Issue: Crime and Justice: A Global Perspective

Research Article

A Tale of Two Nations: Evaluating Terrorism and the Challenges of Counter Terrorism Strategies in Pakistan and Nigeria

Ngboawaji Daniel Nte[1]✉, Isaac Ngutor Akaageregr[2], Irfan Ullah Khan[3], Onyeka Bienose

[1] Department of Intelligence and Security Studies, Novena University, Delta State, Nigeria
[2] Defence Intelligence Agency, Abuja Nigeria
[3] Centre for Nontraditional Security and Peaceful Development Studies, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, People's Republic of China
[4] Global Intelligence, Peace and Security Institute
✉ ngbodante@gmail.com

Abstract: The menace of terrorism the world over cannot be over emphasised as it remains the greatest existential threat facing mankind. All over the world, this nagging security quagmire has remained quite daunting. Consequently, countries around the world –advanced and developing have embarked on different shades of counter terrorism measures to stem this ugly scourge. In the light of the foregoing, this study is a modest evaluative and comparative study of a tale of two states-Pakistan and Nigeria in their quest to fight this ignoble menace. As countries with similar internal and external threats with significant challenges of governance and political stability, both countries have embarked on conscious counter terrorism measures ranging from socio-economic development programmes to de-radicalisation strategies. However, while the degrees of efficiency of counter terrorism measures varies between these two countries, the study shows that Pakistan appears to have made more concerted efforts than Nigeria, even though the threats are more magnified in Pakistan due to extensive international terrorist linkages in the country. What is more relevant here however is that both countries can learn from each other experiences while making the necessary adjustments to suit local realities bearing in mind that terrorism is more of a mind thing than mere tactical and operational form of militancy by non-state actors. In reaching the above proposition, the study relied on the content analysis of historical facts sourced from secondary sources but logically arranged to provide the required social science enterprise requirements while taking responsibility for any weakness therefrom.

Keywords: *Terrorism; Counter Terrorism; Pakistan; Nigeria; De-radicalisation*

Introduction

Pakistan and Nigeria share very interesting similarities. Historically, both countries were former British colonies and emerged from British supposedly convenient arrangement to settle Islamic Pakistan from Indian demographic and Hindu hegemony in 1947. For Nigeria a near

similar experience played out. Power was consciously handed over to the predominantly Islamic and less combative Northern Nigeria apparently to compensate them for loyalty. Nigeria emerged as a product of rigged demographics and colonial politics. Post-colonial Pakistan and Nigeria therefore have foundational colonial flaws that bred social divisions exacerbated by unpatriotic political power game feasting on these social fault lines. The resultant effects of these include: poverty and unbridled resource competition, ethnic and religious fracturing, senseless military incursion into politics, poverty, injustice and above all terrorism and insurgency. This work will therefore evaluate these apparent twin states with a humongous populations, weak government and pervasive non-state actors vis a vis the efforts by both countries to contain the scourge of terrorism

Terrorism in Pakistan

We will start the overview of the Pakistan terrorism history in the mid XXth century from seeing the situation in the South-East Asia, which brought to the point when Pakistani terrorism started to grow. Hassan N. Gardezi points out that the history of Pakistan politics was subordinate to 'Allah, Army, and America' (the 3As) since 1947, when it was created. When in 1979, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan, it joined America's war against the Soviet Union under the 'global jihad' Islamic motto to fight the 'enemies of Islam' (infidel Soviet forces) in Afghanistan. (Gardezi, 2010)

General Zia's 'offensive jihad' strategy in Afghanistan gave new life to the already-known concept of defensive jihad against infidels of Islam. (Ahmed Rashid, 2010) The 3As nexus mobilized 100,000-500,000 mujahedeen (holy fighters) from 43 Islamic countries including Pakistan to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Behuria, 2007).

The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the US CIA trained these mujahideenin guerrilla camps, and equipped them with modern weapons. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had substantially financed them to strengthen the jihadi structures and increase the network of religiousseminaries - madrassas across Pakistan to raise new recruits for the Afghan Jihad.(N. Ali, 2010) So, Pakistan was radicalized and extremist religious infrastructure was cemented.

FATA became a military base for launching the trained mujahideen into Afghanistan to fight the USSR army.(Cole, 2009) The joint forces of CIA and ISI with the financial support from Saudi Arabia helped to defeat the Soviet forces in Afghanistanin 1989.(Gardezi, 2010)After it,the United States however left behind the impetuous outcome of broken Afghanistan and trouble some jihadi forces in Pakistan.

These mujahideen, who came from 43 different Islamic countries, for jihad(Gardezi, 2010) got settled in FATA and married to locals (Behuria, 2007), which brought the islamization, jihadism and extremism to Pakistan,especially FATA. Soon Afghanistan, deteriorated by civil War (Ahmed Rashid, 2002) in the early 1990's,was captured by Taliban young Afghanis, who graduated Pakistani madrassas and were brainwashed for jihad against the infidels, in 1994Kandahar was occupied first, and then Kabulin 1996.The Taliban imposed Islamic Sharia in Afghanistan (Ahmed Rashid, 2001)

The military establishment created strategic allied forces in Afghanistan against

the strong puissant India to support close ties with jihadi groups and Taliban after the Afghan jihad.(B. G. Williams, 2008)Since independence, India and Pakistan have never been amicable neighbors. Kashmir conflict led to long-lasting hostility between the two countries. Between Pakistan and India, there have been three wars (1948, 1965, and 1971) and conflict in Kargil in 1998, on Kashmir issue (Cole, 2009).

Also, the Islamist revolution in Iran (1979) changed the power distribution in the Gulf and brought to the entire East region destabilized and alsoworsened the situation and reinforced the Pakistani separatist and extremist forces. The revolution procreated a new confrontation between Iran Shia and Saudi Arabia Sunni as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which brought to increasing hatred betweenthe Sunni majority and Shia minority citizens of Pakistan (Rathore & Basit, 2010). This brought to creating sectarian organizations Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) during the Afghanjihad in the 1980s and split Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996 with Anti-Shia sectarian purposes, which further intensified violence between theSunni and Shia in Pakistan.(Mehmood, 2013)Since 1989, the country has witnessed 3,016incidents of sectarian violence, killing 5,227 and injuring 9,903 people in Pakistan till 2016 (South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2016).

