligence materials are not just produced for production’s sake. Their production is usually driven by the needs or requests of clients, that is, consumers of the analytical products who task the producers to do so. When intelligence materials are produced, they are, therefore, expected to be utilized or put into use for the purpose of the need and request for them. It is worthy to remark here that intelligence products might suffer two interrelated kinds of fate in the hands of their intended consumers; non-adequacy or inaccuracy of the products, and non-utilization of the products for the very purpose for which they are produced in the first place. The first case known as ‘intelligence failure’ which usually results in failure of the use of intelligence products to avert particular threats. The second case known as ‘non-utilization of intelligence’ is usually caused by several factors including sheer inability to appreciate or recognize the potency or accurateness of the intelligence products in question, ignoring the use of the analytic products due to lack of political will or poor cognition or both, outright show of bias or compromise and tactical endorsement of the criminal plots of the suspects in question (i.e “insider sabotage”).

The foregoing has been the cog in the wheel of the concerted efforts to fight crime and insecurity in Nigeria over the years. As one interviewee (KI-010) observed:

“All said, it is exactly because of lack of intelligence products or the inaccuracy and poor quality of the very few ones produced that have been sustaining the continued use of the crude style of policing, which some people call “wee-dem, weedem” by the Nigeria Police, as against the new style you call intelligence-led policing. I suspect the problem is not necessarily that of money, but lack of the will power, corruption, and bias, compromise or internal sabotage by both the authorities and the police rank and file (KI-010).

In the case of non-utilization of intelligence products, majority of the interviewees were emphatic and enthusiastic in identifying both the causative factors and the attendant consequences. In one instance, an obviously worried participant (KI-011) has this to say:

“All along, government and its law enforcement agents have shown lack of commitment to utilize the various intelligence products being churned out on daily basis for use in either averting crime or prosecuting suspects. As I speak to you, attacks, killings and destruction by local criminals, robbers, bandits, Boko Haram terrorists in North-east, Fulani herdsmen in this Benue, Plateau, Zamfara, Nasarawa and others, cattle rustlers, inter-communal warlords have continued till today. Does it mean there are no intelligence or evidence produced before hand, and does it mean no suspects have been arrested since in this regard. The answer is capital No! (KI-011).

Still on the issue of non-utilization of intelligence products, another interviewee also posed similar rhetorical questions:

“Does it mean we didn’t have intelligence in our land prior to the Agatu massacre of 2016 that denied over 500 lives, and displaced thousands of persons. Does it mean we had no intelligence prior to the escalation of the herders’ attacks between 2017 and 2018 that led to the open-grazing law in Benue? The answers are capital No! The issue has bordered on lack of political will, and compromise or bias in favour of the suspects by the power-that-be and the policemen themselves. Or tell me why no single terrorist or herdsmen suspect has been prosecuted or imprisoned to set example and deterrent to others since 2009 till date. Who is fooling who?” (KI-011).

E. Conclusion and Recommendation

This qualitative study that utilized the key informant interview (KII) technique examined the relevance and implications of criminal intelligence management to the fight against crime and insecurity that threaten public safety in Benue State. The study focused only on five local Government Areas of the State where incidents of various kinds of crime, particularly herders’ attacks, cattle rustling, armed robbery, banditry, kidnappings and farmers-herders conflicts do occur regularly. The conclusion of the study was that the management of the collection/collation phase of information meant for
intelligence production, including the various agents and tools used for that process (informants, surveillance, technologies (ICT), community policing, and interrogation) predispose criminal intelligence management to be very relevant to the fight against crime. The conclusion of the study was also that how the intelligence analysis phase of the intelligence production process, particularly intelligence analysis is managed makes criminal intelligence management have much relevance and implications to the fight against crime and insecurity. Again, the study also concluded that the way the consumption phase of the intelligence process including utilization, feedback and reviews is managed accounts for the relevance and implication of criminal intelligence management to the fight against crime an insecurity that threaten public safety.