A. Talibanization in Pakistan

"*Talibanization*", which is military Islamic movement, first appeared in Pakistan in 1994, when the first Tehrik-e-Nafaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) Taliban-style movement headed by Sufi Muhammad appeared to enforce Islamic Sharia law in the Malakand region.(Behuria, 2007) It was at the same time, when the Taliban captured Kandahar in Afghanistan

and imposed Islamic Sharia law. With the influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan Sufi Muhammad and his followers started the same armed struggle to impose Taliban Sharia law in Malakand (Behuria, 2007).

Subsequently, TNSM was successful to impose Islamic Sharia law, gaining control over major government institutions and local airports, getting joined by experienced Afghani jihadi from Peshawar and Bajaur Agency. They took over Dir and Swat, but then were suppressed by the government, but peace was restored in the Malakand region only when the government agreed for TNSM's demand to sign a peace agreement with the government for Sharia law legalization for Malakand Division - Dir, Swat, and Chitral. (Hussain, 2009) Rashid Ahmed pointed that by 1998, neo-Taliban groups re-appeared in FATA and Balochistan to impose Sharia law, Sharia courts and Islamic punishment system and strict women dress code. The Talibanization effect spread to the provinces of Punjab and Sindh and in July 2009, around 6,000-8,000 (non-Pashtun) Punjabi militants joined Taliban in Afghanistan to fight against the Northern Alliance (Ahmed Rashid, 1999).

However, most of Pakistani scholars (L. A. Ali, 2010) consider that largely Talibanization emerged after the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan under the "war on terror", the hunt for Al Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden, who had been declared responsible for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2010). Richard Armitage - the U.S. Deputy Secretary at that time threatened the Pakistani military to support the U.S. war on terrorism against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, promising otherwise carpet bombing in Pakistan, (Musharraf, 2006) so General Pervaiz Musharraf, had to handle this critical

situation taking the decision to abandon the Taliban "brothers." This drastic policy change brought the U.S. terrorism countering war deep into Pakistan, including the U.S. drone attacks in FATA to hunt the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership, who reorganized their policy to fight against the US and allied forces in Afghanistan due to Pakistan and Afghanistan vague border in-between (Fair, 2014). Media, civil society (Hassan, 2014) and big part of military circles opposed this decision(Riedel, 2008) considering that the war on terrorism would bring mainly destruction to Pakistan. As a result, the "war on terrorism" was the name for political tactic to oppress Islam and Muslims, which led to anti-U.S. and pro-Taliban support in Pakistan(Middle East Institute, 2009). And as the government had no counter-terrorism strategy at the moment redoubled the situation (Underhill, 2014).

Hoffman concluded that "countless attempts by the governments to deter further violence have backfired catastrophically" (Gunaratna, 2008). Dividing Taliban to "good" and "bad" and trying to double game up-keeping the friendship with "good Taliban" and fighting "bad Taliban" led to uncertainty, which in the end brought to the creation of a stronger, powerful, militant Islamic organization "Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)" in December 2007, which led to a bloody war against the state to enforce Islamic Sharia in Pakistan(Siddiqa, 2011).As stated by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) digital database on conflict and security, TTP committed 88 percent of the total terrorist acts in Pakistan during 2008-2015(Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2015). As we can see terrorism in Pakistan has substantial historical background and the next question of prevailing importance are other in-depth causes of terrorism, which bring to these substantial losses in Pakistan.

B. Pakistan: Root causes of terrorism

As Pakistan has become a flash point of terrorism in the world many scholars have developed and tested numerous theories of which radicalization drivers are mostprevalent or driving in Pakistan. In Malik et al. (2015) research, 500 high, medium and low security officialsin Pakistan were polled to rank 65 terrorism risk factors according to their influence (Akbar, 2015). The researchers found out that the most highly rated factors were dishonest leadership, unjust and unfairaccountability system and corruption, directly related to poor governance. Sectarianismand criminality factors were considered secondary, while non protection of minority rights, negative attitude of civilians to the government and security forces were not considered that important.

In astudy of Forman Christian College in Lahore, the three researchers tested several hypotheses analysing publicly available data, including the Global Terrorism Database. Their analysis supported the'relative deprivation' theory, showing no straight association between income level and terrorism, but showing strong association between 'higher horizontal, cross-provincial inequality' and terrorist attacks (Syed, Saeed, & Martin, 2015). Also it was found out that military aid of US and public expenditures for education were positivelyassociated with terrorism. Considering these findings, the researchers suggest that the pedagogy and school curriculum in Pakistani public educational institutionsmay actually be a more influential radicalization tool than even madrasa education.

While International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy study polled key Pakistani public opinion changers and experts (including professors, government officials, and civil society activists). They gave interviews to rank the importance of various potential violent extremism drivers. From a list of factors, respondents were to identify the influence of local religious leaders, sectarian tensions, and the influence of religious education or madrasas as the most importantfactors, followed closely by anger at foreign states and high unemployment. It was noted that most terrorism driving factor is extremist messaging through traditional media sources was considered more important thansocial media or the internet, though anger at the state was very low ranked by respondents(Johnston et al., 2016).

Concluding the main terrorism enflaming factors in Pakistan we should name wars, ethnic and religious tensions, radicalization, extremist media messaging and educational system, both religious and civil, population, GDP per capita together with poor governance and low level of civil awareness.

C. Counter Terrorism Measures in Pakistan

One of the first substantial attempts to measure counter terrorism activities was taken by Landes(1978) in the study about metal detectors, which were placed in the airports to stop high jacking, and this study evaluated the impact of this measure, which showed positive results, but next researches prove that technological barriers inhibit a specific type of terrorist attack, at the same time causing transference of attacks, which is the terrorism skipping one of the ways for another, as metal detectors increased sky jackings cost, while otherkinds of hostage

taking became relatively less costly. As a result, skyjackings number fell as kidnappings frequency raised (Enders & Sandler, 1993).One of the key important consideration to evaluate most counterterrorism measures is transference.

For example, enhancing embassy security increased terrorists assassinating the officials outside the compound(Enders & Sandler, 1993). This research also estimated effectiveness of retaliatory raids as counterterrorism measures, like in 1986 the bombing raid of US in Libya, which brought to the backfire bombing in Berlin. Enders & Sandler found intertemporal substitution, when terrorists fulfilled the future planned attacks in the present to protest the raid. In this way, terrorism went up straight after the raid attacksand declined for months later and the overalllevel of attacks did not change.

Dugan & Chenoweth's (2012) empirical parametric and nonparametric analyses showedthat indiscriminate repressive actions induce terrorist attacks, when indiscriminate reconciliatoryactions bring to fewer terrorist attacks. These results correspond to other findings about repression escalading backlash attacks (Rosendorff & Sandler, 2010). These examples show that neither counter terrorism measures can be researched and applied separately, it must always be a system of interrelated multi-faceted measures, eliminating the deeper causes of terrorism, not only the on surface effects like high jacking or officials assassination, cause this way is like firefighting in the forest, you stop it in one place and it inflames in another, until the whole forest is not covered with rain or any kind of watering, which will increase humidity till the point when no part of the forest is inflammable. The same way it needs to focus on changing the situation in

a country, having learnt the terrorism main causes, specific for the country, and while eliminating the consequences of each terrorist act 'fire', to deploy coherent system of NTS counter terrorism measures, changing the 'humidity' in the country – the overall political, economic and social situation, bringing to eliminate inflammation causes.

D. Pakistan Government Efforts to Counter Terrorism

The first attempts of Pakistan government to seize terrorism tended to military campaigns and other hard responses. Later, some efforts to decrease radical religious influence have been made by reforming madrasas and regulating them, but these measures were not successful enough. Nevertheless, recently the state started to take serious, long term, many sided steps to implementing soft power NTS strategies.

1. Military Responses

Since 2001, at least seven large scale military operations were conducted by the Pakistani Army targeting extremists, including the TTP and Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). All the operations were focused on attempt to stopmilitants in FATA, with varied level of success. The most recent operation, for example, Zarb-e-Azb, achieved tangible results (837hideouts destroyed, 18,087 weapons captured, 2,763 militants killed), butthe January2016 attack on Bacha Khan University shows that Taliban goes on conducting attacks(Muhammad, 2015).

Sometimes, the military campaigns are followed by controversial peace agreements, though never lasting long before being broken (Khattak, 2012). While both the military operations and peace

agreements had been successful, that success used to be short term. According to Mufti, these tactics succeeded in eliminating some extremist militants, but they didn't touch the deeper roots, which continuously fuel terrorist groups and recommence their rrecruits (Johnston et al., 2016).

2. Initial Non Ttraditional Security and Ideological Responses

After repeated military responses to extremism have failed to reduce the general level of terrorism inPakistan, gradually the state has acknowledged the importance of soft power. Realizing the importance of social, economic and ideological driving factors, the government made first efforts to influence the extremist ideology sources.

a. Madrasa Reform

Madrasa is a religious school. They are popular and numerous in Pakistan. The government has tried to reform the madrasas long before the violentreligious extremism has become a state concern. In 1950-60s, Gen. Ayub Khan gave a proposition of series reforms for thecurriculum and establishment of madrasas, but they were rejected by all political parties, notwithstanding the fact that thousands of new madrasas spread across the country and opening of madrasas for many years had no legal registration required from the government, so enormous quantity of unregistered madrasas appeared. In 1999, when the registration became obligatory, there were many madrasasresisted the government involvement.

In the early 2000s, when President Musharraf proposed several reforminitiatives, including the Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance of 2002, and $113million plan for 5 years to introduce secular subjects into the madrasa

curriculum, the program didn't get sufficient support and funding and the madrasas remained outside the government control or influence (Globalization Challenge Initiative, 2005).

In 2005, an amendment to the Societies Registration Act was finally passed by the government, obliging allmadrasas be registered with the government, submitting financial auditing, ban for militancy andsectarianism teaching. The government started constructive dialog with the National Madrasa OversightBoard (ITMD) to implement this measure, but preliminary tensions challenged the negotiations, andmany madrasas resisted new law. Only after several years, the Interior Ministry and the ITMD agreed to sign an agreement of formal collaboration in key issues including government registration and curriculum reform. Following this deal, 8,656 schools got registered, and the numberof registered madrasas became 14,656, though still more than 35,000 are currently existing (Globalization Challenge Initiative, 2005).

Peace and Education Foundation (PEF) has fortunately managed to establish trusting relationships with lots of madrasas, mostly Deobandiand Ahl-e-Hadith, by respecting the historical role of the madrasas in Islamic history and responding to their interest to enhance their curriculums by modern subjects. Trust and influence, which PEF has developed has helped to facilitate the wide-range reforms. In PEF workshops, madrasa teachers are engaged in discussions oncritical thinking, human rights, religious pluralismand civil engagement.

Throughout the PEF Teacher Training Centers established in the headquarters of five sects madrasasthat sponsor the religious schools, over 700 madrasa teachers have been trainedon ways of Qur'anic teachings and Islamic principles.

b. *Legislative Reforms*

In 2009,governmental counter-terrorism policy in Pakistan changed. A National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was created to facilitate cooperation in all relevant sectors (Yusuf, 2014).

Firstly the activity was not vigorous, but it was revived in 2013, when the Senate passed Act No. XIX, giving the agency legal background and specified responsibilities: gathering intelligence information, conducting research, elaborating and coordinating national counterterrorism strategies.