Without doubt, intelligence-led policing has, of course, grown in much popularity since 1990s it birthed in Nigeria and other Third World countries. Coupled with this, from investigation carried out in the course of this study shows that criminal intelligence management has much relevance and profound implication to the fight against crime and insecurity in Nigeria. However, in spite of the little efforts government, its law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system had made to promote the cause of intelligence-led policing, in general, and criminal intelligence management in particular, the wave of crime and insecurity in Benue State has continued to rise to a worrisome level. Against the foregoing backdrop, a number of recommendations are made here towards promoting the cause of intelligence-led policing, particularly its integral component known as criminal intelligence management.

First and foremost, the various law enforcement agencies in Nigeria particularly the Nigeria Police should be made to see the need to fully jettison their old traditional method of policing known as the incident-based reactive approach (i.e wee-dem, wee-dem method), and in its place embrace the new fad in town known as the intelligence-led policing. To this end, a vigorous advocacy campaign in this direction should be used to sensitize the police and their sister organizations in the law enforcement sector in the country, particularly in Benue State to recognize the fact that the traditional incent-based reactive approach to policing is no longer in vogue as part the security architecture all over the world. The reason is that the said approach, when compared to the modern approach known as intelligence-led policing, is considered to be too costly, too risky, and has little or no evidence to show that it has contributed much to the efforts at reducing the rising spate of criminality anywhere in the world, particularly in Nigeria.
Also considered to be very key to the efficient functioning of the intelligence-led policing approach are the Intelligence Unit, the management of the intelligence production process, otherwise known as the intelligence cycle, and the office of the intelligence analysts. Police authorities should, therefore, pay priority attention towards enhancing the performance of the three cardinal components at all times. The most critical areas of concern here include staffing, conditions of service, and provision of the requisite operational facilities, among others. To this end, efforts should be made to recruit highly experienced persons well educated persons such as graduates of law, and other social science disciplines into the Intelligence Unit of the police or its sister agencies. It should also be ensured that such staff always possess good stock of knowledge, skills, and competences in modern techniques of collecting raw information, including forensic evidence and conversion of same through intelligence analysis into intelligence end-products, and intelligence database management. As a corollary to the quality staffing challenge, well-structured staff development programmes that will comprise training, education, and mentorship should also be put in place to ensure regular availability of a crop of quality personnel in the Intelligence Unit at any given time. Efforts should also be made to enhance, the conditions of service of the personnel of the Intelligence Unit, including competitive salary and other remuneration packages, and quality workplace environment, among others.

Thirdly, authorities of the organizations concerned should also ensure that enough operational logistics such as patrol vehicles, ICT gadgets including computers, smart phones, technical cameras including CCTV, walkie-talkies, GPS devices, and television sets, among many others are provided to the Intelligence Units of the affected organisations regularly. In order to ensure regular and adequate supply of the aforementioned logistics, government should always ensure that adequate funds are provided to the Nigeria Police and sister organizations through both budgetary allocations and donor interventions.

Again, investigations show that there is much evidence to show that the community policing approach to fighting crime and insecurity in parts of Nigeria has made significant contributions to the concerted efforts at reducing the rising level of criminality in the country, using the technique of local vigilantism. By way of maintaining effective regular interface with a vast number of local informants in their respective neighbourhoods both in the grassroots and urban areas, the various vigilante groups scattered across parts of Nigeria have so far done well in extracting valuable raw information and physical evidence about criminal suspects and their evil plots and in
passing same over to the regular law enforcement agents for use in producing
criminal intelligence products. Against the foregoing backdrop, therefore, this
paper recommends that government, particularly the Benue State
Government, the Nigeria Police, and its sister law enforcement agencies
should ensure better and enhanced management of the various vigilante
groups, including the recently created Livestock Guards operating in their
respective neighbourhoods. The foregoing boils down to ensuring that these
vigilant groups are regularly provided with adequate operational facilities,
particularly patrol vehicles, motorcycles, torch lights, telephones, cameras,
and walkie-talkies, among others; and that their personnel are given regular
training on the modern techniques of community policing, local vigilantism,
and intelligence and evidence gathering and reporting.

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