Even though NACTA remained inactive, even with high-level support, the creation of the state body signaled a holistic national strategy for extremism countering. In 2014, this strategy shift was revealed in the first generalized state program: National Internal Security Policy (NISP). And NACTA was supposed to implement the policy, though the entity still lacked real power. The NISP consists three core elements, which combined hard and soft CVE strategies:
1) dialogue with all the sides concerned;
2) truncate the support systems of terrorists;
3) enhancing the capacities of the internal security apparatus.

The NISP started activities to address the social and ideological extremist recruitment factors, but the policy didn't have enough time for full implementation. After the TTP response to the army's operation Zarb-e-Azb in December, 2014, attacking the Peshawar Army Public School and killing 145 persons, mainly school children, the Prime Minister Sharif

announced a new countering terrorism structure of activities: the National Action Plan (NAP).

The NAP contains twenty points, replicating many of the NISP initiatives, with greater emphasis on the military role(International Crisis Group, 2015).Implementation of the plan was slow and truculent, despite strong political support, though several NAP key points proved to be rather effective. One assessment concluded that its measures led to a substantial decrease in targeted killings, murders, extortions, robberies, and terrorism within the first few months of the NAP's implementation (Sahill, 2017).

Accomplishment of many initiatives, however, has proven to be more challenging, as the establishment of special military trial courts for terror suspects for example, which raised controversy and conflict. The courts, which were established at once in a month after the 21st Constitutional Amendment announcement, the amendment was soon challenged in the Supreme Court and could not beimplemented until August 2015. Then it was finally declared constitutional (Dawn, 2015). NAP the same as NACTA were underfunded and partially applied. It was quietly announced after few months when the NAP began that three of the long-term points would not be pursued: reform of the madrasas, taking actions against some relevant organizations, repatriation of refugees from Afghanistan (A. Khan, 2015). So nevertheless, NISP and NAP both outlined clear, generalized framework for terrorism and extremism decrease, the implementation was partial and imperfect. So, it showed necessity to develop new soft power projects.

c.   *Government and Civil Society in Cooperation*

According to a ICRD research, experts both in Pakistan and the US outlined that Pakistan's best help for countering extremism can be found in its civil society (Johnston et al., 2016). At the moment there is a comprehensive number of civil society organizations, around 100, which is being engaged in countering terrorism in one form or another (Mirahamadi, Farooq, & Ziad, 2012).

Civil society can play numerous roles in this fighting. Business leaders can be peace program investors, mothers can interferein the lives of radical young people, and socialactivists might develop civic engagement and religious peace. In 2014, the authorities of Punjab incited religious leaders to get involve, assisting to maintain peace and cooperation with the state. They received many positive responses, including a network of 112,000 scholars - the Pakistan Ulema Counciland some clerics and around 13,600madrasas. Approximately, 2000 members were appointed to assist local governments in preventing hatered speeches or violence encouragement (Virk, 2014).

d.   *Counter-Narratives*

In addition to social, political and civil changes some attempts to stop the extremist interpretations of Islam have been made. And here we would like to underline an example the Javed Ahmad Ghamidi work (Johnston et al., 2016).

Ghamidi is a distinguished media personality and a former Councilof Islamic Ideology member, and also a founder of the al-Mawrid Institute of Islamic Sciences, an international research and education organization spreading knowledge about Islam. He became prominent nationally as an authority on Islamic sciences. He narrates

his vision of Islam with the help of al-Mawrid and other mediachannels (Geo TV, PTV, etc.) and steadfastly denounces the extremist ideologies of Taliban. Ghamidi'spopularity and grounded criticism way brought him now to Malaysia, after a murder attempt by extremists in 2010.

It's almost impossible to estimate the counter-narratives of like Ghamidi's impact, though his name and work is widely recognized, but it can't be determined whether anyone was withdrawn from accepting extremist narratives in this way.

e. *De-radicalization experience*

De-radicalization programs directly attempt to convert active radicals into valid society members and straight addressing extremist ideologies.

For example, the Sabaoon's Center. In 2009, during a short term peace agreement in fighting between the army and the TTP in the Swat district of KPK a rehabilitation facility was established. In efforts to prevent the TTP recruitment an influence in the region, thear my established a rehabilitation center for youth, who had previously been recruited by the terrorist group. The Sabaoon Center for Rehabilitation intended to work both with ideological and social problems that hadbrought the boys to the TTP and started assistin them to reintegrate the society.

The Centre was placed under the guidance of the Hum Pakistani Foundation and Dr. Mohammad Farooq Khan, a psychiatrist and Islamic scholar, who elaborated a pioneering curriculum to correspond the individual needs of the participants, grounded on four key components:
1) General knowledge education, religious re-education on notions like sharia, jihad, and

a. democracy;
2) Vocational professional training;
3) Counseling, psychological therapy, other mental health activities;
4) Social activities, including counseling of the participants' families (Qazi, 2013).

The results of Sabaoon's model were highly aappreciated by de-radicalization experts, but the scales of the project remain small, having reintegrated just around 140 child soldiers during first two years(Rafi, 2015)because of the highly-individualized approach, which limits the spread use of the model.

Also, in SWAT there was Sparley and Mishal Project, focusing on adult de-radicalization. And in this line we should also name the PAIMAN Alumni Trust, which highly successfully integrated de-radicalization into its peace-building programs. They identified radicalyouth by its connections to community actorsacross FATA and KPK and engaged the youngsters as willing participants. PAIMAN has got results in training and empowering mothers,youth, and other participants in peace activities. Since a radical individual was identified, PAIMAN members started to collaborate with the individual's friends, families, and other social networks to foster the youngster participating in PAIMAN's de-radicalization program, which included individual care,counseling, trainingin subsistence skills, education or career opportunities, which was of great help for a number of ex-Talibanyoung people to drastically transform their lives (Davis, 2009).

Even though PAIMAN and Sabaoon activities were not easy to duplicate or scale, their local successes vividly illustrate the crucial importance of strategic partnerships with trusted community and religious

members and actors to access the most vulnerable terrorism recruited populations.

Nigeria and the Challenges of Terrorism

A. History of Terrorism in Nigeria

In Nigeria, terrorism is fast becoming an emerging challenge to national security. According to Azazi (former NSA) as cited in (Obene, 2012) "The Nigerian nation is not prepared for the spate of violence we are experiencing". This paper however argues that there have been signs and symptoms of terrorism in Nigeria before now; because according to McNamara (1990:17) 'any society that seeks to achieve adequate security against the background of acute food shortage, population explosion, low level of productivity and per capita income, low technological development, inadequate and insufficient public utilities and chronic problems of unemployment; (religious intolerance and criminal politicking) has a false sense of security.

Though Nigeria has remained a relatively peaceful and terror free country between 1967 and 1970, Obene (2012) argues that the killing of Mr Dele Giwa, by a 'Letter Bomb' in October 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy hijacked a Nigeria Airways aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of Chief M.K.O. Abiola's presidential election. After this, a vicious bomb blast ripped Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium in August 1994.

Several other incidents have occurred since then. For instance, between 1996 and 1998 there was bomb attack on the car of the then Chief Security Officer of Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria, Dr Omoshola. Subsequently, the escort car of the former Military Administrator of Lagos State, Brig Gen MB Marwa (Rtd) was attacked.

Other notable acts of terrorism in Nigeria can be summarized as follows: General sectarian violence in Jos (2004, 2010, and 2011), Series of bombings and killings in Maiduguri (since 2004 to date), and the 2010 New Year 's Eve bombing of Mogadishu Military Cantonment Mammy Market Abuja. The May 29 2010 Presidential Inauguration bombing in Abuja. The 1st October 2010 bombing in Abuja that disorganized the marking of Nigeria's 50th Independence Anniversary, The Mammy Market bombings in Bauchi, and Zuba near Abuja in 2011.

Post-April 2011 Presidential Election violence in the Northern parts of Nigeria. April 8, 2011 Suleja INEC office bombing. May 29, 2011 bombing of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirts of Abuja. June 16, 2011 Nigeria Police Force Headquarters bombing in Abuja . August 26, 2011 bombing of UN House in Abuja. Nov 4, 2011 bombing of Army Task Force Operational, Police Headquarters and other government buildings in Damaturu, Yobe State and Maiduguri in Borno State. Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla near Abuja (25 December 2011). Mubi, Yola, Gombe and Maiduguri bombings (5-6 January 2012). Kano bombings (20 January and 1 February 2012). HQ 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge bombings in Kaduna (7 February 2012). The list is endless.

Most of these bombings have been attributed to the Boko Haram; a group that emerged out of the "Taliban" founded by Mohammed Yusuf (a Kanuri) as Yusufiya Islamiya Group between 2001 and 2002.

Between this period, an Islamic religious complex that included a mosque and a school were established in Maiduguri. In 2002 the complex were relocated to Yusuf's home state of Yobe in the village Kanamma near the Republic of Niger border. The group first became known internationally following the 2009 sectarian violence when several sect members were arrested by the police, which included Mohammed Yusuf the leader. Yusuf was later killed by the police of whom international and local Human Rights Organizations and Civil Society Groups unequivocally condemned as "Extra-judicial" killing. However, in recent times international news reports have argue that Boko Haram appears to have links to international terror organizations in Somalia, North Africa and the Al-Qaeda terror groups.

B. Counter Terrorism Measures and Impact for Nigeria

Given the complexity of the security situation in Nigeria, blended with the economic, political and social strife, projects and programmes designed to counter terrorism should be build around community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthening judicial institutions. Hence strategy and the importance of collective efforts to counter terrorism in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected Nigeria have become imperative.

This research shall highlight some measures that could be used to counter terrorism in Nigeria. Each of these initiatives targets a different aspect of what Piombo (2007) calls the four "Ds" of fighting terrorism: 'Defeat terrorists and their organizations; Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, and Defend citizens and interests at home and abroad'. Another way to consider these programmes' effectiveness is that they should attempt to fight the supply of terrorists, the demand for terrorist networks, and the ability of terrorist to operate and manoeuvre. The counter terrorism measures proposed in this research include the following:

1) The Meghalaya Model

The Meghalaya model is a multi-sector approach involving government, law enforcement, judiciary and civil society organizations that creates a comprehensive framework for combating trafficking in North East Asia in 1999 under the **five "Ps"** Prevention, Protection, Policing, Press and Prosecution (Kharbhih, 2010). Meghalaya Model is designed to track and rescue trafficked children in North East Asia; to facilitate rehabilitation, and making sure that survivors do not get re-trafficked. It also provides families with livelihood alternatives; provides evidence to prosecute offenders; and raises awareness through the media. The process of Meghalaya Model is the **five "Rs"** Reporting, Rescue, Rehabilitation, Repatriation and Re-education.

This research belief that these activities that are pillars of the Meghalaya model to counter human trafficking are relevant to counter terrorism as they could fight the supply of terrorists, supply of mercenaries for terrorism, and the demand for terrorist networks. This is imperative because, despite international agreements and a plethora of national laws on counter terrorism, the issue remains one of the fastest growing criminal violence in the world. Its proliferation is due to its crossborder nature and thus requires

cooperation and collaboration between states, if it is to be tackled effectively. However, throughout the world often counter terrorism initiatives have failed to incorporate all relevant stakeholders. Hence, the Meghalaya Model though originally designed to track and rescue trafficked children could be adopted or adapted to counter terrorism in Nigeria; as there are insinuations of mercenaries and conscripted fighters for Boko Haram terrorists. And with the porous nature of Nigerian borders and the rate of human trafficking in the country, these mercenaries and conscripted fighters could be trafficked victims from neighboring countries.

This model is relevant to counter terrorism in Nigeria because through a collaborative and far-reaching security network of stakeholders in counter terrorism and human trafficking (Security and Intelligence Agencies, NAPTIP, the media, Civil Society and NGOs), terrorists, mercenaries and terror suspects are more likely to be arrested and will face prosecution.

2) *Countering Terrorism through Public Private Partnerships (CTPPP)*

Closely related to the Meghalaya model is the CTPPP model. While combating terrorism is a primary responsibility of nation States, developing partnerships with the private sector can be beneficial especially in areas where State resources and expertise are limited. The public-private partnerships (PPPs) concept is gaining attention in the business world, but at a much slower pace in the security domain. For instance Jonathan Lucas, Director of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) argues that progress to build partnerships on security matters has been

hampered by lack of legislation to facilitate information exchange between the public and private sectors, as well as the absence of incentives because 'too often no incentives are provided to encourage the private sector to invest in the protection of vulnerable targets as the private sector usually considers funding of PPP initiatives in security sectors as a cost rather than an investment' (2012:8). However, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy explicitly encourages such partnerships in capacity-building and information exchange.

Hence the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) working group on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes argues how it benefited from private sector expertise in 'the technical and legal aspects on how the Internet could be used to counter terrorist narratives' (2012:8). Russia for example, has been engaging with Moscow State University and People's Friendship University of Russia to exchange new ideas and expertise in countering terrorism. Because in their view, 'private-public cooperation should not be limited to the business community alone but should also include non-governmental organizations, media, tourism and hotels, youth associations, academic community and religious leaders' involvement in security sector' (Yudintsev, 2012).

3) *Empowering Youth as Peace-Entrepreneurs and Peace-Seeds*

There is growing evidence from the social science literature on the links between youth unemployment and armed conflict (Collier, 2003), and donors have increasingly used youth job creation programmes as a tool with which to address armed violence. Many donors now identify addressing youth unemployment as an

urgent priority, both in the field of peace building and in efforts to foster economic development (World Bank, 2008; ILO, 2010; UN, 2009). Similarly, the link between job creation and peace building has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General's approval of the 'UN Policy for Post- Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation And Reintegration' in 2008 and more recently by the ILO's 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post- Conflict (UN, 2009; ILO, 2010).

However, a study conducted by Walton (2010) finds that both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a 'stand-alone' tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak, because donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success is usually limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the impact on conflict.

Hence, this research argues that the evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy is stronger: some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence (such as Brazil and South Africa) are good examples. So emphasis on youth Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy should be based on 'holistic', 'comprehensive' and 'integrated' approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities, but seek to address the more complex array of factors (like belief system, religious, political and ethnic fundamentalism) that make youth entrepreneurs of violence rather than peace-seeds. This is imperative because Omale (2012) argues that, if youth involvement in terrorism is becoming a real threat, then the primary step is to try to understand the phenomena of increase, and the causes of such criminal deviance. Because in the word of Socrates 'Fundamentum Omnius Cultus animae' (i.e. the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul).

For instance, the goal of most national educational curriculum in modern times is to produce scientists, lawyers, doctors, engineers, among other professionals for the society. How much of our school curriculum inculcate active citizenship education, youth leadership skills, civil courtesies and speaking for relationship buildings? The earlier we begin to instill the skills of 'Learning to Live Together' (Oshita, 2005), respect for humanity and society through active citizenship education the better for our society.

4)   *Women-Gender Intelligence (WGI)*

This research argues that the innovation of "Women-Gender Intelligence" (WGI) particularly in the events of volatile conflict and endemic suicide bombings in Nigeria has become imperative. For instance, with the continued violent conflict in Jos, and the emerging suicide bombings in the country, the "Women for Change and Development Initiative" of the Office of the former First Lady of Nigeria orchestrated media campaigns and jingles of "Women: See Something; Say Something!"; "The One that give life must Protect Life!"

The impact of these jingles and campaigns; this author would argue motivated a rural woman in a village called *Haya Biu*, Niger State to assist the State Security Service in Nigeria to unravel the hideout of some Boko Haram extremists on 6th September, 2011 whom until then have been hiding there and making IEDs. By this

revelation, it could be argued that women can be strong agents of change and development if adequately harnessed. In terms of security and counter terrorism in Nigeria, this paper argues that if women voluntarily and unanimously agree to stop insecurity, they can; because there is no terrorist or criminal that does not have a mother, a spouse, or a girlfriend. The Women Gender Intelligence (WGI) is even more relevant in the Nigerian context since it is insinuated that some Boko Haram perpetrators are youth who cannot afford to pay bride price for a wife; and are so brain-washed and recruited to kill so as to be rewarded with seven virgins in *Aljena*. In this case therefore, if women are granted protection as whistle blowers, they can be good source of intelligence on counter terrorism in Nigeria.

5)   *Counter Extremism and De-radicalization Programmes (CEDP)*

Religion and cultural differences are among the most important causes of conflicts and violence in Nigeria. A very worrisome dimension of the role of religion in conflicts is the tendency and frequency at which some politicians and leaders exploit it for selfish reasons, as sometimes public statements on issues of religion tend to ignite or exacerbate conflicts, justifying the need for conflict sensitivity. Our world-as an American sociologist Peter Berger notes-is 'fiercely religious' and Nigeria has witnessed rising essentialism within all the major religions. For instance, a Muslim cleric was once criticized by the media for publicly preaching to his followers in a mosque in Kano (northern Nigeria) that "*Un ka kama Mary ko Chinyere ka chisu*" (meaning "if you catch a girl with a name Mary or Chinyere rape her". This is a hate-based preaching that encourages young

Muslims boys to rape girls bearing Christian or South Eastern names in Nigeria.

In the same vein, some Neo-Pentecostal and evangelical Christians in Nigeria see themselves (the "born again" brethren) as holier than the 'Other'. Similarly, crusades that dwell much more on the Biblical verse of Mathew 11: 12 which states: "And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffered violence, and the violent takes it by force" are becoming common citations among youth in Nigeria. Whereas this Biblical injunction does not encourages violence, perverse interpretations of these religious injunctions however have crept into the minds of some people.

This radical mindset has created many of the world's violent outbreaks, both present and past. Lammy (2013) argues in an article written after the May 22nd killing of a Woolwich soldier by a terrorist suspect (Michael Adebolajo) that 'radical Islamism suffocates conventional Islamic beliefs with a diet of anger, hate and intolerance among young men, who perhaps are already convinced of being outcasts, and are intoxicated by teachings that not only entrench this difference further but demands that they despise the society they leave behind'. Hence, it is not uncommon for fringe groups of all ideological persuasions to systematically target these men by manipulating their sense of hopelessness and lack of belonging (Lammy, 2013).

However, if religion could be used to cause conflict it could be used to resolve conflict. Because even in this climate of global religious turbulence, religions offer the potential for generosity, wisdom and an ethical sense of transcendence capable of creating a strong link between people, beyond their differences. People might have different beliefs and dogmas and adhere to

different schools of philosophical and metaphysical thought, but this study strongly believe that it is possible to share a pragmatic universal system of ethics that would allow us all to live together. So Counter Extremism and De-radicalization Programs (CEDP) can work and could be an effective way of countering the spread of radical-violent ideology and activism, provided that the right conditions for success exist. These include, among others, political will, a vibrant civil society, a robust developmental and political capacity within the Nigeria State.

6) *Security Inter-Operability (SIO)*

In every human society there are those that could not be safely contained in the community. Security inter-operability that encourages security networking and intelligence sharing could root out the bad eggs in the society. For instance, if the police, SSS, EFCC and NIA work collaboratively they could unravel both local and international sponsors and financiers of Boko Haram. Similarly, if the Customs, Immigration and the NDLEA work collaboratively they could unravel the criminal importation of foreign mercenaries, drugs, arms and ammunitions that are sustaining the Boko Haram insurgencies. In the same vein, the SSS and police working collaboratively with the Prisons Service could plant pseudo inmates who are fluent in Arabic, Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri in strategic prison cells for intelligence gatherings from detained Boko Haram suspects. The Military Joint Task Forces (JMTF) could as well invest in telemetric security and cable detection technology; and use less of road blocks. Where these security strategies are done well, the use of the Military Joint Task Forces (MJTF) fire operations would only be the last resort. But

if terror attacks do occur, a coordinated and well equipped MJTF that comprises the Military forces, NEMA, Fire Service and the Red Cross should be on a standby for effective evacuation and other needed humanitarian and relief services. However, in a system like Nigeria where security and law enforcement agencies struggle for supremacy and lay claim for arrests and security breakthroughs (as was the case in Kabiru Sokoto's arrest), inter-operability becomes difficult to achieve. Nigeria does not lack the institutions to counter terrorism but what Nigerian security and law enforcement agencies however need to understand is that "success for one is success for all".

Conclusion

No two states can be exactly the same in real situations, however, Pakistan and Nigeria present similar interesting socio-political cum security experiences making these two states a perfect model for comparative analysis. Both countries are creation of British colonial socio-economic exigencies of historical time and space and the concomitant emergence of yawning and impregnable fault lines. The reality today is that both nations are overwhelmed with massive ungoverned spaces taken over by several non-state actors jostling to ascribe value and relevance to themselves on the altar of ethno-religious platforms. Needless to say that terrorism-cum resistance and insurgency pervades both countries.

Consequently, even in the face of massive challenges of governance and legitimacy, Pakistan and Nigeria have embarked on extensive counter terrorism and counter insurgency programmes over the years. For Pakistan, transnational support has been massive apparently to

consolidate the global balance of power and the protection of sundry interests by the major global actors. Nigeria has equally made good efforts in counter terrorism efforts even as there are constant mutation of the terrorist groups and the spread into the Lake Chad Basin sub-region. The challenge to obliterate terrorism in the country has therefore remained extremely difficult. Since the advent of the current regime in 2015, minimal success in degrading the capacity of the group to strike at will has been achieved. For the political class this marginal success has been touted as the defeat of Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, the reality check on ground shows that the group has become more sophisticated, pervasive, illusive and potentially extremely dangerous to Nigeria and the West African Sub-region.

It is therefore interesting to note that Both Pakistan and Nigeria's counter terrorism efforts have yielded insignificant results which are compounded by both national and transnational power game and intrigues. Be that as it may, it is instructive to note that terrorism is sustained by the minds and hearts of terrorists. Their ultimate aim is not to win a physical war against the state or her institutions as they may not possess the resources to do so. The aim is to embarrass and disgrace the state institutions and legitimacy including aggravated harm in a lot of cases. This reality should inform every policy thrust of the state to counter terrorism. Collective and inclusive security should be institutionalised and unhealthy rivalries between social groups and security institutions in these countries should be stemmed. It should be noted that the most potent counter terrorism weapon is to methodically re-orientate the hearts and minds of citizens to genuinely seek peace which should be based on justice and equity.

To this end, religious leaders, educational institutions, social influencers, state ethical and moral orientation agencies are best suited if properly harnessed to stem the scourge of terrorism and guarantee security.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors state that there is no potential conflict of interest in the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

None

References

Ahmad, N. (2016, Jan. 21). Note to US: Pakistan's insatiable appetite for F-16s, *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from http://tribune.com.pk/story/1031773/note-to-us-pakistans-insatiable-appetite-for-f-16s/

Akbar, S. (2015). Identification of Risk Factors Generating Terrorism in Pakistan. *Terrorism & Political Violence, 27*(3), 537-556.

Ali, I. (2016, May,30). Chinese citizen targeted in Karachi blast, *Dawn*. Retrieved from www.dawn.com/news/1261600

Ali, L.A. (2010). Religions Radicalism Resurgence of Taliban and Curbing Militancy: Implications for Pak-Afghan Relation. *Journal of Political Studies, 17*, 9.

Ali, N. (2010). Books vs Bombs? Humanitarian development and the narrative of terror in Northern Pakistan. *Third World Quarterly, 31*(4), 541-559.

Behuria, A., K. (2007). The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State. *Strategic Analysis, 31*(5), 699-724.

Cole, J.. (2009). Pakistan and Afghanistan: Beyond the Taliban. *Political Science Quarterly, 124*(2), 221-249.

Collier, P. (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington D.C: OUP and World Bank.

CTITF. (2012). CTITF Launches Counter-Terrorism Projects in Nigeria. *The Beam UN CTITF*, (5), January-May, p.8.

Davis, P. K. (2009). *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together*.

Dawn, D. (2011, Oct. 10). Thar coal mining: Chinese group loses interest, *Dawn*. Retrieved from http://www.dawn.com/news/666868

Dawn, D. (2015, Aug. 14). 'Six judges declare 21st Amendment, military courts, illegal', . Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1198632

Enders, W., & Hoover, G. A. (2012). The Nonlinear Relationship between Terrorism and Poverty. *American Economic Review American Economic Review, 102*(3), 267-272.

Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1993). The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis. *American Political Science Review, 87*(4), 829-844.

Fair, C. C. (2014). Drones, spies, terrorists, and second-class citizenship in Pakistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25*(1), 205-235.

Gardezi, H. N. (2010). ALLAH, ARMY, AND AMERICA IN PAKISTAN. *Critical Asian Studies Critical Asian Studies, 42*(1), 145-163.

Globalization Challenge Initiative. (2005). Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military. *International Crisis Group*.

Gunaratna, R. (2008). Bruce Hoffman: Inside Terrorism. *Democracy & Security, 4*(3), 312-313.

Hassan, K. (2014). The Role of Private Electronic Media in Radicalising Pakistan. *Round Table, 103*(1), 65-81.

ILO. (2010). Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants. Guidelines, Programme for Crisis Response and Reconstruction.

International Crisis Group. (2015, Jul. 14). Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls, *Asia Report* p. i.

Johnston, D., Mcdonnell, A., Burbridge, H., & Patton, J. . (2016). Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan: Strategies for Engaging Conservative Muslims. Retrieved December 6, 2016, from http://icrd.org/wp-content/uploads/Countering-Violent-Religious-Extremism-in-Pakistan-White-Paper.pdf

Khan, A. (2015, March, 17). Not in the short term: Govt quietly dilutes its counter-terrorism plan, *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from https://tribune.com.pk/story/84972

4/not-in-the-short-term-govt-quietly-dilutes-its-counter-terrorism-plan/

Kharbhih, H. (2010). Meghalaya Model - Combating Human Trafficking through a Comprehensive Framework that engages Stakeholders. Impulse NGO Network.

Khattak, D. (2012). Review Pakistan's Peace Deals with the Taliban. *CTC Sentinel, 5* (9), 11-13.

Lammy, D. (2013). Islamists, Gangs, the EDL-all Target Alienated Men. United Kingdom.

McNamara, R. S. (1990). *The Essence of Security: Reflections in office*. NY: Harper and Row.

Mehmood, S. (2013). Terrorism and the macroeconomy: Evidence from Pakistan. *Defence and Peace Economics Defence and Peace Economics, 25*(5), 509-534.

Middle East Institute. (2009). The Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009. *Middle East Institute*.

Muhammad, K. (2015). ZARB-E-AZB: THE OPERATION THAT CHANGED THE COURSE. *Hilal*.

Musharraf, P. (2006). *In the line of fire : a memoir*. London, UK: Simon and Schuster.

Obene, W. R. (2012).'*Home-grown Terrorism: An Emerging Challenge to Nigeria's National Security*. Presentation to Haske Biyu 2012 Participants at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, Kaduna, 03/04/2012.

Omale, D. J. O (2012). *Restorative justice and Victimology: Euro-Africa Perspective*. The Hague: Wolf Publishers.

Oshita, O. O. (2005). *Thought on Mainstreaming Peace-Building in the Non-Formal Education Curriculum for out- of-School Boys*. Paper presented at a 3-day UNICEF-Assisted Workshop, held at Dannic Hotels, Enugu, 19-21, December.

Pak Institute for Peace Studies. (2015). Pakistan Security Report. Retrieved December 7, 2016, from http://pakpips.com/securityreport.ph

Piombo, J. R. (January, 2007). Terrorism and U. S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview. *Strategic Insights*, *6*(1).

Salehi-Isfahani, D. & Dhillon, N. (2008). Stalled Youth Transitions in the Middle East: a Framework for Policy Reform. *The Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper Number 8*, Wolfensohn School of Government/Dubai School of Government.

Pyszczynski, T. A., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (2010). *In the wake of 9/11 : the psychology of terror*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Assoc.

Qazi, S. H. (2013). A War Without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against Radicalization in Pakistan. *Permanente Journal, 18*(4), 45-50.

Rafi, Y. (2015, Sept. 20). Bringing them home: Pakistan's child deradicalisation centre offers second chance, *Dawn*.

Rathore, M. , & Basit, A. (2010). Trends and Patterns of Radicalization in Pakistan. *PIPS research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies, 3*(2), 15.

Rosendorff, B. P., & Sandler, T. (2010). Suicide Terrorism And The Backlash

Effect. *Defence & Peace Economics, 21*(5-6), 443-457.

Sahill, P. H. (2017). The Terror Speaks: Inside Pakistan's Terrorism Discourse and National Action Plan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 00-00.

South Asian Terrorism Portal. (2016). Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2016.

Syed, S. H., Saeed, L., & Martin, R. P. (2015). Causes and Incentives for Terrorism in Pakistan. *Journal of Applied Security Research, 10*(2), 181-206.

Underhill, N. (2014). *Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency*: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

UN. (2009). *United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration.* United Nations, Geneva.

United Nations General Assembly. (1994). "Measures to Eliminate Terrorism," *Resolution 49/60*, December 9, 1994.

World Bank. (2008). Youth and employment in Africa: The potential, the Problem, the Promise. Africa Development Indicators, World Bank.

How to cite?

QUOTE

Everyone's worried about stopping terrorism. Well, there's really an easy way: Stop participating in it.

Noam Chomsky